The who, what, and wherefore of geoengineering governance

The potential of geoengineering to reverse global warming rapidly and cheaply makes it alluring to groups across the political spectrum. But geoengineering also poses significant risks and raises the specter of technology gone awry. This article analyzes the basic governance issues raised by geoengineering, including the possible functions, forms, objects and agents of governance. It then explores these issues by focusing on four scenarios of particular concern: inadequate research funding, premature rejection, unilateral individual action, and unilateral state action.     

The Oxford Principles

Scientific momentum is increasing behind efforts to develop geoengineering options, but it is widely acknowledged that the challenges of geoengineering are as much political and social as they are technical. Legislators are looking for guidance on the governance of geoengineering research and possible deployment. The Oxford Principles are five high-level principles for geoengineering governance. This article explains their intended function and the core societal values which they attempt to capture. Finally, it proposes a framework for their implementation in a flexible governance architecture through the formulation of technology-specific research protocols.     

1.5℃温控目标下地球工程问题剖析和应对政策建议

《巴黎协定》引入了全球应对气候变化的1.5℃温控目标,但是没有就其实现路径做出清晰安排。实现1.5℃目标对全球减排提出更高要求,各国自主贡献目标距离该目标有较大差距,常规减排技术和政策也很难完成任务。在此背景下,国际上有关地球工程的讨论日渐升温。《巴黎协定》实际上已经包含了人工造林,碳捕获与封存/碳捕获与利用技术（CCS/CCUS),生物质能利用加CCS（BECCS）等负排放技术,这些都是地球工程范畴的碳移除技术（CDR),除此之外,更具争议性的太阳辐射管理（SRM）技术也引起更多关注。地球工程作为非常规技术选项,在1.5℃目标下的影响评估、技术选择、伦理学和国际治理等一系列问题的研究和探讨都十分必要。本文在分析和探讨上述问题的基础上,就中国应重视和加强地球工程研究与应对提出一些政策建议,指出要将地球工程纳入中国应对气候变化战略大框架,围绕1.5℃目标加强地球工程科学研究,并积极参与地球工程国际治理,合理发出中国声音。     

Governing geoengineering research: why, when and how?

Research on geoengineering – deliberate management of the Earth’s climate system – is being increasingly discussed within the science and policy communities. While justified as necessary in order to expand the range of options available to policy makers in the future, geoengineering research has already engendered public controversy. Proposed projects have been protested or cancelled, and calls for a governance framework abound. In this paper, we consider the reasons why geoengineering research might be subject to additional governance and suggest mechanisms that might be usefully applied in developing such a framework. We consider criteria for governance as raised by a review of the growing literature on geoengineering and other controversial scientific topics. We suggest three families of concern that any governance research framework must respond to: the direct physical risks of the research; the transparency and responsibility in decision making for the research; and the larger societal meanings of the research. We review what mechanisms might be available to respond to these three families of concern, and consider how these might apply to geoengineering research.     

Living the global social experiment: An analysis of public discourse on solar radiation management and its implications for governance

Solar radiation management techniques are a class of geoengineering methods designed to reflect some of the inbound sunlight back into space with the intended effect of arresting further warming of the planet and thus counteracting global warming. In this article we examine current debates on solar radiation management governance, clarifying a number of assumptions that persist and why these require further scrutiny. Building on existing research we articulate a more critical role that the social sciences should be playing in public engagement with solar radiation management. We develop a deliberative focus group methodology that aims to open up deliberation on the technology, focusing explicitly on the kinds of world that its deployment would bring into being. Our findings, based on an analysis of public discourse, suggest that solar radiation management would be publicly acceptable only under very specific, and highly contingent, conditions. Given the sensed implausibility of these conditions being realised in the real world, we set out the implications for solar radiation management governance. We explain why solar radiation management was perceived as likely to create a particular kind of world, one with an increased probability of geopolitical conflict, a new condition of global experimentality, and major threats to democratic governance. How to bring these issues into solar radiation management governance entails an important but challenging role for the social sciences.     

Technical characteristics of a solar geoengineering deployment and implications for governance

ABSTRACT

Consideration of solar geoengineering as a potential response to climate change will demand complex decisions. These include not only the choice of whether to deploy solar engineering, but decisions regarding how to deploy, and ongoing decision-making throughout deployment. Research on the governance of solar geoengineering to date has primarily engaged only with the question of whether to deploy. We examine the science of solar geoengineering in order to clarify the technical dimensions of decisions about deployment – both strategic and operational – and how these might influence governance considerations, while consciously refraining from making specific recommendations. The focus here is on a hypothetical deployment rather than governance of the research itself. We first consider the complexity surrounding the design of a deployment scheme, in particular the complicated and difficult decision of what its objective(s) would be, given that different choices for how to deploy will lead to different climate outcomes. Next, we discuss the on-going decisions across multiple timescales, from the sub-annual to the multi-decadal. For example, feedback approaches might effectively manage some uncertainties, but would require frequent adjustments to the solar geoengineering deployment in response to observations. Other decisions would be tied to the inherently slow process of detection and attribution of climate effects in the presence of natural variability. Both of these present challenges to decision-making. These considerations point toward particular governance requirements, including an important role for technical experts – with all the challenges that entails.

Key policy insights

• Decisions about solar geoengineering deployment will be informed not only by political choices, but also by climate science and engineering.

• Design decisions will pertain to the spatial and temporal goals of a climate intervention and strategies for achieving those goals.

• Some uncertainty can be managed through feedback, but this would require frequent operational decisions.

• Some strategic decisions will depend on the detection and attribution of climatic effects from solar geoengineering, which may take decades.

• Governance for solar geoengineering deployment will likely need to incorporate technical expertise for making short-term adjustments to the deployment and conducting attribution analysis, while also slowing down decisions made in response to attribution analysis to avoid hasty choices.

     

Why geoengineering is a public good,even if it is bad

Stephen Gardiner argues that geoengineering does not meet the “canonical technical definition” of a global public good, and that it is misleading to frame geoengineering as a public good. A public good is something that is nonrival and nonexcludable. Contrary to Gardiner’s claims, geoengineering meets both of these criteria. Framing geoengineering as a public good is useful because it allows commentators to draw on the existing economic, philosophical, and social scientific literature on the governance of public goods.     

Public perceptions of geoengineering research governance: An experimental deliberative approach

Recent attempts to conduct experiments in climate ‘geoengineering’ have demonstrated the deeply controversial nature of this field of scientific research. Social scientists have begun to explore public perceptions of geoengineering, and have documented a significant degree of concern over the effective governance of research and experimentation in this area. Yet, public perception on what constitutes a legitimate geoengineering experiment and how it should be governed remains under-researched. In this article we report on a series of experimental deliberative workshops with members of the public designed to elicit and explicate diverse understandings of geoengineering experiments and their governance. In contrast to previous methods of invited public deliberation, which privilege egalitarian-consensual models of discourse and decision-making, we test a novel approach that places majoritarian, individualistic, and consensual forms of public deliberation on an equal footing. Our study suggests that the perceived controllability of experimental interventions is central to public views on their acceptability, but that controllability is itself a complex, multifaceted quality, drawing together a set of heterogeneous concerns about the purpose and repercussions of scientific work. The citizens who participated in our workshops employed four criteria to adjudicate the acceptability of geoengineering experiments: (1) the degree of containment; (2) the uncertainty surrounding experimental outcomes; (3) the reversibility of impacts; and (4) the scientific purity of the enterprise. We theorize that the public legitimacy of geoengineering experiments depends on variable, context-specific combinations of these criteria, and that technical determinations of the proper ‘scale’ or ‘location’ for geoengineering research will be poor predictors of the sorts of public concerns that will be triggered by further experimentation in this area.     

Defining success and limits of field experiments to test geoengineering by marine cloud brightening

Marine cloud brightening (MCB) has been suggested as a possible solar radiation management approach to geoengineering the Earth’s climate in order to offset anthropogenic global warming. We discuss the utility of field experiments to test MCB. These experiments, if appropriately designed, would provide an unprecedented controlled environment to not only test MCB, but to understand aerosol impacts on climate. We discuss the science of MCB and review a set of field experiments that has been proposed as de minimis first steps to field test the concept. Our focus is upon issues of success determination, international oversight and/or governance, and outcomes if initial tests are deemed successful.     

Public engagement on solar radiation management and why it needs to happen now

There have been a number of calls for public engagement in geoengineering in recent years. However, there has been limited discussion of why the public should have a say or what the public can be expected to contribute to geoengineering discussions. We explore how public engagement can contribute to the research, development, and governance of one branch of geoengineering, solar radiation management (SRM), in three key ways: 1. by fulfilling ethical requirements for the inclusion of affected parties in democratic decision making processes; 2. by contributing to improved dialogue and trust between scientists and the public; and 3. by ensuring that decisions about SRM research and possible deployment are informed by a broad set of societal interests, values, and framings. Finally, we argue that, despite the nascent state of many SRM technologies, the time is right for the public to participate in engagement processes.     

Why geoengineering is not a ‘global public good’, and why it is ethically misleading to frame it as one

In early policy work, climate engineering is often described as a global public good. This paper argues that the paradigm example of geoengineering—stratospheric sulfate injection (hereafter ‘SSI’)—does not fit the canonical technical definition of a global public good, and that more relaxed versions are unhelpful. More importantly, it claims that, regardless of the technicalities, the public good framing is seriously misleading, in part because it arbitrarily marginalizes ethical concerns. Both points suggest that more clarity is needed about the aims of geoengineering policy—and especially governance—and that this requires special attention to ethics.     

Governing geoengineering research for the Great Barrier Reef

Coral reefs are highly vulnerable to the impacts of rising marine temperatures and marine heatwaves. Mitigating dangerous climate change is essential and urgent, but many reef systems are already suffering on current levels of warming. Geoengineering options are worth exploring to protect the Great Barrier Reef (GBR) from extreme warming conditions, but we contend that they require strong governance and public consultation from the outset. Australian governments are currently funding feasibility testing of three geoengineering proposals for the GBR. Each proposal involves manipulating ocean or atmospheric conditions to lower water temperatures and thereby reduce the threat of mass coral bleaching events. Innovative strategies to protect the GBR and field testing of these is essential, but current laws do not guarantee robust governance for field testing of these technologies. Nor do they provide the foundation for a more coherent national policy on climate intervention technologies more generally. Responsible governance frameworks, including detailed risk assessment and early public consultation, are necessary for geoengineering research to build legitimacy and promote scientific progress.

Key policy insights

• Marine heatwaves pose a serious threat to coral reefs, including Australia’s iconic Great Barrier Reef.

• Australian governments have recognized the threats of warming waters, and are funding research of geoengineering options for the Great Barrier Reef.

• The limited earlier field testing of geoengineering demonstrates the need for specific governance to manage risks, build legitimacy and maintain public support.

• Australia requires a framework to govern geoengineering research and development before deployment of such technologies.

     

Messing with nature? Exploring public perceptions of geoengineering in the UK

Anthropogenic influence on the climate – and possible societal responses to it – offers a unique window through which to examine the way people think about and relate to the natural world. This paper reports data from four, one-day deliberative workshops conducted with members of the UK public during early 2012. The workshops focused on geoengineering – the deliberate, large-scale manipulation of the planetary environment – as one of three possible responses to climate change (alongside mitigation and adaptation). Here, we explore one of the most pervasive and wide-ranging themes to emerge from the workshops: whether geoengineering represented an unprecedented human intervention into ‘nature’, and what the moral consequences of this might be. Using the concept of ‘messing with nature’ as an analytical lens, we explore public perceptions of geoengineering. We also reflect on why ‘messing with nature’ was such a focal point for debate and disagreement, and whether the prospect of geoengineering may reveal new dimensions to the way that people think about the natural world, and their relationship to it.     

Reexamining the economics of aerosol geoengineering

In this paper, we extend the work of Goes, Tuana, and Keller (Climatic Change 2011; GTK) by reexamining the economic benefit, of aerosol geoengineering. GTK found that a complete substitution of geoengineering for CO₂ abatement fails a cost-benefit test over a wide range of scenarios regarding (i) the probability that such a program would be aborted and (ii) the economic damages caused by geoengineering itself. In this paper, we reframe the conditions under which GTK assumed geoengineering would/could be used. In so doing, we demonstrate that geoengineering may pass a cost-benefit test over a wide range of scenarios originally considered by GTK.     

The economics (or lack thereof) of aerosol geoengineering

Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are changing the Earth’s climate and impose substantial risks for current and future generations. What are scientifically sound, economically viable, and ethically defendable strategies to manage these climate risks? Ratified international agreements call for a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions to avoid dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Recent proposals, however, call for a different approach: to geoengineer climate by injecting aerosol precursors into the stratosphere. Published economic studies typically neglect the risks of aerosol geoengineering due to (i) the potential for a failure to sustain the aerosol forcing and (ii) the negative impacts associated with the aerosol forcing. Here we use a simple integrated assessment model of climate change to analyze potential economic impacts of aerosol geoengineering strategies over a wide range of uncertain parameters such as climate sensitivity, the economic damages due to climate change, and the economic damages due to aerosol geoengineering forcing. The simplicity of the model provides the advantages of parsimony and transparency, but it also imposes severe caveats on the interpretation of the results. For example, the analysis is based on a globally aggregated model and is hence silent on intragenerational distribution of costs and benefits. In addition, the analysis neglects the effects of learning and has a very simplistic representation of climate change impacts. Our analysis suggests three main conclusions. First, substituting aerosol geoengineering for CO₂ abatement can be an economically ineffective strategy. One key to this finding is that a failure to sustain the aerosol forcing can lead to sizeable and abrupt climatic changes. The monetary damages due to such a discontinuous aerosol geoengineering can dominate the cost-benefit analysis because the monetary damages of climate change are expected to increase with the rate of change. Second, the relative contribution of aerosol geoengineering to an economically optimal portfolio hinges critically on, thus far, deeply uncertain estimates of the damages due to aerosol forcing. Even if we assume that aerosol forcing could be deployed continuously, the aerosol geoengineering does not considerably displace CO₂ abatement in the simple economic optimal growth model until the damages due to the aerosol forcing are rather low. Third, substituting aerosol geoengineering for greenhouse gas emission abatement can fail an ethical test regarding intergenerational justice. Substituting aerosol geoengineering for greenhouse gas emissions abatements constitutes a conscious risk transfer to future generations, in violation of principles of intergenerational justice which demands that present generations should not create benefits for themselves in exchange for burdens on future generations.     

太阳辐射管理地球工程对海洋酸化影响的模拟研究

研究地球工程对海洋酸化的影响对于评估地球工程对全球气候和环境的影响有重要意义。文中使用中等复杂程度的地球系统模式,模拟了典型CO₂高排放情景RCP8.5下,实施太阳辐射管理地球工程对海洋表面的pH和文石（碳酸钙的一种亚稳形态）饱和度的影响,并定量分析了各环境因子对海洋酸化影响的机理。模拟结果表明,在RCP8.5情景下,到2100年,相对于工业革命前水平,全球海洋表面平均pH下降了0.43,文石饱和度下降了1.77。相对于RCP8.5情景,2100年地球工程情景下全球海洋表面平均pH增加了0.003,而文石饱和度降低了0.16。地球工程通过改变溶解无机碳、碱度、温度等环境因子影响海洋酸化。相对于RCP8.5情景,实施地球工程引起的溶解无机碳浓度的增加使pH和文石饱和度均减小,碱度的增加使pH和文石饱和度均增大,温度的降低使pH增大而使文石饱和度减小。总体而言,太阳辐射管理地球工程可以降低全球温度,但无法减缓海洋酸化。     

Possibility of geoengineering stabilization of global temperature in the 21st century using the stratospheric aerosol and estimation of potential negative effects

The climate model of atmospheric and oceanic circulation is used to assess a potential of the geoengineering to stabilize the global temperature at the level of +2°C relative to the average for the 20th century. An anthropogenic forcing was set in accordance with the RCP8.5 scenario. The injection of H₂S into the stratosphere transformed afterwards into the sulfate aerosol starts when the temperature reaches a threshold of +2°C. The intensity of the injection is chosen so that the estimated global temperature remains close to the threshold. It is demonstrated that the stabilization of temperature by geoengineering is possible within +(2 ± 0.11)°C during the 21st century. The stabilization of temperature by the end of the 21st century needs the yearly injection of 4.5 Mt S in the form of H₂S. The specific efficiency of the method is about 0.09°C/Mt of aerosol. It was found that the stabilization of global temperature does not provide the stabilization of mean global precipitation. The maximum influence of aerosol is in the equatorial zone where its specific density in the atmosphere will reach 0.074 g/m² by the end of the 21st century. Carried out is a comparison of regional features of temperature and precipitation fields with and without geoengineering. It is shown that the geoengineering will decrease significantly the regional anomalies in the most part of regions and will not increase them in the rest part. Estimated is an effect of the rapid growth in global temperature at the dramatic cessation of geoengineering impacts. Considered is a variant of the gradual decrease in geoengineering intensity, when the negative effects will be smoothed.     

地球工程情景下中国七大区域未来强降水和极端强降水的变化特征对比分析(2010—2099年)

地球工程作为人类影响全球气候的重要工程手段,具有重要的现实意义和科学价值。目前学界在地球工程对极端降水的影响研究方面还处于初始阶段。在这种背景下,基于BNU-ESM模式中地球工程(G4实验)和非地球工程(RCP4.5)情景下的日值降水数据,以95%和99%分位数作为强降水和极端强降水的阈值,分别对比分析两种情景下中国及七大地理分区的强降水和极端强降水在2010—2099年(整个研究时段)、2020—2069年(地球工程实施期间)和2070—2099年(地球工程实施结束)的差异特征。结果表明:(1) 2010—2099年地球工程有利于中国多数地区强降水量和极端强降水量的增加;(2)在实施地球工程的2020—2069年,整体上抑制了中国多数地区强降水量和极端强降水量;(3)在地球工程实施结束后的2070—2099年,地球工程后续影响整体上有利于中国多数地区强降水量和极端强降水量的增加;(4)不同研究时段中国七大地理分区的强降水量和极端强降水量变化趋势均有一定区域差异,且这种差异特征在不同研究时期表现在不同地区。      

Multilateral parametric climate risk insurance: a tool to facilitate agreement about deployment of solar geoengineering?

States will disagree about deployment of solar geoengineering, technologies that would reflect a small portion of incoming sunlight to reduce risks of climate change, and most disagreements will be grounded in conflicting interests. States that object to deployment will have many options to oppose it, so states favouring deployment will have a powerful incentive to meet their objections. Objections rooted in opposition to the anticipated unequal consequences of deployment may be met through compensation, yet climate policy is inhospitable to compensation via liability. We propose that multilateral parametric climate risk insurance might be a useful tool to facilitate agreement on solar geoengineering deployment. With parametric insurance, predetermined payouts are triggered when climate indices deviate from set ranges. We suggest that states favouring deployment could underwrite reduced-rate parametric climate insurance. This mechanism would be particularly suited to resolving disagreements based on divergent judgments about the outcomes of proposed implementation. This would be especially relevant in cases where disagreements are rooted in varying levels of trust in climate model predictions of solar geoengineering effectiveness and risks. Negotiations over the pricing and terms of a parametric risk pool would make divergent judgments explicit and quantitative. Reduced-rate insurance would provide a way for states that favour implementation to demonstrate their confidence in solar geoengineering by underwriting risk transfer and ensuring compensation without the need for attribution. This would offer a powerful incentive for states opposing implementation to moderate their opposition.

Key policy insights

• States favouring deployment of solar geoengineering will need to address other states’ objections—unilateralism is implausible in practice

• This might be partially achieved using parametric climate risk insurance based on objective indicators

• A sovereign risk pool offering reduced-rate parametric insurance underwritten by states backing deployment could facilitate cooperation on solar geoengineering deployment

• States favouring deployment would demonstrate their confidence in solar geoengineering by supporting the risk pool

• Opposing states would be insured against solar geoengineering risks and proposing states would be incentivized to guard against overconfidence