Uncertain climate: An investigation into public scepticism about anthropogenic climate change

This study presents a detailed investigation of public scepticism about climate change in Britain using the trend, attribution, and impact scepticism framework of Rahmstorf (2004). The study found that climate scepticism is currently not widespread in Britain. Although uncertainty and scepticism about the potential impacts of climate change were fairly common, both trend and attribution scepticism were far less prevalent. It further showed that the different types of scepticism are strongly interrelated. Although this may suggest that the general public does not clearly distinguish between the different aspects of the climate debate, there is a clear gradation in prevalence along the Rahmstorf typology. Climate scepticism appeared particularly common among older individuals from lower socio-economic backgrounds who are politically conservative and hold traditional values; while it is less common among younger individuals from higher socio-economic backgrounds who hold self-transcendence and environmental values. The finding that climate scepticism is rooted in people's core values and worldviews may imply a coherent and encompassing sceptical outlook on climate change. However, attitudinal certainty appeared mainly concentrated in non-sceptical groups, suggesting that climate sceptical views are not held very firmly. Implications of the findings for climate change communication and engagement are discussed.     

Network analysis reveals open forums and echo chambers in social media discussions of climate change

Action to tackle the complex and divisive issue of climate change will be strongly influenced by public perception. Online social media and associated social networks are an increasingly important forum for public debate and are known to influence individual attitudes and behaviours – yet online discussions and social networks related to climate change are not well understood. Here we construct several forms of social network for users communicating about climate change on the popular microblogging platform Twitter. We classify user attitudes to climate change based on message content and find that social networks are characterised by strong attitude-based homophily and segregation into polarised “sceptic” and “activist” groups. Most users interact only with like-minded others, in communities dominated by a single view. However, we also find mixed-attitude communities in which sceptics and activists frequently interact. Messages between like-minded users typically carry positive sentiment, while messages between sceptics and activists carry negative sentiment. We identify a number of general patterns in user behaviours relating to engagement with alternative views. Users who express negative sentiment are themselves the target of negativity. Users in mixed-attitude communities are less likely to hold a strongly polarised view, but more likely to express negative sentiment towards other users with differing views. Overall, social media discussions of climate change often occur within polarising “echo chambers”, but also within “open forums”, mixed-attitude communities that reduce polarisation and stimulate debate. Our results have implications for public engagement with this important global challenge.     

A new approach for evaluating climate change communication

Many scholars study when climate change communication increases citizen engagement. Yet, past work has largely used public opinion-based measures of engagement to evaluate alternative frames. In this paper, we argue for a new approach to evaluation, which is premised on research on the policy-making process showing that space on the political agenda and, ultimately, policy change are more likely to arise in response to changes in both public opinion and collective political action. Thus, we argue that alternative frames should be evaluated based on their consequences for both. This is especially critical given that frames can have divergent effects on attitudes and behavior. Using a combination of field and survey experiments, we apply our approach to evaluate two frames related to climate change risks. We find that they heighten people’s concern about climate change yet decrease their rate of political action to express that concern. Our results suggest caution with regard to these frames in particular and that, more generally, frames that might seem advantageous when examining public opinion may not be when political behavior is analyzed.

     

Scepticism and uncertainty about climate change: Dimensions, determinants and change over time

While scientific consensus and political and media messages appear to be increasingly certain, public attitudes and action towards the issue do not appear to be following suit. Popular and academic debate often assumes this is due to ignorance or misunderstanding on the part of the public, but some studies have suggested political beliefs and values may play a more important role in determining belief versus scepticism about climate change. The current research used two representative postal surveys of the UK public to: measure scepticism and uncertainty about climate change; determine how scepticism varies according to individual characteristics, knowledge and values; and examine how scepticism has changed over time. Findings show denial of climate change is less common than the perception that the issue has been exaggerated. Scepticism was found to be strongly determined by individuals’ environmental and political values (and indirectly by age, gender, location and lifestyle) rather than by education or knowledge. Between 2003 and 2008, public uncertainty about climate change has remained remarkably constant, although belief that claims about the issue are exaggerated has doubled over that period. These results are interpreted with reference to psychological concepts of motivated reasoning, confirmation bias and ‘finite pool of worry’. Implications for communication and policy are discussed.     

Communicating the climate impacts of meat consumption: The effect of values and message framing

Meat production for human consumption has serious environmental implications and contributes significantly to climate change. Changing people’s food choices is an important step towards reducing human impacts on the climate. Previous research shows that self-enhancement (i.e. self-interest) and self-transcendence (i.e. altruism) values are related to meat consumption. This study examined the effectiveness of the provision of information about climate impacts of meat consumption in influencing concern about these climate impacts of meat consumption, attitudes towards eating meat and behavioural intentions in a New Zealand sample (N = 848). Further, the study examined whether framing the message to align with people’s value sets would enhance the information’s effectiveness in affecting concern, attitudes and intentions. Survey participants were randomly assigned to a no-information control group, a message targeting self-enhancement values, or a message targeting self-transcendence values. Results indicated that the information provision was associated with significantly higher levels of concern about the climate impacts of meat consumption and significantly lower intentions to eat meat, but it did not affect attitudes towards meat consumption. However, the framing of the message did affect attitudes towards meat consumption, depending on existing values. Implications of this research can be applied to future climate change communication campaigns, through the use of targeted, value-congruent information.     

Consumers’ knowledge about climate change

Several studies have unveiled various misconceptions about climate change that the public holds, for instance, confusion about climate change and ozone depletion. However, so far, there has been no uniform and standardized way to measure climate-related knowledge, which complicates comparisons between different countries or samples. To develop an extensive knowledge scale, we therefore examined the Swiss public??s understanding of climate change in a mail survey and related this scale to attitudes toward climate change. We thereby aimed to consider a broad range of climate-related knowledge, namely physical knowledge about CO₂ and the greenhouse effect, knowledge about climate change and its causes, knowledge about the expected consequences of climate change, and action-related knowledge. The questionnaire included items of different degrees of difficulty, ranging from knowledge that is covered by newspapers to experts?? knowledge. Our findings indicate that people still hold several misconceptions, although people??s knowledge related to CO₂ seems to have increased compared to previous studies. Of all knowledge subscales, knowledge about climate change and causes was most strongly related to attitudes toward climate change.     

How you talk about climate change matters: A communication network perspective on epistemic skepticism and belief strength

A population’s attitudes toward climate change can strongly influence governmental policies as well as community and individual climate-related behaviors. These attitudes have been explained with a variety of factors, including cultural worldviews, environmental attitudes, political ideology, knowledge of climate change, severe weather exposure, and sociodemographic characteristics. These studies typically assume an individual forms attitudes on the basis of preexisting values or beliefs and do not account for dynamic social interaction as a source of influence. This study introduces a network perspective that accounts for the social embeddedness of individuals, using network variables to predict climate attitudes, including homophily, network strength, attitude diversity, centrality, network size, and network valence. An exploratory factor analysis identified two distinct attitudinal dimensions: climate change epistemic skepticism and belief strength. Using egocentric data from a nationally representative survey collected in 2011, this study found that network variables were significant in predicting both climate attitude dimensions; hierarchical regression analyses accounting for other known predictors found two different predictive models for epistemic skepticism and belief strength. Homophily, network strength, attitude diversity, and network valence predicted epistemic skepticism (R²_change = 4.8%), while centrality and network strength predicted belief strength (R²_change = 8.9%). The analyses also found support for cultural factors as significant predictors of climate attitudes, particularly Christianity and cultural worldviews. The results of this study suggest that interpersonal influence through communication networks is a promising avenue for continued research, and should be included in studies of climate attitude formation and change.     

Public perception of cold weather events as evidence for and against climate change

It has been argued that public doubts about climate change have been exacerbated by cold weather events seen as a form of disconfirming evidence for anticipated ‘warming’. Although a link between perceptions of climate and weather is well-established, such assumptions have not been empirically tested. Here we show, using nationally representative data, that directly following a period of severe cold weather in the UK, three times as many people saw these events as pointing towards the reality of climate change, than as disconfirming it. This we argue was a consequence of these cold winters being incorporated into a conceptualisation of extreme or ‘unnatural’ weather resulting from climate change. We also show that the way in which people interpret cold weather is associated with levels of pre-existing scepticism about climate change, which is in turn related to more general worldviews. Drawing attention to ‘extreme’ weather as a consequence of climate change can be a useful communication device, however this is problematic in the case of seasonal cold.     

Lights, camera … action? Altered attitudes and behaviour in response to the climate change film The Age of Stupid

The film The Age of Stupid depicts the world in 2055 devastated by climate change, combining this with documentary footage which illustrates many facets of the problems of climate change and fossil-fuel dependency. This study investigates the effects of the film on UK viewers’ attitudes and behaviour through a three-stage survey. Analysis of changes in attitudes focussed particularly on respondents’ concern about climate change, motivation to act, fear about the potential for catastrophe, beliefs about responsibility for action, and sense of agency. The film increased concern about climate change, motivation to act, and viewers’ sense of agency, although these effects had not persisted 10-14 weeks after seeing it. It was also successful in promoting some mitigation actions and behavioural change, although respondents reported barriers to further action, such as limited options for improving home energy efficiency among those in rented accommodation. However, filmgoers were atypical of the general public in that they exhibited very high levels of concern about climate change, knowledge about how to reduce their carbon emissions, and contact with organisations campaigning about climate change, before they saw the film. The paper considers how these factors may have enabled viewers to respond to the film as they did, as well as policy implications for those seeking to develop effective climate change communications.     

How qualitative approaches matter in climate and ocean change research: Uncovering contradictions about climate concern

There is growing acknowledgement of the need for both quantitative and qualitative methods to unravel complex human-environment interactions and inform a more advanced move towards global sustainability. Nonetheless, qualitative methods still play an understated role in climate and ocean change research. One important reason for this are continuing tendencies in the natural sciences to value ‘hard’ and value-free quantitative approaches over ‘soft’ and value-laden qualitative approaches. This paper argues that to overcome such methodological reservations, it is necessary to inform not only about the key characteristics of qualitative research but also – and this has received little attention – about the concrete empirical insights that can be gained from qualitative as opposed to quantitative data, despite sharing the same research focus.The environmental literature still lacks relevant examples from fieldwork that explain in detail how exactly decisive information is elicited from specific qualitative datasets, thereby illustrating how qualitative approaches matter. This paper seeks to help fill this gap by demonstrating to sceptical quantitative researchers the necessity and added value of integrating qualitative data in global environmental change research and highlighting impeding factors. This is done by presenting empirical findings about climate and ocean change adaptation in Norwegian coastal fisheries and elucidating how different qualitative interview techniques reveal that fishers who initially state that they do not worry about climate change actually do worry, and vice versa. Self-categorisation theory from social psychology is used to better explain such contradictory statements. Detecting salient but masked climate concern and understanding the reasons behind it are crucial for avoiding misleading conclusions and effectively tailoring adaptation strategies to the requirements of specific audiences.     

A linked vulnerability and resilience framework for adaptation pathways in remote disadvantaged communities

We develop a systems framework for exploring adaptation pathways to climate change among people in remote and marginalized regions. The framework builds on two common and seemingly paradoxical narratives about people in remote regions. The first is recognition that people in remote regions demonstrate significant resilience to climate and resource variability, and may therefore be among the best equipped to adapt to climate change. The second narrative is that many people in remote regions are chronically disadvantaged and therefore are among the most vulnerable to climate change impacts. These narratives, taken in isolation and in extremis, can have significant maladaptive policy and practice implications. From a systems perspective, both narratives may be valid, because they form elements of latent and dominant feedback loops that require articulation for a nuanced understanding of vulnerability-reducing and resilience-building responses in a joint framework. Through literature review and community engagement across three remote regions on different continents, we test the potential of the framework to assist dialogue about adaptation pathways in remote marginalized communities. In an adaptation pathway view, short-term responses to vulnerability can risk locking in a pathway that increases specific resilience but creates greater vulnerability in the long-term. Equally, longer-term actions towards increasing desirable forms of resilience need to take account of short-term realities to respond to acute and multiple needs of marginalized remote communities. The framework was useful in uniting vulnerability and resilience narratives, and broadening the scope for adaptation policy and action on adaptation pathways for remote regions.     

Political orientation and climate concern shape visual attention to climate change

Despite the scientific consensus, there is widespread public controversy about climate change. Previous explanations focused on interpretations hampered by political bias or insufficient knowledge of climate facts. We propose that public views of climate change may also be related to an attentional bias at a more basic level of cognitive processing. We hypothesized that selective visual attention towards or away from climate-related information would be associated with climate concern. To test prioritization of climate-related stimuli under conditions of limited attention, we asked participants to identify climate-related and neutral words within a rapid stream of stimuli. Undergraduate students attended to climate-related words more readily than neutral words. This attentional prioritization correlated with self-rated climate concern. We then examined this relationship in a more diverse community sample. Principal component analysis of survey data in the community sample revealed a component indexing a relationship between climate concern and political orientation. That component was correlated with the degree of selective inattention to climate-related words. Our findings suggest that climate-related communications may be most effective if tailored in a manner accounting for how attentional priorities differ between audiences—particularly those with different political orientations.     

Extreme weather events and climate change concern

This paper examines whether experience of extreme weather events—such as excessive heat, droughts, flooding, and hurricanes—increases an individual’s level concern about climate change. We bring together micro-level geospatial data on extreme weather events from NOAA’s Storm Events Database with public opinion data from multiple years of the Cooperative Congressional Election Study to study this question. We find evidence of a modest, but discernible positive relationship between experiencing extreme weather activity and expressions of concern about climate change. However, the effect only materializes for recent extreme weather activity; activity that occurred over longer periods of time does not affect public opinion. These results are generally robust to various measurement strategies and model specifications. Our findings contribute to the public opinion literature on the importance of local environmental conditions on attitude formation.     

An economic approach to adaptation: illustrations from Europe

Policy makers are still struggling to find a rational and effective way to handle adaptation to climate change. This paper discusses a more strategic, economic approach to public adaptation and compares it with adaptation practice in Europe. An economic approach to adaptation involves setting priorities, both spatially (where to adapt) and inter-temporally (when to adapt). The paper reviews what we know about Europe’s geographic adaptation priorities. On inter-temporal priorities, it recommends fast-tracking two types of action: Win-win measures that yield an immediate return, such as water efficiency, and strategic decisions on infrastructure and spatial planning that have long-term consequences for Europe’s vulnerability profile. An economic approach to adaptation involves careful project design to ensure adaptation measures are cost-effective and flexible in the light of climate uncertainty (how to adapt). The final element of an economic approach to adaptation is the division of labour between the state and private actors (who should adapt). The paper argues that the traditional functions of the state—the provision of public goods, creation of an enabling environment and protection of the vulnerable—also apply to adaptation.     

Effects of local drought condition on public opinions about water supply and future climate change

A growing body of research indicates that opinions about long-term climate change and other natural resource issues can be significantly affected by current weather conditions (e.g., outside air temperature) and other highly contingent environmental cues. Although increased severity and frequency of droughts is regarded as a likely consequence of anthropogenic climate change, little previous research has attempted to relate the experience of drought with public attitudes about water supply or water-related climate change issues. For this study, a large set (n?=?3,163) of public survey data collected across nine states of the southern United States was spatio-temporally linked with records of short-term (~12 weeks) and long-term (~5 years) drought condition at the level of each respondent’s zip code. Multivariate ordinal logistic regression models that included numerous other independent variables (environmental ideology, age, gender, education, community size, residency duration, and local annual precipitation) indicated highly significant interactions with long-term drought condition, but showed no significant effect from short-term drought condition. Conversely, attitudes about water-related climate change showed highly significant interactions with short-term drought, with weaker to no effects from long-term drought. While the finding of significant effects from short-term drought condition on opinions about future drought is broadly consistent with previous public opinion research on climate change, the finding of water supply attitudes being more responsive to longer term drought condition is, to our knowledge, a novel result. This study more generally demonstrates the methodological feasibility and applied importance of accounting for local drought condition when public opinion information is used to evaluate outreach programs for water conservation and climate change.     

Mapping the shadow of experience of extreme weather events

Climate change will increase the frequency and/or intensity of certain extreme weather events, and perceived experience with extreme weather may influence climate change beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. However, the aspects of extreme events that influence whether or not people perceive that they have personally experienced them remain unclear. We investigate (1) the correspondence of reported experience of extreme weather events with documented events, and (2) how characteristics of different extreme events shape the geographic area within which people are likely to report they have experienced it—the event’s perceived “shadow of experience.” We overlay geocoded survey responses indicating personal experience with hurricanes, tornadoes, and drought—from a 2012 nationally representative survey (N?=?1,008) of U.S. residents—on maps of recorded event impacts. We find that reported experiences correspond well with recorded event impacts, particularly for hurricanes and tornadoes. Reported experiences were related to event type, proximity, magnitude and duration. The results suggest locations where disaster preparedness efforts and climate change education campaigns could be most effective after an extreme weather event.     

Barriers perceived to engaging with climate change among the UK public and their policy implications

This paper reports on the barriers that members of the UK public perceive to engaging with climate change. It draws upon three mixed-method studies, with an emphasis on the qualitative data which offer an in-depth insight into how people make sense of climate change. The paper defines engagement as an individual's state, comprising three elements: cognitive, affective and behavioural. A number of common barriers emerge from the three studies, which operate broadly at ‘individual’ and ‘social’ levels. These major constraints to individual engagement with climate change have implications for achieving significant reductions in greenhouse gases in the UK. We argue that targeted and tailored information provision should be supported by wider structural change to enable citizens and communities to reduce their carbon dependency. Policy implications for effective engagement are discussed.     

Climate change and the agricultural sector in Ireland: examining farmer awareness and willingness to adopt new advisory mitigation tools

Agriculture is responsible for the bulk of Ireland’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. However, the potential to mitigate some of these emissions through the adoption of more efficient farm management practices may be hampered by farmers’ awareness and attitude towards climate change and agriculture’s role in contributing to GHG emissions. This paper presents results from a survey of 746 Irish farmers in 2014, with a view to understanding farmers’ awareness of, and attitudes to, climate change and GHG emissions. Survey results show that there was a general uncertainty towards a number of questions related to agricultural GHG emissions, e.g. if tilling of land causes GHG emissions, and that farmers were reluctant to take action to reduce GHG emissions on their farm. To further explore farmers’ attitudes towards climate change, a multinomial logit model was used to examine the socio-economic factors that affect farmers’ willingness to adopt an advisory tool that would show the potential reduction in GHG emissions from the adoption of new technologies. Results show that farmers’ awareness of human-induced global climate change was positively related to the tool’s adoption.

Key policy insights

• Irish farmers are generally not sufficiently aware of the impact of their activities on climate change.

• A quarter of farmers believed that climate change will only impact on their business in the long-term; such an attitude may lead to a reluctance amongst these farmers to adopt management practices that reduce GHG emissions.

• Awareness of climate change affects positively the adoption of new tools to reduce GHG emissions on farmers’ farms.

• IT literacy affects willingness to adopt new tools to address GHG emissions.

• Reception of agri-environmental advice can have a positive influence on farmers’ willingness to adopt new GHG emission abatement tools.

• Farmers in receipt of environmental subsidies are more likely to adopt new abatement tools, either because they are more environmentally conscious or because the subsidy raised their environmentally consciousness.

• Willingness to adopt differs between different farm enterprises; operating dairy enterprise increases the willingness to adopt new advisory mitigation tools.