The exposure of global base metal resources to water criticality,scarcity and climate change

Mining operations are vital to sustaining our modern way of life and are often located in areas that have limited water supplies or are at an increased risk of the effects of climate change. However, few studies have considered the interactions between the mining industry and water resources on a global scale. These interactions are often complex and site specific, and so an understanding of the local water contexts of individual mining projects is required before associated risks can be adequately assessed. Here, we address this important issue by providing the first quantitative assessment of the contextual water risks facing the global base metal mining industry, focusing on the location of known copper, lead, zinc and nickel resources.The relative exposure of copper, lead-zinc and nickel resources to water risks were assessed by considering a variety of spatial water indices, with each providing a different perspective of contextual water risks. Provincial data was considered for water criticality (CRIT), supply risk (SR), vulnerability to supply restrictions (VSR) and the environmental implications (EI) of water use. Additionally, watershed or sub-basin scale data for blue water scarcity (BWS), the water stress index (WSI), the available water remaining (AWaRe), basin internal evaporation recycling (BIER) ratios and the water depletion index (WDI) were also considered, as these have particular relevance for life cycle assessment and water footprint studies. All of the indices indicate that global copper resources are more exposed to water risks than lead-zinc or nickel resources, in part due to the large copper endowment of countries such as Chile and Peru that experience high water criticality, stress and scarcity. Copper resources are located in regions where water consumption is more likely to contribute to long-term decreases in water availability and also where evaporation is less likely to re-precipitate in the same drainage basin to cause surface-runoff or groundwater recharge.The global resource datasets were also assessed against regional Köppen-Geiger climate classifications for the observed period 1951–2000 and changes to 2100 using the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s A1FI, A2, B1 and B2 emission scenarios. The results indicate that regions containing copper resources are also more exposed to likely changes in climate than those containing lead-zinc or nickel resources. Overall, regions containing 27–32% (473–574 Mt Cu) of copper, 17–29% (139–241 Mt Pb + Zn) of lead-zinc and 6–13% (19–39 Mt Ni) of nickel resources may have a major climate re-classification as a result of anthropogenic climate change. A further 15–23% (262–412 Mt) of copper, 23–32% (195–270 Mt) of lead-zinc and 29–32% (84–94 Mt) of nickel are exposed to regional precipitation or temperature sub-classification changes. These climate changes are likely to alter the water balance, water quality and infrastructure risks at mining and mineral processing operations. Effective management of long-term changes to mine site water and climate risks requires the further adoption of anticipatory risk management strategies.     

Modeling Dynamic Vegetation Response to Rapid Climate Change Using Bioclimatic Classification

Modeling potential global redistribution of terrestrial vegetation frequently is based on bioclimatic classifications which relate static regional vegetation zones (biomes) to a set of static climate parameters. The equilibrium character of the relationships limits our confidence in their application to scenarios of rapidly changing climate. Such assessments could be improved if vegetation migration and succession would be incorporated as response variables in model simulations. We developed the model MOVE (Migration Of VEgetation), to simulate the geographical implications of different rates of plant extirpation and in-migration. We used the model to study the potential impact on terrestrial carbon stocks of climate shifts hypothesized from a doubling of atmospheric greenhouse gas concentration. The model indicates that the terrestrial vegetation and soil could release carbon; the amount of this carbon pulse depends on the rate of migration relative to the rate of climate change. New temperate and boreal biomes, not found on the landscape today, increase rapidly in area during the first 100 years of simulated response to climate change. Their presence for several centuries and their gradual disappearance after the climate ceases to change adds uncertainty in calculating future terrestrial carbon fluxes.     

Copper demand,supply, and associated energy use to 2050

To a set of well-regarded international scenarios (UNEP’s GEO-4), we have added consideration of the demand, supply, and energy implications related to copper production and use over the period 2010–2050. To our knowledge, these are the first comprehensive metal supply and demand scenarios to be developed. We find that copper demand increases by between 275 and 350% by 2050, depending on the scenario. The scenario with the highest prospective demand is not Market First (a “business as usual” vision), but Equitability First, a scenario of transition to a world of more equitable values and institutions. These copper demands exceed projected copper mineral resources by mid-century and thereafter. Energy demand for copper production also demonstrates strong increases, rising to as much as 2.4% of projected 2050 overall global energy demand. We investigate possible policy responses to these results, concluding that improving the efficiency of the copper cycle and encouraging the development of copper-free energy distribution on the demand side, and improving copper recycling rates on the supply side are the most promising of the possible options. Improving energy efficiency in primary copper production would lead to a reduction in the energy demand by 0.5% of projected 2050 overall global energy demand. In addition, encouraging the shift towards renewable technologies is important to minimize the impacts associated with copper production.     

Contraction and convergence of in-use metal stocks to meet climate goals

The foundations of modern society are based on metals, yet their production is currently placing considerable strain on the Earth’s carrying capacity. Here, we develop a century-long scenario for six major metals (iron, aluminum, copper, zinc, lead, and nickel) harmonized with climate goals, with the goal of establishing science-based targets. We show that for the metal sector to contribute proportionally to emission reductions targets of the industrial sector, global in-use metal stocks need to converge from the current level of around 4 t/capita to about 7 t/capita. This will require today’s high-income countries to contract their per capita stock from current levels of about 12 t/capita to make room for growth in countries that are presently classified as middle- and low-income countries. In such a contraction and convergence scenario, primary production of all six metals will peak by 2030, and secondary production will surpass primary production by at least 2050. Consequently, cumulative ore requirements over the 21st century will remain below currently identified resources, implying that natural ore extraction will be limited by emissions budgets before existing resources can be depleted. Importantly, realizing such system changes will require urgent and concerted international efforts involving all countries, but specific responsibilities will vary according to income level. Namely, wealthy countries will need to use existing metal stocks more intensively and for longer periods to reduce stock replacement demand, while poor countries will need to develop long-lasting and material-efficient infrastructure to curtail stock expansion demand in the first half of the 21st century.     

Albedo enhancement over land to counteract global warming: impacts on hydrological cycle

A recent modelling study has shown that precipitation and runoff over land would increase when the reflectivity of marine clouds is increased to counter global warming. This implies that large scale albedo enhancement over land could lead to a decrease in runoff over land. In this study, we perform simulations using NCAR CAM3.1 that have implications for Solar Radiation Management geoengineering schemes that increase the albedo over land. We find that an increase in reflectivity over land that mitigates the global mean warming from a doubling of CO₂ leads to a large residual warming in the southern hemisphere and cooling in the northern hemisphere since most of the land is located in northern hemisphere. Precipitation and runoff over land decrease by 13.4 and 22.3%, respectively, because of a large residual sinking motion over land triggered by albedo enhancement over land. Soil water content also declines when albedo over land is enhanced. The simulated magnitude of hydrological changes over land are much larger when compared to changes over oceans in the recent marine cloud albedo enhancement study since the radiative forcing over land needed (?8.2?W?m^?2) to counter global mean radiative forcing from a doubling of CO₂ (3.3?W?m^?2) is approximately twice the forcing needed over the oceans (?4.2?W?m^?2). Our results imply that albedo enhancement over oceans produce climates closer to the unperturbed climate state than do albedo changes on land when the consequences on land hydrology are considered. Our study also has important implications for any intentional or unintentional large scale changes in land surface albedo such as deforestation/afforestation/reforestation, air pollution, and desert and urban albedo modification.     

Resource depletion,peak minerals and the implications for sustainable resource management

Today's global society is economically, socially and culturally dependent on minerals and metals. While metals are recyclable, terrestrial mineral deposits are by definition ‘non-renewable’ over human timescales and their stocks are thus finite. This raises the spectre of ‘peak minerals’ – the time at which production from terrestrial ores can no longer rise to meet demand and where a maximum (peak) production occurs. Peak minerals prompts a focus on the way minerals can be sustainably used in the future to ensure the services they provide to global society can be maintained.As peak minerals approaches (and is passed in some cases), understanding and monitoring the dynamics of primary mineral production, recycling and dematerialisation, in the context of national and global discussions about mineral resources demand and the money earned from their sale, will become essential for informing and establishing mechanisms for sustainable mineral governance and use efficiency into the future. Taking a cross-scale approach, this paper explores the economic and productivity impacts of peak minerals, and how changes in the mineral production profile are influenced not only by technological and scarcity factors, but also by environmental and social constraints. Specifically we examine the impacts of peak minerals in Australia, a major global minerals supplier, and the consequences for the Asia-Pacific region, a major destination for Australia's minerals.This research has profound implications for local and regional/global sustainability of mineral and metal use. The focus on services is useful for encouraging discussion of transitions in how such services can be provided in a future more sustainable economy, when mineral availability is constrained. The research also begins to address the question of how we approach the development of strategies to maximise returns from mineral wealth over generations.     

International trade buffers the impact of future irrigation shortfalls

There is increasing interest in the water–food nexus, especially the restrictive effect of water on food production in hot spots where irrigation stress is growing. However, little is known about the larger-scale implications of future irrigation shortfalls for global trade and economic welfare, as well as of the potential buffering impacts of international trade on the local impacts of irrigation shortage. In this paper, we utilize a recently developed model, GTAP-BIO-W, to study the economic effects of changes in irrigation outlook for 126 river basins, globally by 2030. Projected irrigation availability is obtained from the IMPACT-WATER model, and imposed upon the present-day economy. Irrigation availability in 2030 is expected to drop by 30–60% in several key rivers basins, including: Hai He, Indus, Luni, and the Eastern Mediterranean basin, leading to significant output declines in China, South Asia, and the Middle East. We find that the regional production impacts of future irrigation water shortages are quite heterogeneous, depending on the size of the shortfall, the irrigation intensity of crop production, the possibility of expanding rainfed areas, as well as the crop mix. These changes in regional output significantly alter the geography of international trade. To compensate for the loss of productivity caused by the irrigation constraint, an estimated 7.6 million hectares of cropland expansion is needed to meet the demand for food. In spite of the remarkable reduction of irrigation in some basins, the resulting welfare impact is relatively modest as a result of the buffering capacity of global markets. The global welfare loss amounts to $3.7 billion (2001 prices) and results from a combination of the reduction in irrigation availability as well as the interplay with agricultural support policies.     

Hegemonic transitions and global shifts in social metabolism: Implications for resource-rich countries. Introduction to the special section

This introductory paper to the special section of Global Environmental Change entitled “Global transformations, social metabolism and the dynamics of socio-environmental conflicts” argues that the emergence of new global economic centers is inducing a major expansion in the global social metabolism—the flows of energy and materials into the world economy —, a transformation in the systems for the extraction and provision of natural resources, as well as setting the conditions for socio-environmental conflicts at the commodity frontiers, particularly in areas with a dense human occupation of the territory. We point out that we are currently experiencing global transformations that constitute the beginning of a new historical phase of modern capitalism. The aim of the paper is to draw an overall picture of such transformations, to discuss some of their implications for resource-rich countries, particularly in Latin America and Africa, and by doing so to provide an analytical framework that allow us to make explicit the linkages between the different papers that compose the special section.     

Trade-offs between mitigation costs and temperature change

This paper uses the MERGE integrated assessment model to identify the least-cost mitigation strategy for achieving a range of climate policies. Mitigation is measured in terms of GDP foregone. This is not a benefit-cost analysis. No attempt is made to calculate the reduction in damages brought about by a particular policy. Assumptions are varied regarding the availability of energy-producing and energy-using technologies. We find pathways with substantial reductions in temperature change, with the cost of reductions varying significantly, depending on policy and technology assumptions. The set of scenarios elucidates the potential energy system transformation demands that could be placed on society. We find that policy that allows for “overshoot” of a radiative forcing target during the century results in lower costs, but also a higher temperature at the end of the century. We explore the implications of the costs and availability of key mitigation technologies, including carbon capture and storage (CCS), bioenergy, and their combination, known as BECS, as well as nuclear and energy efficiency. The role of “negative emissions” via BECS in particular is examined. Finally, we demonstrate the implications of nationally adopted emissions timetables based on articulated goals as a counterpoint to a global stabilization approach.     

Climate and Vegetation Drivers of Terrestrial Carbon Fluxes:A Global Data Synthesis

The terrestrial carbon(C) cycle plays an important role in global climate change, but the vegetation and environmental drivers of C fluxes are poorly understood. We established a global dataset with 1194 available data across site-years including gross primary productivity(GPP), ecosystem respiration(ER), net ecosystem productivity(NEP), and relevant environmental factors to investigate the variability in GPP, ER and NEP, as well as their covariability with climate and vegetation drivers.The results indicated that both GPP and ER increased exponentially with the increase in mean annual temperature(MAT)for all biomes. Besides MAT, annual precipitation(AP) had a strong correlation with GPP(or ER) for non-wetland biomes.Maximum leaf area index(LAI) was an important factor determining C fluxes for all biomes. The variations in both GPP and ER were also associated with variations in vegetation characteristics. The model including MAT, AP and LAI explained 53%of the annual GPP variations and 48% of the annual ER variations across all biomes. The model based on MAT and LAI explained 91% of the annual GPP variations and 92.9% of the annual ER variations for the wetland sites. The effects of LAI on GPP, ER or NEP highlighted that canopy-level measurement is critical for accurately estimating ecosystem–atmosphere exchange of carbon dioxide. The present study suggests a significance of the combined effects of climate and vegetation(e.g.,LAI) drivers on C fluxes and shows that climate and LAI might influence C flux components differently in different climate regions.     

Bioenergy in energy transformation and climate management

This study explores the importance of bioenergy to potential future energy transformation and climate change management. Using a large inter-model comparison of 15 models, we comprehensively characterize and analyze future dependence on, and the value of, bioenergy in achieving potential long-run climate objectives. Model scenarios project, by 2050, bioenergy growth of 1 to 10 % per annum reaching 1 to 35 % of global primary energy, and by 2100, bioenergy becoming 10 to 50 % of global primary energy. Non-OECD regions are projected to be the dominant suppliers of biomass, as well as consumers, with up to 35 % of regional electricity from biopower by 2050, and up to 70 % of regional liquid fuels from biofuels by 2050. Bioenergy is found to be valuable to many models with significant implications for mitigation and macroeconomic costs of climate policies. The availability of bioenergy, in particular biomass with carbon dioxide capture and storage (BECCS), notably affects the cost-effective global emissions trajectory for climate management by accommodating prolonged near-term use of fossil fuels, but with potential implications for climate outcomes. Finally, we find that models cost-effectively trade-off land carbon and nitrous oxide emissions for the long-run climate change management benefits of bioenergy. The results suggest opportunities, but also imply challenges. Overall, further evaluation of the viability of large-scale global bioenergy is merited.     

Global-scale remote sensing of mine areas and analysis of factors explaining their extent

Mines are composed of features like open cut pits, water storage ponds, milling infrastructure, waste rock dumps, and tailings storage facilities that are often associated with impacts to surrounding areas. The size and location of mine features can be determined from satellite imagery, but to date a systematic analysis of these features across commodities and countries has not been conducted. We created detailed maps of 295 mines producing copper, gold, silver, platinum group elements, molybdenum, lead-zinc, nickel, uranium or diamonds, representing the dominant share of global production of these commodities. The mapping entailed the delineation and classification of 3,736 open pits, waste rock dumps, water ponds, tailings storage facilities, heap leach pads, milling infrastructure and other features, totalling ~3,633 km². Collectively, our maps highlight that mine areas can be highly heterogeneous in composition and diverse in form, reflecting variations in underlying geology, commodities produced, topography and mining methods. Our study therefore emphasises that distinguishing between specific mine features in satellite imagery may foster more refined assessments of mine-related impacts. We also compiled detailed annual data on the operational characteristics of 129 mines to show via regression analysis that the sum area of a mine's features is mainly explained by its cumulative production volume (cross-validated R² of 0.73). This suggests that the extent of future mine areas can be estimated with reasonable certainty based on expected total production volume. Our research may inform environmental impact assessments of new mining proposals, or provide land use data for life cycle analyses of mined products.     

Detecting Regional Deep Ocean Warming below 2000 Meter Based on Altimetry,GRACE, Argo,and CTD Data

The deep ocean below 2000 m is a large water body with the sparsest data coverage, challenging the closure of the sea-level budget and the estimation of the Earth's energy imbalance. Whether the deep ocean below 2000 m is warming globally has been debated in the recent decade. However, as the regional signals are generally larger than the global average, it is intriguing to investigate the regional temperature changes. Here, we adopt an indirect method that combines altimetry, GRACE, and Argo data to examine the global and regional deep ocean temperature changes below 2000 m. The consistency between high-quality conductivity-temperature-depth (CTD) data from repeated hydrographic sections and our results confirms the validity of the indirect method. We find that the deep oceans are warming in the Middle East Indian Ocean, the subtropical North and Southwest Pacific, and the Northeast Atlantic, but cooling in the Northwest Atlantic and Southern oceans from 2005 to 2015.     

What are the limits to oil palm expansion?

Palm oil production has boomed over the last decade, resulting in an expansion of the global oil palm planting area from 10 to 17 Million hectares between 2000 and 2012. Previous studies showed that a significant share of this expansion has come at the expense of tropical forests, notably in Indonesia and Malaysia, the current production centers. Governments of developing and emerging countries in all tropical regions increasingly promote oil palm cultivation as a major contributor to poverty alleviation, as well as food and energy independence. However, being under pressure from several non-governmental environmental organizations and consumers, the main palm oil traders have committed to sourcing sustainable palm oil. Against this backdrop we assess the area of suitable land and what are the limits to future oil palm expansion when several constraints are considered. We find that suitability is mainly determined by climatic conditions resulting in 1.37 billion hectares of suitable land for oil palm cultivation concentrated in twelve tropical countries. However, we estimate that half of the biophysically suitable area is already allocated to other uses, including protected areas which cover 30% of oil palm suitable area. Our results also highlight that the non-conversion of high carbon stock forest (>100 t AGB/ha) would be the most constraining factor for future oil palm expansion as it would exclude two-thirds of global oil palm suitable area. Combining eight criteria which might restrict future land availability for oil palm expansion, we find that 234 million hectares or 17% of worldwide suitable area are left. This might seem that the limits for oil palm expansion are far from being reached but one needs to take into account that some of this area might be hardly accessible currently with only 18% of this remaining area being under 2 h transportation to the closest city and that growing demand for other agricultural commodities which might also compete for this land has not been yet taken into account.     

Multi-model assessment of global hydropower and cooling water discharge potential under climate change

Worldwide, 98% of total electricity is currently produced by thermoelectric power and hydropower. Climate change is expected to directly impact electricity supply, in terms of both water availability for hydropower generation and cooling water usage for thermoelectric power. Improved understanding of how climate change may impact the availability and temperature of water resources is therefore of major importance. Here we use a multi-model ensemble to show the potential impacts of climate change on global hydropower and cooling water discharge potential. For the first time, combined projections of streamflow and water temperature were produced with three global hydrological models (GHMs) to account for uncertainties in the structure and parametrization of these GHMs in both water availability and water temperature. The GHMs were forced with bias-corrected output of five general circulation models (GCMs) for both the lowest and highest representative concentration pathways (RCP2.6 and RCP8.5). The ensemble projections of streamflow and water temperature were then used to quantify impacts on gross hydropower potential and cooling water discharge capacity of rivers worldwide. We show that global gross hydropower potential is expected to increase between +2.4% (GCM-GHM ensemble mean for RCP 2.6) and +6.3% (RCP 8.5) for the 2080s compared to 1971–2000. The strongest increases in hydropower potential are expected for Central Africa, India, central Asia and the northern high-latitudes, with 18–33% of the world population living in these areas by the 2080s. Global mean cooling water discharge capacity is projected to decrease by 4.5-15% (2080s). The largest reductions are found for the United States, Europe, eastern Asia, and southern parts of South America, Africa and Australia, where strong water temperature increases are projected combined with reductions in mean annual streamflow. These regions are expected to affect 11–14% (for RCP2.6 and the shared socio-economic pathway (SSP)1, SSP2, SSP4) and 41–51% (RCP8.5–SSP3, SSP5) of the world population by the 2080s.     

Biomes computed from simulated climatologies

The biome model of Prentice et al. (1992a) is used to predict global patterns of potential natural plant formations, or biomes, from climatologies simulated by ECHAM, a model used for climate simulations at the Max-Planck-Institut fur Meteorologie. This study is undertaken in order to show the advantage of this biome model in diagnosing the performance of a climate model and assessing effects of past and future climate changes predicted by a climate model. Good overall agreement is found between global patterns of biomes computed from observed and simulated data of present climate. But there are also major discrepancies indicated by a difference in biomes in Australia, in the Kalahari Desert, and in the Middle West of North America. These discrepancies can be traced back to failures in simulated rainfall as well as summer or winter temperatures. Global patterns of biomes computed from an ice age simulation reveal that North America, Europe, and Siberia should have been covered largely by tundra and taiga, whereas only small differences are seen for the tropical rain forests. A potential northeast shift of biomes is expected from a simulation with enhanced C0₂ concentration according to the IPCC Scenario A. Little change is seen in the tropical rain forest and the Sahara. Since the biome model used is not capable of predicting changes in vegetation patterns due to a rapid climate change, the latter simulation has to be taken as a prediction of changes in conditions favourable for the existence of certain biomes, not as a prediction of a future distribution of biomes.[/ab]     

‘Strange changes’: Indigenous perspectives of climate change and adaptation in NE Arnhem Land (Australia)

Despite growing global attention to the development of strategies and policy for climate change adaptation, there has been little allowance for input from Indigenous people. In this study we aimed to improve understanding of factors important in integration of Yolngu perspectives in planning adaptation policy in North East Arnhem Land (Australia). We conducted workshops and in-depth interviews in two ‘communities’ to develop insight into Yolngu peoples’ observations and perspectives on climate change, and their ideas and preferences for adaptation. All participants reported observing changes in their ecological landscape, which they attributed to mining, tourism ‘development’, and climate change. ‘Strange changes’ noticed particularly in the last five years, had caused concern and anxiety among many participants. Despite their concern about ecological changes, participants were primarily worried about other issues affecting their community's general welfare. The results suggest that strategies and policies are needed to strengthen adaptive capacity of communities to mitigate over-arching poverty and well-being issues, as well as respond to changes in climate. Participants believed that major constraints to strengthening adaptive capacity had external origins, at regional, state and federal levels. Examples are poor communication and engagement, top-down institutional processes that allow little Indigenous voice, and lack of recognition of Indigenous culture and practices. Participants’ preferences for strategies to strengthen community adaptive capacity tended to be those that lead towards greater self-sufficiency, independence, empowerment, resilience and close contact with the natural environment. Based on the results, we developed a simple model to highlight main determinants of community vulnerability. A second model highlights components important in facilitating discourse on enhancing community capacity to adapt to climatic and other stressors.     

Climate shocks and political violence

The dominant discourse on the security implications of climate change has asserted that acute environmental scarcity—such as that caused by drought—causes political violence. In contrast, we argue that there are good reasons why water scarcity might have a pacifying effect on armed conflict, and that political violence should be more prevalent during periods of comparatively better agro-climatic conditions. Political violence is more prevalent when basic needs are met and when the tactical environment is more conducive to attacks—conditions that hold when water is comparatively abundant. Empirically, this paper explores the relationship between environmental scarcity and political violence in a global sample of countries, 1970–2006. We find that water abundance is positively correlated with political violence, and that this relationship is stronger in less developed, more agriculturally dependent societies. These findings are robust to several different operationalizations of our variables. We conclude with a brief discussion of the policy implications of our findings.     

‘Signals’ from pre-crisis discourse: Lessons from UK flooding for global environmental policy change?

This paper evaluates policy accelerations after past flood crises in the UK (in 1947, 1953, 1998 and 2000) and explores their value as surrogates or metaphors for how governments might respond with policy changes to the local expressions of global climate and environmental change in the future. We find that these past policy change accelerations were, in general, not based on the development of new ideas but on bringing forward existing ideas that were already the subject of widespread professional or public discourse. We suggest, therefore, that we may be able to detect now, as ‘signals’ within current policy discourse, the embryos of the policy shifts that are likely to come about as part of any crisis-response adaptation to future climate change. If this is the case, then we believe that those with policy responsibilities now may be able to begin carefully and proactively to prepare the ground for such policy changes ahead of the crisis events that will alone trigger their acceleration and adoption.     

Temperature change and macroinvertebrate biodiversity: assessments of organism vulnerability and potential distributions

Peninsular environments are ecosystems that are one of the most vulnerable to global warming. Despite the importance of conserving regional biodiversity, peninsular environments are among the least studied with respect to the influences of global warming. In this study, we used data on benthic macroinvertebrate communities from 521 sites across Korea (a nationwide scale) to evaluate the potential impact of temperature increases on river ecosystems. Weighted averaging regression models (WARMs) were used to project the relationships between relative macroinvertebrate abundance and water temperature, based on the temperature data of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) A1B scenario. Maximum tolerance water temperatures were used to quantify the risks to macroinvertebrates at the catchment and national scales. Ambient air temperatures in the 2090s were projected to increase by an average of 3.4?ºC relative to the baseline of the 2000s at the national scale. Mayflies, stoneflies and caddisflies were identified as potentially the most sensitive taxa to global warming. The impact of global warming on macroinvertebrates was predicted to be minimal prior to the 2060s; however, by the 2080s, species loss was predicted to be 55 %. Potential distribution ranges of cold water species in the future decades were expected to decrease continuously over time, while those of warm species were expected to increase from the 2000s to the 2040s and then decrease until the 2080s. Our projections may be useful for understanding how climate parameters affect the biogeographical patterns of aquatic biodiversity from a thermal-preference perspective.