Big brand sustainability: Governance prospects and environmental limits

This article introduces and evaluates the implications for global environmental change of the rising power and authority of big brand companies as global environmental governors. Contributing to the private governance literature and, in particular, addressing the gap in this research with respect to the political implications of individual firm ‘buyer power’, the article provides evidence and analysis of how big brand sustainability is altering the power relations within global supply chains, and the governance prospects and limits of this trend. The authors argue that recent brand company efforts through their global supply chains, while still a long way off from their goals, are achieving environmental gains in product design and production. Yet, these advances are also fundamentally limited. Total environmental impacts of consumption are increasing as brand companies leverage corporate sustainability for competitive advantage, business growth, and increased sales. Big brand sustainability, while important, will not on its own resolve the problems of global environmental change. In conclusion, the article highlights the importance of a co-regulatory governance approach that includes stronger state regulations, sustained advocacy, more responsible individual consumerism, and tougher international legal constraints to go beyond the business gains from big brand sustainability to achieve more transformational, ‘absolute’ global environmental progress.     

Climate change technology transfer: a new paradigm and policy agenda

This article proposes a shift to a paradigm that is more extensive than the current narrow focus on North—South climate change technology transfers, towards a more inclusive ‘global’ paradigm. An implication of the paradigm shift is that there should be a concomitant expansion of the policy agendas of the international climate and trade regimes. The traditional North—South paradigm of technology transfer ignores the increasing importance of developing countries as sources of advanced climate-friendly technologies, and therefore ignores South—North and South—South transfers. Further, whereas the North—South paradigm has emphasized developing countries' intellectual property rights policies as barriers to technology transfers, the ‘global’ paradigm focuses attention on trade and investment policy barriers, including developed countries' policies that inhibit technology transfer from developing countries. The analysis is relevant to international negotiations in the post-2012 climate regime, and is also relevant to the future development of the trade regime—not only at the multilateral level in the WTO, but also at the regional and bilateral levels.     

When less is more: limits to international transfers under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement

International carbon markets can be an important tool in achieving countries’ mitigation targets under the Paris Agreement, but they are subject to a number of environmental integrity risks. An important risk is that some countries have mitigation targets that correspond to higher levels of emissions than independent projections of their likely emissions. If such ‘hot air’ can be transferred to other countries, it could increase aggregated emissions and create a perverse incentive for countries not to enhance the ambition of future mitigation targets. Limits to international transfers of mitigation outcomes have been proposed to address this risk. This article proposes a typology for such limits, explores key design options, and tests different types of limits in the context of 15 countries. Our analysis indicates that limits to international transfers could, if designed appropriately, prevent most of the hot air contained in current mitigation targets from being transferred, but also involve trade-offs between different policy objectives. Given the risks from international transfer of hot air and the uncertainty over whether other approaches will be effective in ensuring environmental integrity, we recommend that countries take a cautious approach and pursue a portfolio of approaches to ensure environmental integrity, in which case limits could provide for additional safeguards.

Key policy insights

• Limits to international transfers involve trade-offs between different policy objectives, in particular reducing the risk that countries transfer hot air and enabling participation in carbon markets.

• Under ‘relative’ limits a country may transfer mitigation outcomes to the extent that its actual emissions are below the limit. Relative limits derived from historical emissions data have significant limitations, and none of the tested approaches was found to be effective for all countries. Relative limits based on emission projections could be a more valid approach, although they are also technically and politically challenging.

• Under ‘absolute’ limits a country could only issue, transfer or acquire a certain amount of mitigation outcomes. Absolute limits set at sufficiently low levels could prevent countries from transferring large amounts of hot air, but are bluntly applicable to all countries, whether or not they have hot air.

     

Reaching a climate agreement: compensating for energy market effects of climate policy

Because of large economic and environmental asymmetries among world regions and the incentive to free ride, an international climate regime with broad participation is hard to reach. Most of the proposed regimes are based on an allocation of emissions rights that is perceived as fair. Yet, there are also arguments to focus more on the actual welfare implications of different regimes and to focus on a ‘fair’ distribution of resulting costs. In this article, the computable general equilibrium model DART is used to analyse the driving forces of welfare implications in different scenarios in line with the 2?°C target. These include two regimes that are often presumed to be ‘fair’, namely a harmonized international carbon tax and a cap and trade system based on the convergence of per capita emissions rights, and also an ‘equal loss’ scenario where welfare losses relative to a business-as-usual scenario are equal for all major world regions. The main finding is that indirect energy market effects are a major driver of welfare effects and that the ‘equal loss’ scenario would thus require large transfer payments to energy exporters to compensate for welfare losses from lower world energy demand and prices.

Policy relevance

A successful future climate regime requires ‘fair’ burden sharing. Many proposed regimes start from ethical considerations to derive an allocation of emissions reduction requirements or emissions allowances within an international emissions trading scheme. Yet, countries also consider the expected economic costs of a regime that are also driven by other factors besides allowance allocation. Indeed, in simplified lab experiments, successful groups are characterized by sharing costs proportional to wealth. This article shows that the major drivers of welfare effects are reduced demand for fossil energy and reduced fossil fuel prices, which implies that (1) what is often presumed to be a fair allocation of emissions allowances within an international emissions trading scheme leads to a very uneven distribution of economic costs and (2) aiming for equal relative losses for all regions requires large compensation to fossil fuel exporters, as argued, for example, by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).     

Great expectations: can international emissions trading deliver an equitable climate regime?

Abstract

Climate change equity debates tend to focus on achieving a fair and global ‘allocation’ of emission rights among countries. Allocation proposals typically envision, if implicitly, two purposes for international emissions trading. First, trading is expected to serve as a cost-effective means of promoting compliance with emissions targets. Second, trading is posited as a means to generate financial transfers, typically from industrialized to transitioning and developing countries.

This article investigates the common assumption that international emissions trading will effectively serve both of these purposes. We conclude that the two purposes might not be mutually supportive, and that efforts to use international emissions trading as a financial transfer mechanism may potentially undermine cost-effectiveness goals. International emissions trading on a global scale would create new risks in terms of both cost-effectiveness and environmental performance, some of which will be challenging to manage. In particular, uncertainties over market prices and trading eligibility, coupled with the costs of participation, may together be the Achilles heel of some allocation proposals that entail large financial transfers from industrialized to developing countries. Any proposal for an ‘equitable’ allocation of emission allowances, we conclude, must be cognizant of the risks and costs implied by a reliance on international emissions trading. We offer some suggestions to this end.     

Greenhouse gas emission mitigation plan for the State of Israel: strategies,incentives and reporting

In the context of the negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its accompanying Kyoto Protocol, participating nations have recognized the need for formulating Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs). These NAMAs allow countries to take into account their national circumstances and to construct measures to mitigate GHG emissions across economic sectors. Israel has declared to the UN that it would strive to reduce its GHG emissions by 20% in the year 2020 relative to a ‘business as usual' scenario. With its growing population and an expanding economy, the national GHG mitigation plan was developed to draw a course for steering the Israeli economy into a low-carbon future while accommodating continued economic growth. The article describes relevant policy measures, designed to aid in the implementation of the plan and compares them with measures being undertaken by different countries. Emphasis is placed on analysing the progress to date, opportunities and barriers to attaining the ultimate GHG emissions reduction goals. The objective of this article is to contribute to the knowledge base of effective approaches for GHG emissions reduction. We emphasize the integrated approach of planning and implementation that could be especially useful for developing countries or countries with economies in transition, as well as for developed countries. Yet, in the article we argue that NAMAs’ success hinges on structured tracking of progress according to emerging global consensus standards such as the GHG Protocol Mitigation Goals Standard.

Policy relevance:

The study is consistent with the NAMA concept, enabling a country to adopt a ‘climate action plan’ that contributes to its sustainable development, while enabled by technology and being fiscally sound.

The analysis shows that although NAMAs have been framed in terms of projects, policies, and goals, current methodologies allow only the calculation of emission reductions that can be attributed to distinct projects. Currently, no international guidance exists for quantifying emissions reduction from policy-based NAMAs, making it difficult to track and validate progress. This gap could be addressed by an assessment framework that we have tested, as part of a World Resources Institute pilot study for an emerging voluntary global standard.     

Common but differentiated convergence (CDC): a new conceptual approach to long-term climate policy

Abstract

This article describes a new concept for an international climate regime for differentiation of future commitments: the ‘common but differentiated convergence’ approach (CDC). Under CDC, Annex-I countries' per-capita emission allowances converge within a convergence period to a low level. Individual non-Annex-I countries' allowances converge to the same level also within the same period (‘common convergence’), but starting when their per-capita emissions are a certain percentage above global average (‘differentiated’). Until then they may voluntarily take on ‘positively binding’ targets. This approach eliminates two concerns often voiced in relation to gradually converging per-capita emissions: (i) advanced developing countries have their commitment to reduce emissions delayed and their targets are not the same as Annex-I countries with equal per-capita emissions; (ii) CDC does not provide excess emission allowances to the least developing countries. Under CDC, stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations at 550 and 650 ppm CO₂-equivalent can be reached with participation at roughly 0% and 50% above global average and convergence to around 3 and 4.5 tCO₂-eq/cap within 40 years. Even if the CDC approach is not implemented in its entirety, it is possible that the step-by-step decisions on the international climate regime can be guided by the principles provided in the CDC approach.     

Public policy, institutional investors and climate change: a UK case-study

Institutional investors have two important roles to play in encouraging companies to address the risks and take advantage of the opportunities presented by climate change. The first is through using their influence as shareholders to encourage companies to adopt more proactive approaches to managing the risks and opportunities presented by climate change. The second is through explicitly factoring climate change risks and opportunities into ‘mainstream’ investment analysis processes. While there is growing investor activity on the former, the integration of climate change into investment analysis remains confined to sectors where there are strong government incentives (e.g. for renewable energy) or where greenhouse gas emissions have a market price. This article reviews the evolution of UK institutional investor interest in climate change from 1990 to 2005, focusing in particular on the relative contributions of ‘soft’ policy measures such as information-disclosure and awareness raising, and ‘hard’ policy measures such as regulation and market-based instruments. The article concludes that, over this period, soft policy measures played an important role in encouraging investors to discuss climate change issues with companies, but had minimal influence on investment decisions. It was only with the introduction of hard policy measures that climate change started to be systematically factored into investment analysis. The article canvasses the implications of these findings for government efforts in the UK and elsewhere to encourage investors to play a more proactive role in the climate change debate. It also considers the role that institutional investors themselves can play in strengthening public policy measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.     

A no cap but trade proposal for emission targets

One problem in international climate policy is the refusal of large developing countries to accept emission reduction targets. Brazil, China and India together account for about 20% of today's CO₂ emissions. We analyse the case in which there is no international agreement on emission reduction targets, but countries do have domestic targets, and trade permits across borders. We contrast two scenarios. In one scenario, Brazil, China and India adopt their business as usual emissions as their target. In this scenario, there are substantial exports of emission permits from developing to developed countries, and substantial economic gains for all. In the second scenario, Brazil, China and India reduce their emissions target so that they have no net economic gain from permit trade. Here, developing countries do not accept responsibility for climate change (as they bear no net costs), but they do contribute to an emission reduction policy by refusing to make money out of it. Adopting such break-even targets can be done at minor cost to developed and developing countries (roughly $2 bn/year each in extra costs and forgone benefits), while developing countries are still slightly better off than in the case without international emissions trade. This result is robust to variations in scenarios and parameters. It contrasts with Stewart and Wiener (2003) who propose granting ‘hot air’ to developing countries to seduce them to accept targets. In 2020, China and India could reduce their emissions by some 10% from the baseline without net economic costs.     

Sector-based approach to the post-2012 climate change policy architecture

A sectoral approach to GHG emissions reductions in developing countries is proposed as a key component of the post-2012 climate change mitigation framework. In this approach, the ten highest-emitting developing countries in the electricity and other major industrial sectors pledge to meet voluntary, ‘no-lose’ GHG emissions targets in these sectors. No penalties are incurred for failing to meet a target, but emissions reductions achieved beyond the target level earn emissions reduction credits (ERCs) that can be sold to industrialized nations. Participating developing countries establish initial ‘no-lose’ emissions targets, based upon their national circumstances, from sector-specific energyintensity benchmarks that have been developed by independent experts. Industrialized nations then offer incentives for the developing countries to adopt more stringent emissions targets through a ‘Technology Finance and Assistance Package’, which helps to overcome financial and other barriers to technology transfer and deployment. These sectorspecific energy-intensity benchmarks could also serve as a means for establishing national economy-wide targets in developed countries in the post-2012 regime. Preliminary modelling of a hybrid scenario, in which Annex I countries adopt economy-wide absolute GHG emissions targets and high-emitting developing countries adopt ‘no-lose’ sectoral targets, indicates that such an approach significantly improves the likelihood that atmospheric concentrations of CO₂ can be stabilized at 450 ppmv by the end of the century.     

Enabling adaptation? Lessons from the new ‘Green Revolution’ in Malawi and Kenya

This article explores the extent to which efforts to improve productivity of smallholder agriculture through a new ‘Green Revolution’ in Sub Saharan Africa are likely to enhance the capacity of smallholder farmers to adapt to the impacts of climate change. Drawing on empirical material from Malawi and Kenya, the paper finds more conflicts than synergies between the pursuit of higher productivity through the promotion of hybrid maize adoption and crop diversification as a strategy for climate change adaptation. This is despite an oft-assumed causal link between escape from the ‘low maize productivity trap’ and progression towards crop diversification as an adaptive strategy. In both countries, a convergence of interests between governments, donors and seed companies, combined with a historical preference for, and dependence on maize as the primary staple, has led to a narrowing of options for smallholder farmers, undermining the development of adaptive capacities in the longer term. This dynamic is linked to the conflation of market-based variety of agricultural technologies, as viewed ‘from the top down’, with diversity-in-context, as represented by site-specific and locally derived and adapted technologies and institutions that can only be developed ‘from the bottom up’.     

Land tenure and REDD+: The good,the bad and the ugly

A number of international donors, national governments and project proponents have begun to lay the groundwork for REDD+, but tenure insecurity – including the potential risks of land grabbing by outsiders and loss of local user rights to forests and forest land – is one of the main reasons that many indigenous and other local peoples have publicly opposed it. Under what conditions is REDD+ a threat to local rights, and under what conditions does it present an opportunity? This article explores these issues based on available data from a global comparative study on REDD+, led by the Center for International Forestry Research, which is studying national policies and processes in 12 countries and 23 REDD+ projects in 6 countries. The article analyses how tenure concerns are being addressed at both national and project level in emerging REDD+ programs. The findings suggest that in most cases REDD+ has clearly provided some new opportunities for securing local tenure rights, but that piecemeal interventions by project proponents at the local level are insufficient in the absence of broader, national programs for land tenure reform. The potential for substantial changes in the status quo appear unlikely, though Brazil – the only one with such a national land tenure reform program – offers useful insights. Land tenure reform – the recognition of customary rights in particular – and a serious commitment to REDD+ both challenge the deep-rooted economic and political interests of ‘business as usual’.     

Kyoto flexibility mechanisms in EU accession countries: will they make a difference?

What potential effect do flexible mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol have on energy efficiency, fuel switching and the development of renewable energy sources for the eight post-communist EU Member States that accessed in 2004? These countries are chief candidates for hosting Joint Implementation (JI) projects and for participating in international emission trading, which may assist the implementation and financing of projects in these target areas. The potentials and barriers to Joint Implementation are reviewed, as well as the conditions under which international emission trading can influence the energy use of the selling country. Different strategies adopted by the host countries towards the application of these instruments, and their impact on sustainable energy development, are examined. The article concludes that the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms may play a positive, but rather limited, role in the sustainable energy development of the region, but the barriers to Joint Implementation may shift the emphasis towards transactions under the framework of international emission trading. If innovative mechanisms are tied to sustainable development goals, this may mobilize the energyefficiency potentials of these countries. An attractive opportunity exists to achieve energy efficiency and emission reductions, utilizing the revenues from allowance sales through ‘green investment’ schemes.     

欧盟航空碳税及其国际影响

根据当前欧盟征收国际航空碳税政策的国际环境,介绍欧盟航空碳税的历史沿革、具体政策、二氧化碳排放监测方法,就各国反应及其国际影响进行分析.欧盟航空碳税可能会导致全球航空业成本增加,并最终转嫁给消费者;欧盟航空碳税对发达国家航空公司影响较小,而对发展中国家的航空公司影响较大.鉴于欧盟航空碳税对中国航空业的影响,建议尽早制定相关的碳排放标准,维护中国应有的发展权与话语权.     

Natural gas and climate finance

Should energy projects to extend the use of natural gas be considered for funding under public climate finance commitments? This article provides an overview of evidence for and against climate finance for natural gas projects. The argument focuses on a case study, the UK’s International Climate Fund (ICF). This synthesis concludes that gas-related projects will rarely be eligible for funding under public climate finance, save a few exceptions in which they provide energy access to households directly. Although gas power plants have generally lower emissions than those which use other fossil fuels such as coal, their impact will depend on the material constraints to calculate emissions reductions, the context of implementation, and the political economy of the target country. Three case studies demonstrate that energy access projects need to be understood as providing a whole range of sustainable benefits, from improving local health to reducing emissions. Overall, gas-related projects are complex interventions that require context-specific knowledge of both the effects of technology and the possible business models that can work in context.

POLICY RELEVANCE

This article investigates whether projects related to natural gas constitute an appropriate use of public climate finance, with a particular focus on the UK’s International Climate Fund. Policy makers in developed countries will decide in the coming years how to use public climate finance; that is, the fraction of overseas development assistance (ODA) for climate change mitigation and adaptation. In the UK, for example, the ICF is the most important instrument to provide climate finance for developing countries. In 2013, the UK set out a clear position ‘to end support for public financing of new coal-fired power plants overseas, except in rare circumstances.’ This ban has fostered debate about whether similar positions should follow for other fossil fuels such as natural gas, specifically in the context of ICF funding. Similar debates are taking place in other countries such as Germany and Norway, and are informing the implementation of international facilities such as the Green Climate Fund.     

Chinese business at the dawn of its domestic emissions trading scheme: incentives and barriers to participation in carbon trading

This article explores the incentives and challenges for Chinese business companies in participating in carbon emissions trading schemes (ETSs). Based on extensive interviews with the business managers and government officers who are currently involved in the ongoing policy experiments of pilot ETS programmes across China, the article identifies factors that either motivate or discourage companies in participating in carbon trading activities. It argues that different business groups, i.e. capped enterprises, uncapped enterprises, and carbon intermediaries, are affected by these factors to significantly different extents in terms of formulating their specific carbon strategies. It also illustrates some factors, such as a lack of stakeholder pressure and fragmented political interests, which have a distinctive Chinese character and are believed will have a fundamental impact on the quality and efficiency of Chinese ETSs in the future.

Policy relevance

At the outset, the successful implementation of any ETS depends critically on the active involvement of business actors across various industries. Hence, having an understanding of the business incentives and obstacles in participating in carbon trading is crucial, as these factors will ultimately determine the size and quality of the carbon market, and the total volume and integrity of the GHG emissions to be traded. This article also illustrates the common factors that affect business appetite for carbon trading throughout the world, as well as the factors that are unique to the Chinese political and economic context to constrain business in the market. Finally, a presentation of the business attitude towards the ETS experiment indicates the most worrying aspects of the policy design regarding carbon trading in China. As the construction and implementation of the ETS is a long-term undertaking, such investigation deserves attention from both policy makers and business leaders alike.     

Difficulties in accounting for private finance in international climate policy

It is widely acknowledged that private finance has a key role to play in achieving low-carbon development and resilience to climate change. However, while there have been several studies that have closely examined the data on public climate finance, there have been few such studies of the private climate-related finance data. There is a political dimension to accounting for ‘private finance’ given the commitment of industrialized countries – enshrined in the Copenhagen Accord and the Cancun Agreements – to mobilize US$100 billion of public and private finance for developing countries by 2020, on an annual basis. The availability and quality of data for different types of private climate finance flows with climate benefits (investments, carbon market payments, and voluntary funding) are analysed, and these flows are assessed according to various criteria for inclusion in the $100 billion figure. While existing data suggest that private climate finance invested in developing countries and mobilized by industrialized countries might currently be in the range of $27–123 billion per year, this number is a questionable point of reference. Existing data are limited and of very poor quality: definitions of ‘private climate finance’ are missing and data are hardly verified. Therefore, policy makers will first have to clearly define ‘private climate finance’ and develop systems for measuring, reporting, and verifying it, before using private finance numbers in international climate agreements.     

Keeping the forest for the climate's sake: avoiding deforestation in developing countries under the UNFCCC

Abstract

A process for reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries has been initiated under the UNFCCC. Efforts to agree on a legally binding instrument to halt deforestation have previously failed in other international fora. The magnitude of the social, economic, technical and political complexities underlying deforestation have led to negotiations being challenging. What policy instruments could provide incentives to reduce deforestation, and how could these instruments be framed, under the UNFCCC? This article analyses the advantages and disadvantages of the available alternatives within and outside of the Kyoto Protocol. Staying within the Kyoto framework means low institutional development costs, established but limited incentives for action, and low flexibility. Alternatives outside the Protocol provide higher institutional development costs, uncertainties with regard to the incentives, but greater flexibility. We argue that a separate protocol may be the most viable option, as it could offer the necessary flexibility and avoid some technical and political pitfalls that would be likely to beset new efforts under the Kyoto Protocol. The article also presents the concept of ‘committed forests’ as a means of defining geographically where the reduction of emissions from deforestation can take place.     

Shifting discourses of climate change in India

Developing countries like India are under international pressure to sign a legally binding emissions treaty to avert catastrophic climatic change. Developing countries, however, have argued that any international agreement must be based on historic and per capita carbon emissions, with developed countries responsible for reducing their emissions first and funding mitigation and adaptation in other countries. Recently, however, several scholars have argued that Indian government climate change discourses are shifting, primarily by recognizing the “co-benefits” of an alignment between its development and climate change objectives, and by displaying increasing “flexibility” on mitigation targets. This study investigates the factors driving shifting Indian discourses of climate change by conducting and analyzing 25 interviews of Indian climate policy elites, including scientists, energy policy experts, leading government officials, journalists, business leaders, and advocates, in addition to analysis of articles published in Economic and Political Weekly (a prominent Indian policy journal), and reports published by the government and other agencies. Our analysis suggests that India’s concerns about increasing energy access and security, along with newer concerns about vulnerability to climate change and the international leadership aspirations of the Indian government, along with emergence of new actors and institutions, has led to plurality of discourses, with potential implications for India’s climate change policies.     

Climate change diffusion: While the world tips, business schools lag

The influence of business schools on business practitioners is considerable. An important proportion of corporate leaders hold a degree in business administration or an MBA, if not both. In the context of climate change, this influence matters: greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from a selection of global 500 companies approximate that of the USA and the EU15 combined. Not only do corporations have a significant climate footprint, but the impact of climate change on the business landscape is already noticeable. Yet, meeting the managerial challenges that climate change brings requires knowledge only moderately addressed in business education and scholarship today. Climate change tends to be discussed in electives - hence reaching only a fraction of students - and tends to be treated alongside a myriad of other corporate social responsibility issues. Moreover, from 1992 to 2008, only seven articles with titles containing climate change or global warming were published in the top-30 peer-reviewed management journals (this paper, see also Goodall, 2008). In this paper, by mapping the diffusion of climate change within press media and academic peer-reviewed publications, I argue that understanding the existing lag in business scholarship engagement requires a fundamental understanding of processes that either hinder or lead to the diffusion of new ideas. To do so, I present a simple yet novel approach for the quantification of climate change or global warming (CCorGW) coverage relative to population size. My results on the diffusion of the climate change idea over time show: (a) an overall increase in proportional coverage in all databases (b) tipping points around the late 1980s and circa 2005 and (c) delays in adoption between press categories. I explicate the occurrence of these tipping points as well as the existence of delays by theoretically unifying my analyses with results from previous studies under the umbrella of the diffusion of innovation paradigm. I suggest that the following key factors have contributed in slowing the diffusion within business scholarship: (a) corporate values, beliefs and operational modes (b) social structures and incentives prevailing within academia and finally (b) academia's valued research communication channels. I conclude by elaborating key recommendations to facilitate the diffusion of this idea to business scholars and other influential audiences.