Personal experience with climate change predicts intentions to act

The public's willingness to engage in mitigation actions has not received as much attention as the level of belief in Global Warming (GW), especially on the international stage. Research in Western nations indicates that people systematically misunderstand GW and the actions required for mitigation. Important factors that influence judgments about mitigation actions include personal experiences, beliefs, knowledge, values, and worldviews. We present results of an international survey (25 samples from 24 countries) measuring general intentions to act and willingness to engage in specific actions. Our analysis reveals that endorsement of specific actions is (a) lower than general endorsement of mitigation, (b) accompanied by higher intra-individual variance, and (c) more strongly related to personal experiences with GW. This pattern can be attributed to the compatibility between the proximal construal of specific actions and the nature of the personal experience. Lastly we provide recommendations on how these findings can be used to encourage mitigation action.     

Household perceptions of climate change and preferences for mitigation action: the case of the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme in Australia

The study aims to reveal Australian households?? perceptions of climate change and their preferences for mitigation action. A web-based survey was conducted in November 2008 in which over 600 households from the state of New South Wales were asked for their willingness to bear extra household expenditure to support the ??Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme??, an emissions trading scheme proposed by the Australian government. The results of the study can be summarized in four key findings. First, respondents?? willingness to pay for climate change mitigation is significantly influenced by their beliefs of future temperature rise. Support for the policy increased at a decreasing rate as the perceived temperature change rose. Second, perceptions of policy failure have a significant negative impact on respondents?? support for the proposed mitigation measure. The higher the perceived likelihood that the measure would not deliver any outcome, the lower was the likelihood that respondents would support the policy. Third, respondent preferences for the proposed policy are influenced by the possibility of reaching a global agreement on emissions reduction. Sample respondents stated significantly higher values for the policy when the biggest polluting countries implement a similar scheme. Finally, respondents?? willingness to take action against climate change, both at the national and household level, is found to be influenced by their level of mass-media exposure. Particularly, those respondents who watched ??An Inconvenient Truth?? were significantly more likely to act for climate change mitigation than others.     

Voluntary citizen participation in carbon allowance markets: the role of norm-based motivation

The results from a semi-experimental study of Swedish students’ stated willingness to purchase emission allowances for carbon dioxide are presented. Drawing heavily on recent developments in the literature on integrating norm-motivated behaviour into neoclassical consumer theory, it is assumed that individuals have a preference for maintaining a self-image as a responsible (and thus norm-compliant) person. The results indicate that students’ willingness to purchase carbon allowances is determined by both price and the presence of norms: those who feel personally responsible for contributing to reducing climate damages also appear more inclined to buy allowances. The empirical findings are consistent with the notion that a person's beliefs about others’ stated willingness to purchase carbon allowances imply improvements in their own self-image and ultimately behavioural change. This suggests that information campaigns that attempt to influence beliefs about others’ intentions could promote ‘green’ consumer behaviour in the carbon allowance market. Such (stated) behaviour also appears to be influenced by a person's awareness of the problem of climate change and their beliefs about their own ability to contribute to solving it.

Policy relevance

Although there is a concern that public goods such as reduced climate change may be under-provided in the free market, individual concern for the environment occasionally has profound impacts on consumer choice and voluntary action. This research suggests that information campaigns that attempt to influence beliefs about others’ intentions could promote ‘green’ consumer behaviour in carbon allowance markets. Publicly-provided information about the impacts of climate change and the ways in which these damages stem from individual choices could also induce this type of behaviour.     

Farmer beliefs and concerns about climate change and attitudes toward adaptation and mitigation: Evidence from Iowa

Agriculture is both vulnerable to climate change impacts and a significant source of greenhouse gases. Increasing agriculture’s resilience and reducing its contribution to climate change are societal priorities. Survey data collected from Iowa farmers are analyzed to answer the related research questions: (1) do farmers support adaptation and mitigation actions, and (2) do beliefs and concerns about climate change influence those attitudes. Results indicate that farmers who were concerned about the impacts of climate change on agriculture and attributed it to human activities had more positive attitudes toward both adaptive and mitigative management strategies. Farmers who believed that climate change is not a problem because human ingenuity will enable adaptations and who did not believe climate change is occurring or believed it is a natural phenomenon—a substantial percentage of farmers—tended not to support mitigation.     

The genesis of climate change activism: from key beliefs to political action

Climate change activism has been uncommon in the U.S., but a growing national movement is pressing for a political response. To assess the cognitive and affective precursors of climate activism, we hypothesize and test a two-stage information-processing model based on social cognitive theory. In stage 1, expectations about climate change outcomes and perceived collective efficacy to mitigate the threat are hypothesized to influence affective issue involvement and support for societal mitigation action. In stage 2, beliefs about the effectiveness of political activism, perceived barriers to activist behaviors and opinion leadership are hypothesized to influence intended and actual activism. To test these hypotheses, we fit a structural equation model using nationally representative data. The model explains 52 percent of the variance in a latent variable representing three forms of climate change activism: contacting elected representatives; supporting organizations working on the issue; and attending climate change rallies or meetings. The results suggest that efforts to increase citizen activism should promote specific beliefs about climate change, build perceptions that political activism can be effective, and encourage interpersonal communication on the issue.     

Climate change beliefs, concerns, and attitudes toward adaptation and mitigation among farmers in the Midwestern United States

A February 2012 survey of almost 5,000 farmers across a region of the U.S. that produces more than half of the nation’s corn and soybean revealed that 66 % of farmers believed climate change is occurring (8 % mostly anthropogenic, 33 % equally human and natural, 25 % mostly natural), while 31 % were uncertain and 3.5 % did not believe that climate change is occurring. Results of initial analyses indicate that farmers’ beliefs about climate change and its causes vary considerably, and the relationships between those beliefs, concern about the potential impacts of climate change, and attitudes toward adaptive and mitigative action differ in systematic ways. Farmers who believed that climate change is occurring and attributable to human activity were significantly more likely to express concern about impacts and support adaptive and mitigative action. On the other hand, farmers who attributed climate change to natural causes, were uncertain about whether it is occurring, or did not believe that it is occurring were less concerned, less supportive of adaptation, and much less likely to support government and individual mitigative action. Results suggest that outreach with farmers should account for these covariances in belief, concerns, and attitudes toward adaptation and mitigation.     

How does framing affect policy support for emissions mitigation? Testing the effects of ocean acidification and other carbon emissions frames

Public support for carbon emissions mitigation is crucial to motivate action to address global issues like climate change and ocean acidification (OA). Yet in the public sphere, carbon emissions mitigation policies are typically discussed in the context of climate change and rarely in the context of OA or other global change outcomes. In this paper, we advance research on OA and climate change perceptions and communication, by (i) examining causal beliefs about ocean acidification, and (ii) measuring support for mitigation policies from individuals presented with one of five different policy frames (climate change, global warming, carbon pollution, air pollution, and ocean acidification). Knowledge about OA causes and consequences is more widespread than we anticipated, though still generally low. Somewhat surprisingly, an “air pollution” mitigation frame elicits the highest degree of policy support overall, while “carbon pollution” performs no better than “climate change” or “global warming.” Framing effects are in part contingent on prior knowledge and attitudes, and mediated by concern. Perhaps due to a lack of OA awareness, the OA frame generates the least support overall, although it seems to close the gap in support associated with political orientation: the OA frame increases support among those (few) conservatives who report having heard of OA before the survey. These findings complement previous work on climate change communication and suggest the need for further research into OA as an effective way to engage conservatives in carbon emissions mitigation policy. Potentially even more promising is the air pollution framing.     

When worry about climate change leads to climate action: How values,worry and personal responsibility relate to various climate actions

The IPCC's report on Global Warming of 1.5°C positioned climate change as one of the most worrying issues mankind has ever faced. Although many people worry about climate change, there is still much unknown about the origins and outcomes of worry about climate change; particularly, whether and how it can motivate specific and personal climate actions. The current paper investigates this critical relationship with data from the European Social Survey Round 8 (44,387 respondents from 23 countries). As expected, the more individuals worried about climate change, the more likely they were to take and support climate action. Yet, the process through which this association occurred differed between actions. Specifically, worry was both directly and indirectly, via feelings of personal responsibility to reduce climate change, associated with climate policy support; whereas worry was mostly indirectly associated with personal climate mitigation behaviours, via personal responsibility. In addition, worry about climate change appears partly rooted in biospheric values (i.e., caring about nature and the environment), and biospheric values were also clearly, directly and positively related to personal climate mitigation behaviours. The relationships were highly consistent across countries but varied somewhat in size. The results show how generic feelings about climate change can directly and indirectly affect both climate policy support and personal climate mitigation behaviours, thereby providing critical insights for science and policy making.     

Assessing the likelihood of widespread landholder adoption of afforestation and reforestation projects

Tree planting for carbon sequestration is a commonly proposed climate change mitigation strategy, with afforestation projects forming part of voluntary and mandatory carbon offset trading schemes. Afforestation is often promoted as a new economic opportunity for private landholders. While multiple studies have identified physical and economic opportunities for afforestation, few have examined the willingness of private landholders to adopt afforestation, and the factors that influence this willingness. We examine this using data from a survey of Australian landholders. The willingness of landholders to adopt afforestation for carbon sequestration varies substantially depending on how this afforestation is designed and implemented: landholders prefer small plantings on less productive land, which minimise the disturbance afforestation presents to land management, and to landholder values about appropriate uses of agricultural land. Landholders are less willing to consider afforestation if it involves planting the large areas required by many current carbon afforestation schemes. Willingness to adopt afforestation is influenced in particular by landholder's perceptions of its potential to provide a diversified income stream, and its impacts on flexibility of land management. More broadly, it is influenced by their views about the social acceptability of afforestation, particularly whether the landholder believes trees should be planted on agricultural land, and how they believe others in the community view afforestation. Our results suggest that widespread adoption requires designing afforestation so it (i) provides a range of socio-economic benefits that go beyond provision of income; (ii) minimises disruption to land management flexibility; and (iii) is compatible with landholder beliefs about appropriate use of agricultural land.     

Delayed action and uncertain stabilisation targets. How much will the delay cost?

Despite the growing concern about actual on-going climate change, there is little consensus on the scale and timing of actions needed to stabilise the concentrations of greenhouse gases. Many countries are unwilling to implement mitigation strategies, at least in the short term, and no agreement on an ambitious global stabilisation target has yet been reached. It is thus likely that international climate policies will be characterized by a high degree of uncertainty over the stringency of the climate objective, and that some countries might delay their participation to global action. What additional economic costs will this delay in the adoption of mitigation measures imply? What would the optimal short-term strategy be given the uncertainty surrounding the climate policy to come? Is there a hedging strategy that decision makers can adopt to cope with delayed action and uncertain targets? This paper addresses these questions by quantifying the economic implications of delaying mitigation action, and by computing the optimal abatement strategy in the presence of uncertainty about a global stabilisation target (which will be agreed upon in future climate negotiations). Results point to short-term inaction as the key determinant for the economic costs of ambitious climate policies. They also indicate that there is an effective hedging strategy that could minimise the cost of climate policy uncertainty over the global stabilisation target: a short-term moderate climate policy would be a good strategy to reduce the costs of delayed action and to cope with uncertainty about the outcome of future climate negotiations. By contrast, failing to curb emissions in the short term imposes rapidly increasing additional costs of compliance.     

Lights, camera … action? Altered attitudes and behaviour in response to the climate change film The Age of Stupid

The film The Age of Stupid depicts the world in 2055 devastated by climate change, combining this with documentary footage which illustrates many facets of the problems of climate change and fossil-fuel dependency. This study investigates the effects of the film on UK viewers’ attitudes and behaviour through a three-stage survey. Analysis of changes in attitudes focussed particularly on respondents’ concern about climate change, motivation to act, fear about the potential for catastrophe, beliefs about responsibility for action, and sense of agency. The film increased concern about climate change, motivation to act, and viewers’ sense of agency, although these effects had not persisted 10-14 weeks after seeing it. It was also successful in promoting some mitigation actions and behavioural change, although respondents reported barriers to further action, such as limited options for improving home energy efficiency among those in rented accommodation. However, filmgoers were atypical of the general public in that they exhibited very high levels of concern about climate change, knowledge about how to reduce their carbon emissions, and contact with organisations campaigning about climate change, before they saw the film. The paper considers how these factors may have enabled viewers to respond to the film as they did, as well as policy implications for those seeking to develop effective climate change communications.     

Climate change beliefs in an agricultural context: what is the role of values held by farming and non-farming groups?

Climate change in many agricultural contexts will increase tensions between farming and non-farming populations over adaptations in land use and water conservation strategies. How adequately these future tensions may be mitigated will be partially determined by each groups' beliefs about climate change. A voluminous literature shows that climate change beliefs are crucial for understanding engagement with climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies, and that values motivate climate change beliefs, but the role of values remains unclear, and comparisons of farming and non-farming populations are scant. We develop a model of climate change beliefs that integrates four main motivating factors - values, political ideology, knowledge, and worldview - and we explicitly compare members of farming and non-farming populations in an agricultural watershed in the Central Great Plains, USA. Our findings highlight the role of held values in motivating climate change beliefs and point to areas of potential consensus and tension within and among members of these two groups. The results provide an empirical basis for developing future climate change engagement strategies in contexts of growing divides and conflicts among farming and non-farming groups.     

Modelling risk adaptation and mitigation behaviour under different climate change scenarios

The main objective of this study is to simulate household choice behavior under varying climate change scenarios using choice experiments. Economic welfare measures are derived for society’s willingness to pay (WTP) to reduce climate change induced flood risks through private insurance and willingness to accept compensation (WTAC) for controlled flooding under varying future risk exposure levels. Material flood damage and loss of life are covered in the insurance policy experiment, while the WTAC experiment also captures the economic value of immaterial flood damage such as feelings of discomfort, fear and social disruption. The results show that WTP and WTAC are substantial, suggesting a more prominent role of external social damage costs in cost-benefit analysis of climate change and flood mitigation policies.     

Lessons from co-impacts assessment under the Mitigation Action Plans and Scenarios (MAPS) Programme

The MAPS Programme has been active in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru in supporting the development of an evidence base to inform the processes involved in climate mitigation policy-making. The programme combines detailed quantitative analysis with an extensive stakeholder engagement process to provide policy and decision makers with the information required for long-term climate mitigation planning.

In recognition of the critical need to consider the developmental context and agenda in climate policy-making, the projects undertaken in these countries have experimented with various types of assessments of developmental impacts at both the macro and micro levels. These impacts have been collectively termed co-impacts to reflect the fact that these may be either positive or negative. In this article the value and challenges associated with co-impacts work for climate mitigation policy are considered. The value of including co-impacts analysis in the MAPS processes included increased stakeholder buy-in, making the case for mitigation action, informing INDCs and the prioritization of particular mitigation actions. Challenges include those associated with obtaining locally relevant data, the selection and operation of appropriate macro-economic models and analytical approaches and working with multidisciplinary teams.

The article concludes by making some suggestions to optimize co-impacts work, through reference to other bodies of literature. The authors highlight that this article is situated within a dominant approach to climate mitigation policy work in developing countries, which implicitly places the non-climate benefits of any action as secondary to the primary benefit of climate change mitigation and constructs an artificial separation of policy formulation and implementation. Practitioners are encouraged to reflect on the implications of these considerations in future efforts.

Policy relevance

One of the primary challenges to advancing climate mitigation policy in developing countries is that of perceived relevance: near-term development priorities are overwhelming. Identifying, understanding and engaging with the co-impacts of mitigation actions has emerged as one way of addressing this challenge. Although still at an experimental phase, experience with co-impacts analysis in the MAPS countries provides some useful lessons in how to develop this area of work.     

Using Protection Motivation Theory to examine information-seeking behaviors on climate change

Many earlier studies concluded that exposure to changes in local weather or extreme weather events prompt public interest in climate change, and in turn raise support for mitigation policies. However, these findings do not square with observations of record-breaking temperatures, and decades of failure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. To address this conundrum, we use Protection Motivation Theory to form hypotheses on the specific type of climate change-related information that individuals seek during periods of extreme local weather. Using daily-level internet search engine data from Chinese cities, we find that residents are purposeful and rational in seeking information on climate change. Specifically, when faced with high or abnormal temperatures, they are much more likely to seek information to appraise their susceptibility to climate change threats, and evaluate coping responses. On the other hand, due to the lack of direct benefits, they do not seek out information on climate mitigation behaviors. In contrast to earlier studies, our findings suggest that it is unlikely that extreme weather events will prompt support for climate mitigation actions. Instead, as worldwide weather becomes more extreme and unpredictable, it is likely that public’s attention will shift in the direction of adaptation measures.     

Human health as a motivator for climate change mitigation: results from four European high-income countries

Invoking health benefits to promote climate-friendly household behavior has three unique advantages: (i) health co-benefits accrue directly to the acting individual, they are "private goods" rather than public ones; (ii) the evidence base for, and magnitude of health co-benefits is well-established; and (iii) the idea of a healthy life-style is well-engrained in public discourse, much more so than that of a climate-friendly life-style. In previous research, assessing the influence of information on health effects on people’s motivation to adopt mitigation actions, health co-benefits for the individual were typically confounded with collective health co-benefits, for example from pollution reduction. The present research aims to overcome this limitation by providing information on individual health co-benefits that are unconditional on the actions of others (direct health co-benefits). We report effects of this kind of health information on stated willingness to adopt mitigation actions as well as on simulation-based carbon emission reductions in a pre-registered experimental setting among 308 households in 4 mid-size case-study cities in 4 European high-income countries: France, Germany, Norway and Sweden. For each mitigation action from the sectors food, housing, and mobility, half of the sample received the amount of CO₂equivalents (CO₂-eq) saved and the financial costs or savings the respective action generated. The other half additionally received information on direct health co-benefits, where applicable. For households receiving information on direct health co-benefits, we find a higher mean willingness to adopt food and housing actions, and a greater proportion very willing to adopt one or more mitigation actions (OR 1.86, 95% CI 1.1, 3.12); and a greater simulated reduction in overall carbon footprint: difference in percent reduction -2.70%, (95% CI -5.34, -0.04) overall and -4.45%, (95% CI -8.26, -0.64) for food. Our study is the first to show that providing information on strictly unconditional, individual health co-benefits can motivate households in high-income countries to adopt mitigation actions.     

Climate policy at the local level: Insights from California

Local governments in the United States have been hotbeds of climate change activity. Recently, states have sought to incorporate these primarily voluntary actions into broader climate change mitigation programs. Using the example of California, a national leader in U.S. climate policy, this article examines the scope for effectiveness of local climate action and assesses factors related to adoption of local climate policies. The analysis draws on two original surveys of city and county governments, designed to learn about adoption of comprehensive policy tools (emission inventories and climate action plans) and programs in specific areas (energy, water, land use, transportation). Adoption rates are fairly high and growing; by mid 2010 roughly 70% of all jurisdictions were already engaged or planning to engage in comprehensive climate actions, up from roughly 50% in 2008. The adoption of specific programs varies with the degree of local government authority in different sectors, and is generally higher for programs targeting municipal facilities and operations than those targeting residents and businesses. Population size, household income, and strong support from local leaders and the public are all associated with higher rates of adoption, particularly for comprehensive actions. Partisan attitudes are more important for comprehensive actions than for programs in specific areas such as energy efficiency and renewable energy, mirroring the findings of state and national public opinion surveys, which find broader support for actions like clean energy than for explicit climate change-oriented actions. Qualitative analysis reveals additional keys to success, including partnering with other local governments and private organizations and leveraging cost savings and other potential co-benefits of action. As states move to incorporate local actions into broader plans, mandates will also play an increasing role in setting a floor for local efforts.     

Empirical testing of the visualizations of climate change mitigation scenarios with citizens: A comparison among Germany,Poland, and France

While scenarios are used extensively for communication about climate change mitigation, little is known about the interpretation of these scenarios by citizens. We conducted a cross-country empirical evaluation of scenario visualizations for global mitigation, using online surveys in Germany (N = 379), Poland (N = 223), and France (N = 225). Each respondent received visualizations of the required changes in global carbon dioxide emissions and composition of electricity supply (fossil fuels, nuclear, and renewable sources) for limiting global warming to 1.5 °C. We evaluated the effects of respondents’ demographics, prior beliefs, numeracy, and graph literacy on the reading accuracy and knowledge gains from the visualizations. We also included an experimental between-groups design on visualization format, where four groups received different graph formats (steep or gradual graphs with depictions of uncertainty ranges or scenario ensembles) and the fifth group received a table. Results showed that higher education level, numeracy, and graph literacy increased reading accuracy in all countries, while age reduced them. Respondents with prior beliefs about climate change mitigation that matched the information in the visualizations had also higher reading accuracy and knowledge gains. While the effects of different visualization formats were comparatively minor, customizing formats according to demographic and country differences was used to reduce adverse effects from these differences. These results emphasize the need to design visualizations that match characteristics of the intended audience and could inform better communication of climate change mitigation scenarios to non-expert audience.