Analysis and farmers’ perception of climate change in the Kashmir Valley,India

Theoretical and Applied Climatology - Analysis of climatic variables is important for the detection and attribution of climate change trends and has received considerable attention from researchers...     

Determinants of farmers’ choice of adaptation methods to climate change in the Nile Basin of Ethiopia

This study identifies the major methods used by farmers to adapt to climate change in the Nile Basin of Ethiopia, the factors that affect their choice of method, and the barriers to adaptation. The methods identified include use of different crop varieties, tree planting, soil conservation, early and late planting, and irrigation. Results from the discrete choice model employed indicate that the level of education, gender, age, and wealth of the head of household; access to extension and credit; information on climate, social capital, agroecological settings, and temperature all influence farmers’ choices. The main barriers include lack of information on adaptation methods and financial constraints.     

How much climate change can pastoral livelihoods tolerate? Modelling rangeland use and evaluating risk

Livestock is the most important source of income for pastoral livelihoods in drylands. Pastoralists have developed flexible resource utilization strategies that enable them to cope with the high spatio-temporal resource variability typical to these areas. However, climate change in the form of decreasing mean annual precipitation accompanied by increasing variability has important consequences for rangeland productivity and thus pastoral livelihood security. Here, we use a spatial simulation model to assess impacts of changing precipitation regimes, and to identify limits of tolerance for these changes beyond which pastoral livelihoods cannot be secured. We also examine strategies to control these limits.Our results indicate that: (i) while reduced mean annual precipitation always had negative effects, increased precipitation variability can have negative, none or even positive effects, depending on the vegetation's recovery potential. (ii) Depending on income requirements there are limits of tolerance to decreases in mean annual precipitation beyond which precipitation regimes overcharge the coping capacity of the pastoral household and threaten its livelihood. (iii) There are certain strategies, in particular “Increasing mobility” and “Diversifying income for coping with income risks from pastoralism”, that allow the limits of tolerance to be shifted to a certain extent. We conclude that it is important to consider climate change and human requirements together to create appropriate climate change mitigation strategies in pastoral systems. Our results also shed new light on the discussion on disequilibrium rangeland systems by identifying mechanisms that can support fluctuating but non-degrading herbivore-vegetation dynamics. The paper finishes with remarks on the broader potential of the presented modelling approach beyond rangelands.     

Natural variability or climate change? Stakeholder and citizen perceptions of extreme event attribution

Scientists can now connect extreme weather events with climate change using a methodology known as “extreme event attribution”, or EEA. The idea of connecting climate change and extreme weather has long been heralded as a panacea for communications, connecting the dangers of climate change to real-world, on-the-ground events. However, event attribution remains a nascent science, and attribution studies of the same event can sometimes produce divergent answers due to precise methodology used, variables examined, and the timescale selected for the event. The 2011–2017 California drought was assessed by 11 EEA studies which came to varying conclusions on its connection to climate change. This article uses the case study of the drought and a multi-methods approach to examine perceptions of EEA among key stakeholders and citizens. Twenty-five key informant interviews were conducted with different stakeholders: scientists performing EEA research, journalists, local and state-level policymakers, and non-governmental organization representatives. In addition, two focus groups with 20 California citizens were convened: one with environmentalists and another with agriculturalists. While climate change was viewed by many as a mild contributing factor to the California drought, many stakeholders had not heard of EEA or doubted that scientists could conclusively link the drought to anthropogenic climate change; those that were familiar with EEA felt that the science was generally uncertain. In the focus groups, presentation of divergent EEA results led participants to revert to pre-existing ideas about the drought-climate connection, or to question whether science had sufficiently advanced to analyze the event properly. These results indicate that while EEA continues to provoke interest and research in the scientific community, it is not currently utilized by many stakeholders, and may entrench the public in pre-existing views.     

Investigating the impact of climate change on New York City’s primary water supply

Future climate scenarios projected by three different General Circulation Models and a delta-change methodology are used as input to the Generalized Watershed Loading Functions – Variable Source Area (GWLF-VSA) watershed model to simulate future inflows to reservoirs that are part of the New York City water supply system (NYCWSS). These inflows are in turn used as part of the NYC OASIS model designed to simulate operations for the NYCWSS. In this study future demands and operation rules are assumed stationary and future climate variability is based on historical data to which change factors were applied in order to develop the future scenarios. Our results for the West of Hudson portion of the NYCWSS suggest that future climate change will impact regional hydrology on a seasonal basis. The combined effect of projected increases in winter air temperatures, increased winter rain, and earlier snowmelt results in more runoff occurring during winter and slightly less runoff in early spring, increased spring and summer evapotranspiration, and reduction in number of days the system is under drought conditions. At subsystem level reservoir storages, water releases and spills appear to be higher and less variable during the winter months and are slightly reduced during summer. Under the projected future climate and assumptions in this study the NYC reservoir system continues to show high resilience, high annual reliability and relatively low vulnerability.     

Bridging science and community knowledge? The complicating role of natural variability in perceptions of climate change

Although the spatial and temporal scales on which climate varies is a prominent aspect of climate research in the natural sciences, its treatment in the social sciences remains relatively underdeveloped. The result is limited understanding of the public's capacity to perceive climate variability as distinct from change, and uncertainty surrounding how and when to best communicate information on variability/change. Ignoring variability in favour of change-focused analyses and language risks significant misrepresentation of public perception and knowledge, and precludes detailed synthesis of data from the social and natural sciences. An example is presented based on a regional comparison of variability-dominated climate observations and change-focused survey data, collected in western Newfoundland (Canada). This region experiences pronounced, slow-varying natural variability, which acted to obscure broader climate trends through the 1980s and 1990s; since the late 1990s, the same variability has amplified apparent change. While survey results confirm residents perceive regional climate change, it is not clear whether respondents distinguish variability from change. This presents uncertainty in the best approach to climate science communication in this region, and raises concern that subsequent variability-driven transient cooling will erode public support for climate action. Parallels are drawn between these regional concerns and similar uncertainty surrounding treatment of variability in discussion of global temperature trends, highlighting variability perception as a significant gap in human dimensions of climate change research.     

High impact,low probability? An empirical analysis of risk in the economics of climate change

To what extent does economic analysis of climate change depend on low-probability, high-impact events? This question has received a great deal of attention lately, with the contention increasingly made that climate damage could be so large that societal willingness to pay to avoid extreme outcomes should overwhelm other seemingly important assumptions, notably on time preference. This paper provides an empirical examination of some key theoretical points, using a probabilistic integrated assessment model. New, fat-tailed distributions are inputted for key parameters representing climate sensitivity and economic costs. It is found that welfare estimates do strongly depend on tail risks, but for a set of plausible assumptions time preference can still matter.     

Are homeowners willing to adapt to and mitigate the effects of climate change?

The need to adapt to climate change impacts, whilst simultaneously limiting greenhouse gas emissions, requires that the government’s efforts are joined by public action. In England and Wales, housing contributes significantly to the emissions and many properties are at risk of flooding. This paper investigates the preparedness of homeowners in England and Wales to make changes to their homes in response to the predicted effects of climate change. A telephone survey of 961 homeowners investigated their interest in purchasing mitigation and adaptation improvements against their concern about climate change, awareness of flood risk and attribution of responsibility for action. Whilst the majority of homes had some energy-saving improvements, few were found to have property-level flood protection. The high levels of awareness about climate change and flooding were coupled with the perception of risks as low. Whilst some respondents accepted personal responsibility for action, most believed that the authorities were responsible for flood protection, and would not pay the costs required to make their home more energy-efficient and better prepared for the eventuality of floods. The results suggest that there is scope for further improvement of energy-saving measures, and that the levels of adoption of flood-protection measures are very low. Multi-faceted strategies, including more effective communication of risks and responsibilities, incentives, and material support for the poorest, will need to be developed to overcome the current reluctance by homeowners to invest in flood-protection measures and further energy conservation solutions in the future.     

Who and what are carbon markets for? Politics and the development of climate policy

Why have carbon markets been rapidly adopted as policy solutions to climate change in the last decade? Perhaps surprisingly, this question has attracted virtually no attention in the large literature on such markets. The standard arguments given for why carbon markets are good ways to respond to climate change do not explain why such markets have flourished as governance mechanisms in relation to climate. Carbon markets have spread and become taken-for-granted because of the potential they give to certain powerful actors (financiers, specifically) to create new cycles of investment, profits and growth. As a consequence, they make possible a political coalition combining financiers with environmentalists. This coalition has considerable potential to legitimize substantial cuts in carbon emissions in the face of continued opposition from other interests. It is the combination of these two elements – the promotion of specific growth sectors and the construction of a political coalition – that constitutes the principal political virtue of carbon markets. In order to demonstrate this claim, the history of emissions trading is traced and the implication of this analysis is explored for the further building of climate governance centred on carbon markets.     

What happened to climate change? CITES and the reconfiguration of polar bear conservation discourse

In the past decade, polar bears have become the poster species of climate change. But in March 2013, a joint proposal by the governments of the United States and the Russian Federation to up-list polar bears to Appendix I of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) diverted public attention from climate change towards the hunting of polar bears. Prior to a vote on the proposal, non-governmental organisations spear-headed a media campaign to support the up-listing. In the United Kingdom the campaign received support from celebrities and was widely reported in English language news media. Narratives of commercial legal and illegal polar bear hunting and the imminent extinction of polar bears were aggressively promoted, rhetorically supported by the manipulation of trade and scientific data. By rendering discourses of commercial hunting and a lucrative global trade in polar bear parts highly visible, sustainable hunting and climate change-induced habitat loss were rendered invisible. Media reports of commercial hunting de-coupled polar bear conservation from climate change mitigation, and disassociated polar bear hunting from regulated indigenous subsistence practices. A review of current polar bear conservation measures and an analysis of media coverage leading up to the CITES decision reveal these conflicting discourses, and suggest that more nuanced media coverage of polar bear conservation is necessary if appropriate multilateral conservation policies are to be enacted and publicly supported.     

How are healthy,working populations affected by increasing temperatures in the tropics? Implications for climate change adaptation policies

Climate change and land use change are increasing average and extreme temperatures. Hotter temperatures can detrimentally affect workers’ health and their economic productivity and livelihoods, especially in rural areas in industrializing countries that may be more vulnerable and less resilient. A growing literature has examined these factors at large spatial scales, yet few studies have done so at finer scales. Micro-level data from developing regions is needed to understand the extent of heat exposure, as well as current and future adaptation strategies of working, healthy, and rural populations. We fill this gap using objective environmental measurements from 3M^TM Questemp^TM 46 Heat Stress Monitors, as well as survey data from working, healthy, and rural communities in East Kalimantan, Indonesia. Our data contain two groups: those who work in only open areas, and those who work in both forests and open areas. We document workers’ livelihood strategies, work schedules, perceptions of how temperatures impact their work, and future adaptation strategies for even hotter days. Ambient temperatures are 2.6–8.3 °C cooler in forests compared to open areas, indicating the temperature effects of deforestation can be immediate and significant. Those working only in open areas face up to 6.5 h of exposure to temperatures above the accepted Threshold Limit Value for worker well-being. Workers adapt to hotter temperatures by altering the timing of their work shifts and breaks, indicating our sample is already adapting to increasing temperatures from climate and land use change. We also find differential adaptation strategies between those working only in open areas compared to those working in both forests and open areas, suggesting current acclimatization may be a factor in how people adapt. Our results suggest the need for adaptation and mitigation policies tailored to the unique constraints of rural workers that specifically incorporate extant adaptation strategies.     

Lights, camera … action? Altered attitudes and behaviour in response to the climate change film The Age of Stupid

The film The Age of Stupid depicts the world in 2055 devastated by climate change, combining this with documentary footage which illustrates many facets of the problems of climate change and fossil-fuel dependency. This study investigates the effects of the film on UK viewers’ attitudes and behaviour through a three-stage survey. Analysis of changes in attitudes focussed particularly on respondents’ concern about climate change, motivation to act, fear about the potential for catastrophe, beliefs about responsibility for action, and sense of agency. The film increased concern about climate change, motivation to act, and viewers’ sense of agency, although these effects had not persisted 10-14 weeks after seeing it. It was also successful in promoting some mitigation actions and behavioural change, although respondents reported barriers to further action, such as limited options for improving home energy efficiency among those in rented accommodation. However, filmgoers were atypical of the general public in that they exhibited very high levels of concern about climate change, knowledge about how to reduce their carbon emissions, and contact with organisations campaigning about climate change, before they saw the film. The paper considers how these factors may have enabled viewers to respond to the film as they did, as well as policy implications for those seeking to develop effective climate change communications.     

Future makers or future takers? A scenario analysis of climate change and the Great Barrier Reef

The extent to which nations and regions can actively shape the future or must passively respond to global forces is a topic of relevance to current discourses on climate change. In Australia, climate change has been identified as the greatest threat to the ecological resilience of the Great Barrier Reef, but is exacerbated by regional and local pressures. We undertook a scenario analysis to explore how two key uncertainties may influence these threats and their impact on the Great Barrier Reef and adjacent catchments in 2100: whether (1) global development and (2) Australian development is defined and pursued primarily in terms of economic growth or broader concepts of human well-being and environmental sustainability, and in turn, how climate change is managed and mitigated. We compared the implications of four scenarios for marine and terrestrial ecosystem services and human well-being. The results suggest that while regional actions can partially offset global inaction on climate change until about mid-century, there are probable threshold levels for marine ecosystems, beyond which the Great Barrier Reef will become a fundamentally different system by 2100 if climate change is not curtailed. Management that can respond to pressures at both global and regional scales will be needed to maintain the full range of ecosystem services. Modest improvements in human well-being appear possible even while ecosystem services decline, but only where regional management is strong. The future of the region depends largely on whether national and regional decision-makers choose to be active future ‘makers’ or passive future ‘takers’ in responding to global drivers of change. We conclude by discussing potential avenues for using these scenarios further with the Great Barrier Reef region's stakeholders.     

Is it time to abolish company car benefits? An analysis of transport behaviour in Germany and implications for climate change

Company cars have received considerable attention because of their partial tax-exemption and the changes in travel behaviour they stimulate, including car model choices, distances driven, and car ownership patterns. This paper is the first to present evidence on actual transport behaviour change, based on mobility and fuel diaries, and comparing a sample of 624 company cars and 9328 private cars in Germany. Analysis confirms that company cars belong to the more heavily motorized car segments (with an average 97?kW, as opposed to 79?kW of private cars), and are driven more than private cars (24,672?km per year, compared to 12,828?km per year for private cars). Company car benefits also increase average household vehicle numbers by 25%. Results show that it is imperative to distinguish company cars of company owners relative to those driven by employees, as negative externalities increase significantly where company cars are used by the latter. Abolishing company car benefits could significantly reduce emissions from passenger road transport and stimulate change in the country’s automotive industries towards a lower-carbon path. As Germany is not currently on track to meet its climate mitigation targets, this would be a timely policy shift.

Key policy insights

• Company car benefits increase transport demand, car ownership, and average vehicle fleet engine power. These effects are particularly relevant for employees.

• Company cars have, in spite of their larger size and greater engine power, a (modestly) better fuel economy than private cars, possibly because they represent more recent and hence more efficient car models.

• A policy focus on vehicle fuel efficiency improvements will fail to reduce the German car fleet’s CO₂ emissions to a sustainable level.

• Abolishing company car benefits could yield a significant reduction in GHG emissions from passenger road transport.

• Company car subsidies are an out-dated mode of support for the fossil-fuel based automotive industry.