CDM and international technology transfer: empirical evidence on wind power

This article examines the effect of the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) on the international transfer of wind power technologies. The analysis is conducted using patent data from over 100 countries during the period 1988–2008. It is found that transfers from Annex I countries to non-Annex I countries are significantly affected by the contemporaneous establishment of projects under the CDM. However, when taking into account the cumulative effect of CDM projects, the effect is negative. Finally, the effect of domestic absorptive capacity in the host country is positive and significant. Because involvement with the CDM may increase the latter, this is an important area for further research.     

Stabilizing CO2 concentrations with incomplete international cooperation

Many stabilization scenarios have examined the implications of stabilization on the assumption that all regions and all sectors of all of the world's economies undertake emissions mitigations wherever and whenever it is cheapest to do so. This idealized assumption is just one of many ways in which emissions mitigation actions could play out globally, but not necessarily the most likely. This paper explores the implications of generic policy regimes that lead to stabilization of CO₂ concentrations under conditions in which non-Annex I regions delay emissions reductions and in which carbon prices vary across participating regions. The resulting stabilization scenarios are contrasted with the idealized results. Delays in the date by which non-Annex I regions begin to reduce emissions raise the price of carbon in Annex I regions relative to the price of carbon in Annex I in an idealized regime for any given CO₂ concentration limit. This effect increases the longer the delay in non-Annex I accession, the lower the non-Annex I carbon prices relative to the Annex I prices, and the more stringent the stabilization level. The effect of delay is very pronounced when CO₂ concentrations are stabilized at 450 ppmv, however the effect is much less pronounced at 550 ppmv and above. For long delays in non-Annex I accession, 450 ppmv stabilization levels become infeasible.     

Non-energy use of fossil fuels and resulting carbon dioxide emissions: bottom–up estimates for the world as a whole and for major developing countries

We present and apply a simple bottom–up model for estimating non-energy use of fossil fuels and resulting CO₂ (carbon dioxide) emissions. We apply this model for the year 2000: (1) to the world as a whole, (2) to the aggregate of Annex I countries and non-Annex I countries, and (3) to the ten non-Annex I countries with the highest consumption of fossil fuels for non-energy purposes. We find that worldwide non-energy use is equivalent to 1,670 ± 120 Mt (megatonnes) CO₂ and leads to 700 ± 90 Mt CO₂ emissions. Around 75% of non-energy use emissions is related to industrial processes. The remainder is attributed to the emission source categories of solvent and other product use, agriculture, and waste. Annex I countries account for 51% (360 ± 50 Mt CO₂) and non-Annex I countries for 49% (340 ± 70 Mt CO₂) of worldwide non-energy use emissions. Among non-Annex I countries, China is by far the largest emitter of non-energy use emissions (122 ± 18 Mt CO₂). Our research deepens the understanding of non-energy use and related CO₂ emissions in countries for which detailed emission inventories do not yet exist. Despite existing model uncertainties, we recommend NEAT-SIMP to inventory experts for preparing correct and complete non-energy use emission estimates for any country in the world.     

Who picks up the remainder? Mitigation in developed and developing countries

A fair, effective, flexible and inclusive climate regime beyond 2012 will need several political balances. Mitigation and funding will be at the heart of the agreement. The IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report indicates that absolute reductions will be needed in Annex I (AI) countries and substantial deviation from baseline in some non-Annex I (NAI) regions by 2020. Although the latter was not explicitly quantified by the IPCC, the EU subsequently proposed a range for developing countries. Sharing the burden for mitigation is essentially zero-sum: if one does less, the other has to do more. We critically examine the implicit assumption that NAI countries would pick up the remainder of the required global effort minus the AI contribution. We suggest that greater levels of ambition can be achieved by turning the formula around politically, starting from the achievable ‘deviation below baseline’ given NAI's national programmes and appropriate international support. AI countries may have to exceed the IPCC ranges or pay for the remainder. For notional levels of NAI mitigation action, Annex I has to reduce by between ?52% and ?69% below 1990 by 2020, only dropping to a domestic ?35% with commitments to offset payments through the carbon market. Given the large mitigation gap, a political agreement on the question of ‘who pays’ is fundamental. The carbon market will provide some investment, but it mainly serves to reduce costs, particularly in developed countries, rather than adding to the overall effort. Market-linked levies and Annex I public funding will therefore be crucial to bridge the gap.     

Future mitigation commitments: differentiating among non-Annex I countries

Abstract

In the long term, any definition of adequacy consistent with UNFCCC Article 2 will require increased mitigation efforts from almost all countries. Therefore, an expansion of emission limitation commitments will form a central element of any future architecture of the climate regime. This expansion has two elements: deepening of quantitative commitments for Annex B countries and the adoption of commitments for those countries outside of the current limitation regime. This article seeks to provide a more analytical basis for further differentiation among non-Annex I countries. To be both fair and reflective of national circumstances, it is based on the criteria of responsibility, capability and potential to mitigate. Altogether, non-Annex I countries were differentiated in four groups, each including countries with similar national circumstances: newly industrialized countries (NICs), rapidly industrializing countries (RIDCs), ‘other developing countries’, and least developed countries (LDCs). Based on the same criteria that were used for differentiating among non-Annex I countries, a set of decision rules was developed to assign mitigation and financial transfer commitments to each group of countries (including Annex I countries). Applying these decision rules results in (strict) reduction commitments for Annex I countries, but also implies quantifiable mitigation obligations for NICs and RIDCs, assisted by financial transfers from the North. Other developing countries are obliged to take qualitative commitments, but quantifiable mitigation commitments for these countries and the LDC group would be not justifiable. As national circumstances in countries evolve over time, the composition of the groups will change according to agreed triggers.     

Carbon tariffs for financing clean development

In order to address carbon leakage and preserve the competitiveness of domestic industries, some industrialized Annex I countries have proposed to implement carbon tariffs. These tariffs would be levied on energy-intensive imports from developing non-Annex I countries that have not agreed to binding emissions reductions. This action could have detrimental welfare impacts, especially on those developing countries, and may not lead to significant reductions in leakage. A recent proposal is to use the revenues generated from carbon tariffs to finance clean development in the relevant exporting non-Annex I countries. This proposal is evaluated using an energy-economic model of the global economy. The model is supplemented by marginal abatement cost curves and bottom-up information on abatement potentials in order to represent how clean development financing affects emissions reductions. The results indicate that carbon tariffs could raise US$3.5–24.5 billion (with a central value of $9.8 billion) for clean development financing. This could reduce the emissions of non-Annex I countries by 5–15% and still leave funds available for other purposes, such as adaptation. Furthermore, recycling the revenues generated from carbon tariffs back to the exporting country itself could alleviate some of the negative welfare impacts associated with them. However, a net negative impact especially on the welfare and gross domestic product of developing countries would remain.     

Valueloading And Uncertainty In A Sector-based Differentiation Scheme For Emission Allowances

The Triptych approach is a sectoral approach for differentiation of quantitative greenhouse gas emission reduction objectives. In this study we investigate the ranges in emission reduction targets that result from differences in valueladen assumptions and uncertainties in input data and parameters. In order to assess the effect of highly valueladen assumptions on resulting objectives we used two approaches. First we performed a sensitivity analysis. Then we elaborated the approach from four ideal-typical value-orientations: the administrator, the businessman, the campaigner and the survivor. For each of these value-orientations we specified corresponding sets of assumptions of highly valueladen parameters. Within each set, we also assessed uncertainties for the remaining parameters and input data. We assessed the strength and we quantified their inexactnesses with probability distribution functions. Next, we carried out Monte Carlo simulations in each of the four value-orientations to quantify error propagation from the inexactnesses in input data and parameters. We found targets for the year 2015 for Annex I countries differed up to around 20%-points over the four value-orientations. For developing countries differences in allowances were found up to the order of four. In addition, results are affected to a large extent by uncertainties in the other input data and parameters. Ranges in the outcome resulting from uncertainties are between 10 and 35%-points for Annex I countries, depending on the value-orientation chosen and between 20 and 120%-points for non-Annex I countries. However, the ranking of countries within the calculated differentiation remains roughly the same, an exception being the ranking that resulted from the businessman’s perspective. Other consistent combinations of valueladen assumptions may result in objectives that are outside the range that we based on the four value-orientations. We concluded that care should be taken when assessing valueloading in calculations schemes for emissions objectives based on a limited number of value-orientations only. Our analysis clearly underlines the relevance of making explicit policy variables in schemes for the differentiation of commitments. It is necessary to reach consensus on these variables if such schemes are to support negotiations on greenhouse gas emissions allowances.     

Reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in Annex I and non-Annex I countries for meeting concentration stabilisation targets

The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, Working Group III, summarises in Box 13.7 the required emission reduction ranges in Annex I and non-Annex I countries as a group, to achieve greenhouse gas concentration stabilisation levels between 450 and 650 ppm CO₂-eq. The box summarises the results of the IPCC authors’ analysis of the literature on the regional allocation of the emission reductions. The box states that Annex I countries as a group would need to reduce their emissions to below 1990 levels in 2020 by 25% to 40% for 450 ppm, 10% to 30% for 550 ppm and 0% to 25% for 650 ppm CO₂-eq, even if emissions in developing countries deviate substantially from baseline for the low concentration target. In this paper, the IPCC authors of Box 13.7 provide background information and analyse whether new information, obtained after completion of the IPCC report, influences these ranges. The authors concluded that there is no argument for updating the ranges in Box 13.7. The allocation studies, which were published after the writing of the IPCC report, show reductions in line with the reduction ranges in the box. From the studies analysed, this paper specifies the “substantial deviation” or “deviation from baseline” in the box: emissions of non-Annex I countries as a group have to be below the baseline roughly between 15% to 30% for 450 ppm CO₂-eq, 0% to 20% for 550 ppm CO₂-eq and from 10% above to 10% below the baseline for 650 ppm CO₂-eq, in 2020. These ranges apply to the whole group of non-Annex I countries and may differ substantially per country. The most important factor influencing these ranges above, for non-Annex I countries, and in the box, for Annex I countries, is new information on higher baseline emissions (e.g. that of Sheehan, Climatic Change, 2008, this issue). Other factors are the assumed global emission level in 2020 and assumptions on land-use change and forestry emissions. The current, slow pace in climate policy and the steady increase in global emissions, make it almost unfeasible to reach relatively low global emission levels in 2020 needed to meet 450 ppm CO₂-eq, as was first assumed feasible by some studies, 5 years ago.     

Values for a post-Kyoto discourse

Environmental policy, including the Kyoto Protocol, is laden with values. Recognizing this fact can help UNFCCC parties come to agreement. Much of the contention surrounding the post-Kyoto negotiations can be explained through a framework of values. This article summarizes the arguments used by proponents and critics of emissions trading of greenhouse gas emissions under the Kyoto Protocol through such a framework of values. Proponents and critics of emissions trading espouse common values, such as achievement, to work toward ameliorating climate change; there is less agreement on emissions trading seen through values such as responsibility and fairness. As non-Annex I parties are expected to take a more active role in the second commitment period, identifying values held by those working on their behalf will facilitate negotiations and help develop a discourse that is inclusive of their interests. Annex I parties can also benefit from the identification of the values to better convey their interests. All parties can use the values framework identified here to construct a more durable climate change regime.     

Reflections on the current state of global climate response

What is the significance of the 2007 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali? The formal outcomes, especially the ‘Bali Action Plan’, are described and commented on, along with the challenges for negotiating a post-2012 agreement in Copenhagen during 2008 and 2009. The article concludes that the outcome of the Bali meeting is insufficient when compared to the nature of the challenge posed by climate change. However, it can nevertheless be considered a success in terms of ‘Realpolitik’ in paving the way for the negotiations ahead, because some real changes have been discerned in the political landscape. The challenges for the road towards Copenhagen are manifold: the sheer volume and complexity of the issues and the far-reaching nature of decisions such as differentiation between non- Annex I countries pose significant challenges in themselves, while the dependency on the electoral process in the USA introduces a high element of risk into the whole process. The emergence of social justice as an issue turns climate policy into an endeavour to improve the world at large—thereby adding to the complexity. And, finally, the biggest challenge is the recognition that the climate problem requires a global solution, that Annex I and non-Annex I countries are mutually dependent on each other and that only cooperation regarding technology in combination with significant financial support will provide the chance to successfully tackle climate change.     

The emissions gap between the Copenhagen pledges and the 2 °C climate goal: Options for closing and risks that could widen the gap

As part of the Copenhagen Accord, Annex I Parties (industrialised countries) and non-Annex I Parties (developing countries) have submitted reduction proposals (pledges) and mitigation actions to the UNFCCC secretariat. Our calculations show that if the current reduction offers of Annex I and non-Annex I countries are fully implemented, global greenhouse gas emissions could amount to 48.6-49.7 GtCO₂eq by 2020. Recent literature suggests that the emission level should be between 42 and 46 GtCO₂eq by 2020 to maintain a “medium” chance (50-66%) of meeting the 2 °C target. The emission gap is therefore 2.6-7.7 GtCO₂eq. We have identified a combined set of options, which could result in an additional 2.8 GtCO₂eq emission reduction. This would lead to an emission level just within the range needed. The options include reducing deforestation and emissions from bunker fuels, excluding emissions allowance increases from land use and forestry rules, and taking into account the national climate plans of China and India. However, there are also important risks that could widen the emissions gap, like lower reductions from countries with only a conditional pledge and the use of Kyoto and/or trading of new surplus emission allowances.     

Adaptation financing in a global agreement: is the adaptation levy appropriate?

The climate negotiations recognize that adequate and additional funds are needed to assist adaptation in developing countries. This article analyses whether a future 2% or any higher adaptation levy (AL) can achieve this, whether it causes – as it is a tax on the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) – a significant excess burden, and how it alters the relation between adaptation financing and mitigation. While former studies have focused on single AL levels, this article determines the transfers from the CDM and the AL for a range of emission reduction targets and AL levels with a partial equilibrium model based on marginal abatement cost estimates for 2020. Revenues from a 2% AL are negligible and remain inadequate for ambitious emission reductions and an AL that maximizes transfers (e.g. US$15 billion for 30% reduction target). Revenues are mostly subtracted from CDM transfers, so little additional funds are raised (e.g. less than $2.4 billion for 30% reduction target). Adaptation financing increases disproportionally with more stringent reduction targets for a rising levy, and the share of Annex I country expenditures devoted to transfers increases slightly. Both effects are only small. The excess burden is larger than 85% of the additional funds.

Policy relevance

Financing adaptation in developing countries has become a cornerstone of a global climate agreement. The mechanism for raising additional funds has not yet been determined. This article assesses the potential of upscaling one option that is already in place under the Kyoto Protocol: the 2% AL on the CDM. It is estimated that even a much higher AL does not generate substantial additional funds, mainly redistributes transfers within non-Annex I countries, does so at social costs in the same order of magnitude as additional funds, and increases the share of Annex I country expenditures devoted to transfers. It is unwise to link mitigation and adaptation as CDM and AL jointly do, since this taxes a beneficial activity. Financial instruments with transfers that decrease with or are independent from climate protection would be preferable.     

Action targets: a new approach to international greenhouse gas controls

Abstract

This article introduces and explores a new form of international commitment to limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, called an action target. Action targets differ from other forms of targets, such as the Kyoto Protocol's fixed targets, in that they define a quantity of GHG abatement to be achieved, rather than a future emission level to be reached. This article explains the basic mechanics of how action targets might operate, and analyses the approach across a range of criteria, including uncertainty management and contributions to sustainable development in non-Annex I (developing) countries. The analysis suggests that action targets might improve the prospects of widening and deepening developing country participation in the international climate regime.     

Differentiating Future Commitments on the Basis of Countries’ Relative Historical Responsibility for Climate Change: Uncertainties in the ‘Brazilian Proposal’ in the Context of a Policy Implementation

During the negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol, Brazil proposed allocating the greenhouse gas emission reductions of Annex I Parties according to the relative effect of a country’s historical emissions on global temperature increase. This paper analyses the impact of scientific uncertainties and of different options in policy implementation (policy choices) on the contribution of countries’ historical emissions to indicators of historical responsibility for climate change. The influence of policy choices was found to be at least as large as the impact of the scientific uncertainties analysed here. Building on this, the paper then proceeds to explore the implications of applying the Brazilian Proposal as a climate regime for differentiation of future commitments on the global scale combined with an income threshold for participation of the non-Annex I regions. Under stringent climate targets, such a regime leads to high emission reductions for Annex I regions by 2050, in particular for Europe and Japan. The income threshold assumptions strongly affect the Annex I reductions, even more than the impact of another burden-sharing key. A variant of the Brazilian Proposal, allocating emission reductions on the basis of cumulative emissions since 1990, would lead to a more balanced distribution of emission reductions.     

Mitigating methane emissions from livestock: a global analysis of sectoral policies

Methane emissions from livestock enteric fermentation and manure management represent about 40% of total anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions from the agriculture sector and are projected to increase substantially in the coming decades, with most of the growth occurring in non-Annex 1 countries. To mitigate livestock methane, incentive policies based on producer-level emissions are generally not feasible because of high administrative costs and producer transaction costs. In contrast, incentive policies based on sectoral emissions are likely administratively feasible, even in developing countries. This study uses an economic model of global agriculture to estimate the effects of two sectoral mitigation policies: a carbon tax and an emissions trading scheme based on average national methane emissions per unit of commodity. The analysis shows how the composition and location of livestock production and emissions change in response to the policies. Results illustrate the importance of global mitigation efforts: when policies are limited to Annex 1 countries, increased methane emissions in non-Annex 1 countries offset approximately two-thirds of Annex 1 emissions reductions. While non-Annex 1 countries face substantial disincentives to enacting domestic carbon taxes, developing countries could benefit from participating in a global sectoral emissions trading scheme. We illustrate one scheme in which non-Annex 1 countries collectively earn USD 2.4 billion annually from methane emission permit sales when methane is priced at USD 30/t CO₂-eq.     

圣保罗案文的基本要点

2006年8月,BASIC项目的巴西课题组推出了一个后京都国际气候制度的全面设计方案,简称圣保罗案文。概括介绍了该案文的设计思路和基本要点,包括全球中长期目标、附件I和非附件I国家的不同义务、市场机制、适应问题、技术研发和转让,以及议定书的审评和遵约机制等。在此基础上,简要比较了圣保罗案文与巴西案文的不同特点,客观评价了圣保罗案文在政治阻力和技术难度上存在的内在缺陷。     

Catching air? Climate change policy in Russia,Ukraine and Kazakhstan

Abstract

Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan have each participated actively in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conferences of the Parties, and each is developing domestic rules and institutions to address UN obligations under the treaties. Russia and Ukraine are each Annex I/Annex B countries. Kazakhstan will become Annex I upon ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, but has not yet established itself as Annex B. Each state has evolved a distinct set of policies and priorities in the domestic and the international arena. Drawing largely on interviews in each country, this article presents brief histories of the evolution of climate policy, focusing on each state's behavior in the international arena, the sources of domestic policy leadership, and the forces that led to change in each national approach. Current policies and practices are evaluated with an eye towards learning from the successes and failures in each state.     

Rethinking the Kyoto Emissions Targets

The overall targets for greenhouse gas emissions of the Kyoto Protocol are not based on a specific objective for the future world climate. Moreover, the allocations of emissions restrictions among countries do not have a principled logic and impose arbitrary differences in costs. Calculations arepresented of the costs of alternative guidelines for emissions restrictions, each of which has a plausible ethical basis: equal per capita reductions, equal country shares in reductions, equalized welfare costs, and emulation of the United Nations budget allocations. All of these would result in far lower total costs of reaching the Kyoto targets. The alternatives would also eliminate the wholly capricious accommodations given to the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The lower cost alternativeswould permit the Annex B countries to make unequivocal commitments for cost reimbursement to the non-Annex B countries to induce them to participate in emissions reductions. Everyone would gain from that.     

What role for climate negotiations on technology transfer?

Little progress has been made in climate negotiations on technology since 1992. Yet the diffusion of climate change mitigation technologies to developing countries (non-Annex I) has increased dramatically over the last twenty years. The shift has mostly concerned emerging economies, which are now reasonably well connected to international technology flows. This is good news, as the bulk of emissions increases are expected to take place in these countries in the near future. In contrast, the least developed countries still appear to be excluded from international technology flows, mostly because of their negligible participation in the recent economic globalization. This article focuses on the policy implications of the contribution of climate negotiations to international technology diffusion.

Policy relevance

The discrepancy between the small amount of progress made in climate negotiations on technology since 1992 and the steady increase in the international diffusion of climate mitigation technologies leads to the perhaps controversial view that the diffusion of climate mitigation technologies does not need strong international coordination over technology issues under the UNFCCC. However, climate negotiations can play a key role in stimulating the demand for low-carbon technologies by setting ambitious emission reductions targets and policies.     

Economic and environmental effectiveness of a technology-based climate protocol

Abstract

The present stalemate in climate negotiations between the USA and the other Annex I countries has led policy analysts and economists to explore the possible emergence of alternative climate regimes that may be applied after 2012. This article explores the idea of replacing international cooperation on greenhouse gas emission control with international cooperation on climate-related technological innovation and diffusion. This idea—recently proposed among others by Barrett (2001) and Benedick (2001)—is based on the insight that incentives to free-ride are much smaller in the case of technological cooperation than in the case of cooperation on emission control. This article provides a first applied game theory analysis of a technology-based climate protocol by assessing: (i) the self-enforcingness (namely, the absence of incentives to free-ride) of the coalition that would form when countries negotiate on climate-related technological cooperation; (ii) the environmental effectiveness of a technology-based climate protocol. The analysis is carried out by using a model in which endogenous and induced technical change are explicitly modelled. The results of our analysis partly support Barrett's and Benedick's conjectures. On the one hand, a self-enforcing agreement is more likely to emerge when countries cooperate on environmental technological innovation and diffusion than when they cooperate on emission abatement. However, technological cooperation—without any commitment to emission control—may not lead to a sufficient abatement of greenhouse gas concentrations.