International climate policy: a “second best” solution for a “second best” world?

In the current political environment, it is highly unlikely that all countries will agree to take on immediate commitments to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. In particular, developing countries will look to their wealthier neighbors to be the “first movers.” In this paper, we assume that developing countries will eventually accede to an international emission reductions regime under two alternative scenarios. In the first, the decision on the part of developing countries to join the coalition is not made until just before accession. There is no planning to reconfigure their capital stock in advance of joining the coalition. In the second, we assume that developing countries commit to prespecified reductions beginning at an agreed upon date in the future; that is, they anticipate accession. We find that with an agreement now to future reductions, developing countries will modify their technology investment decisions in advance of accession to avoid being saddled with costly stranded assets, substantially reducing their GDP losses. Developed countries also benefit from not having to make as drastic reductions in the near-term to preserve the feasibility of stringent stabilization goals.     

Selling climate change? The limitations of social marketing as a strategy for climate change public engagement

Social marketing is the systematic application of marketing concepts and techniques to achieve specific behavioural goals relevant to the social good. Social marketing approaches are becoming increasingly popular among governmental and non-governmental actors seeking to engage the public on climate change. The effectiveness of social marketing in achieving specific behavioural goals is empirically well-supported. However, in the first systematic critique of social marketing as a strategy for engaging the public on climate change, we present evidence that social marketing alone is insufficient to build support for the more ambitious policy changes and interventions that constitute a proportional response to climate change. In some circumstances, social marketing approaches may even be counterproductive. We describe some alternative approaches for engaging the public, which may provide governmental and non-governmental actors with additional or preferable tools for promoting public engagement with climate change. Given the scale of the challenge, it seems critical that those seeking to engage the public are equipped with the most effective strategies available - a goal that this paper seeks to contribute to. We conclude that acknowledging the limitations of social marketing - and exploring alternative methods of engaging the public - is an urgent task for climate change communication researchers and practitioners.     

Landscape for change? International climate policy and energy transitions: evidence from sub-Saharan Africa

What is the role of the climate regime in facilitating rapid decarbonization of the world’s energy systems? We examine how core assumptions concerning the roles of the nation state, carbon markets and finance and technology in international climate policy are being challenged by the realities of how transitions in the energy systems are unfolding. Drawing on the critical region of sub-Saharan Africa, we examine the potential for international climate policy to foster new trajectories towards decarbonization.

Policy relevance

The international regime for climate policy has been in place for some twenty years. Despite significant changes in the landscape of energy systems and drivers of global GHG emissions over this time, the core principles and tools remain relatively stable – national governments, carbon markets, project-based climate finance and the transfer of technological hardware. Given the diversity of actors and drivers and the limited direct reach and influence of international climate policy, however, there is an urgent need to consider how the climate regime can best support the embryonic transitions that are slowly taking form around the world. To do this effectively requires a more nuanced understanding of the role of the state in governing these transitions beyond the notion of a cohesive state serving as rule-enforcer and transition manager. It also requires a broader view of technology, not just as hardware that is transferred, but as a set of practices and networks of expertise and enabling actors. Likewise, though markets have an important role to play as vehicles for achieving broader ends, they are not an end in themselves. Finally on finance, while acknowledging the important role of climate aid, often as a multiplier or facilitator of more ambitious private flows, it is critical to differentiate between the types of finance required for different transitions, many of which will not be counted under, or directed by, the climate regime. In sum, the (low-) carbon economy is being built in ways and in numerous sites that the climate regime needs to be cognizant of and engage with productively, and this may require fundamental reconsideration of the building blocks of the international climate regime.     

Testing supply-side climate policies for the global steam coal market—can they curb coal consumption?

The achieved international consensus on the 1.5–2 °C target entails that most of current fossil fuel reserves must remain unburned. A major contribution has to come from coal as both the most abundant and the most emission-intensive fuel. Currently, a majority of climate policies aiming at reducing coal consumption are directed towards the demand side. In the absence of a global carbon-pricing regime, these policies are prone to carbon leakage and other adverse effects. Supply-side climate policies present an alternative and increasingly discussed approach to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels. In this article, I employ a numerical model of the international steam coal market to examine two supply-side policies that are currently discussed in academic literature and by policy-makers, alike: (1) a production subsidy reform introduced in major coal-producing countries and (2) a globally implemented moratorium on new coal mines. The model simulates global patterns of coal supply, demand, and international trade, with endogenous investment in coal production and transportation capacities. I find that mere production subsidy removal, while associated with a small positive total welfare effect, leads to a minor reduction of global emissions. By contrast, a mine moratorium induces a much more pronounced reduction in global coal consumption by effectively limiting coal availability and strongly increasing prices. Depending on the specification of reserves, the moratorium can induce a coal consumption path consistent with the 1.5–2 °C target.     

Subjective measures of climate resilience: What is the added value for policy and programming?

Subjective approaches to resilience measurement are gaining traction as a complementary approach to the standard frameworks that typically contain objective measures. Proponents suggest that subjective approaches may add value to existing measures in three areas: by improving our understanding of the drivers of resilience, reducing the questionnaire burden on respondents, and potentially offering more valid cross-cultural comparisons. This perspective assesses the potential, evidence and uncertainties around each of these claims, drawing from decades of research using subjective techniques in the wellbeing and psychological resilience literatures. Overall we find that subjective approaches can theoretically add value in each of these three areas. However the design of appropriate indicators must proceed with specificity and rigour for subjective measures to add value to programming and policy for climate resilience.     

Options for differentiation of future commitments in climate policy: how to realise timely participation to meet stringent climate goals?

Abstract

This paper aims at exploring options for differentiation of future commitments in global greenhouse gas emissions control, linked to climate targets. This is done on the basis of theEUtarget of a maximum global temperature increase of 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels. The Framework to Assess International Regimes for the differentiation of commitments (FAIR) is used to explore the implications of two possible climate regimes: (1) increasing participation (i.e. a gradual increase in the number of parties involved and their level of commitment according to participation and differentiation rules) and (2) ‘contraction and convergence’ (C&C) with universal participation and a convergence of per capita emission permits. It is found that in a regime of increasing participation, stabilising the CO₂ concentration at 450 ppmv by 2100 requires participation of major developing countries before 2050 in global emission control, irrespective of the participation and differentiation rules chosen. In the case of stringent climate targets, a convergence regime seems to provide more incentives for a timely participation of developing countries, and opportunities for an effective and efficient regime for controlling global emissions than increasing participation.     

Options for differentiation of future commitments in climate policy: how to realise timely participation to meet stringent climate goals?

This paper aims at exploring options for differentiation of future commitments in global greenhouse gas emissions control, linked to climate targets. This is done on the basis of the EU target of a maximum global temperature increase of 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels. The Framework to Assess International Regimes for the differentiation of commitments (FAIR) is used to explore the implications of two possible climate regimes: (1) increasing participation (i.e. a gradual increase in the number of parties involved and their level of commitment according to participation and differentiation rules) and (2) ‘contraction and convergence’ (C&C) with universal participation and a convergence of per capita emission permits. It is found that in a regime of increasing participation, stabilising the CO₂ concentration at 450 ppmv by 2100 requires participation of major developing countries before 2050 in global emission control, irrespective of the participation and differentiation rules chosen. In the case of stringent climate targets, a convergence regime seems to provide more incentives for a timely participation of developing countries, and opportunities for an effective and efficient regime for controlling global emissions than increasing participation.     

Climate sensitivity: should the climate tail wag the policy dog?

The small but stubbornly unyielding possibility of a very large long-term response of global temperature to increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide can be termed the fat tail of high climate sensitivity. Recent economic analyses suggest that the fat tail should dominate a rational policy strategy if the damages associated with such high temperatures are large enough. The conclusions of such analyses, however, depend on how economic growth, temperature changes, and climate damages unfold and interact over time. In this paper we focus on the role of two robust physical properties of the climate system: the enormous thermal inertia of the ocean, and the long timescales associated with high climate sensitivity. Economic models that include a climate component, and particularly those that focus on the tails of the probability distributions, should properly represent the physics of this slow response to high climate sensitivity, including the correlated uncertainty between present forcing and climate sensitivity, and the global energetics of the present climate state. If climate sensitivity in fact proves to be high, these considerations prevent the high temperatures in the fat tail from being reached for many centuries. A failure to include these factors risks distorting the resulting economic analyses. For example, we conclude that fat-tail considerations will not strongly influence economic analyses when these analyses follow the common—albeit controversial—practices of assigning large damages only to outcomes with very high temperature changes and of assuming a significant baseline level of economic growth.     

A ‘safety deposit’ mechanism for US climate policy

US policy makers are currently evaluating options to reduce domestic carbon dioxide emissions, and several economy-wide cap-and-trade proposals have been put forward in the 111th Congress. Despite mounting enthusiasm for cap-and-trade, advocates of this approach have had to defend such proposals against the criticisms that prices in the resulting carbon market will be unstable and that the implied costs of policy might exceed society's willingness to pay for the expected environmental benefits. Allowance borrowing has been proposed as one solution to both of these concerns, with firm-level borrowing intended to mitigate the impacts of transient cost shocks, and system-level borrowing intended to hedge against the risk of early technology bottlenecks. Each of these mechanisms, as proposed, relies upon prescribed constraints, such as interest payments or quantity limits, to protect against overuse. This article introduces a novel mechanism that offers qualitatively similar protection—a firm-level deposit on borrowed allowances that is refundable upon repayment of the emissions debt. However, the deposit mechanism is shown to be both more economically efficient and more effective in mitigating performance risk, when compared to the existing alternatives.     

Does effective climate policy require well-informed citizen support?

Citizen support for climate policies is typically seen as an important criterion in climate policy making. Some studies of climate policy support assume that a significant number of citizens need to be aware of the policies in question and able to provide informed opinions. In this study, we probe this assumption using a web-based survey of residents of the Canadian province of British Columbia (n = 475) by assessing: (1) citizen awareness and knowledge of climate policies, (2) citizen support for different climate policies, (3) the relationship between citizen knowledge and policy support, and (4) the effect of information provision on policy support. Our main finding is that most survey respondents are not aware of any of British Columbia's climate policies, and have little understanding of the potential effect of these on reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Once they are made aware of different types of climate policies, respondents are more likely to express support for regulations, such as the zero-emissions electricity standard and energy efficiency regulations, and less likely to support a carbon tax. Statistical analysis indicates that citizen knowledge of policy is not associated with higher policy support. Furthermore, providing information on likely policy effectiveness to our survey respondents did not translate into higher support, suggesting that widespread knowledge and well-informed citizen support are not necessarily required for implementation of effective climate policies.     

Global warming vs. climate change, taxes vs. prices: Does word choice matter?

Does ??climate change?? seem like a less serious problem than ??global warming?? to Americans and Europeans? Does describing the costs of climate change mitigation in terms of ??higher taxes?? instead of ??higher prices?? reduce public support for such efforts? In an experiment embedded in an American national survey, respondents were randomly assigned to rate the seriousness of ??global warming,?? ??climate change,?? or ??global climate change.?? Contrary to predictions made by a leading political strategist, the full sample and political Independents perceived ??climate change?? and ??global warming?? to be equally serious. Among Republicans, ??climate change?? was perceived to be more serious than ??global warming,?? whereas the reverse was true among Democrats. A similar experiment embedded in a survey of residents of 31 European countries showed that ??global warming?? and ??climate change?? were perceived to be equally serious problems. And an experiment embedded in an American survey showed that describing the increased costs of climate change mitigation legislation via ??higher taxes?? instead of via ??higher prices?? did not reduce popular support for such legislation, also contradicting a political strategy memo. Thus, word choice may sometimes affect public perceptions of the climate change seriousness or support for mitigation policies, but a single choice of terminology may not influence all people the same way, making strategic language choices difficult to implement.     

Who and what are carbon markets for? Politics and the development of climate policy

Why have carbon markets been rapidly adopted as policy solutions to climate change in the last decade? Perhaps surprisingly, this question has attracted virtually no attention in the large literature on such markets. The standard arguments given for why carbon markets are good ways to respond to climate change do not explain why such markets have flourished as governance mechanisms in relation to climate. Carbon markets have spread and become taken-for-granted because of the potential they give to certain powerful actors (financiers, specifically) to create new cycles of investment, profits and growth. As a consequence, they make possible a political coalition combining financiers with environmentalists. This coalition has considerable potential to legitimize substantial cuts in carbon emissions in the face of continued opposition from other interests. It is the combination of these two elements – the promotion of specific growth sectors and the construction of a political coalition – that constitutes the principal political virtue of carbon markets. In order to demonstrate this claim, the history of emissions trading is traced and the implication of this analysis is explored for the further building of climate governance centred on carbon markets.     

Does leadership promote cooperation in climate change mitigation policy?

In the run-up to the Copenhagen negotiations, commentators, politicians and the public had great expectations of some state taking the lead towards a new global climate deal. Is there something in such a call for leadership? In two steps, this article provides an empirically informed answer to that question. The first part develops a theoretical account of the relation between leadership and cooperation in international climate change mitigation policy (ICCMP). Starting from a five-dimensional leadership account and a simple game-theoretical analysis of the impediments to cooperation, it is predicted that (1) increased leadership facilitates cooperation in ICCMP and (2) different leadership modes contribute to cooperation in varying degrees. The second part tests these hypotheses: a new leadership index measures the extent to which the EU exhibited leadership at the negotiations of the Conference of the Parties (COP) between 1995 and 2008. This positively correlates with the level of cooperation arrived at. The result also holds for four out of five leadership modes.     

Biomass strategies for climate policies?

Abstract

This paper discusses the results of the BEAP linear programming model that has been developed to study the optimal use of biomass and land for greenhouse gas emission reduction, notably the competition between food production, biomass production for energy and materials and afforestation. The model results suggest up to 100 EJ biomass use in case of global policies (about 20% of global primary energy use). The biomass is used for industrial and residential heating, transportation fuels and as a feedstock for plastics. In the electricity markets competing emission reduction options are more cost-effective than biomass. In case the Kyoto protocol is continued beyond 2010 the developed countries can rely in 2020–2030 on afforestation and land use change credits from developing countries, without any major use of other emission reduction strategies. However, in case of a planning perspective of more than half a century bioenergy is preferred instead of afforestation. The results indicate a limited impact on global agricultural trade, but food demand may be affected by CO₂ policies.     

No regrets?: Economy and environment in Australia's domestic climate change policy process

This paper explores Australia's domestic response to the issue of climate change, and charts the evolution of ‘no-regrets’ as the guiding principle for policy development. The concept of no-regrets encapsulates the ecologically modern idea that addressing environmental problems can bring economic, as well as social and environmental, benefits. It is argued that the degree of reconciliation between environmental and economic objectives achieved has been made possible through a progressive narrowing of the scales over which costs and benefits are weighed, and the exclusion of the non-material benefits of the environment. Tensions between addressing climate change and continuing business as usual, which are far from unique to Australia, remain and continue to limit effective reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.