Multipolarity and the new world (dis)order: US hegemonic decline and the fragmentation of the global climate regime

The international climate change negotiations leading to and including the Copenhagen and Cancun Conferences of the Parties in 2009 and 2010 have shown a very different balance of power from those of the 1997 Kyoto round. This “New World dis(Order)” is characterized by insecurity of the United States in the face of economic and political decline vis-à-vis China; fragmentation of the Group of 77 developing nations negotiating bloc; and weakening of the European Union, which was cut out entirely from the group negotiating the Copenhagen Accord. In addition to old alignments of developing countries based on solidarity, negotiating blocs have fractured along lines of responsibility for climate change, capability to address it, and national vulnerability to climate risks. This paper assesses whether, over the past two decades, negotiations have come closer to meeting basic criteria of international climate justice, and chronicles how environmental negotiations have come to reflect a different and shifting balance of power. Drawing insights from Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly Silver's analyses of US hegemonic decline and the rise of China, the article argues that the roots of the worst stubbornness by the US in recent climate talks lie in growing insecurity about its ability to provide jobs for its workers in a future where all sorts of work is moving to China and India.     

Experiences of host communities with carbon market projects: towards multi-level climate justice

The literature on equity and justice in climate change mitigation has largely focused on North–South relations and equity between states. However, some initiatives (e.g. the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation programme (REDD), and voluntary carbon markets (VCMs)) are already establishing multi-level governance structures that involve communities from developing countries in global mitigation efforts. This poses new equity and justice dilemmas: how the burdens and benefits of mitigation are shared across various levels and how host communities are positioned in multi-level governance structures. A review of the existing literature is used to distill a framework for distinguishing between four axes of climate justice from the perspective of communities. Empirical evidence from African and Asian carbon market projects is used to assess the distributive and procedural justice implications for host communities. The evidence suggests that host communities often benefit little from carbon market projects and find it difficult to protect their interests. Capacity building, attention to local power relations, supervision of business practices, promotion of projects with primarily development aims and an active involvement of non-state actors as bridges between local communities and the national/international levels could potentially contribute towards addressing some of the key justice concerns.Policy relevance International negotiations on the institutional frameworks that are envisaged to govern carbon markets are proceeding at a rather slow pace. As a consequence, host countries and private-sector actors are making their own arrangements to safeguard the interests of local communities. While several standards have emerged to guide carbon market activity on the ground, distributive as well as procedural justice concerns nevertheless remain salient. Four empirical case studies across Asia and Africa show that within the multi-scale and multi-actor carbon market governance, local-level actors often lack sufficient agency to advance their claims and protect their interests. This evidence suggests that ameliorating policy reforms are needed to enhance the positioning of local communities. Doing so is important to ensure future acceptability of carbon market activity in potential host communities as well as for ensuring their broader legitimacy.     

Obtaining public support for North-South climate funding: Evidence from conjoint experiments in donor countries

The adoption of the Warsaw mechanism on loss and damage has again highlighted the North-South divide in those parts of UNFCCC negotiations dealing with international climate finance. Current estimates put required funding from rich countries at 50–100 billion Euros per year to induce non-Annex I countries to take on greenhouse gas limitation commitments and to assist highly vulnerable countries. Results from survey-embedded conjoint experiments can help policy-makers anticipate opportunities and pitfalls in designing large-scale climate funding schemes. We implemented such experiments in the United States and Germany to better understand what institutional design characteristics are likely to garner more public support for climate funding among citizens in key developed countries. We find that climate funding receives more public support if it flows to efficient governments, funding decisions are made jointly by donor and recipient countries, funding is used both for mitigation and adaptation, and other donor countries contribute a large share. Contrary to what one might expect, climate change damage levels, income, and emissions in/of potential recipient countries have no significant effect on public support. These findings suggest that finance mechanisms that focus purely on compensating developing countries, without contributing to the global public good of mitigation, will find it hard to garner public support.     

Financing climate adaptation with a credit mechanism: initial considerations

Climate mitigation credits have mobilized considerable resources for projects in developing countries, but similar funding to adapt to climate change has yet to emerge. The Copenhagen Accord targets up to US$50 billion per year in adaptation funding, but commitments to date have been trivial compared to what is needed. Although there are some studies and suggestions, it remains unclear where the money will come from and how it will be disbursed. Beyond this, many development experts believe that the main hurdle in climate adaptation is effective implementation. A framework, based on the polluter pays principle, is presented here regarding the mobilization of resources for adaptation in developing countries using market mechanisms. It is assumed that mitigation and adaptation are at least partly fungible in terms of long-term global societal costs and benefits, and that quantifying climate vulnerability reductions is possible at least sometimes. The scheme's benefits include significant, equitable and flexible capital flows, and improved and more efficient resource allocation and verification procedures that incentivize sustained project management. Challenges include overcoming political resistance to historical responsibility-based obligations and scepticism of market instruments, and, critically, quantifying climate impact costs and verifying investments for vulnerability reduction credits.     

从哥本哈根气候变化大会看气候变化谈判的焦点问题及IPCC第五次评估报告的可能作用

从哥本哈根气候变化大会的谈判焦点可以预期,后续国际气候变化谈判的重点将是谈判的基础案文、发达国家在《京都议定书》第二承诺期进一步的量化减排承诺以及长期目标的表述等问题。IPCC第五次评估报告将对以往报告已阐述的科学问题和基本结论加以巩固并提供更有说服力的证据和论据,更加侧重区域问题,增加适应和减缓经济学成本、气候变化与可持续发展等内容的分析。关于气候变化检测和归因、气候变化影响和关键脆弱性、大气温室气体浓度稳定水平、适应的选择及其成本效益、减缓措施的选择和社会经济成本、责任分担机制及公平性等问题的评估结论,将对谈判进程的推进发挥重要作用。     

Difficulties in accounting for private finance in international climate policy

It is widely acknowledged that private finance has a key role to play in achieving low-carbon development and resilience to climate change. However, while there have been several studies that have closely examined the data on public climate finance, there have been few such studies of the private climate-related finance data. There is a political dimension to accounting for ‘private finance’ given the commitment of industrialized countries – enshrined in the Copenhagen Accord and the Cancun Agreements – to mobilize US$100 billion of public and private finance for developing countries by 2020, on an annual basis. The availability and quality of data for different types of private climate finance flows with climate benefits (investments, carbon market payments, and voluntary funding) are analysed, and these flows are assessed according to various criteria for inclusion in the $100 billion figure. While existing data suggest that private climate finance invested in developing countries and mobilized by industrialized countries might currently be in the range of $27–123 billion per year, this number is a questionable point of reference. Existing data are limited and of very poor quality: definitions of ‘private climate finance’ are missing and data are hardly verified. Therefore, policy makers will first have to clearly define ‘private climate finance’ and develop systems for measuring, reporting, and verifying it, before using private finance numbers in international climate agreements.     

马德里气候大会盘点及全球气候治理展望

《联合国气候变化框架公约》（简称《公约》）第25次缔约方会议取得了一定进展,但未能就各方最为关注的《巴黎协定》第六条市场机制实施细则达成一致。会议成果平淡主要有4个原因:第一,过度强调提高各方减排目标力度而未能聚焦《巴黎协定》第六条相关谈判;第二,主席国和部分缔约方急切将各方尚未形成政治共识的提高承诺力度问题引入谈判进程,破坏了谈判氛围;第三,各个议题推进不平衡;第四,发达国家企图逃避责任,促使发展中国家更加团结并形成对立。展望2020年的全球气候多边进程形势,《巴黎协定》第六条相关谈判将继续作为重点,提高力度也将成为讨论主题,但片面强调1.5℃目标可能引发重谈《巴黎协定》风险,同时发达国家背弃《公约》、转嫁责任意图明显。全球气候治理应聚焦落实承诺的力度,并平行推进《公约》及其《巴黎协定》的实施。     

CMIP6年代际气候预测计划（DCPP）概况与评述

年代际气候预测计划（DCPP）是第六次国际耦合模式比较计划（CMIP6）的子计划之一,其目标是利用多模式开展气候系统年代际预测、可预测性和变率机制研究。DCPP设计了3组试验,即年代际回报试验、预报试验以及理解年代际变率机制和可预测性的敏感性试验。目前有21个模式拟参与DCPP计划,其中包括5个来自中国的模式。DCPP将推动解决气候系统从年际到年代际尺度预测相关的多项科学问题,评估当前气候预测系统预报技巧,挖掘潜在可预报性,研究长时间尺度气候变率形成机制,提供对科学和社会有用的预测产品。     

Weather and international price shocks on food prices in the developing world

In the context of a changing climate, there is an urgent need to better understand the impact that weather disturbances have on food affordability in the developing world. While the influence of international markets on local food markets has received considerable attention, in contrast, the potential influence of weather disturbances on local food markets has received much less attention. In fact, local weather disturbances may have an adverse impact on the poorest households in developing countries. Here we quantify the short-run impact of both weather disturbances as well as international price changes on monthly food prices across 554 local commodity markets in 51 countries during the period between 2008 and 2012. We find that almost 20% of local market prices were affected by domestic weather disturbances in the short run, 9% by international price changes and 4% by both domestic weather disturbances and international price changes during the period. An improved understanding of the magnitude and relative importance of weather disturbances and international price changes on rural economies will inform public policies that are designed to mitigate the impact of adverse weather disturbances.     

Proposal for a poverty-adaptation-mitigation window within the Green Climate Fund

The stakes for alleviating poverty and avoiding unbridled climate change are inextricably linked. Climate change impacts will slow down and may even reverse trends in poverty reduction. The pathways consistent with global warming of no more than 2?°C require strategies for poverty alleviation to make allowance for the constraint of low-carbon development. Existing climate funds have failed to target poverty alleviation as a high-priority strategy for adaptation or as a component of low-carbon development. This article proposes a funding window as part of the Green Climate Fund in order to foster synergies targeting greater satisfaction of basic needs, while making allowance for adaptation and mitigation. This financial mechanism is based on indicators of the satisfaction of basic needs and could respond to the claims of the developing countries, which see alleviating poverty as the first priority in climate negotiations. It defines a country continuum, given that there are poor people everywhere; all developing countries are therefore eligible with a mechanism of this sort.

Policy relevance

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) calls for substantial emissions reductions and adaptation strategies over the next decades to reduce the high risks of severe impacts of climate change over the 21st century. Industrialized countries and developing countries alike recognize the need to mitigate climate change and to adapt to it. But they face many challenges that lead to an ‘emissions gap’ between an emissions level consistent with the 2?°C increase limit and the voluntary pledges that they have made thus far in the climate negotiations (United Nations Environment Programme. (2014). The Emissions Gap Report 2014. A UNEP synthesis report). In this arena, many developing countries underline that their first domestic priority is the satisfaction of basic needs. In the run-up to the next climate negotiations at the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP 21) in Paris, the proposed poverty-adaptation-mitigation funding window could contribute to alleviate the conflict between development and climate goals in developing countries. In this sense, it could spur developing countries to integrate more ambitious emissions limitations pledges into their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions. This could in turn entice industrialized countries to act similarly. In the end, it could pave the way to an ambitious climate agreement in Paris at COP 21.     

The changing geopolitics of climate change finance

Funding for climate change efforts in developing countries is firmly established in the Articles of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Since the early days of the climate change negotiations, finance has been a key focus of attention and, often, a principal source of tension between developed and developing countries. Understandably, these tensions have led to numerous efforts to reform the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC. The history of reforms of the Global Environment Facility – for some time the only operating entity of the financial mechanism – and the recent establishment of the Green Climate Fund are good examples of such efforts. It is asked here whether these efforts have been sufficient to keep pace with a rapidly changing, more complex and radically different world from that of 1992 when the UNFCCC was signed by most countries in Rio de Janeiro. On the 21st anniversary of the signing of the UNFCCC, the effects that global transformations have had on climate change finance are here explored, and some of the new challenges, as well as emerging opportunities, resulting from the new landscape of climate finance that has emerged as a result are described.

Policy relevance

The climate change negotiations are entering a critical period. The issue of finance is one of the key pillars on which the success of a new deal on a binding agreement depends. A better understanding of the increasing complexity of the climate finance landscape is essential. The world of climate finance and the geopolitics in which it operates have been significantly transformed since the signing of the UNFCCC. A better understanding of this transformation would help policy makers and negotiators find more effective and realistic ways to help unleash the immense amount of financial resources that could potentially be made available for the great challenge that many countries face to address climate change. The need for up-front and significantly scaled-up investments requires effective mechanisms that can leverage and encourage investments into areas where they are most needed to face the challenge of climate change. The role of the Green Climate Fund will be critical in this regard.     

Investing in low-carbon transitions: energy finance as an adaptive market

The amount of capital required to transition energy systems to low-carbon futures is very large, yet analysis of energy systems change has been curiously quiet on the role of capital markets in financing energy transitions. This is surprising given the huge role finance and investment must play in facilitating transformative change. We argue this has been due to a lack of suitable theory to supplant neoclassical notions of capital markets and innovation finance. This research draws on the notion from Planetary economics: Energy, climate change and the three domains of sustainable development, by Grubb and colleagues, that planetary economics is defined by three ‘domains’, which describe behavioural, neoclassical, and evolutionary aspects of energy and climate policy analysis. We identify first- and second-domain theories of finance that are well established, but argue that third-domain approaches, relating to evolutionary systems change, have lacked a compatible theory of capital markets. Based on an analysis of electricity market reform and renewable energy finance in the UK, the ‘adaptive market hypothesis' is presented as a suitable framework with which to analyse energy systems finance. Armed with an understanding of financial markets as adaptive, scholars and policy makers can ask new questions about the role of capital markets in energy systems transitions.

Policy relevance

This article explores the role of financial markets in capitalising low-carbon energy systems and long-term change. The authors demonstrate that much energy and climate policy assumes financial markets are efficient, meaning they will reliably capitalise low-carbon transitions if a rational return is created by subsidy regimes or other market mechanisms. The authors show that the market for renewable energy finance does not conform to the efficient markets hypothesis, and is more in line with an ‘adaptive’ markets understanding. Climate and energy policy makers that design policy, strategy, and regulation on the assumption of efficient financial markets will not pay attention to structural and behavioural constraints on investment; they risk falling short of the investment levels needed for long-term systems change. In short, by thinking of financial markets as adaptive, the range of policy responses to enable low-carbon investment can be much broader.     

Economic and environmental effectiveness of a technology-based climate protocol

Abstract

The present stalemate in climate negotiations between the USA and the other Annex I countries has led policy analysts and economists to explore the possible emergence of alternative climate regimes that may be applied after 2012. This article explores the idea of replacing international cooperation on greenhouse gas emission control with international cooperation on climate-related technological innovation and diffusion. This idea—recently proposed among others by Barrett (2001) and Benedick (2001)—is based on the insight that incentives to free-ride are much smaller in the case of technological cooperation than in the case of cooperation on emission control. This article provides a first applied game theory analysis of a technology-based climate protocol by assessing: (i) the self-enforcingness (namely, the absence of incentives to free-ride) of the coalition that would form when countries negotiate on climate-related technological cooperation; (ii) the environmental effectiveness of a technology-based climate protocol. The analysis is carried out by using a model in which endogenous and induced technical change are explicitly modelled. The results of our analysis partly support Barrett's and Benedick's conjectures. On the one hand, a self-enforcing agreement is more likely to emerge when countries cooperate on environmental technological innovation and diffusion than when they cooperate on emission abatement. However, technological cooperation—without any commitment to emission control—may not lead to a sufficient abatement of greenhouse gas concentrations.     

Constructed peer groups and path dependence in international organizations: The case of the international climate change negotiations

International organizations sometimes institutionalize country groupings by specifying differentiated commitments that may, in turn, affect negotiation dynamics. Drawing on incentive-based and socialization arguments, we develop a “constructed peer group” hypothesis suggesting that by creating these groups those organizations may actually construct new lines of confrontation over and above the substance-based disagreements existing between countries. This generates a particular type of path dependence, rendering broad-based international agreements more difficult in the future.We analyze this question at the example of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change's increasingly politicized split between Annex I and non-Annex I countries. Using a self-coded dataset of country oral statements during the negotiations between December 2007 and December 2009 we assess whether Annex I membership influences a country's stance toward other countries’ arguments, while controlling for country characteristics that may drive their preferences and the affiliation to Annex I. We find that the split between Annex I and non-Annex I has indeed influenced negotiation behavior and amplified the divide between developing and industrialized countries in the climate negotiations.     

利用高原积雪信号改进我国南方夏季降水预测的新方法及其在2014年降水预测中的应用试验

2014年夏季我国南方出现严重洪涝、北方大部干旱,国内绝大多数预测模型在三月起报的汛期预测中均未能抓住位于南方地区的异常雨带,导致预测准确率明显偏低。基于模式对东亚地区夏季海平面气压场的高预报技巧和青藏高原冬季积雪与南方地区夏季降水的高相关性,本文提出一个针对我国夏季降水异常的组合统计降尺度预测新方法（Hybrid Statistical Downscaling Prediction,简称HSDP）,该方法综合利用了气候模式输出的高可预报性环流信息和前期观测的高原积雪异常信号,从而实现对我国南方夏季降水进行动力-统计相结合的改进预报。据此方法建立了一个基于国家气候中心气候预测模式的统计降尺度模型。对我国南方夏季降水进行跨季节预测的交叉检验结果显示,HSDP方法对于南方地区多年平均空间距平相关系数从模式原始预报的-0.006提高到0.24,且在大多数年份均有改进。基于HSDP方法于三月份制作的2014年夏季降水预测,能够很好地抓住南涝北旱的基本形势和我国南方的降水大值区,空间距平相关系数达到0.43。这表明,该方法对于我国夏季降水预测具有较好业务应用前景。     

How inequitable is the global distribution of responsibility, capability, and vulnerability to climate change: A comprehensive indicator-based assessment

While it is generally asserted that those countries who have contributed least to anthropogenic climate change are most vulnerable to its adverse impacts some recently developed indices of vulnerability to climate change come to a different conclusion. Confirmation or rejection of this assertion is complicated by the lack of an agreed metric for measuring countries’ vulnerability to climate change and by conflicting interpretations of vulnerability. This paper presents a comprehensive semi-quantitative analysis of the disparity between countries’ responsibility for climate change, their capability to act and assist, and their vulnerability to climate change for four climate-sensitive sectors based on a broad range of disaggregated vulnerability indicators. This analysis finds a double inequity between responsibility and capability on the one hand and the vulnerability of food security, human health, and coastal populations on the other. This double inequity is robust across alternative indicator choices and interpretations of vulnerability. The main cause for the higher vulnerability of poor nations who have generally contributed little to climate change is their lower adaptive capacity. In addition, the biophysical sensitivity and socio-economic exposure of poor nations to climate impacts on food security and human health generally exceeds that of wealthier nations. No definite statement can be made on the inequity associated with climate impacts on water supply due to large uncertainties about future changes in regional water availability and to conflicting indicators of current water scarcity. The robust double inequity between responsibility and vulnerability for most climate-sensitive sectors strengthens the moral case for financial and technical assistance from those countries most responsible for climate change to those countries most vulnerable to its adverse impacts. However, the complex and geographically heterogeneous patterns of vulnerability factors for different climate-sensitive sectors suggest that the allocation of international adaptation funds to developing countries should be guided by sector-specific or hazard-specific criteria despite repeated requests from participants in international climate negotiations to develop a generic index of countries’ vulnerability to climate change.     

A Chinese commitment to commit: can it break the negotiation stall?

Preparatory talks to the next round of negotiations seem to indicate that a comprehensive agreement to mitigate climate change will not be easily attainable, despite the intentions of the US administration and the high expectations surrounding the Copenhagen meeting. One key reason is to what extent fast growing economies, and especially China, should take actions to reduce their growth of emissions. This paper argues that a turning point for international negotiations on climate change could be achieved if China were to agree on carbon obligations in the future. Results from modelling work suggest that the optimal investment behaviour is to anticipate the implementation of a climate policy by roughly 10 years, and that thus future commitments—if credible—could lead to significantly earlier steps towards carbon mitigation. If fast growing economies, and foremost China, believe in the long term objective of global stabilization of carbon concentrations, it might be economically rationale to sign on future targets, provided developed countries take on immediate action. Such a provision could be beneficial for both the developing and developed world.     

波兹南会议之后的气候变化政治格局

2008年12月的波兹南会议作为巴厘岛和哥本哈根一次中间会议,既要全面回顾巴厘路线图的执行情况又要为即将到来的哥本哈根谈判作好准备,因此极为重要。发达国家、发展中国家两大谈判阵营,欧盟、美国和"77国集团+中国"三股主要力量围绕长期愿景、减排目标、适应、资金和技术转让等问题谈判激烈。2009年奥巴马执政以来美国与欧盟气候立场逐渐靠拢,新兴发展中大国地位愈发凸显,其他谈判力量也根据自身情况不断作出立场调整。中国在国际气候机制形成和发展中已处于关键位置,如何根据政治格局变化维护发展中国家利益和立场,实现负责任大国形象和国内低碳发展将伴随着整个后京都过程。     

大样本初始化十年际预测试验（CESM-DPLE）对东亚夏季气候预测的评估

基于气温和降水观测资料以及美国国家环境预报中心/国家大气研究中心（NCEP/NCAR）大气再分析资料,系统评估了大样本初始化十年际预测试验（CESM-DPLE）对1959—2016年东亚夏季气候预测的能力。结果表明,CESM-DPLE能较好地模拟东亚夏季气候以及相关主要大气环流系统的基本态特征,在年际尺度上对东亚气温有很高的预测技巧但对降水几乎没有预测能力。CESM-DPLE再现了北大西洋多年代际振荡（AMO）经由激发遥相关波列所引起的中高纬度大气环流、东亚夏季风和气候的异常。20世纪90年代末之后,北大西洋多年代际振荡由冷位相转为暖位相,遥相关波列位相调整,东亚受异常低压控制,东亚夏季风偏强,夏季气温偏高、降水偏多。总体上,尽管还存在着不足,但CESM-DPLE对东亚夏季温度年际变化以及与20世纪90年代末北大西洋多年代际振荡位相转变相联的东亚夏季气候年代际变化具备一定的预测能力,是目前研究和预测东亚气候变化的一套较好试验数据。      

The global carbon market-mechanism landscape: pre and post 2020 perspectives

With market-mechanisms likely to achieve emission reductions at lower cost than alternative approaches, there is a presumption that they will be embraced by those who are serious about achieving ambitious reductions. Two broad messages exist; there is already considerable activity and some ambition in many parts of the world – a fragmented but embryonic ‘global’ trading landscape is emerging – and there are efforts at UN level to provide a unifying framework for these bottom-up developments. The topography of interest and response varies considerably across groups of countries, and there have been delays in making progress on a unifying framework. This article analyses the current carbon market landscape in terms of market dynamics and market-mechanism developments whilst undertaking an examination of how climate change negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is shaping the future carbon market landscape. This work shows that the combination of existing, emerging, and potential carbon market-mechanisms can be regarded as an emerging pre-2020 fragmented ‘global’ carbon market landscape based on differing bottom-up market based approaches. One outcome of a 2015 Climate Agreement could be a post-2020 global carbon market which would include new domestic and international market initiatives such as the Framework for Various Approaches and New Market Mechanism, together with reformed Kyoto mechanisms.

Policy relevance

With the 2015 Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) expected to see Parties commit to ambitious mitigation commitments, post-2020 could see significant Party (& industry) investment in market-mechanisms and associated emissions units in an effort to achieve some of the abatement cost minimization offered by market approaches. This article is written for those who have an interest in understanding what is happening – and what is not happening – as regards the emergence of market-related approaches to GHG mitigation globally in the run up to the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC which meets in Paris in December 2015, and what could be the shape of things to come post-2020.