The role and limits of strategic framing for promoting sustainable consumption and policy

Strategic issue framing is widely regarded as an effective communication strategy to alter public opinion and citizens’ policy support. However, it is unclear to what extent strategic framing can increase support for ambitious demand-side actions and policies that make the cost of mitigation perceptible in citizens’ everyday lives. Taking an exploratory approach, we conducted qualitative interviews and a comparative framing experiment with 9,750 survey respondents from China, Germany, and the United States. We analyzed strategic issue framing effects in two areas known to be key for increasing the sustainability of consumption: meat/fish consumption, and fossil-fuel car usage. Employing both classical linear regressions and advanced Bayesian sparse estimations, we show that in all three countries widespread arguments in favor of reduced meat/fish consumption and car use are unlikely to substantially alter citizens’ concern, willingness to pay, behavioral intentions and policy support for demand-side action. Our findings suggest that in the absence of a broader behavioral change campaign, strategic issue framing alone is unlikely to be effective in changing entrenched attitudes and behaviors. On its own, it is also unlikely to substantially increase public support for demand-side policies to reduce consumption. More careful research is needed to help policymakers understand the role and limits of different strategic framing techniques.     

Preaching to different choirs: How to motivate dismissive,uncommitted, and alarmed audiences to adapt to climate change?

People vary considerably in terms of their knowledge, beliefs, and concern about climate change. Thus, an important challenge for climate change communicators is how to most effectively engage different types of audiences. This study aimed to identify distinct audience segments that vary in terms of their values, beliefs, and responses to climate change and determine for each segment which specific message attributes increased motivation to engage in climate adaptation. A sample of 1031 Australian residents (aged 18–66 years) completed an online survey assessing their values, beliefs, and behaviors related to climate change, and recording their responses to a broad range of climate change adaptation messages. Latent profile analysis identified three distinct audience segments: alarmed (34.4%), uncommitted (45.2%), and dismissive (20.3%). Sixty climate change adaptation messages were coded in terms of the presence/absence of six attributes: explicit reference to climate change, providing specific adaptation advice, strong negative emotive content, emphasis on collective responsibility, highlighting local impacts, and underscoring financial impacts. Participants viewed a random sample of six messages and rated the extent to which each message motivated them to seek out more information and immediately respond to the climate change threat portrayed in the message. Multilevel modeling indicated messages that included strong negative emotive content or provided specific adaptation advice increased adaptation intentions in all three audience segments. Omitting any mention of climate change and emphasizing local impacts increased adaptation intentions in dismissive audiences. Implications for tailoring and targeting climate change adaptation messages are discussed.     

Public values for energy system change

In this paper we discuss the importance of framing the question of public acceptance of sustainable energy transitions in terms of values and a ‘whole-system’ lens. This assertion is based on findings arising from a major research project examining public values, attitudes and acceptability with regards to whole energy system change using a mixed-method (six deliberative workshops, n = 68, and a nationally representative survey, n = 2441), interdisciplinary approach. Through the research we identify a set of social values associated with desirable energy futures in the UK, where the values represent identifiable cultural resources people draw on to guide their preference formation about particular aspects of energy system change. As such, we characterise public perspectives as being underpinned by six value clusters relating to efficiency and wastefulness, environment and nature, security and stability, social justice and fairness, autonomy and power, and processes and change. We argue that this ‘value system’ provides a basis for understanding core reasons for public acceptance or rejection of different energy system aspects and processes. We conclude that a focus on values that underpin more specific preferences for energy system change brings insights that could provide a basis for improved dialogue, more robust decision-making, and for anticipating likely points of conflict in energy transitions.     

A cautionary note about messages of hope: Focusing on progress in reducing carbon emissions weakens mitigation motivation

For the first time this millennium, growth in carbon emissions has slowed. Indeed, the year 2014 was the first time in 40 years that the planet saw zero growth in emissions. We examine whether this message of progress can be effective in motivating people to engage in mitigation efforts. This question dovetails with commentary suggesting that gloomy messages about climate change risk fatiguing the population, and that alternative approaches are necessary. It is also informed by work suggesting that hope is a motivating force in terms of engaging in collective action and social change. Study 1 (N = 574) showed that negative emotions were strongly related to mitigation motivation and feelings of efficacy, but hope-related emotions had a much weaker relationship with these constructs. In the main experiment (Study 2: N = 431) participants read an optimistic, pessimistic, or neutral message about the rate of progress in reducing global carbon emissions. Relative to the pessimistic message, the optimistic message reduced participants’ sense that climate change represented a risk to them, and the associated feelings of distress. Consequently, the optimistic message was less successful in increasing mitigation motivation than the pessimistic message. In sum, predictions that the optimistic message would increase efficacy did not transpire; concerns that the optimistic message would increase complacency did transpire. Recent progress in curbing global carbon emissions is welcome, but we found no evidence that messages focusing on this progress constitute an effective communication strategy.     

How you talk about climate change matters: A communication network perspective on epistemic skepticism and belief strength

A population’s attitudes toward climate change can strongly influence governmental policies as well as community and individual climate-related behaviors. These attitudes have been explained with a variety of factors, including cultural worldviews, environmental attitudes, political ideology, knowledge of climate change, severe weather exposure, and sociodemographic characteristics. These studies typically assume an individual forms attitudes on the basis of preexisting values or beliefs and do not account for dynamic social interaction as a source of influence. This study introduces a network perspective that accounts for the social embeddedness of individuals, using network variables to predict climate attitudes, including homophily, network strength, attitude diversity, centrality, network size, and network valence. An exploratory factor analysis identified two distinct attitudinal dimensions: climate change epistemic skepticism and belief strength. Using egocentric data from a nationally representative survey collected in 2011, this study found that network variables were significant in predicting both climate attitude dimensions; hierarchical regression analyses accounting for other known predictors found two different predictive models for epistemic skepticism and belief strength. Homophily, network strength, attitude diversity, and network valence predicted epistemic skepticism (R²_change = 4.8%), while centrality and network strength predicted belief strength (R²_change = 8.9%). The analyses also found support for cultural factors as significant predictors of climate attitudes, particularly Christianity and cultural worldviews. The results of this study suggest that interpersonal influence through communication networks is a promising avenue for continued research, and should be included in studies of climate attitude formation and change.     

Farmer perceptions of climate change: Associations with observed temperature and precipitation trends,irrigation, and climate beliefs

How individuals perceive climate change is linked to whether individuals support climate policies and whether they alter their own climate-related behaviors, yet climate perceptions may be influenced by many factors beyond local shifts in weather. Infrastructure designed to control or regulate natural resources may serve as an important lens through which people experience climate, and thus may influence perceptions. Likewise, perceptions may be influenced by personal beliefs about climate change and whether it is human-induced. Here we examine farmer perceptions of historical climate change, how perceptions are related to observed trends in regional climate, how perceptions are related to the presence of irrigation infrastructure, and how perceptions are related to beliefs and concerns about climate change. We focus on the regions of Marlborough and Hawke’s Bay in New Zealand, where irrigation is utilized on the majority of cropland. Data are obtained through analysis of historical climate records from local weather stations, interviews (n = 20), and a farmer survey (n = 490). Across both regions, no significant historical trends in annual precipitation and summer temperatures since 1980 are observed, but winter warming trends are significant at around 0.2–0.3 °C per decade. A large fraction of farmers perceived increases in annual rainfall despite instrumental records indicating no significant trends, a finding that may be related to greater perceived water availability associated with irrigation growth. A greater fraction of farmers perceived rainfall increases in Marlborough, where irrigation growth has been most substantial. We find those classes of farmers more likely to have irrigation were also significantly more likely to perceive an increase in annual rainfall. Furthermore, we demonstrate that perceptions of changing climate – regardless of their accuracy – are correlated with increased belief in climate change and an increased concern for future climate impacts. Those farmers that believe climate change is occurring and is human induced are more likely to perceive temperature increases than farmers who believe climate change is not occurring and is not human induced. These results suggest that perceptions are influenced by a variety of personal and environmental factors, including infrastructure, which may in turn alter decisions about climate adaptation.     

The “I” in climate: The role of individual responsibility in systematic processing of climate change information

Past research suggests that how we perceive risk can be related to how we attribute responsibility for risk-related issues, such as climate change; however, a gap in research lies in exploring possible connections between attribution of responsibility, risk perception, and information processing. Using the Risk Information Seeking and Processing model, this study fills this gap by examining how RISP-based variables are related to information processing and whether attribution of responsibility for mitigating climate change influences communication behaviors that are often predicted by elevated risk perceptions. Undergraduates at two large research universities (N = 572) were randomly assigned to read one of two newspaper articles that emphasized either individual responsibility (by highlighting personal actions) or societal responsibility (by highlighting government policy) for climate change mitigation. Results indicate that subjects in the individual responsibility condition were significantly more likely to process the message in a systematic manner; however, attribution of responsibility did not interact with risk perception to influence systematic processing. Moreover, attitudes toward climate change information and negative affect mediated the relationship between other key variables and systematic processing. These and other findings suggest that strategic communication about climate change may benefit from emphasizing individual responsibility to attract more attention from diverse audiences and to promote deeper thinking about the issue. Additional theoretical implications are presented.     

Impacts and adaptation to climate change in European economies

This paper evaluates the impacts of climate change to European economies under an increase in global mean temperature at +2 °C and +4 °C. It is based on a summary of conclusions from available studies of how climate change may affect various sectors of the economies in different countries. We apply a macroeconomic general equilibrium model, which integrates impacts of climate change on different activities of the economies. Agents adapt by responding to the changes in market conditions following the climatic changes, thus bringing consistency between economic behaviour and adaptation to climate change. Europe is divided into 85 sub-regions in order to capture climate variability and variations in vulnerabilities within countries. We find that the impacts in the +2 °C are moderate throughout Europe, with positive impacts on GDP in some sub-regions and negative impacts down to 0.1 per cent per year in others. At +4 °C, GDP is negatively affected throughout Europe, and most substantially in the southern parts, where it falls by up to 0.7 per cent per year in some sub-regions. We also find that climate change causes differentiations in wages across Europe, which may cause migration from southern parts of Europe to northern parts, especially to the Nordic countries.     

Climate change and river floods in the European Union: Socio-economic consequences and the costs and benefits of adaptation

This study presents the first appraisal of the socio-economic impacts of river floods in the European Union in view of climate and socio-economic changes. The assessment is based on two trajectories: (a) no adaptation, where the current levels of protection are kept constant, and (b) adaptation, where the level of protection is increased to defend against future flooding events. As a basis for our analysis we use an ensemble-based pan-European flood hazard assessment for present and future conditions. Socio-economic impacts are estimated by combining flood inundation maps with information on assets exposure and vulnerability. Ensemble-based results indicate that current expected annual population affected of ca. 200,000 is projected to increase up to 360,000 due to the effects of socio-economic development and climate change. Under the no adaptation trajectory current expected annual damages of €5.5 billion/year are projected to reach €98 billion/year by the 2080s due to the combined effects of socio-economic and climate change. Under the adaptation trajectory the avoided damages (benefits) amount to €53 billion/year by the 2080s. An analysis of the potential costs of adaptation associated with the increase in protection suggests that adaptation could be highly cost-effective. There is, however, a wide range around these central numbers reflecting the variability in projected climate. Analysis at the country level shows high damages, and by association high costs of adaptation, in the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Romania, Hungary and Czech Republic. At the country level, there is an even wider range around these central values, thus, pointing to a need to consider climate uncertainty in formulating practical adaptation strategies.     

Public engagement with marine climate change issues: (Re)framings,understandings and responses

Climate change impacts on marine environments have been somewhat neglected in climate change research, particularly with regard to their social dimensions and implications. This paper contributes to addressing this gap through presenting a UK focused mixed-method study of how publics frame, understand and respond to marine climate change-related issues. It draws on data from a large national survey of UK publics (N = 1,001), undertaken in January 2011 as part of a wider European survey, in conjunction with in-depth qualitative insights from a citizens’ panel with participants from the East Anglia region, UK. This reveals that discrete marine climate change impacts, as often framed in technical or institutional terms, were not the most immediate or significant issues for most respondents. Study participants tended to view these climate impacts ‘in context’, in situated ways, and as entangled with other issues relating to marine environments and their everyday lives. Whilst making connections with scientific knowledge on the subject, public understandings of marine climate impacts were mainly shaped by personal experience, the visibility and proximity of impacts, sense of personal risk and moral or equity-based arguments. In terms of responses, study participants prioritised climate change mitigation measures over adaptation, even in high-risk areas. We consider the implications of these insights for research and practices of public engagement on marine climate impacts specifically, and climate change more generally.     

My neighbourhood,my country or my planet? The influence of multiple place attachments and climate change concern on social acceptance of energy infrastructure

Research on place attachments and identities has made an important contribution to understanding social acceptance of low carbon infrastructure, which are often objected to by local communities. However, a focus on local attachments predominates in studies to date, neglecting the potential role of national and global attachments and identities on energy beliefs and attitudes, despite the fact that large energy infrastructures are not only local in significance or function. To investigate this, survey data was collected from a representative sample of UK adults (N = 1519), capturing place attachments at local, national and global levels, climate change concern, beliefs about power lines and support for energy system change. Findings show significant differences in infrastructure beliefs and attitudes depending upon relative strength of attachments at different levels, controlling for personal characteristics. Analyses of variance revealed that individuals with stronger national than local or global attachments were less likely to support European grid integration; those with relatively stronger global attachment were most likely to support decentralised energy and those with relatively stronger local attachment were most likely to protest against a nearby power line. In addition, those with strong attachments at local, national and global levels were most willing to reduce energy demand, and those with weak attachments were least likely to trust grid companies. Relatively stronger global than national attachment was positively associated with support for decentralised energy, with this effect partially mediated by climate change concern. Explanations for the findings and implications for future research are discussed.     

Pathways for climate resilient development: Human well-being within a safe and just space in the 21st century

The concept of climate resilient development pathways (CRDPs) introduced in IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report remains poorly conceptualised. We have attempted to deepen the conceptualisation of climate resilient development (CRD) or climate compatible development, while charting its pathways through fuzzy cognitive maps (FCMs)-based simulations aided by knowledge based on stakeholders’ insights. We conceptualise CRD as a development embracing mitigation, adaptation and inclusive sustainable development to advance planetary health and well-being for all. The FCMs-based simulations demonstrate that appropriate enabling conditions are critical to the achievement of CRD, the most important of them being (i) the ethics, values, and worldviews shaping CRD’s directions by framing appropriate climate narratives and action; (ii) partnerships and commitment to finance and technology by the governments; (iii) interactions between the actors and arenas of engagement facilitating CRD decisions and actions; and (iv) dimensions of governance at multiple levels involving policy, institutions and practice. Citizens’ defence against climate change as a human right, along with planetary health and well-being, demands synergies while implementing mitigation, adaptation and sustainable development. Short-term decisions and actions related to mitigation, adaptation, and sustainable development could have long-term effects on CRDPs. CRD could entail a societal transformation to eudaimonic living for ensuring universal well-being. The findings of this research could have profound implications for multilateral negotiations.     

Impacts of different climate stabilisation scenarios on plant species in Europe

With the use of goals from the Convention on Biological Diversity we evaluated two climate stabilisation profiles on their merits for conservation of biodiversity, comparing them with a baseline profile. Focusing on plant ecosystems at the pan-European level, we concluded that although a maximum global-mean temperature increase of 2 °C is likely to be met in a 550 ppmv CO₂-equivalent stabilisation profile, large areas of ecosystems in Europe will be affected. Most of the impacts manifest themselves in northern countries, with a high net increase of plant species, and in Mediterranean countries, with a decrease in the number of plant species and stable area. Other impacts are less robust, given the regional variation in climate results for different climate models.     

When enough should be enough: Improving the use of current agricultural lands could meet production demands and spare natural habitats in Brazil

Providing food and other products to a growing human population while safeguarding natural ecosystems and the provision of their services is a significant scientific, social and political challenge. With food demand likely to double over the next four decades, anthropization is already driving climate change and is the principal force behind species extinction, among other environmental impacts. The sustainable intensification of production on current agricultural lands has been suggested as a key solution to the competition for land between agriculture and natural ecosystems. However, few investigations have shown the extent to which these lands can meet projected demands while considering biophysical constraints. Here we investigate the improved use of existing agricultural lands and present insights into avoiding future competition for land. We focus on Brazil, a country projected to experience the largest increase in agricultural production over the next four decades and the richest nation in terrestrial carbon and biodiversity. Using various models and climatic datasets, we produced the first estimate of the carrying capacity of Brazil's 115 million hectares of cultivated pasturelands. We then investigated if the improved use of cultivated pasturelands would free enough land for the expansion of meat, crops, wood and biofuel, respecting biophysical constraints (i.e., terrain, climate) and including climate change impacts. We found that the current productivity of Brazilian cultivated pasturelands is 32–34% of its potential and that increasing productivity to 49–52% of the potential would suffice to meet demands for meat, crops, wood products and biofuels until at least 2040, without further conversion of natural ecosystems. As a result up to 14.3 Gt CO₂ Eq could be mitigated. The fact that the country poised to undergo the largest expansion of agricultural production over the coming decades can do so without further conversion of natural habitats provokes the question whether the same can be true in other regional contexts and, ultimately, at the global scale.     

Use of aviation by climate change researchers: Structural influences,personal attitudes,and information provision

Aviation is a fast-growing sector, releasing more carbon dioxide per passenger kilometre than other transport modes. For climate change researchers, work-related travel – including for conferences and fieldwork – is a major carbon-emitting activity. At the same time, many argue that climate scientists have an important role in curbing their own aviation emissions to align their practices with their assertions in relation to emissions reduction. We examine the tensions between competing professional demands in relation to flying; measure levels of flying by climate and non-climate researchers; assess influences on choices and attitudes; and consider how information provision and structural changes might enable changes in practice. Study 1 entails a large, international survey of flying undertaken by climate change (including sustainability and environmental science) researchers and those from other disciplines (N = 1408). Study 2 tests effects of varying information provision on researchers’ behavioural intentions and policy support to reduce flying (N = 362). Unexpectedly, we find climate change researchers – particularly professors – fly more than other researchers, but are also more likely to have taken steps to reduce or offset their flying. Providing information about the impacts of aviation increases behavioural intentions and support for institutional policies to reduce flying, particularly amongst more pro-environmental respondents. However, while attitudinal factors (e.g., personal norm) predict willingness to reduce flying, structural/social factors (e.g., family commitments, location) are more important in predicting actual flying behaviour. Recent initiatives to develop a low-carbon and more inclusive research culture within climate science and the broader research community thus need to be supported by broader policies and technologies to encourage and enable low-carbon and avoided travel.     

Adaptive and risk-based approaches to climate change and the management of uncertainty and institutional risk: The case of future flooding in England

This paper focuses on how scientific uncertainties about future peak flood flows and sea level rises are accounted for in long term strategic planning processes to adapt inland and coastal flood risk management in England to climate change. Combining key informant interviews (n = 18) with documentary analysis, it explores the institutional tensions between adaptive management approaches emphasising openness to uncertainty and to alternative policy options on the one hand and risk-based ones that close them down by transforming uncertainties into calculable risks whose management can be rationalized through cost-benefit analysis and nationally consistent, risk-based priority setting on the other hand. These alternative approaches to managing uncertainty about the first-order risks to society from future flooding are shaped by institutional concerns with managing the second-order, ‘institutional’ risks of criticism and blame arising from accountability for discharging those first-order risk management responsibilities. In the case of river flooding the poorly understood impacts of future climate change were represented with a simplistic adjustment to peak flow estimates, which proved robust in overcoming institutional resistance to making precautionary allowances for climate change in risk-based flood management, at least in part because its scientific limitations were acknowledged only partially. By contrast in the case of coastal flood risk management, greater scientific confidence led to successively more elaborate guidance on how to represent the science, which in turn led to inconsistency in implementation and increased the institutional risks involved in taking the uncertain effects of future sea level rise into account in adaptation planning and flood risk management. Comparative analysis of these two cases then informs some wider reflections about the tensions between adaptive and risk-based approaches, the role of institutional risk in climate change adaptation, and the importance of such institutional dynamics in shaping the framing uncertainties and policy responses to scientific knowledge about them.     

Attitudes toward hydraulic fracturing: The opposing forces of political conservatism and basic knowledge about fracking

Hydraulic fracturing has become a contentious issue around the globe. In the present study, using a sample of American adults (n = 412), the role of political orientation (conservative vs. liberal) and basic knowledge about fracking on fracking risk perception attitudes, fracking economic attitudes, energy reliance attitudes, trust of energy information sources, and preferred dwelling distance from energy operations was investigated. Basic knowledge about hydraulic fracturing as a possible moderating mechanism was also explored. Correlational and regression results revealed that political ideology and basic fracking knowledge are key predictors of fracking and energy source attitudes, and that the nature of the relation between ideology and fracking risk perceptions, fracking economic attitudes, reliance on natural gas, wind and solar, and distrust of government agencies, are influenced by an individual’s basic knowledge about fracking.     

Voluntary citizen participation in carbon allowance markets: the role of norm-based motivation

The results from a semi-experimental study of Swedish students’ stated willingness to purchase emission allowances for carbon dioxide are presented. Drawing heavily on recent developments in the literature on integrating norm-motivated behaviour into neoclassical consumer theory, it is assumed that individuals have a preference for maintaining a self-image as a responsible (and thus norm-compliant) person. The results indicate that students’ willingness to purchase carbon allowances is determined by both price and the presence of norms: those who feel personally responsible for contributing to reducing climate damages also appear more inclined to buy allowances. The empirical findings are consistent with the notion that a person's beliefs about others’ stated willingness to purchase carbon allowances imply improvements in their own self-image and ultimately behavioural change. This suggests that information campaigns that attempt to influence beliefs about others’ intentions could promote ‘green’ consumer behaviour in the carbon allowance market. Such (stated) behaviour also appears to be influenced by a person's awareness of the problem of climate change and their beliefs about their own ability to contribute to solving it.

Policy relevance

Although there is a concern that public goods such as reduced climate change may be under-provided in the free market, individual concern for the environment occasionally has profound impacts on consumer choice and voluntary action. This research suggests that information campaigns that attempt to influence beliefs about others’ intentions could promote ‘green’ consumer behaviour in carbon allowance markets. Publicly-provided information about the impacts of climate change and the ways in which these damages stem from individual choices could also induce this type of behaviour.     

Potential emissions of CO2 and methane from proved reserves of fossil fuels: An alternative analysis

Scientists have argued that no more than 275 GtC (IPCC, 2013) of the world’s reserves of fossil fuels of 746 GtC can be produced in this century if the world is to restrict anthropogenic climate change to ≤2 °C. This has raised concerns about the risk of these reserves becoming “stranded assets” and creating a dangerous “carbon bubble” with serious impacts on global financial markets, leading in turn to discussions of appropriate investor and consumer actions. However, previous studies have not always clearly distinguished between reserves and resources, nor differentiated reserves held by investor-owned and state-owned companies with the capital, infrastructure, and capacity to develop them in the short term from those held by nation-states that may or may not have such capacity. This paper analyzes the potential emissions of CO₂ and methane from the proved reserves as reported by the world's largest producers of oil, natural gas, and coal. We focus on the seventy companies and eight government-run industries that produced 63% of the world’s fossil fuels from 1750 to 2010 (Heede, 2014), and have the technological and financial capacity to develop these reserves. While any reserve analysis is subject to uncertainty, we demonstrate that production of these reported reserves will result in emissions of 440 GtC of carbon dioxide, or 160% of the remaining 275 GtC carbon budget. Of the 440 GtC total, the 42 investor-owned oil, gas, and coal companies hold reserves with potential emissions of 44 GtC (16% of the remaining carbon budget, hereafter RCB), whereas the 28 state-owned entities possess reserves of 210 GtC (76% of the RCB). This analysis suggests that what may be needed to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference (DAI) with the climate system differs when one considers the state-owned entities vs. the investor-owned entities. For the former, there is a profound risk involved simply in the prospect of their extracting their proved reserves. For the latter, the risk arises not so much from their relatively small proved reserves, but from their on-going exploration and development of new fossil fuel resources. For preventing DAI overall, effective action must include the state-owned companies, the investor-owned companies, and governments. However, given that the majority of the world's reserves are coal resources owned by governments with little capacity to extract them in the near term, we suggest that the more immediate urgency lies with the private sector, and that investor and consumer pressure should focus on phasing out these companies’ on-going exploration programs.     

Climate visuals: A mixed methods investigation of public perceptions of climate images in three countries

Imagery plays a central role in climate change communication. But whereas research on the verbal communication of climate change has proliferated, far fewer studies have focused on visual communication. Correspondingly, relatively little is known about how to effectively engage the public using the visual medium. The current research is the first mixed methods, cross-national investigation of public perceptions of climate images, with a focus on photographic climate change imagery. Four structured discussion groups in the UK and Germany (N = 32) and an international survey with an embedded experiment in the UK, Germany and the US (N = 3014) were conducted to examine how different types of climate change imagery were evaluated. The qualitative research pointed to the importance of the perceived authenticity and credibility of the human subjects in climate images, as well as widespread negativity towards images depicting protests and demonstrations. Images of climate ‘solutions’ produced positive emotional responses in the survey and were less polarizing for climate change skeptics, but they were also the least motivating of action. Familiar climate images (such as a polar bear on melting ice) were easily understood in the survey (and evaluated positively as a consequence) but viewed with cynicism in discussion groups. We present a detailed discussion of these and other key findings in this paper and describe a novel application of the data through an online image library for practitioners which accompanies the research (www.climatevisuals.org).