The economics (or lack thereof) of aerosol geoengineering

Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are changing the Earth’s climate and impose substantial risks for current and future generations. What are scientifically sound, economically viable, and ethically defendable strategies to manage these climate risks? Ratified international agreements call for a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions to avoid dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Recent proposals, however, call for a different approach: to geoengineer climate by injecting aerosol precursors into the stratosphere. Published economic studies typically neglect the risks of aerosol geoengineering due to (i) the potential for a failure to sustain the aerosol forcing and (ii) the negative impacts associated with the aerosol forcing. Here we use a simple integrated assessment model of climate change to analyze potential economic impacts of aerosol geoengineering strategies over a wide range of uncertain parameters such as climate sensitivity, the economic damages due to climate change, and the economic damages due to aerosol geoengineering forcing. The simplicity of the model provides the advantages of parsimony and transparency, but it also imposes severe caveats on the interpretation of the results. For example, the analysis is based on a globally aggregated model and is hence silent on intragenerational distribution of costs and benefits. In addition, the analysis neglects the effects of learning and has a very simplistic representation of climate change impacts. Our analysis suggests three main conclusions. First, substituting aerosol geoengineering for CO₂ abatement can be an economically ineffective strategy. One key to this finding is that a failure to sustain the aerosol forcing can lead to sizeable and abrupt climatic changes. The monetary damages due to such a discontinuous aerosol geoengineering can dominate the cost-benefit analysis because the monetary damages of climate change are expected to increase with the rate of change. Second, the relative contribution of aerosol geoengineering to an economically optimal portfolio hinges critically on, thus far, deeply uncertain estimates of the damages due to aerosol forcing. Even if we assume that aerosol forcing could be deployed continuously, the aerosol geoengineering does not considerably displace CO₂ abatement in the simple economic optimal growth model until the damages due to the aerosol forcing are rather low. Third, substituting aerosol geoengineering for greenhouse gas emission abatement can fail an ethical test regarding intergenerational justice. Substituting aerosol geoengineering for greenhouse gas emissions abatements constitutes a conscious risk transfer to future generations, in violation of principles of intergenerational justice which demands that present generations should not create benefits for themselves in exchange for burdens on future generations.     

The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways and their energy,land use,and greenhouse gas emissions implications: An overview

This paper presents the overview of the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) and their energy, land use, and emissions implications. The SSPs are part of a new scenario framework, established by the climate change research community in order to facilitate the integrated analysis of future climate impacts, vulnerabilities, adaptation, and mitigation. The pathways were developed over the last years as a joint community effort and describe plausible major global developments that together would lead in the future to different challenges for mitigation and adaptation to climate change. The SSPs are based on five narratives describing alternative socio-economic developments, including sustainable development, regional rivalry, inequality, fossil-fueled development, and middle-of-the-road development. The long-term demographic and economic projections of the SSPs depict a wide uncertainty range consistent with the scenario literature. A multi-model approach was used for the elaboration of the energy, land-use and the emissions trajectories of SSP-based scenarios. The baseline scenarios lead to global energy consumption of 400–1200 EJ in 2100, and feature vastly different land-use dynamics, ranging from a possible reduction in cropland area up to a massive expansion by more than 700 million hectares by 2100. The associated annual CO₂ emissions of the baseline scenarios range from about 25 GtCO₂ to more than 120 GtCO₂ per year by 2100. With respect to mitigation, we find that associated costs strongly depend on three factors: (1) the policy assumptions, (2) the socio-economic narrative, and (3) the stringency of the target. The carbon price for reaching the target of 2.6 W/m² that is consistent with a temperature change limit of 2 °C, differs in our analysis thus by about a factor of three across the SSP marker scenarios. Moreover, many models could not reach this target from the SSPs with high mitigation challenges. While the SSPs were designed to represent different mitigation and adaptation challenges, the resulting narratives and quantifications span a wide range of different futures broadly representative of the current literature. This allows their subsequent use and development in new assessments and research projects. Critical next steps for the community scenario process will, among others, involve regional and sectoral extensions, further elaboration of the adaptation and impacts dimension, as well as employing the SSP scenarios with the new generation of earth system models as part of the 6th climate model intercomparison project (CMIP6).     

Public perceptions of geoengineering research governance: An experimental deliberative approach

Recent attempts to conduct experiments in climate ‘geoengineering’ have demonstrated the deeply controversial nature of this field of scientific research. Social scientists have begun to explore public perceptions of geoengineering, and have documented a significant degree of concern over the effective governance of research and experimentation in this area. Yet, public perception on what constitutes a legitimate geoengineering experiment and how it should be governed remains under-researched. In this article we report on a series of experimental deliberative workshops with members of the public designed to elicit and explicate diverse understandings of geoengineering experiments and their governance. In contrast to previous methods of invited public deliberation, which privilege egalitarian-consensual models of discourse and decision-making, we test a novel approach that places majoritarian, individualistic, and consensual forms of public deliberation on an equal footing. Our study suggests that the perceived controllability of experimental interventions is central to public views on their acceptability, but that controllability is itself a complex, multifaceted quality, drawing together a set of heterogeneous concerns about the purpose and repercussions of scientific work. The citizens who participated in our workshops employed four criteria to adjudicate the acceptability of geoengineering experiments: (1) the degree of containment; (2) the uncertainty surrounding experimental outcomes; (3) the reversibility of impacts; and (4) the scientific purity of the enterprise. We theorize that the public legitimacy of geoengineering experiments depends on variable, context-specific combinations of these criteria, and that technical determinations of the proper ‘scale’ or ‘location’ for geoengineering research will be poor predictors of the sorts of public concerns that will be triggered by further experimentation in this area.     

Next steps in geoengineering scenario research: limited deployment scenarios and beyond

Climate engineering has received increasing attention, but its discussion has remained on the sidelines of mainstream climate policy. The policy relevance of this previously exotic option is poised to rise because of the gap between the temperature goals of the Paris Agreement and slow global mitigation efforts. It is therefore crucial to understand the risks and benefits of the proposed schemes, and the social implications of policy choices. Assessment of the risks and benefits of solar geoengineering strongly depends on scenarios, but previous scenarios have not reflected the full range of social choices. In light of concerns over risks, a newer set of scenarios is desirable, which represents both uncertainties and social choices more fully. Borrowing and extending lessons from recent literature on the new community climate scenario process, we envision a possible scenario-building process that combines interdisciplinary scholarship with the involvement of stakeholders and citizens. The resultant scenarios would better characterize uncertainties of, and policy choices for, solar geoengineering, and foster critical appraisal of its risks and benefits. Such societal choices might include not only total ban and large-scale deployment, but also limited deployment, which has received less attention in the scenario literature. The interaction between scenario and governance research would be able to highlight the central issues at stake, including ethical, social, and political dimensions.

Key policy insights

• A more comprehensive assessment of solar geoengineering is necessary to evaluate its risks and benefits, necessitating new scenario research

• It is crucial to reflect the full span of policy choices and uncertainties with interdisciplinary collaboration in such scenarios

• Such societal choices might include not only total ban and large-scale deployment, but also limited deployment, which has received less attention in the scenario literature

• Participatory scenario research would enable incorporating the concerns and opinions of stakeholders and citizens in scenario creation

     

Multilateral parametric climate risk insurance: a tool to facilitate agreement about deployment of solar geoengineering?

States will disagree about deployment of solar geoengineering, technologies that would reflect a small portion of incoming sunlight to reduce risks of climate change, and most disagreements will be grounded in conflicting interests. States that object to deployment will have many options to oppose it, so states favouring deployment will have a powerful incentive to meet their objections. Objections rooted in opposition to the anticipated unequal consequences of deployment may be met through compensation, yet climate policy is inhospitable to compensation via liability. We propose that multilateral parametric climate risk insurance might be a useful tool to facilitate agreement on solar geoengineering deployment. With parametric insurance, predetermined payouts are triggered when climate indices deviate from set ranges. We suggest that states favouring deployment could underwrite reduced-rate parametric climate insurance. This mechanism would be particularly suited to resolving disagreements based on divergent judgments about the outcomes of proposed implementation. This would be especially relevant in cases where disagreements are rooted in varying levels of trust in climate model predictions of solar geoengineering effectiveness and risks. Negotiations over the pricing and terms of a parametric risk pool would make divergent judgments explicit and quantitative. Reduced-rate insurance would provide a way for states that favour implementation to demonstrate their confidence in solar geoengineering by underwriting risk transfer and ensuring compensation without the need for attribution. This would offer a powerful incentive for states opposing implementation to moderate their opposition.

Key policy insights

• States favouring deployment of solar geoengineering will need to address other states’ objections—unilateralism is implausible in practice

• This might be partially achieved using parametric climate risk insurance based on objective indicators

• A sovereign risk pool offering reduced-rate parametric insurance underwritten by states backing deployment could facilitate cooperation on solar geoengineering deployment

• States favouring deployment would demonstrate their confidence in solar geoengineering by supporting the risk pool

• Opposing states would be insured against solar geoengineering risks and proposing states would be incentivized to guard against overconfidence

     

太阳辐射管理地球工程对海洋酸化影响的模拟研究

研究地球工程对海洋酸化的影响对于评估地球工程对全球气候和环境的影响有重要意义。文中使用中等复杂程度的地球系统模式,模拟了典型CO₂高排放情景RCP8.5下,实施太阳辐射管理地球工程对海洋表面的pH和文石（碳酸钙的一种亚稳形态）饱和度的影响,并定量分析了各环境因子对海洋酸化影响的机理。模拟结果表明,在RCP8.5情景下,到2100年,相对于工业革命前水平,全球海洋表面平均pH下降了0.43,文石饱和度下降了1.77。相对于RCP8.5情景,2100年地球工程情景下全球海洋表面平均pH增加了0.003,而文石饱和度降低了0.16。地球工程通过改变溶解无机碳、碱度、温度等环境因子影响海洋酸化。相对于RCP8.5情景,实施地球工程引起的溶解无机碳浓度的增加使pH和文石饱和度均减小,碱度的增加使pH和文石饱和度均增大,温度的降低使pH增大而使文石饱和度减小。总体而言,太阳辐射管理地球工程可以降低全球温度,但无法减缓海洋酸化。     

Albedo enhancement of marine clouds to counteract global warming: impacts on the hydrological cycle

Recent studies have shown that changes in solar radiation affect the hydrological cycle more strongly than equivalent CO₂ changes for the same change in global mean surface temperature. Thus, solar radiation management ??geoengineering?? proposals to completely offset global mean temperature increases by reducing the amount of absorbed sunlight might be expected to slow the global water cycle and reduce runoff over land. However, proposed countering of global warming by increasing the albedo of marine clouds would reduce surface solar radiation only over the oceans. Here, for an idealized scenario, we analyze the response of temperature and the hydrological cycle to increased reflection by clouds over the ocean using an atmospheric general circulation model coupled to a mixed layer ocean model. When cloud droplets are reduced in size over all oceans uniformly to offset the temperature increase from a doubling of atmospheric CO₂, the global-mean precipitation and evaporation decreases by about 1.3% but runoff over land increases by 7.5% primarily due to increases over tropical land. In the model, more reflective marine clouds cool the atmospheric column over ocean. The result is a sinking motion over oceans and upward motion over land. We attribute the increased runoff over land to this increased upward motion over land when marine clouds are made more reflective. Our results suggest that, in contrast to other proposals to increase planetary albedo, offsetting mean global warming by reducing marine cloud droplet size does not necessarily lead to a drying, on average, of the continents. However, we note that the changes in precipitation, evaporation and P-E are dominated by small but significant areas, and given the highly idealized nature of this study, a more thorough and broader assessment would be required for proposals of altering marine cloud properties on a large scale.     

Global warming mitigation by sulphur loading in the stratosphere: dependence of required emissions on allowable residual warming rate

An approach to mitigate global warming via sulphur loading in the stratosphere (geoengineering) is studied, employing a large ensemble of numerical experiments with the climate model of intermediate complexity IAP RAS CM. The model is forced by the historical+SRES A1B anthropogenic greenhouse gases+tropospheric sulphates scenario for 1860–2100 with additional sulphur emissions in the stratosphere in the twenty-first century. Different ensemble members are constructed by varying values of the parameters governing mass, horizontal distribution and radiative forcing of the stratospheric sulphates. It is obtained that, given a global loading of the sulphates in the stratosphere, among those studied in this paper latitudinal distributions of geoengineering aerosols, the most efficient one at the global basis is that peaked between 50°N and 70°N and with a somewhat smaller burden in the tropics. Uniform latitudinal distribution of stratospheric sulphates is a little less efficient. Sulphur emissions in the stratosphere required to stop the global temperature at the level corresponding to the mean value for 2000–2010 amount to more than 10 TgS/year in the year 2100. These emissions may be reduced if some warming is allowed to occur in the twenty-first century. For instance, if the global temperature trend S _g in every decade of this century is limited not to exceed 0.10 K/decade (0.15 K/decade), geoengineering emissions of 4–14 TgS/year (2–7 TgS/year) would be sufficient. Even if the global warming is stopped, temperature changes in different regions still occur with a magnitude up to 1 K. Their horizontal pattern depends on implied latitudinal distribution of stratospheric sulphates. In addition, for the stabilised global mean surface air temperature, global precipitation decreases by about 10%. If geoengineering emissions are stopped after several decades of implementation, their climatic effect is removed within a few decades. In this period, surface air temperature may grow with a rate of several Kelvins per decade. The results obtained with the IAP RAS CM are further interpreted employing a globally averaged energy–balance climate model. With the latter model, an analytical estimate for sulphate aerosol emissions in the stratosphere required climate mitigation is obtained. It is shown that effective vertical localisation of the imposed radiative forcing is important for geoengineering efficiency.     

Dissecting Future Aerosol Emissions: warming Tendencies and Mitigation Opportunities

Future global emissions of aerosols will play an important role in governing the nature and magnitude of future anthropogenic climate change. We present in this paper a number of future scenarios of emissions of black carbon (BC) and organic carbon (OC) by world region, which we combine with sulfate (SO₄) assessed in terms of the emissions of its precursor, SO₂. We find that aerosol emissions from the household and industrial sectors are likely to decline along almost all future pathways. Transportation emissions, however, are subject to complex interacting forces that can lead to either increases or decreases. Biomass burning declines in many scenarios, but the Amazon rainforests remain vulnerable if unsustainable economic growth persists. East Asia is the key region for primary aerosols, and trends in China will have a major bearing on the direction and magnitude of releases of BC (expected reductions in the range of 640–1290 Gg), OC (reductions of 520–1900 Gg), and SO₂ (ranging from an increase of 21 Tg to a reduction of 30 Tg). Analysis of joint BC, OC, and SO₂ emission changes identifies a number of key world regions and economic sectors that could be effectively targeted for aerosol reductions.     

Technical characteristics of a solar geoengineering deployment and implications for governance

ABSTRACT

Consideration of solar geoengineering as a potential response to climate change will demand complex decisions. These include not only the choice of whether to deploy solar engineering, but decisions regarding how to deploy, and ongoing decision-making throughout deployment. Research on the governance of solar geoengineering to date has primarily engaged only with the question of whether to deploy. We examine the science of solar geoengineering in order to clarify the technical dimensions of decisions about deployment – both strategic and operational – and how these might influence governance considerations, while consciously refraining from making specific recommendations. The focus here is on a hypothetical deployment rather than governance of the research itself. We first consider the complexity surrounding the design of a deployment scheme, in particular the complicated and difficult decision of what its objective(s) would be, given that different choices for how to deploy will lead to different climate outcomes. Next, we discuss the on-going decisions across multiple timescales, from the sub-annual to the multi-decadal. For example, feedback approaches might effectively manage some uncertainties, but would require frequent adjustments to the solar geoengineering deployment in response to observations. Other decisions would be tied to the inherently slow process of detection and attribution of climate effects in the presence of natural variability. Both of these present challenges to decision-making. These considerations point toward particular governance requirements, including an important role for technical experts – with all the challenges that entails.

Key policy insights

• Decisions about solar geoengineering deployment will be informed not only by political choices, but also by climate science and engineering.

• Design decisions will pertain to the spatial and temporal goals of a climate intervention and strategies for achieving those goals.

• Some uncertainty can be managed through feedback, but this would require frequent operational decisions.

• Some strategic decisions will depend on the detection and attribution of climatic effects from solar geoengineering, which may take decades.

• Governance for solar geoengineering deployment will likely need to incorporate technical expertise for making short-term adjustments to the deployment and conducting attribution analysis, while also slowing down decisions made in response to attribution analysis to avoid hasty choices.

     

Long-term economic growth projections in the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways

Long-term economic scenarios (up to 2100) are needed as a basis to explore possible different futures for major environmental challenges, including climate change. Given the high level of uncertainty involved, such scenarios would need to span a wide range of possible growth trajectories. The recently developed storylines of the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) provide a basis for making such projections. This paper describes a consistent methodology to derive (per capita) GDP trend pathways on a country basis. The methodology is based on a convergence process and places emphasis on the key drivers of economic growth in the long run: population, total factor productivity, physical capital, employment and human capital, and energy and fossil fuel resources (specifically oil and gas). The paper uses this methodology to derive country-level economic growth projections for 184 countries. The paper also investigates the influence of short-term growth rate estimates on the long-term income levels in various countries. It does so by comparing long-term projections based on short-term forecasts from 2011 with the projections based on forecasts from 2013. This highlights the effects of the recent economic crisis and uncertainty in short term developments on longer term growth trends. The projections are subject to large uncertainties, particularly for the later decades, and disregard a wide range of country-specific drivers of economic growth that are outside the narrow economic framework, such as external shocks, governance barriers and feedbacks from environmental damage. Hence, they should be interpreted with sufficient care and not be treated as predictions.     

Albedo enhancement over land to counteract global warming: impacts on hydrological cycle

A recent modelling study has shown that precipitation and runoff over land would increase when the reflectivity of marine clouds is increased to counter global warming. This implies that large scale albedo enhancement over land could lead to a decrease in runoff over land. In this study, we perform simulations using NCAR CAM3.1 that have implications for Solar Radiation Management geoengineering schemes that increase the albedo over land. We find that an increase in reflectivity over land that mitigates the global mean warming from a doubling of CO₂ leads to a large residual warming in the southern hemisphere and cooling in the northern hemisphere since most of the land is located in northern hemisphere. Precipitation and runoff over land decrease by 13.4 and 22.3%, respectively, because of a large residual sinking motion over land triggered by albedo enhancement over land. Soil water content also declines when albedo over land is enhanced. The simulated magnitude of hydrological changes over land are much larger when compared to changes over oceans in the recent marine cloud albedo enhancement study since the radiative forcing over land needed (?8.2?W?m^?2) to counter global mean radiative forcing from a doubling of CO₂ (3.3?W?m^?2) is approximately twice the forcing needed over the oceans (?4.2?W?m^?2). Our results imply that albedo enhancement over oceans produce climates closer to the unperturbed climate state than do albedo changes on land when the consequences on land hydrology are considered. Our study also has important implications for any intentional or unintentional large scale changes in land surface albedo such as deforestation/afforestation/reforestation, air pollution, and desert and urban albedo modification.     

Climate change and critical thresholds in China’s food security

Identification of ‘critical thresholds’ of temperature increase is an essential task for inform policy decisions on establishing greenhouse gas (GHG) emission targets. We use the A2 (medium-high GHG emission pathway) and B2 (medium-low) climate change scenarios produced by the Regional Climate Model PRECIS, the crop model – CERES, and socio-economic scenarios described by IPCC SRES, to simulate the average yield changes per hectare of three main grain crops (rice, wheat, and maize) at 50 km × 50 km scale. The threshold of food production to temperature increases was analyzed based on the relationship between yield changes and temperature rise, and then food security was discussed corresponding to each IPCC SRES scenario. The results show that without the CO₂ fertilization effect in the analysis, the yield per hectare for the three crops would fall consistently as temperature rises beyond 2.5 ^{^}C; when the CO₂ fertilization effect was included in the simulation, there were no adverse impacts on China’s food production under the projected range of temperature rise (0.9–3.9 ^{^}C). A critical threshold of temperature increase was not found for food production. When the socio-economic scenarios, agricultural technology development and international trade were incorporated in the analysis, China’s internal food production would meet a critical threshold of basic demand (300 kg/capita) while it would not under A2 (no CO₂ fertilization); whereas basic food demand would be satisfied under both A2 and B2, and would even meet a higher food demand threshold required to sustain economic growth (400 kg/capita) under B2, when CO₂ fertilization was considered.     

Carbon dioxide sequestration: how much and when?

Carbon dioxide (CO₂) sequestration has been proposed as a key component in technological portfolios for managing anthropogenic climate change, since it may provide a faster and cheaper route to significant reductions in atmospheric CO₂ concentrations than abating CO₂ production. However, CO₂ sequestration is not a perfect substitute for CO₂ abatement because CO₂ may leak back into the atmosphere (thus imposing future climate change impacts) and because CO₂ sequestration requires energy (thus producing more CO₂ and depleting fossil fuel resources earlier). Here we use analytical and numerical models to assess the economic efficiency of CO₂ sequestration and analyze the optimal timing and extent of CO₂ sequestration. The economic efficiency factor of CO₂ sequestration can be expressed as the ratio of the marginal net benefits of sequestering CO₂ and avoiding CO₂ emissions. We derive an analytical solution for this efficiency factor for a simplified case in which we account for CO₂ leakage, discounting, the additional fossil fuel requirement of CO₂ sequestration, and the growth rate of carbon taxes. In this analytical model, the economic efficiency of CO₂ sequestration decreases as the CO₂ tax growth rate, leakage rates and energy requirements for CO₂ sequestration increase. Increasing discount rates increases the economic efficiency factor. In this simple model, short-term sequestration methods, such as afforestation, can even have negative economic efficiencies. We use a more realistic integrated-assessment model to additionally account for potentially important effects such as learning-by-doing and socio-economic inertia on optimal strategies. We measure the economic efficiency of CO₂ sequestration by the ratio of the marginal costs of CO₂ sequestration and CO₂ abatement along optimal trajectories. We show that the positive impacts of investments in CO₂ sequestration through the reduction of future marginal CO₂ sequestration costs and the alleviation of future inertia constraints can initially exceed the marginal sequestration costs. As a result, the economic efficiencies of CO₂ sequestration can exceed 100% and an optimal strategy will subsidize CO₂ sequestration that is initially more expensive than CO₂ abatement. The potential economic value of a feasible and acceptable CO₂ sequestration technology is equivalent – in the adopted utilitarian model – to a one-time investment of several percent of present gross world product. It is optimal in the chosen economic framework to sequester substantial CO₂ quantities into reservoirs with small or zero leakage, given published estimates of marginal costs and climate change impacts. The optimal CO₂ trajectories in the case of sequestration from air can approach the pre-industrial level, constituting geoengineering. Our analysis is silent on important questions (e.g., the effects of model and parametric uncertainty, the potential learning about these uncertainties, or ethical dimension of such geoengineering strategies), which need to be addressed before our findings can be translated into policy-relevant recommendations.     

Governing geoengineering research: why, when and how?

Research on geoengineering – deliberate management of the Earth’s climate system – is being increasingly discussed within the science and policy communities. While justified as necessary in order to expand the range of options available to policy makers in the future, geoengineering research has already engendered public controversy. Proposed projects have been protested or cancelled, and calls for a governance framework abound. In this paper, we consider the reasons why geoengineering research might be subject to additional governance and suggest mechanisms that might be usefully applied in developing such a framework. We consider criteria for governance as raised by a review of the growing literature on geoengineering and other controversial scientific topics. We suggest three families of concern that any governance research framework must respond to: the direct physical risks of the research; the transparency and responsibility in decision making for the research; and the larger societal meanings of the research. We review what mechanisms might be available to respond to these three families of concern, and consider how these might apply to geoengineering research.     

The Consistency of IPCC's SRES Scenarios to 1990–2000 Trends and Recent Projections

The greenhouse gas emissions scenarios published by the IPCC in the Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES) continue to serve as a primary basis for assessing future climate change and possible response strategies. These scenarios were developed between 1996 and 1999 and sufficient time has now passed to make it worth examining their consistency with more recent data and projections. The comparison performed in this paper includes population, GDP, energy use, and emissions of CO₂, non-CO₂ gases and sulfur. We find the SRES scenarios to be largely consistent with historical data for the 1990–2000 period and with recent projections. Exceptions to this general observation include (1) in the long-term, relatively high population growth assumptions; in some regions, particularly in the A2 scenario; (2) in the medium-term, relatively high economic growth assumptions in the LAM (Latin America, Africa and Middle East) region in the A1 scenario; (3) in the short-term, CO₂ emissions projections in A1 that are somewhat higher than the range of current scenarios; and (4) substantially higher sulfur emissions in some scenarios than in historical data and recent projections. In conclusion, given the relatively small inconsistencies for use as global scenarios there seems to be no immediate need for a large-scale IPCC-led update of the SRES scenarios that is solely based on the SRES scenario performance vis-a-vis data for the 1990–2000 period and/or more recent projections. Based on reported findings, individual research teams could make, and in some cases already have made, useful updates of the scenarios.     

Relative roles of climate sensitivity and forcing in defining the ocean circulation response to climate change

The response of the ocean’s meridional overturning circulation (MOC) to increased greenhouse gas forcing is examined using a coupled model of intermediate complexity, including a dynamic 3-D ocean subcomponent. Parameters are the increase in CO₂ forcing (with stabilization after a specified time interval) and the model’s climate sensitivity. In this model, the cessation of deep sinking in the north “Atlantic” (hereinafter, a “collapse”), as indicated by changes in the MOC, behaves like a simple bifurcation. The final surface air temperature (SAT) change, which is closely predicted by the product of the radiative forcing and the climate sensitivity, determines whether a collapse occurs. The initial transient response in SAT is largely a function of the forcing increase, with higher sensitivity runs exhibiting delayed behavior; accordingly, high CO₂-low sensitivity scenarios can be assessed as a recovering or collapsing circulation shortly after stabilization, whereas low CO₂-high sensitivity scenarios require several hundred additional years to make such a determination. We also systemically examine how the rate of forcing, for a given CO₂ stabilization, affects the ocean response. In contrast with previous studies based on results using simpler ocean models, we find that except for a narrow range of marginally stable to marginally unstable scenarios, the forcing rate has little impact on whether the run collapses or recovers. In this narrow range, however, forcing increases on a time scale of slow ocean advective processes results in weaker declines in overturning strength and can permit a run to recover that would otherwise collapse.     

The principal-agent problem and climate change adaptation on public lands

Climate change presents clear risks to natural resources, which carry potential economic costs. The limited nature of physical, financial, human and natural resources means that governments, as managers of natural resources, must make careful decisions regarding trade-offs and the potential future value of investments in climate change adaptation. This paper presents cost-benefit analysis of scenarios to characterise economic benefits of adaptation from the perspective of a public institution (the provincial government) and private agents (forest licensees). The example provided is the context of assisted migration strategies for regenerating forests that are currently being implemented in British Columbia to reduce future impacts of climate change on forests. The analysis revealed positive net present value of public investment in assisted migration across all scenarios under a range of conditions; however, private sector agents face disincentives to adopt these strategies. Uncertainty about how the costs, benefits and risks associated with climate change impacts will be distributed among public institutions and private actors influences incentives to adapt to climate change (the “principal-agent problem”) and further complicates adaptation. Absent development of risk-sharing mechanisms or re-alignment of incentives, uptake of assisted migration strategies by private agents is likely to be limited, creating longer-term risks for public institutions. Analyzing incentives and disincentives facing principals and agents using a well-known tool (cost-benefit analysis) can help decision-makers to identify and address underlying barriers to climate change adaptation in the context of public lands management.     

Possibility of geoengineering stabilization of global temperature in the 21st century using the stratospheric aerosol and estimation of potential negative effects

The climate model of atmospheric and oceanic circulation is used to assess a potential of the geoengineering to stabilize the global temperature at the level of +2°C relative to the average for the 20th century. An anthropogenic forcing was set in accordance with the RCP8.5 scenario. The injection of H₂S into the stratosphere transformed afterwards into the sulfate aerosol starts when the temperature reaches a threshold of +2°C. The intensity of the injection is chosen so that the estimated global temperature remains close to the threshold. It is demonstrated that the stabilization of temperature by geoengineering is possible within +(2 ± 0.11)°C during the 21st century. The stabilization of temperature by the end of the 21st century needs the yearly injection of 4.5 Mt S in the form of H₂S. The specific efficiency of the method is about 0.09°C/Mt of aerosol. It was found that the stabilization of global temperature does not provide the stabilization of mean global precipitation. The maximum influence of aerosol is in the equatorial zone where its specific density in the atmosphere will reach 0.074 g/m² by the end of the 21st century. Carried out is a comparison of regional features of temperature and precipitation fields with and without geoengineering. It is shown that the geoengineering will decrease significantly the regional anomalies in the most part of regions and will not increase them in the rest part. Estimated is an effect of the rapid growth in global temperature at the dramatic cessation of geoengineering impacts. Considered is a variant of the gradual decrease in geoengineering intensity, when the negative effects will be smoothed.