Learning from Lancashire: Exploring the contours of the shale gas conflict in England

This paper explores the conflict over shale gas exploration in Lancashire where the company Cuadrilla is preparing to horizontally drill and hydraulically fracture the first shale gas wells in England. At present, this is the only location in Europe where new commercial exploration for shale gas is underway, thus the outcome has wider significance. The initial planning applications were refused by Lancashire County Council in June 2015. The decisions were then appealed by Cuadrilla and there was a public enquiry in February and March of 2016. On 6 October 2016, the central Government over-turned the initial decisions at one site and gave Cuadrilla more time to address traffic concerns at the other. The paper uses the public enquiry to map the contours of the shale gas conflict. It is divided into three sections. The first explores public attitudes towards shale gas development in the UK and reveals growing public awareness and increasing opposition. The second presents the conceptual frame for the analysis, which includes both a critical assessment of the social licence to operate (SLO) and an introduction to a social, actuarial, and political risk and licensing model (SAP Model). The third deploys the SAP model to analyse the public enquiry. The model explains how Cuadrilla is able drill despite the absence of both a local political and social licence to operate. It is concluded that unless the industry and the government can address growing public concerns about shale gas development, continuing conflict could constrain commercial development.     

US institutional pathways to clean coal and shale gas: lessons for China

China's 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) envisages that shale gas and coal will be central to its energy future. However, for China to meet the energy security and climate change objectives set out in its 12th Five-Year Plan it will be reliant on the widespread commercial deployment of two key technologies; hydraulic fracturing combined with horizontal drilling for shale gas, and carbon capture and storage (CCS) for coal. China is moving to acquire these technologies through technology transfer and diffusion from the US, but progress has been slow, and neither is currently available in China on a commercial scale. Drawing on interviews in the US and China, this article argues that China's expectation of technology from the US may well be disappointed because of factors unique to the US institutional environment that have made the development of fracking technology possible and hinder the development of CCS technology at a commercial scale.

Policy relevance

If China is to meet the energy security and climate change objectives set out in its 12th Five-Year Plan it will be reliant on the widespread commercial deployment of fracking and clean coal technologies. While China expects to acquire these technologies via technology transfer and diffusion from the US, progress has been slow. Because of factors unique to the US institutional environment the availability of both technologies on a commercial scale in China is unlikely in the coming years. As a result, Chinese policy makers would be well-advised not to count on these technologies to meet their energy and climate goals.     

The influence of political ideology on greenhouse gas emissions

This research tests the casual link from political ideology to national greenhouse gas emissions by utilizing multinational panel data covering 98 countries during the period 1990–2016. Overall, the baseline results and robustness tests show a political divide on national greenhouse gas emissions, whereby compared to right-wing governments, left-wing governments are more likely to exhibit less carbon dioxide emissions. We further explore this topic from the perspectives of energy efficiency and education. Three-stage OLS regressions suggest that leftist parties increase energy efficiency and spend more on secondary education, which lead to less greenhouse gas emissions. We also introduce the interaction between political ideology and economic performance as well as globalization to test the moderating effects of economic performance and globalization. The study further looks into the interaction effects of political ideology and democracies on greenhouse gas emissions by dividing the whole sample into two sub-samples. The results indicate that the ideology effect on greenhouse gas emissions varies among countries with different economic performances or different degrees of political globalization, as well as between democracies and non-democracies.     

A shale gas revolution for China?

The question of whether China is on the verge of a ‘shale gas revolution’ is examined. This has potentially significant consequences for energy policy and climate change mitigation. Contrary to the optimistic reading of some commentators, it argues that various technological, environmental, political, regulatory and institutional factors will constrain the growth of China's shale gas market and that such a revolution might in any event have consequences that are at best mixed, at worst antithetical to climate change mitigation.Policy relevanceChina's reserves of unconventional gas have the potential to transform energy policy, as has occurred in the US, resulting in the substitution of shale gas for coal in the energy mix. Because gas emits only approximately half the GHG per unit as coal, such a move would have important implications for climate policy. However, substantial obstacles stand in the way of the ‘energy revolution’ that some policy analysts see China as embarking upon. The need to acknowledge these obstacles, particularly those relating to regulation and governance (and whether or to what extent they can be overcome), is an issue of profound importance to the future of climate and energy policy.     

Attitudes toward hydraulic fracturing: The opposing forces of political conservatism and basic knowledge about fracking

Hydraulic fracturing has become a contentious issue around the globe. In the present study, using a sample of American adults (n = 412), the role of political orientation (conservative vs. liberal) and basic knowledge about fracking on fracking risk perception attitudes, fracking economic attitudes, energy reliance attitudes, trust of energy information sources, and preferred dwelling distance from energy operations was investigated. Basic knowledge about hydraulic fracturing as a possible moderating mechanism was also explored. Correlational and regression results revealed that political ideology and basic fracking knowledge are key predictors of fracking and energy source attitudes, and that the nature of the relation between ideology and fracking risk perceptions, fracking economic attitudes, reliance on natural gas, wind and solar, and distrust of government agencies, are influenced by an individual’s basic knowledge about fracking.     

The socio-political context for deploying carbon capture and storage in China and the U.S

Together, the U.S. and China emit roughly 40% of world's greenhouse gas emissions, and these nations have stated their desire to reduce absolute emissions (U.S.) or reduce the carbon intensity of the economy (China). However, both countries are dependent on coal for a large portion of their energy needs, which is projected to continue over the next several decades. They also have large amounts of coal resources, coal-dependent electricity production, and in China's case, extensive use of coal in the industrial sector, making any shift from coal socio-politically difficult. Both nations could use carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies to simultaneously decrease greenhouse gas emissions and continue the use of domestic coal resources; however, the socio-political context for CCS deployment differs substantially between the two countries and potentially makes large-scale CCS deployment challenging. Here, we examine and compare the political and institutional contexts shaping CCS policy and CCS deployment, both for initial pilot projects and for the creation of large-scale CCS technology deployment, and analyze how the socio-political context for CCS in China and the United States aligns with national climate, energy security, and economic priorities.     

Show some enthusiasm, but not too much: carbon capture and storage development prospects in China

China is the world's largest carbon dioxide (CO₂) emitter and its energy system is dominated by coal. For China to dramatically reduce its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions over the next few decades, it must either replace most of its uses of coal with energy supplies from renewables and nuclear power or install demonstration-size and then scaled-up carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies. Currently, China is pushing ahead with increased investment in renewables and nuclear power and with demonstration CCS projects. This strategy is consistent with a country that seeks to be ready in case global pressures prompt it to launch an aggressive GHG reduction effort while also not going so fast that it reduces the likelihood of receiving substantial financial support from wealthier countries, as it feels it is entitled to as a developing country. At such a time, given the magnitude of the coal resource in China, and the country's lack of other energy resources, it is likely the Chinese will make a substantial effort to develop CCS before taking the much more difficult step of trying to phase-out almost all use of coal in the span of just a few decades in a country that is so dependent on this domestically abundant and economically affordable resource.     

The feasibility of low CO2 concentration targets and the role of bio-energy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS)

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC 1992) calls for stabilization of atmospheric greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. We use three global energy system models to investigate the technological and economic attainability of meeting CO₂ concentration targets below current levels. Our scenario studies reveal that while energy portfolios from a broad range of energy technologies are needed to attain low concentrations, negative emission technologies—e.g., biomass energy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS)—significantly enhances the possibility to meet low concentration targets (at around 350 ppm CO₂).     

Mapping feasibilities of greenhouse gas removal: Key issues,gaps and opening up assessments

Greenhouse gas removal technologies and practices are essential to bring emissions to net zero and limit global warming to 1.5 °C. To achieve this, the majority of integrated assessment models (IAMs), that generate future emissions scenarios and inform the international policy process, use large-scale afforestation and biomass energy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS). The feasibility of these technologies and practices has only so far been considered from a relatively narrow techno-economic or biophysical perspective. Here, we present one of the first studies to elicit perspectives through an expert mapping process to open up and broaden the discussion around feasibility of afforestation and BECCS. Our stakeholders included business and industry, non-governmental organisations and policy makers, spanning expertise in bioenergy, forestry, CCS and climate change. Perspectives were elicited on (1) issues relating to BECCS with large-scale afforestation, and (2) specific criteria for assessing feasibility. Participants identified 12 main themes with 61 sub-themes around issues, and 11 main themes with 33 sub-themes around feasibility criteria. Our findings show important societal and governance aspects of feasibility that are currently under-represented, specifically issues around real-world complexity, competing human needs, justice and ethics. Unique to the use of these technologies for greenhouse gas removal are issues around temporal and spatial scale, and greenhouse gas accounting. Using these expert insights, we highlight where IAMs currently poorly capture these concerns. These broader, often more qualitative perspectives, issues and uncertainties must be recognised and accounted for, in order to understand the real-world feasibility of large-scale afforestation and BECCS and the role they play in limiting climate change. These considerations enable widening the scope to broader and deeper discussions about possible and desirable futures, beyond a focus on achieving net-zero emissions, attentive to the effects such decisions may have. We outline approaches that can be used to attend to the complex social and political dimensions that IAMs do not render. By complementing IAMs in this way opportunities can be created to open up considerations of future options and alternatives beyond those framings proposed by IAMs, creating opportunities for inclusion of knowledges, reflexivity and responsibility.     

The discursive politics of ‘fracking’: Frames,storylines, and the anticipatory contestation of shale gas development in the United Kingdom

How contested sources of energy such as shale gas are perceived in frontier countries considering their development is incredibly important to national and international climate policies. The UK shale development case is of particular interest currently as the Government attempts to position the UK as a pioneer of European, safe, sustainable shale gas development. We conduct a mixed-methods analysis of the UK policy debate on shale gas development involving 30 stakeholder interviews and 1557 political documents. This empirical focus extends the existing literature by identifying the use of frames in and through the institutions and practices of formal UK politics. We identify nine key frames and their associated storylines, analyse their use over time, and compare these findings with other national case studies. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given most UK Governments within our timeframe have supported shale development, pro-shale development frames dominate in the policy debate; however, we also find a high level of anti-shale development frame use, suggesting a deep and ongoing framing contest in national formal political sites. We find in particular a more prominent focus on land-use issues and impacts on the landscape than other UK studies or other national contexts. Conceptually, the study puts forward an integrative approach to the related concepts of frames and storylines, as well as arguments concerning the impotence of storylines in anticipatory political debate and the polyvalence of framing strategies. Questions about governance are raised by the general lack of consensus over the framing of shale development within formal political sites, let alone amongst the broader public; and by the lack of a coherent response from the Government to criticisms of its approach. Finally, we reflect on the apparent lack of evidence for Hajer’s ‘communicative miracle’ in our case, and speculate as to whether the lack of broad-based resonance of the ‘bridge’ storyline signals trouble for the positive-sum thinking of ecological modernisation.     

The impact of shale gas on the costs of climate policy

The use of shale gas is commonly considered as a low-cost option for meeting ambitious climate policy targets. This article explores global and country-specific effects of increasing global shale gas exploitation on the energy markets, on greenhouse gas emissions, and on mitigation costs. The global techno-economic partial equilibrium model POLES (Prospective Outlook on Long-term Energy Systems) is employed to compare policies which limit global warming to 2°C and baseline scenarios when the availability of shale gas is either high or low. According to the simulation results, a high availability of shale gas has rather small effects on the costs of meeting climate targets in the medium and long term. In the long term, a higher availability of shale gas increases baseline emissions of greenhouse gases for most countries and for the world, and leads to higher compliance costs for most, but not all, countries. Allowing for global trading of emission certificates does not alter these general results. In sum, these findings cast doubt on shale gas’s potential as a low-cost option for meeting ambitious global climate targets.

POLICY RELEVANCE

Many countries with a large shale gas resource base consider the expansion of local shale gas extraction as an option to reduce their GHG emissions. The findings in this article imply that a higher availability of shale gas in these countries might actually increase emissions and mitigation costs for these countries and also for the world. An increase in shale gas extraction may spur a switch from coal to gas electricity generation, thus lowering emissions. At the global level and for many countries, though, this effect is more than offset by a crowding out of renewable and nuclear energy carriers, and by lower energy prices, leading to higher emissions and higher mitigation costs in turn. These findings would warrant a re-evaluation of the climate strategy in most countries relying on the exploitation of shale gas to meet their climate targets.     

Tools for a new climate conversation: A mixed-methods study of language for public engagement across the political spectrum

Political orientation and ideology are amongst the most significant influences on climate change attitudes and responses. Specifically, those with right-of-centre political views are typically less concerned and more sceptical about climate change. A significant challenge remains to move beyond this ideological impasse and achieve a more open and constructive debate across the political spectrum. This paper reports on novel mixed-methods research in the UK to develop and test a series of ‘narratives’ to better engage citizens with centre-right political views. Qualitative work in Study 1 revealed two particularly promising narratives. The first focused on the idea that saving energy is predicated on the ‘conservative’ principle of avoiding waste; the second focused on the advantages of ‘Great British Energy’ (based on patriotic support for domestic low-carbon technologies). An online experiment in Study 2 with a representative UK sample compared these narratives with a more typically left-of-centre narrative focused on the concept of ‘climate justice’ with a representative sample of the UK public. Results indicate that the first two narratives elicited broad agreement and reduced scepticism amongst centre-right participants, while the ‘climate justice’ narrative (which reflects a common environmental message framing) polarised audiences along political lines. This research offers clear implications for how climate change communicators can move beyond preaching to the converted and initiate constructive dialogue about climate change with traditionally disengaged audiences.     

中国燃煤电厂碳捕集与生物质掺烧碳捕集改造的经济性

碳捕集与封存（CCS）技术作为解决全球气候变化问题的重要手段之一,能够有效减少CO₂排放。中国作为碳排放大国,当前电力的主要来源仍是煤电,碳捕集（CC）改造在燃煤电厂中有很大的应用潜力。经济性对CC改造的部署至关重要。为此,本文计算了中国各省典型电厂CC改造前后的平准化度电成本,比较了不同省份的CO₂捕集成本与CO₂避免成本,分析了不同掺烧率下生物质掺烧结合碳捕集(bioenergy with carbon capture,BECC)改造的经济性。研究发现,CC改造会导致不同地区的燃煤电厂度电成本增加57.51%~93.38%。煤价较低的华北和西北地区（青海除外）CC改造经济性较好,BECC改造则更适合华中地区。建议在推进燃煤电厂CC和BECC改造时要充分考虑区域资源特点,完善碳市场建设,形成合理碳价以促进CC和BECC部署。     

Innovation benefits from nuclear phase-out: can they compensate the costs?

This paper investigates whether an inefficient allocation of abatement due to constraints on the use of currently available low carbon mitigation options can promote innovation in new technologies and have a positive impact on welfare. We focus on the case of a nuclear power phase-out and endogenous technical change in energy efficiency and alternative low carbon technologies. The research is inspired by the re-thinking about nuclear power deployment which took place in some countries, especially in Western Europe, after the Fukushima accident in March 2011. The analysis uses an Integrated Assessment Model, WITCH, which features multiple externalities related to greenhouse gas emissions and innovation market failures. Our results show that phasing out nuclear power stimulates R&D investments and deployment of technologies with large learning potential. The resulting technology benefits that would not otherwise occur due to intertemporal and international externalities almost completely offset the economic costs of foregoing nuclear power. The extent of technology benefits depends on the stringency of the climate policy and is distributed unevenly across countries.     

Understanding attitudes toward energy security: Results of a cross-national survey

Energy security is embedded in a complex system encompassing factors that constitute the social environment in which individuals are immersed. Everything from education, to access to resources to policy and cultural values of particular places affects perceptions and experiences of energy security. This article examines the types of energy security challenges that nations face and characterizes the policy responses that are often used to address these challenges. Drawing from a survey of energy consumers in Brazil, China, Germany, India, Kazakhstan, Japan, Papua New Guinea, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and the United States, we conduct a cross-national comparison of energy security attitudes as well as analyze each country's energy resources, consumption characteristics and energy policies. Through multivariate regression analysis and case studies we find that socio-demographic and regional characteristics affect attitudes towards energy security. Specifically, we find a strong relationship between level of reliance on oil imports and level of concern for a variety of energy security characteristics including availability, affordability and equity. Our results reaffirm the importance of gender and age in shaping perceptions of security, but also extend existing literature by elucidating the impacts of country energy portfolios and policies in shaping climate and security perceptions. Level of development, reliance on oil, and strong energy efficiency policies all affect individuals’ sense of energy security. In sum, we find that energy security is a highly context-dependent condition that is best understood from a nuanced and multi-dimensional perspective.     

浅析内蒙古由能源结构调整产生的CO_2减排成本

针对内蒙古地区能源结构调整中CO2减排对经济产生的影响,文章计算和分析了煤炭、油品和天然气的减排成本和减排量。结果表明:优先使用天然气,能够以较低的减排成本实现较大的减排总量,是既经济又有效的CO2减排措施。同时提出,积极利用可再生的风能、太阳能、生物质能等新能源代替化石燃料。对于实现内蒙古地区经济社会可持续发展具有重要的战略意义。     

Climate consequences of natural gas as a bridge fuel

Many have recently speculated that natural gas might become a “bridge fuel”, smoothing a transition of the global energy system from fossil fuels to zero carbon energy by temporarily offsetting the decline in coal use. Others have contended that such a bridge is incompatible with oft-discussed climate objectives and that methane leakage from natural gas system may eliminate any advantage that natural gas has over coal. Yet global climate stabilization scenarios where natural gas provides a substantial bridge are generally absent from the literature, making study of gas as a bridge fuel difficult. Here we construct a family of such scenarios and study some of their properties. In the context of the most ambitious stabilization objectives (450 ppm CO₂), and absent carbon capture and sequestration, a natural gas bridge is of limited direct emissions-reducing value, since that bridge must be short. Natural gas can, however, play a more important role in the context of more modest but still stringent objectives (550 ppm CO₂), which are compatible with longer natural gas bridges. Further, contrary to recent claims, methane leakage from natural gas operations is unlikely to strongly undermine the climate benefits of substituting gas for coal in the context of bridge fuel scenarios.     

Oil prices and energy technology innovation: An empirical analysis

To achieve environmental sustainability and reduce their vulnerability to oil shocks, countries can develop new energy technologies. Technological advances reduce the cost of structural changes in the energy economy, and thus also increase the political feasibility of such changes. But what explains international variation in the form and quality of energy technology innovation? We build on previous theories and offer an integrated account: increasing oil prices reinforce existing sectoral innovation systems, both politically and economically, thus allowing public policymakers and private entrepreneurs to profitably invest in new energy technologies. We test this theoretical argument against data on public R&D expenditures and patents in the domain of renewable energy technology for industrialized countries from 1989 to 2007. We find strong support for the interactive hypothesis. Thus, we contribute to literatures on (i) domestic responses to international shocks, (ii) environmental sustainability and energy security, and (iii) the political economy of technology innovation.     

Carbon Capture and Storage From Fossil Fuels and Biomass – Costs and Potential Role in Stabilizing the Atmosphere

The capture and storage of CO₂ from combustion of fossil fuels is gaining attraction as a means to deal with climate change. CO₂ emissions from biomass conversion processes can also be captured. If that is done, biomass energy with CO₂ capture and storage (BECS) would become a technology that removes CO₂ from the atmosphere and at the same time deliver CO₂-neutral energy carriers (heat, electricity or hydrogen) to society. Here we present estimates of the costs and conversion efficiency of electricity, hydrogen and heat generation from fossil fuels and biomass with CO₂ capture and storage. We then insert these technology characteristics into a global energy and transportation model (GET 5.0), and calculate costs of stabilizing atmospheric CO₂ concentration at 350 and 450 ppm. We find that carbon capture and storage technologies applied to fossil fuels have the potential to reduce the cost of meeting the 350 ppm stabilisation targets by 50% compared to a case where these technologies are not available and by 80% when BECS is allowed. For the 450 ppm scenario, the reduction in costs is 40 and 42%, respectively. Thus, the difference in costs between cases where BECS technologies are allowed and where they are not is marginal for the 450 ppm stabilization target. It is for very low stabilization targets that negative emissions become warranted, and this makes BECS more valuable than in cases with higher stabilization targets. Systematic and stochastic sensitivity analysis is performed. Finally, BECS opens up the possibility to remove CO₂ from the atmosphere. But this option should not be seen as an argument in favour of doing nothing about the climate problem now and then switching on this technology if climate change turns out to be a significant problem. It is not likely that BECS can be initiated sufficiently rapidly at a sufficient scale to follow this path to avoiding abrupt and serious climate changes if that would happen.