Global climate change and variability and its influence on Alpine climate — concepts and observations

Summary The paper discusses annual to decadal climate variability and change in the European Alps by utilizing the procedure of synoptic downscaling, i.e. it investigates the influence of global to continental scale synoptic structures and processes on the regional climate of the Alps. The European Alps lie to the southeast and under the right exit zone of the southwest-northeast oriented axis of the polar front jet over the North Atlantic ocean, in a transition zone between the Azores high and Icelandic low, between oceanic and continental and between Mediterranean and North Atlantic climates. Together with complex topographically induced phenomena like lee cyclogenesis, orographic precipitation, strong downslope winds and thermotopographical circulation systems, this transitional position makes climate studies in the Alps even more interesting. Only a minor correlation can be observed between global climate variability and Alpine climate. In contrast, the Alpine climate is strongly related to processes over the North Atlantic ocean and its sea ice system (e.g. it has a high correlation with the North Atlantic Oscillation and the dynamics and position of the Icelandic low), an area with a rather low climate prediction potential.Since the early 1970's (or just after the Great Salinity Anomaly in the North Atlantic Ocean) the intensification of the wintertime westerly jet over the North Atlantic area led to a noticeable northwest-southeast mass transport in the exit area of the jet over Central Europe, leading to pressure and temperature rises and an increase in the amount of precipitation. There is a question over whether this phenomenon is a consequence of natural climate variability or the beginning of an anthropogenic climate change.With 16 Figures     

Unstoppable climate change? The influence of fatalistic beliefs about climate change on behavioural change and willingness to pay cross-nationally

Although climate change is an urgent problem, behavioural and policy responses have not yet been sufficient to either reduce the volume of greenhouse gas emissions or adapt to a disrupted climate system. Significant efforts have been made to raise public awareness of the dangers posed by climate change. One reason why these efforts might not be sufficient is rooted in people’s need to feel efficacy to solve complex problems; the belief that climate change is unstoppable might thwart action even among the concerned. This paper tests for the effect of fatalistic beliefs on behavioural change and willingness to pay to address climate change using two cross-national surveys representing over 50,000 people in 48 nations.

Key policy insights

• The perception that climate change poses a risk or danger increases the likelihood of behavioural change and willingness to pay to address climate change.

• The belief that climate change is unstoppable reduces the behavioural and policy response to climate change and moderates risk perception.

• Communicators and policy leaders should carefully frame climate change as a difficult, yet solvable, problem to circumvent fatalistic beliefs.

     

Measuring household vulnerability to climate change—Why markets matter

Climate change and climate variability affect households in developing countries both directly through their impact on crop yields and indirectly through their impact on wages, food prices and the livelihoods of the poor. Therefore, vulnerable household groups cannot be identified without considering their position in and access to markets. I illustrate the effects – transmitted through markets – that are significant in household exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity to climate change by simulating productivity shocks to maize up to 2030 due to climate change in a computable general equilibrium model of Malawi. The results show that rural households with large land holdings may benefit from the adverse impact of climate change on maize yields as a result of increased maize prices. Urban poor and small-scale farmers are vulnerable to climate change due to the large portion of their incomes spent on food. Existing vulnerability measures that do not consider equilibrium effects and characterise all farmers as vulnerable may therefore be misleading.     

Are we adapting to climate change?

Human systems will have to adapt to climate change. Understanding of the magnitude of the adaptation challenge at a global scale, however, is incomplete, constrained by a limited understanding of if and how adaptation is taking place. Here we develop and apply a methodology to track and characterize adaptation action; we apply these methods to the peer-reviewed, English-language literature. Our results challenge a number of common assumptions about adaptation while supporting others: (1) Considerable research on adaptation has been conducted yet the majority of studies report on vulnerability assessments and natural systems (or intentions to act), not adaptation actions. (2) Climate change is rarely the sole or primary motivator for adaptation action. (3) Extreme events are important adaptation stimuli across regions. (4) Proactive adaptation is the most commonly reported adaptive response, particularly in developed nations. (5) Adaptation action is more frequently reported in developed nations, with middle income countries underrepresented and low-income regions dominated by reports from a small number of countries. (6) There is limited reporting on adaptations being developed to take advantage of climate change or focusing on women, elderly, or children.     

Are homeowners willing to adapt to and mitigate the effects of climate change?

The need to adapt to climate change impacts, whilst simultaneously limiting greenhouse gas emissions, requires that the government’s efforts are joined by public action. In England and Wales, housing contributes significantly to the emissions and many properties are at risk of flooding. This paper investigates the preparedness of homeowners in England and Wales to make changes to their homes in response to the predicted effects of climate change. A telephone survey of 961 homeowners investigated their interest in purchasing mitigation and adaptation improvements against their concern about climate change, awareness of flood risk and attribution of responsibility for action. Whilst the majority of homes had some energy-saving improvements, few were found to have property-level flood protection. The high levels of awareness about climate change and flooding were coupled with the perception of risks as low. Whilst some respondents accepted personal responsibility for action, most believed that the authorities were responsible for flood protection, and would not pay the costs required to make their home more energy-efficient and better prepared for the eventuality of floods. The results suggest that there is scope for further improvement of energy-saving measures, and that the levels of adoption of flood-protection measures are very low. Multi-faceted strategies, including more effective communication of risks and responsibilities, incentives, and material support for the poorest, will need to be developed to overcome the current reluctance by homeowners to invest in flood-protection measures and further energy conservation solutions in the future.     

Contributions of individual countries?? emissions to climate change and their uncertainty

We have compiled historical greenhouse gas emissions and their uncertainties on country and sector level and assessed their contribution to cumulative emissions and to global average temperature increase in the past and for a the future emission scenario. We find that uncertainty in historical contribution estimates differs between countries due to different shares of greenhouse gases and time development of emissions. Although historical emissions in the distant past are very uncertain, their influence on countries?? or sectors?? contributions to temperature increase is relatively small in most cases, because these results are dominated by recent (high) emissions. For relative contributions to cumulative emissions and temperature rise, the uncertainty introduced by unknown historical emissions is larger than the uncertainty introduced by the use of different climate models. The choice of different parameters in the calculation of relative contributions is most relevant for countries that are different from the world average in greenhouse gas mix and timing of emissions. The choice of the indicator (cumulative GWP weighted emissions or temperature increase) is very important for a few countries (altering contributions up to a factor of 2) and could be considered small for most countries (in the order of 10%). The choice of the year, from which to start accounting for emissions (e.g. 1750 or 1990), is important for many countries, up to a factor of 2.2 and on average of around 1.3. Including or excluding land-use change and forestry or non-CO₂ gases changes relative contributions dramatically for a third of the countries (by a factor of 5 to a factor of 90). Industrialised countries started to increase CO₂ emissions from energy use much earlier. Developing countries?? emissions from land-use change and forestry as well as of CH₄ and N₂O were substantial before their emissions from energy use.     

Are there social limits to adaptation to climate change?

While there is a recognised need to adapt to changing climatic conditions, there is an emerging discourse of limits to such adaptation. Limits are traditionally analysed as a set of immutable thresholds in biological, economic or technological parameters. This paper contends that limits to adaptation are endogenous to society and hence contingent on ethics, knowledge, attitudes to risk and culture. We review insights from history, sociology and psychology of risk, economics and political science to develop four propositions concerning limits to adaptation. First, any limits to adaptation depend on the ultimate goals of adaptation underpinned by diverse values. Second, adaptation need not be limited by uncertainty around future foresight of risk. Third, social and individual factors limit adaptation action. Fourth, systematic undervaluation of loss of places and culture disguises real, experienced but subjective limits to adaptation. We conclude that these issues of values and ethics, risk, knowledge and culture construct societal limits to adaptation, but that these limits are mutable.     

The new national climate change documents of Mexico: what do the regional climate change scenarios represent?

This paper presents a review of the methodology applied for generating the regional climate change scenarios utilized in important National Documents of Mexico, such as the Fourth National Communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Fourth National Report to the Convention on Biological Diversity and The Economics of Climate Change in Mexico. It is shown that these regional climate change scenarios, which are one of the main inputs to support the assessments presented in these documents, are an example of the erroneous use of statistical downscaling techniques. The arguments presented here imply that the work based on such scenarios should be revised and therefore, these documents are inadequate for supporting national decision- making.     

The vulnerability of beach tourism to climate change—an index approach

The attractiveness of a region for touristic activities depends strongly on the local weather and climate. This paper analyses the vulnerability of the beach tourism sector towards climate change by means of an index approach on a country level. A vulnerability framework for the tourism sector is developed and on its basis, indicators are defined for exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity. A transparent index approach, including a robustness analysis with multiple transformation methods and weighting sets, yields an assessment of the overall relative vulnerability of the beach tourism sector in 51 countries. Aggregate results on an annual level are presented as a starting point for a more detailed comparison of countries based on the individual indicators. The important limitations regarding the availability of accurate indicators as well as the concept of vulnerability itself are discussed. Despite these limitations, the present study contributes to integrating the numerous direct as well as indirect effects climate change may have on beach tourism.     

From observer to extension agent—using research experiences to enable proactive response to climate change

A shared learning model is described, in which researchers and local practitioners collaborate on climate change studies. The legacy of such partnerships is that beyond the generation of research results, practitioners may become climate change extension agents, supporting governments and businesses in responding to climate change.     

Uncertainty analysis comes to integrated assessment models for climate change…and conversely

This article traces the development of uncertainty analysis through three generations punctuated by large methodology investments in the nuclear sector. Driven by a very high perceived legitimation burden, these investments aimed at strengthening the scientific basis of uncertainty quantification. The first generation building off the Reactor Safety Study introduced structured expert judgment in uncertainty propagation and distinguished variability and uncertainty. The second generation emerged in modeling the physical processes inside the reactor containment building after breach of the reactor vessel. Operational definitions and expert judgment for uncertainty quantification were elaborated. The third generation developed in modeling the consequences of release of radioactivity and transport through the biosphere. Expert performance assessment, dependence elicitation and probabilistic inversion are among the hallmarks. Third generation methods may be profitably employed in current Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) of climate change. Possible applications of dependence modeling and probabilistic inversion are sketched. It is unlikely that these methods will be fully adequate for quantitative uncertainty analyses of the impacts of climate change, and a penultimate section looks ahead to fourth generation methods.     

Changing streamflow on Columbia basin tribal lands—climate change and salmon

Over the last 100 years, linear trends of tributary streamflow have changed on Columbia River Basin tribal reservations and historical lands ceded by tribes in treaties with the United States. Analysis of independent flow measures (Seasonal Flow Fraction, Center Timing, Spring Flow Onset, High Flow, Low Flow) using the Student t test and Mann-Kendall trend test suggests evidence for climate change trends for many of the 32 study basins. The trends exist despite interannual climate variability driven by the El Niño–Southern Oscillation and Pacific Decadal Oscillation. The average April—July flow volume declined by 16 %. The median runoff volume date has moved earlier by 5.8 days. The Spring Flow Onset date has shifted earlier by 5.7 days. The trend of the flow standard deviation (i.e., weather variability) increased 3 % to 11 %. The 100-year November floods increased 49 %. The mid-Columbia 7Q10 low flows have decreased by 5 % to 38 %. Continuation of these climatic and hydrological trends may seriously challenge the future of salmon, their critical habitats, and the tribal peoples who depend upon these resources for their traditional livelihood, subsistence, and ceremonial purposes.     

Adapting California’s water management to climate change

California faces significant water management challenges from climate change, affecting water supply, aquatic ecosystems, and flood risks. Fortunately, the state also possesses adaptation tools and institutional capabilities that can limit vulnerability to changing conditions. Water supply managers have begun using underground storage, water transfers, conservation, recycling, and desalination to meet changing demands. These same tools are promising options for responding to a wide range of climate changes. Likewise, many staples of flood management—including reservoir operations, levees, bypasses, insurance, and land-use regulation—are available for the challenges of increased floods. Yet actions are also needed to improve response capacity. For water supply, a central issue is the management of the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, where new conveyance, habitat investments, and regulations are needed to sustain water supplies and protect endangered fish species. For flood management, among the least-examined aspects of water management with climate change, needed reforms include forward-looking reservoir operation planning and floodplain mapping, less restrictive rules for raising local funds, and improved public information on flood risks. For water quality, an urgent priority is better science. Although local agencies are central players, adaptation will require strong-willed state leadership to shape institutions, incentives, and regulations capable of responding to change. Federal cooperation often will be essential.     

The ‘ultimate objective’ of the framework convention on climate change requires a new approach in climate change research

In the Framework Convention on Climate Change an ultimate objective is formulated that calls for stabilization of the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at a level that would allow ecosystems to adapt naturally, safeguard food supply and enable sustainable development to proceed in a sustainable manner. This paper addresses the possible contribution of science to translate this rather vague and ambiguous objective into more practicable terms. We propose a regionalized, risk-based six-step approach that couples an analysis of ecosystem vulnerability to the results of simulations of climate change. An ultimate objective level could be determined in terms of stabilized concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The level and timing of this stabilization would be determined by a political appreciation of associated risks for managed and unmanaged ecosystems. These risks would be assessed by region in an internationally coordinated scientific effort, followed by a global synthesis.     

How robust are global conservation priorities to climate change?

International conservation organisations have identified priority areas for biodiversity conservation. These global-scale prioritisations affect the distribution of funds for conservation interventions. As each organisation has a different focus, each prioritisation scheme is determined by different decision criteria and the resultant priority areas vary considerably. However, little is known about how the priority areas will respond to the impacts of climate change. In this paper, we examined the robustness of eight global-scale prioritisations to climate change under various climate predictions from seven global circulation models. We developed a novel metric of the climate stability for 803 ecoregions based on a recently introduced method to estimate the overlap of climate envelopes. The relationships between the decision criteria and the robustness of the global prioritisation schemes were statistically examined. We found that decision criteria related to level of endemism and landscape fragmentation were strongly correlated with areas predicted to be robust to a changing climate. Hence, policies that prioritise intact areas due to the likely cost efficiency, and assumptions related to the potential to mitigate the impacts of climate change, require further examination. Our findings will help determine where additional management is required to enable biodiversity to adapt to the impacts of climate change.     

How harmful are restrictions on adapting to climate change?

The dominant assumption in economic models of climate policy remains that adaptation will be implemented in an optimal manner. There are, however, several reasons why optimal levels of adaptation may not be attainable. This paper investigates the effects of suboptimal levels of adaptation caused by different types of adaptation restrictions, on the composition and level of climate change costs and on welfare. We find that especially restrictions to the effectiveness of adaptation at more extreme levels of climate change can be very harmful. Furthermore we show that the potential of mitigation to offset suboptimal adaptation varies from being essential in case adaptation becomes ineffective at higher temperature increases, to being largely ineffective in case of short-term inaction. However, in all cases the short-term recommendation is to increase mitigation levels slightly above what is normally recommended, and to keep mitigation policies flexible enough to be able to respond when adaptation restrictions become more prominent. It is clear that by reducing adaptation restrictions, in combination with adjusting the optimal level of mitigation may keep the costs of adaptation restrictions limited, and thus generally it is very harmful to ignore existing restrictions on adaptation when devising (efficient) climate policies.