The role of water resources in the evolution of the Israeli–Lebanese border

The current location of the border between Lebanon and Palestine, today's Israel, is a product of various competing forces. The Zionist Organization aspired to include the entire Galilee region up to the lower reaches of the Litani River (also known as the Kassimiyah River) within Palestine. The river itself was the desired northern border of the country. The Zionists supported their position by employing instrumental arguments that were largely related to the availability of water resources. On the other hand, residents of the upper Galilee, today's southern Lebanon, demanded that they be included with Lebanon. They used their trade links with Beirut, and cultural and familial ties with other parts of Lebanon to support their position. These instrumental and expressive arguments appear to have assisted in the demarcation of the border between Lebanon and Palestine. Currently, access to the water resources, not necessarily control over them, is likely to influence negotiations between Israel and Lebanon over the future of the Israeli-occupied security zone in southern Lebanon.     

Power and changes in the balance between ideology and pragmatism in the right wing Likud Party

When the Zionist executive abandoned Jewish rights to Trans-Jordanian Palestine, Jabotinsky established the Revisionist movement from which Etzel the Jewish right-wing underground movement in Palestine developed. This was the precursor of the Herut (Freedom) Party, from which the Likud party emerged in September 1973 to challenge the Labour Alignment (headed by the Israel Labour Party). Between the War of Independence (1948) and the signature of the Camp David accords (1978), the Government of Israel came under strong international pressure to solve the problem of the Arab refugees. During this time, dramatic changes took place in Herut's ideology and political status. In 1948, Herut was an outcast political party with a radical ideology, demanding the establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth on both sides of the Jordan. It perceived the Arab refugees to be a potential fifth column and the contiguous Arab states to be inimical. It strenuously opposed the Mapai led political Establishment's willingness to sign Armistice Agreements and make compromises with regard to Arab refugees. After Levi Eshkol replaced Ben-Gurion as the head of Mapai, Herut began to become part of the Israeli consensus and a member of the political Establishment. Herut served in Levy Eshkol's National Crisis Government before and during the 1967 war, and as the major force of Gahal, after the war. Concomitant with this, there were great changes in Herut's expressed ideology, chief among these were the tacit renunciation of trans-Jordan Palestine as part of the Jewish Commonwealth and the explicit acceptance of the Arab refugees as potential citizens of the State of Israel.     

Mapping groundwater development costs for the transboundary Western Aquifer Basin, Palestine/Israel

The costs of developing groundwater in the Western Aquifer Basin vary considerably across the West Bank and Israel. One of the main reasons for this variability is the diverse hydrogeological conditions within the aquifer. Using data from recent hydrogeological investigations, an estimate of the variation of both the drilling and pumping costs was calculated and then mapped across the Upper and Lower Aquifers within the Western Aquifer Basin. These groundwater cost maps proved helpful in analyzing the impacts of hydrogeology on water supply, and also in communicating complex hydrogeological information to a broader audience. The maps clearly demonstrate that the most cost-effective area to develop groundwater is along the Green Line—the 1949 armistice boundary between Israel and the Palestinian West Bank. Any migration of this boundary eastwards will affect the cost and feasibility of developing groundwater within Palestine, making abstraction from the Upper Aquifer impracticable, and increasing the cost of developing the Lower Aquifer. Therefore, the separation wall, which is being constructed to the east of the Armistice Line in Palestinian territory, will significantly reduce the ability of the Palestinians to develop groundwater resources.     

State in formation: the Ghetto State as typified in the West Bank and Gaza Strip

State formation is a complex process. Using the notion of the ghetto state, the case of the West Bank and Gaza Strip are analyzed. State formation processes among the Palestinians are shown to be a direct reaction to the processes of political and military control put into operation by Israel since 1967. The continued administrative and political separation of the West Bank and Gaza from the dominant Israeli territory enable the Palestinians to formulate their own independent national identity. This includes the establishment of economic, cultural and local political organizations, providing the foundations for future statehood. Such organizational capability is indicative of the wide range of non-violent forms of power which, in many cases, are more effective than direct acts of violence against Israel. The Intifada — or popular uprising — which has been in operation since 1987 has enforced these processes of statehood formation, through its combination of both violent and non-violent forms of power.     

How Viable will the Agricultural economy be in the New State of Palestine?

A key objective of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in Palestine has been to render the economy of these regions dependent on the Israeli economy and thus hamper their economic development. Large areas of land have been confiscated or expropriated by the Israeli authorities to establish Jewish settlements. Other severe measures imposed include control of irrigation water and obstacles for the Arab agricultural and industrial sector in the Occupied Territories aimed at preventing Arab competition with Israeli products.Palestinian agriculturalists have met this challenge and have worked to achieve higher production levels in agriculture. Nonetheless, economic development there was blocked, and many agriculturalists sought employment inside Israel. The Intifada since December 1987 has aimed at encouraging Arab economic independence and intensification of efforts to meet national requirements of greater self-sufficiency in subsistence crops and stimulation of agriculture-related industries. The Intifada is thus functioning as a stimulus to development and economic viability.     

Elusive security: The military and political geography of South Lebanon

Israel's quest for security on its northern border with Lebanon has a history dating back to the foundation of the Palestine mandate. In the early period from the First World War to the end of the 1960s the quest was dominated with attaining economic and environmental security by seeking to acquire rights to the waters of South Lebanon. Recent decades in contrast have witnessed the rise in importance of border security and strategic security requirements in the face of military threats to northern Israel. Israel's interventionist policy in South Lebanon has been formalised to include a permanent presence on Lebanese territory in the form of the security zone. It is argued that despite the positive events that have occurred in the region in the early 1990s, it remains unlikely that Israel will easily relinquish its security shield in South Lebanon thus ultimately undermining the possibility of moving away from elusive to permanent security.     

Jewish settlement and its economic impact on the West Bank, 1967–1987

This paper focuses on the process of Jewish settlement in the West Bank and its economic consequences in the period from 1967 to the outbreak of the Intifada late in 1987. It attempts to show that this process is the practical application of Israeli objectives which are based on expansion and occupation of neighbouring Arab lands, facilitated by the fashioning of a dual or bifurcate economy there.After the war of June 1967, Israeli occupation authorities started to draw up plans with a view to settling Jews in the West Bank. There has been an increase in the numbers of settlements and settlers, estimated at 122 and 52,000 respectively in 1987. The pattern of settlement distribution is randomly dispersed, although it is concentrated in a region located to the NW of Jerusalem. The settlement began in the Jordan valley and extended gradually westward in the highlands.Jewish settlement has affected economic development of the West Bank, where there were many constraints on Arab agriculture and industry. Inequality is evident between settlers and Palestinians in an economy that has been structurally bifurcated: although settlers represent about 3% of total population of the West Bank, their economic activity constitutes at least 35% of the GDP of the West Bank.     

The extension of Ebenezer Howard's ideas on urbanization outside the British Isles: The example of Palestine

The idea of the Garden City, which was initiated by Ebenezer Howard at the end of the last century in England, was extended quickly to other places in the world. While the establishment of Garden Cities encountered many difficulties, there was much success in the establishment of Garden Suburbs. In Palestine, where Jewish immigrants and Zionist leaders brought Ebenezer Howard's ideas from Europe, Garden Suburbs were very successful. Zionism looked upon the Garden Suburb as the model for urban Zionist colonization in Palestine and it intended to establish such suburbs near all the big cities. Only Jews were supposed to live in those suburbs. The first Garden Suburb was Tel-Aviv near the port town of Jaffa. Subsequently, Tel-Aviv became the first Jewish city in Palestine. Following Tel-Aviv Jewish suburbs were established near Jerusalem, Haifa and Tiberias. In Palestine too, as in Europe, there were plans to establish Jewish Garden Cities, but they did not turn out well.     

Centralized power and divided space: `Fractured regions' in the Israeli `ethnocracy'

This paper uses a critical political-geographical perspective to account for the high centrality of power found in Israel. It suggests that the concentration of power have not been solely caused by national solidarity and integration or by metropolitan development, as commonly explained, but also by the territorial `fracturing' of the main social and ethnic groups in Israel/Palestine. This has prevented the emergence of effective pressure for regional devolution. Israel's character as a settler and settling state, and its central project of Judaizing contested territories, enabled the Israeli `ethnocracy' and its (mainly Ashkenazi and secular) elites to create a political geography of `fractured ethnic and social regions'. Dispersing minorities and legitimizing segregation and inequality, all in the name of the `national interest', achieved this. The Israeli political landscape is therefore organized as `fractured regions', each representing a distinct and interconnected, yet geographically dispersed, set of localities, and resembling a `chain of beads'. The logic of dispersal and segregation, in turn, has also influenced patterns of development and residential separation within Israel's main urban areas. Thus, ethnic and social fragmentation and conflict, and not a putative process of national or metropolitan integration, can explain much of Israel's highly centralized power structure.     

Territoriality of negation: Co-production of “creative destruction” in Israel

Based on an examination of Israel’s territorial conceptions, strategies, and achievements since the establishment of the state, this article shows how state territoriality subsumes ideology and political agendas and may, under certain circumstances, lead the state to negate its very self-conceptions and harm its own perceived interests. Its analysis pays special attention to the state’s inadvertently produced territories of negation, which run counter to its own conception of territoriality, and considers the kind of social–spatial entities produced by the state. It also considers Israeli territoriality’s more recently asserted goal of shaping Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, in addition to the goals of controlling Jerusalem and Judaizing the Galilee and the Negev. To illustrate the theoretical assertion that discriminatory and marginalizing state territoriality has the distinct potential to bring about its own negation, the article concludes with two prominent expressions of this phenomenon. The first is manifested in green-line Israel, where the state’s territorial policies and the resulting marginalization of the Palestinian minority has resulted in collective resistance against the state and its policies, basic Jewish-Israeli symbols such as the anthem and the flag, and Israel’s very definition as a Jewish State. The second is manifested in Israel’s inadvertent creation of bi-national spaces both within Israel proper and in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, indirectly promoting the solution of a single bi-national state and posing a serious challenge to the very goals that Israeli territoriality has consistently strived to achieve.     

National and transnational borderlanders’ attitudes towards the security fence between Israel and the Palestinian Authority

The subject of the security fence between Israel and the Palestinians in the West Bank has become a major issue in Israel and in the world in the last several years. The main aim of this research is to reveal the attitudes and thoughts about the fence held by local residents living in settlements (borderlanders) in the proximity of a part of the security fence that has already been completed. The research concentrates on the western-Israeli side of the fence, as it aspires to delve into and understand the meaning and implications of the security fence on matters such as personal security, safety of property and freedom of movement, the possibility of maintaining social and economic ties between the two sides and feelings about living in the area in the future. Underlying this research is the transformation occurring in the border area as a result of its closure by construction of the security fence, after many years in which it was open partially. This process has many diverse consequences, some of them contradictory, on the two populations residing near the border in Israel: the majority Jewish population (the national borderlanders), and the minority Arab population (the transnational borderlanders).     

Numerical analysis of the groundwater regime in the western Dead Sea escarpment, Israel + West Bank

Water is scarce in the semi-arid to arid regions around the Dead Sea, where water supply mostly relies on restricted groundwater resources. Due to increasing population in this region, the regional aquifer system is exposed to additional stress. This results in the continuous decrease in water level of the adjacent Dead Sea. The interaction of an increasing demand for water due to population growth and the decrease of groundwater resources will intensify in the near future. Thus, the water supply situation could worsen significantly unless sustainable water resource management is conducted. In this study, we develop a regional groundwater flow model of the eastern and southern Judea Group Aquifer to investigate the groundwater regime in the western Dead Sea drainage basin of Israel and the West Bank. An extensive geological database was developed and consequently a high-resolution structural model was derived. This structural model was the basis for various groundwater flow scenarios. The objective was to capture the spatial heterogeneity of the aquifer system and to apply these results to the southern part of the study area, which has not been studied in detail until now. As a result we analyzed quantitatively the flow regime, the groundwater mass balance and the hydraulic characteristics (hydraulic conductivity and hydraulic head) of the cretaceous aquifer system and calibrated them with PEST. The calibrated groundwater flow model can be used for integrated groundwater water management purposes in the Dead Sea area, especially within the framework of the SUMAR-Project.     

Recharge,geochemical processes and water quality in karst aquifers: Central West Bank,Palestine

The Central West Bank aquifer (CWB) is one of the most important resources of fresh groundwater of Palestine. The geology of the area consists mainly of karstic and permeable limestones and dolomites interbedded with argillaceous beds of late Albian–Turonian age. Exploitation of the CWB aquifer, combined with lack of information required to understand the groundwater pattern, represents a challenge for reservoir management. The present work reports hydrogeochemistry, microbiology and environmental isotope data from spring water samples, which were utilized to understand recharge mechanisms, geochemical evolution and renewability of groundwater in CWB aquifer. Besides the major chemical compositions, ionic ratios were used to delineate mineral-solution reactions and weathering processes. Interpretation of chemical data suggests that the chemical evolution of groundwater is primarily controlled by (1) water–rock interactions, involving dissolution of carbonate minerals (calcite and dolomite), and (2) cation exchange processes. The measured equation of the local meteoric water line is δD?=?5.8 δ¹⁸O?+?9.9. Stable isotopes show that precipitation is the source of recharge to the groundwater system. The evaporation line has a linear increasing trend from south to north direction in the study area. All analyzed spring waters are suitable for irrigation, but not for drinking purposes. The results from this study can serve as a basis for decision-makers and stakeholders, with the intention to increase the understanding of sustainable management of the CWBs.     

Water resources and the political geography of development in Southern Africa: The case of Swaziland

In Africa, the development of water resources for irrigation is seen as crucial for the recovery from current crises. This paper examines two issues generated by the geography of river systems which pose political as well as technical and economic questions. First is the problem of inter-state cooperation, where river systems cross political boundaries. Second is the domestic debate that arises from the differential access to water supply through the pattern of water rights. These issues are illustrated with material from Swaziland, a small landlocked state in southern Africa. Here, regional political tensions exacerbate the problems of long-term water development.     

1926-2009年额尔齐斯河流域中游地区气候变化及其对水资源的影响分析

额尔齐斯河流域中游地区是哈萨克斯坦共和国重要的水资源富矿与战略经济区, 资料表明这一地区过去几十年来气候与水资源均发生了显著变化, 分析研究其气候变化及其对水资源的影响, 对水资源合理利用具有重要的指导意义.利用研究区7个气象站1926-2009年84 a逐月降水和气温资料, 应用高桥浩一郎公式计算研究区月平均蒸发量及可利用降水量, 分析了1926-2009年研究区气候变化及其对水资源的影响.结果表明: 1)与全球气候变暖一致, 过去84 a来研究区平均气温呈较快的升高趋势, 且自20世纪80年代末以来进入快速升温变暖期; 2)84 a来, 研究区降水总体呈增加趋势, 随着温度的升高, 蒸发量同步增加. 因此, 研究区可利用降水量尽管有波动但总体变化不大; 3)降水是影响研究区可利用降水量的最重要的影响因素, 二者呈现显著的正相关关系, 1%的降水变化可导致1.68%的可利用降水量变化.研究区是全球气候变化的敏感区域, 水资源开发利用需切实做好应对气候变化的适应性对策.     

Transformation in territorial concepts: from nation building to concessions

The transition to globalization, socio-cultural fragmentation and an era of peace all constrain Zionism to a restructuring in its territorial perspectives. In the nation-building era, Zionism made the territory the focus of Zionist activity, which necessitated seizing territory, controlling it, and creating an affinity and attachment and a bond of identity between the nation and the territory. Pure colonization as a central strategy for realizing these national goals originated mainly from the unique historical circumstances of Zionism and from the adoption of an ethno-national ideology. This also led to the Palestinian-Jewish conflict that concentrated on the control of territory. The national economy regime that influenced Israel in different ways also served the territorial ideology to a great degree. Peace borders will require Israel to cooperate closely with Jordan, Palestine, Syria and Lebanon in managing resources, external influences and additional common interests. The peace economy will integrate with the multi-national economy. Furthermore, in the reality of peace, Israel will have to abandon the internal colonization of areas populated by Israeli Arab citizens and give greater legitimation to their more prominent inclusion the Israeli identity. It will also become difficult for any elite group to dictate the national agenda to other marginal groups, such as Israeli Arabs, and Sephardic or Orthodox Jews, each group creates for itself considerable degree of autonomy in its own territory. In the main, the national periphery divides into an Israeli Arab periphery beside the periphery of the traditionally religious Sephardic Jews. The ultra-Orthodox Jews take control of increasingly larger Israeli space and expanding the horizons of their public involvement beyond their traditional ghettos. Each group creates for itself a different symbolic space with differing views concerning the limits of Israeli sovereignty.     

Evaluation of distributed recharge in an upland semi-arid karst system: the West Bank Mountain Aquifer,Middle East

Assessment of recharge in a structurally complex upland karst limestone aquifer situated in a semi-arid environment is difficult. Resort to surrogate indicators such as measurement of spring outflow and borehole discharge, is a common alternative, and attempts to apply conventional soil moisture deficit analysis may not adequately account for the intermittent spate conditions that arise in such environments. A modelling approach has been made using the West Bank Mountain Aquifer system in the Middle East as a trial. The model uses object oriented software which allows various objects to be switched on and off. Each of the main recharge processes identified in the West Bank is incorporated. The model allows either conventional soil moisture deficit analysis calculations or wetting threshold calculations to be made as appropriate, and accommodates both direct recharge and secondary recharge. Daily time steps enable recharge and runoff routing to be calculated for each node. Model runs have enabled a series of simulations for each of the three aquifer basins in the West Bank and for the whole of the West Bank. These provide recharge estimates comparable to those prepared by earlier workers by conventional means. The model is adaptable and has been successfully used in other environments.     

Variations on a Hebrew theme: The politics of art music in Israel

No culture, no society, remains static but changes imperceptibly day by day. The struggle waged by western art music in Israel for survival is eerily suggestive of how Israeli society in general has changed since the early Zionists set the course for the creation of a Jewish nation-state. Once regarded as the civilized face and civilizing influence of the Jewish national endeavour in Palestine/Israel, its advocates claim ever more desperately that western art music in Israel is in a state of rapid decline. Yet public opinion surveys reveal that the Israeli public backs state support for arts and culture whether or not people participate in cultural activities. Despite this, the internal ethnic struggle for domination of the arts and culture world and the rearguard action by culture administrators are both in danger of being overtaken by the country’s exposure to global popular culture.     

以色列依靠科技创新走出缺水困境的经验

以色列地处中东,降雨稀少且分布不均,天然淡水资源短缺。为解决这一困境,以色列自1948年建国后就一直致力于发展水资源高效利用技术,在水资源生产、运输、回收等领域研发出诸多领先全球的新技术。经过多年努力,该国从一个缺水的国家成为高效用水的农业大国,甚至被誉为“欧洲国家的菜篮子”。文章首先介绍了以色列的地理气候情况和水资源类型,然后介绍了水资源利用结构,最后列举了以色列在解决水资源危机时发展的6项创新技术。文章可为我国水资源高效利用与管理提供借鉴,同时也可为今后我国与以色列开展水资源方面的相关合作及学术研究提供基础资料。     

From national to post-national territorial identities in Israel-Palestine

Territory remains a central component of national identity in the contemporary political discourse between Israelis and Palestinians, both populations opposing power sharing within the same space, for fear of the other's domination. The contemporary political discourse relates to conflict management and the desire for separate spaces within which national identities are strengthened through territorial/national homogeneity. The Zionist national ideology of most Jewish citizens of Israel has strong territorial roots; hence they reject the post-Zionist post-nationalist ideology, regardless of whether they accept the possibility of change in Israel's territorial configuration or of a diminishment in the importance of the territorial dimension of national struggle. The rights of residency and citizenship even of second and third generation Jewish citizens remain linked with the territorial configurations of a State that will continue to be called Israel and have a national anthem expressing the aspirations of a single, exclusive, national group. But within territorial readjustment, issues of configuration may become less relevant and in it is this sense that post-Zionism focuses on a discourse of territorial pragmatism, rather than the disappearance of territory from the nationality-citizenship debate altogether. It is part of a process of re-territorialization and spatial reconfiguration of political and national identities, not a reversal of territorialization, if only because there is no such thing as a post-territorial notion of the organization of political power. The boundaries of national identity become more permeable, more inclusive, but they do not disappear altogether.