Russian behaviour in the market for permits under the Kyoto Protocol

After the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol and the extension of national quotas in the Bonn and Marrakesh agreements, meagre environmental effects and a low price of emission permits are likely to be the outcome of implementation. This paper attempts to analyze this scenario, mainly in relation to the Russian case. I discuss on the basis of certain key assumptions the strategic options open to the supply side of the permit market and Russia’s potentially incompatible interests as a producer of oil and gas on the one hand and a dominating seller of emission permits under the Kyoto Protocol on the other. The analysis shows that Russian oil and gas interests are likely to boost Russia’s inclination to sell permits, ultimately resulting in lower permit prices.     

California RECLAIM's market failure: lessons for the Kyoto Protocol

Abstract

The failure of Los Angeles' RECLAIM emission trading market in the summer of 2000 uncovers important issues that have direct relevance for the various systems now emerging for exchanging greenhouse gas credits. Two primary causes for the breakdown of RECLAIM are apparent. On the one hand, RECLAIM did not succeed because of a series of unpredictable events that included manipulation of the market by brokers and the California energy shortage. On the other hand, several potentially foreseeable program design flaws contributed to the failure. This study examines the structure of RECLAIM and concludes that there was sufficient resilience to endure the two unexpected crises. However, the problematic program design features created a market that was fatally flawed and, regardless of impinging circumstances, was ultimately bound to collapse. We also investigate the status of the rapidly developing international greenhouse gas market and identify several lessons from the RECLAIM experience: the need for a holistic approach to market design that includes the role of a bank, the interface with project-based credits, the similarities of the industries enrolled in the program, and need to carefully consider how to handle the problems caused by the end of the trading period.     

Compliance of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in the first commitment period

This article provides an ex post analysis of the compliance of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol during the first commitment period (2008–2012) based on the final data for national GHG emissions and exchanges in carbon units that became available at the end of 2015. On the domestic level, among the 36 countries that fully participated in the Kyoto Protocol, only nine countries emitted higher levels of GHGs than committed and therefore had to resort to flexibility mechanisms. On the international level – i.e. after the use of flexibility mechanisms – all Annex B Parties are in compliance. Countries implemented different compliance strategies: purchasing carbon units abroad, stimulating the domestic use of carbon credits by the private sector and incentivizing domestic emission reductions through climate policies.

Overall, the countries party to the Protocol surpassed their aggregate commitment by an average 2.4 GtCO₂e yr^–1. Of the possible explanations for this overachievement, ‘hot-air’ was estimated at 2.2 GtCO₂e yr^–1, while accounting rules for land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) further removed 0.4 GtCO₂e yr^–1 from the net result excluding LULUCF. The hypothetical participation of the US and Canada would have reduced this overachievement by a net 1 GtCO₂e yr^–1. None of these factors – some of which may be deemed illegitimate – would therefore on its own have led to global non-compliance, even without use of the 0.3 GtCO₂e of annual emissions reductions generated by the Clean Development Mechanism. The impact of domestic policies and ‘carbon leakage’ – neither of which is quantitatively assessed here – should not be neglected either.

Policy relevance

Given the ongoing evolution of the international climate regime and the adoption of the Paris Agreement in December 2015, we believe that there is a need to evaluate the results of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. To our knowledge there has been no overarching quantitative ex post assessment of the Kyoto Protocol based on the final emissions data for 2008–2012, which became available in late 2015. This article attempts to fill this gap, focusing on the domestic and international compliance of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in the first commitment period.     

Economics of the Kyoto Protocol for Russia

Abstract

In this article we propose a careful analysis of the economic consequences of the Kyoto Protocol for Russia, taking into account the most recently available data and the latest developments in the trends regarding Russian economic recovery. We present a review of different GHG forecasts for Russia and develop a new forecast for uncertain GDP growth and changing elasticity of GHG emission per GDP. Since the rate of growth remains uncertain, elasticity could change over time, as well as the fuel mix. We apply the Monte-Carlo method to simulate these uncertainties and to produce a reasonable interval for CO₂ emissions in 2010. The probability of Russia exceeding its Kyoto emissions budget is essentially zero. Further, we discuss the benefits for Russia from the Kyoto Protocol, and more generally from implementation of GHG mitigation policy. Ancillary benefits from Kyoto Protocol implementation will bring essential reductions in risk to human health. On the other hand, potential negative changes in the fuel mix and GDP structure, as well as a slowing of the innovation process, could exacerbate existing health problems. Alternatives to the Kyoto Protocol may bring much tougher commitments to Russia. We conclude that the Kyoto Protocol is the best possible deal for Russia. Therefore, Russia most will ratify it.     

《京都议定书》第二承诺期森林管理基准线分析

基于各附件I缔约方2011年提交的年度国家温室气体排放清单、《京都议定书》第一承诺期森林管理活动的温室气体源/汇数据,以及森林管理活动的基准线数据,分析了森林管理活动在第一承诺期履约中的贡献,以及按各方提交的基准线,预计森林管理活动在未来承诺期履约中的作用。结果表明,《京都议定书》第一承诺期的最初两年（2008—2009年）,附件I缔约方可从合格的森林管理活动中获得年均2.46亿t CO2当量（CO2-eq）的信用额,相当于相应缔约方基准年（1990年）源排放的2.3%,对减限排目标的贡献率达53%,不合理的规则使一些缔约方在履约中可过度地利用森林管理的汇清除。各附件I缔约方提交的2013—2020年森林管理活动的基准线（约2.52亿t CO2-eq/a的净汇清除）远低于目前和过去的水平,使其可从中获得的用于抵消减排目标的信用额约为第一承诺期的4倍,对未来承诺期履约的贡献率将更大,一些缔约方提交的减排目标中的大部分可通过森林管理活动的信用额来抵消。因此,本文建议在未来的谈判中,要严格控制可用的森林管理活动的信用额,避免森林管理活动被滥用。     

Time to market in the CDM: variation over project characteristics and time

Not only is the carbon market inundated with Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) issued by successful projects, it is also littered with failed projects, that is, projects that either fail to be registered under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) or projects that have been successfully registered but fail to issue CERs. By relying on a novel application of survival analysis in the context of the CDM, this article shows that half of all projects that start the Global Stakeholder Process fail to issue CERs, while the other half have a median time to market of four years. Furthermore, it is shown that some of the best projects, in terms of being additional, are those that are least likely to make it to market, whereas some of the worst projects, in terms of not being additional, are the ones that are most likely to make it to market. This presents a fundamental challenge for the CDM and future offset schemes that rely on the same design as the CDM. In contrast with previous studies, it is shown that, when project characteristics are controlled for, not all durations measured along the CDM project cycle have increased over time.

Policy relevance

This article develops a novel method for analysing durations measured along the CDM project cycle that avoids the biases of previous studies, and corrects for some misconceptions of what the delays faced by CDM projects are and how these delays have changed over time. Developing an understanding of the delays is important in order not to draw the wrong lessons from the CDM experience. As the leading example of an offset scheme, both in terms of geographical scope and sectoral coverage, and some would say institutional complexity, the CDM serves as a benchmark and reference for all future offset schemes, among others, for the New Market Mechanisms (NMMs) and the Chinese domestic offset programme. While the NMMs are still very much in development, China has announced that it will rely on the methodologies and procedures developed under the CDM for generating offsets for their regional carbon trading schemes.     

Keeping the forest for the climate's sake: avoiding deforestation in developing countries under the UNFCCC

Abstract

A process for reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries has been initiated under the UNFCCC. Efforts to agree on a legally binding instrument to halt deforestation have previously failed in other international fora. The magnitude of the social, economic, technical and political complexities underlying deforestation have led to negotiations being challenging. What policy instruments could provide incentives to reduce deforestation, and how could these instruments be framed, under the UNFCCC? This article analyses the advantages and disadvantages of the available alternatives within and outside of the Kyoto Protocol. Staying within the Kyoto framework means low institutional development costs, established but limited incentives for action, and low flexibility. Alternatives outside the Protocol provide higher institutional development costs, uncertainties with regard to the incentives, but greater flexibility. We argue that a separate protocol may be the most viable option, as it could offer the necessary flexibility and avoid some technical and political pitfalls that would be likely to beset new efforts under the Kyoto Protocol. The article also presents the concept of ‘committed forests’ as a means of defining geographically where the reduction of emissions from deforestation can take place.     

我国“十二五”时期建立碳交易市场的政策思考

基于对国际碳市场的调研和定量分析,建议我国碳市场建设之初,应首先选择电力、钢铁等对碳价格敏感的高排放强度行业进入碳市场;尽早开展跨地区交易,便于有效降低总体减排成本;同时碳排放总量上限的设定应与 “十二五”时期的碳强度下降目标挂钩;并在市场建立之初设定碳价格下限等。