Measuring fishery profitability: An index number approach

Tracking the financial well-being of vessels that depend on a marine fishery resource is an important function of regulators. This research demonstrates how simple indices can be constructed and utilized to track the economic well-being of vessels operating in the Northeast (USA) Multispecies (Groundfish) Fishery. The indices, which use both public and private data, can separately track trends in inputs, outputs, and prices. For the Northeast Multispecies Fishery, the indices reveal that the economic well-being of the groundfish fleet has improved under catch share management through gains in productivity.     

Economic characteristics and management challenges of the Hawaii pelagic longline fisheries: Will a catch share program help?

To date, none of the fisheries in the U.S. Pacific Islands Region is managed under a catch share program. In light of the NOAA policy to encourage the use of catch shares as a fishery management tool, the Western Pacific Fishery Management Council (WPFMC) listed six commercial fisheries, including the Hawaii pelagic longline fishery, the largest in the region, as potential candidates for catch share programs. This study examines the baseline economic characteristics and the main challenges facing the Hawaii pelagic longline fishery and evaluates the impact of these on the desirability and feasibility of a catch share program for this particular fishery.     

Stakeholder perceptions of the northern Gulf of Mexico grouper and tilefish individual fishing quota program

The Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council determined that previous management of the grouper and tilefish fisheries in the northern Gulf of Mexico were not meeting management goals, and developed a catch shares program using individual fishing quotas (IFQs) beginning in January 2010 in order to more effectively manage these fisheries. An IFQ is a management method in which individual fishers and corporations are allocated the right to harvest a percentage of a fishery's total allowable catch, thus specifying how much of a particular species each fisher can harvest. This study makes use of a mail out survey to document the perceptions of fishers, seafood wholesalers, fisheries managers, and academics with an interest in the (northern) Gulf of Mexico grouper and tilefish IFQ program. While fishers, seafood dealers, fisheries managers, and academics all acknowledge that the IFQ program will create some problems, commercial fishers and dealers were far more skeptical of the alleged benefits of IFQs. Moreover, larger commercial operators were more inclined to agree with managers and academics that the IFQ program will produce several benefits for their operations and the fisheries. Some smaller operators believe that they will be driven to ignore the new rules or be forced out of business. In the future, the Gulf Council might do two things: put a bit more effort into making fishers aware of the potential benefits of IFQs, and develop alternatives with more flexibility perhaps working more closely with communities of fishers, who prize their independent way of life above all else.     

Sharing the catch or catching the shares: Catch shares for the western Pacific region?

The applicability of catch shares programs is evaluated for the various fisheries of the Western Pacific Fishery Management Council region in each of the archipelagoes. Implementation of Catch Shares programs in the region is problematic, but would require better data to be done fairly and equitably. Catch shares are currently under initial consideration for the Hawaii and American Samoa longline fisheries and the Hawaii Deep 7 bottomfish fishery. It is argued that current conditions in all the other small boat fisheries in the region make them inappropriate for catch shares management. Overfishing and the “race for fish” are not yet an issue for these fisheries and some are underdeveloped. Catch share programs can cause significant negative social consequences for Western Pacific communities because data on fishermen's participation, catch histories, and motivations to fish for cultural needs is not adequate for any initial allocation scheme to be developed equitably. The prevailing Western Pacific cultural value of sharing the fish by gifting portions, sharing the catch widely and sharing fishing opportunities widely is in clear conflict with the individualized commercial profit motive philosophy of fisheries that are appropriate for catch shares. The small boat fisheries lack adequate monitoring and enforcement, and do not have a total allowable catch or quota. Nor do they usually have a demonstrated need for one. Preliminary community outreach by Council staff and community discussion of catch shares shows a general lack of information yet a potential for strong resistance to the imposition of catch shares.     

Considering community allocations: Power and the politics of enclosure in the Gulf of Alaska

In 2012, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council initiated the process of designing a new management structure for the Gulf of Alaska trawl groundfish fleet. The new program is currently structured as a catch share program and driven by the need to end the ‘race for fish’ and provide the trawl fleet with the tools to reduce bycatch. To date much of the discussion among policy makers and stakeholders has centered on community protection measures and how best to avoid the negative social and economic impacts of catch share programs including impacts to crew, consolidation and the flight of quota and resource wealth from Gulf of Alaska fishery dependent communities. This paper examines how community protection measures related to the distribution of benefits and access to fishery resources are considered and challenged in the North Pacific today. Special attention is given to the ongoing debate surrounding the potential inclusion of an initial allocation to place-based Gulf of Alaska communities via a Community Fishing Association. As part of this effort, this paper examines the political space and underlying power dynamics in which consideration of alternatives to the commodification of fishing rights occurs.     

Rationalization of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands crab fisheries

In recent years, overcapacity in Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands crab fisheries has resulted in a dangerous race for crab. This paper examines a unique management program developed by the North Pacific Fishery Management Council intended to alleviate these problems, while accommodating a variety of stakeholders dependent on the fisheries. The discussion concludes by identifying some of the most substantial hurdles that the program must overcome to succeed and some characteristics of the fisheries that contribute to the potential to overcome these obstacles.     

CCAMLR process of risk assessment to minimise the effects of longline fishing mortality on seabirds

We describe the process used in the fisheries management system of the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) to minimise seabird bycatch, and the risk-assessment methodology developed to assist this. We examine the progress of several Regional Fishery Management Organisations in taking steps to address seabird bycatch. CCAMLR has the most advanced system of management among the RFMOS covered in this review, and has made the most demonstrable progress in reducing seabird bycatch levels in its longline fisheries. A combination of proven mitigation measures, extensive monitoring by independent observers, annual expert review of seabird bycatch rates and evolving fishery and mitigation practices have been instrumental in reducing seabird bycatch in CCAMLR fisheries.     

Decomposing productivity and efficiency changes in the Alaska head and gut factory trawl fleet

Fishing fleets are subject to numerous factors that affect economic performance, making identification and attribution of such impacts difficult. This paper separately identifies the effects of changing input and output prices, fishery management, and quota allocations on total factor productivity using a Lowe Index. Indices account for technical change and decompose productivity estimates into its technical, environmental, and scale-mix components. This results in measures that reflect shifts in the production frontier, and movements by vessels toward and around the frontier, to capture economies of scale and mix after a policy shift to a catch share program that includes fishing cooperatives and a limited access fishery. The difference between cooperative and limited access vessels is exploited to compare the changes in economic performance between the groups after the introduction of the shift to catch shares and cooperative management, which allowed the vessels to improve the timing and coordination across multi-species fisheries and to decrease incidental catch of quota-limited bycatch species that had closed the target fisheries prematurely in the past. Results indicate that total factor productivity increased significantly after the move to a catch share program, largely due to increases in technical change that shifted out the production frontier of the fishery.     

Toward shared understandings of ecosystem-based fisheries management among fishery management councils and stakeholders in the U.S. Mid-Atlantic and New England regions

Ecosystem-based fisheries management (EBFM) is often discussed by fisheries managers and stakeholders as a potential goal. EBFM is based on a multi-species approach, which varies significantly from the single species fisheries management (SSFM) approach currently practiced under the U.S. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSFCMA). EBFM is “holistic” and considers “all factors,” but it is impossible for management to incorporate all factors into EBFM. This study sought to improve understanding of factors contributing to or preventing progress toward EBFM implementation in the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council (MAFMC) and New England Fishery Management Council (NEFMC), focusing on Council member and stakeholder beliefs, attitudes, and mutual understanding. Objectives included determining mutual understanding between MAFMC and NEFMC members and stakeholders about EBFM and identifying MAFMC and NEFMC member and stakeholder preferences for EBFM definitions, practices, and outcomes, and prioritizing which aspects of EBFM managers and stakeholders find most important. Stakeholders included commercial fishermen, recreational anglers, nongovernmental organization (NGO) leaders, and Scientific and Statistical Committee (SSC) members. Over 1000 survey responses about EBFM from council members and stakeholders in the Mid-Atlantic (MA) and New England (NE) regions were analyzed. The Coorientation Model was used to characterize understanding between the Council and fisheries-related stakeholder groups. For the MA and NE regions, most stakeholders agreed on definitions, practices, and possible outcomes for EBFM. Results suggest that most Council members and stakeholders in the MA and NE regions support a change from SSFM to EBFM at an incremental, intermediate, or complete, gradual (5–10 years) pace. The application of the Coorientation Model to EBFM and the fishery management councils provided insights into how an improved understanding of the attitudes, beliefs, and mutual comprehension of Council members and stakeholder groups could potentially facilitate the implementation of EBFM. Council members and stakeholders responded similarly to, and Council members correctly predicted stakeholder responses about, EBFM definitions, practices, and outcomes. These findings suggest that Council member and stakeholder agreement and understanding are not barriers to MAFMC and NEFMC adoption of EBFM.     

Assessing catch shares' effects evidence from Federal United States and associated British Columbian fisheries

What are the effects of transitioning traditionally managed fisheries to incentive-based catch shares fisheries? In a study of all major United States federal catch share fisheries and associated shared stock fisheries in British Columbia, catch shares result in environmental improvements, economic improvements, and a mixture of changes in social performance, relative to the race for fish under traditional management. Environmentally, compliance with total allowable catch increases and discards decrease. Economically, vessel yields rise, total revenues grow, and long-term stock increases are encouraged. Socially, safety increases, some port areas modestly consolidate, needed processing capacity often reduces, and labor markets shift from part time jobs to full time jobs with similar total employment. Newer catch shares address many social concerns through careful design.     

Indonesia tuna fisheries development and future strategy

Tuna has made a significant contribution to Indonesian and world fisheries. Indonesian tuna fisheries were introduced from Japan, Taiwan and Korea. Longline fishing was introduced in 1962, and purse seine gear was first used in 1974. Many foreign vessels have reflagged to the Indonesian flag. The Indonesian government developed its own tuna fisheries and closed the chartering program in 2006. Through these efforts, Indonesia became the number one tuna production country in 2004 and has further targeted an increase in marine capture fisheries catch of 0.5%/year from 2010 to 2014. Tuna resources remain under pressure globally. The tuna regional fisheries management organizations attempt to manage tuna fisheries by strengthening conservation of stocks. To enhance international cooperation, Indonesia ratified the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1985 and the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in 2005 and became a member of Indian Ocean Tuna Commission and Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna and a cooperating non-member of Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission in the 2000s. Consequently, Indonesia adopted domestic regulations to comply with management measures. For future sustainable development, Indonesia needs to build its capacity, improve its compliance with the tuna RFMOs’ conservation and management measures, strengthen data collection, develop its products to increase their quality and diversification, and enhance its international cooperation.     

The fishery conservation and management act of 1976: Organizational structure and conceptual framework

The author introduces a theoretical context for discussing the organizational structure and conceptual framework of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976. He applies this to the Regional Fishery Management Councils established under the Act in order to assess the trends in their evolution and, in particular, to examine the balance between federal and regional authority over fisheries management. He concludes that structural and conceptual dichotomies within the Act provide a desirable flexibility, but could be counterproductive if the Regional Fishery Management Councils do not take specific action to commission the data that they require to fulfil the roles authorized by the Act. Without such action an imbalance could arise which would lead to their demise or subservience to federal authority and advice.     

An overview of marine fisheries management in China

China is the world's largest country in terms of fish production, yet its fisheries management is comparatively unknown outside the country. This article gives an overview of the current management system and highlights some of its challenges. In the past 30 years, the Department of Fishery Administration has formulated and organized a series of conservation and management regimes and measures. The most important tools are minimum mesh size regulation and a range of input control measures, including seasonal closures and attempts to control fishing capacity through licensing and limiting total engine power. However, fisheries output is only controlled through a nation-wide total catch limit. Certain progress has been achieved, but there are still problems as the resource situation is poor. While the existing measures could, in principle, improve sustainability, their enforcement is insufficient, and they do not limit fishing effort in a way that would allow recovery.     

Objectives of fisheries management: case studies from the UK, France, Spain and Denmark

The main objectives of fisheries management are generally similar throughout the world. These are often stated in policy documents such as the Common Fisheries Policy and the Magnuson–Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act. However, at the local level often the key objectives of management are more detailed, characterised by both the overriding management structure and the status and type of fishery concerned. In this paper, we consider case study fisheries from the UK, France, Spain and Denmark to compare some of the various types of fisheries and fisheries management systems that exist in the European Union. From this, we define the key objectives for each management system.     

Fisheries annual fixed cost data collection and estimation methodology: An application in the Northeast,U.S.

Information on the cost of fishing is integral in measuring fisheries performance and correctly evaluating the economic impacts of fisheries regulations and management rules. However, limited availability of cost data often renders such analyses either incomplete or implausible. This study discusses a survey effort that was undertaken in the Northeast US to collect fisheries annual fixed cost data directly from commercial fishermen. Stratified random samples of fishing vessel owners were surveyed in 2012 and 2013. An overview of the survey procedures, sample selection and administration is given here. The data cleaning process, non-response bias and data summaries are also presented. A modeling framework is discussed for estimating fisheries cost data. Robust cost models in combination with regular data collection efforts will allow for more complete economic and financial analyses relevant to fisheries management and conservation.     

Catch share programs in the Western Pacific—A solution in search of a problem?

The movement toward catch shares by NOAA Fisheries and fisheries managers worldwide responds to dysfunctional fisheries plagued by a host of interrelated problems including radically shortened seasons, a race to fish, supply gluts, lowered product quality, increased bycatch, safety issues, excess capacity, and lack of profitability. However, the NOAA Catch Shares Policy recognizes that catch shares are not appropriate for every fishery, and others have agreed that the success of catch shares programs depends on their fit with ecological, economic, and social characteristics. This article describes the characteristics of the Hawaii-based deep-set longline fleet, identified by NOAA Fisheries as a possible candidate for catch shares because it operates under a bigeye tuna quota instituted by the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. One of the main concerns in the fishery is the potential for closing during the holiday season, a culturally important time for fish consumption in Hawaii. An evaluation of the fishery suggests that many of the problems leading to development of catch shares programs in other fisheries are not present, but that some warning signs exist which could be addressed by catch share programs or other management alternatives.     

Standards for the effective management of fisheries bycatch

Mitigating the environmental impact of commercial fishing, by avoiding, minimizing and compensating for adverse effects, is core business for fisheries management authorities globally. The complex interplay of ecological, economic, and social considerations has often resulted in bycatch management being reactive, confrontational and costly. In many cases it has been difficult to demonstrate success and to establish whether bycatch management has been efficient or effective. This article proposes standards for bycatch management following reviews of literature, international agreements and Australian domestic fishery management policies, and consideration by many technical experts and several stakeholder representatives. The standards have been developed using Australian Commonwealth fisheries – and the international fisheries agreements to which Australia is party – as a baseline, but should be applicable to both domestic and regional/international governance systems. The proposed standards involve quantifying fisheries bycatch, agreeing on operational objectives, assessing the effects of fishing on bycatch populations, establishing the cost-effectiveness of mitigation measures, and evaluating performance. The standards encourage domestic management measures that are consistent with the guidance and requirements of international agreements and regional fisheries management organisations. The importance of engaging stakeholders throughout the process is recognised. The standards provide a framework for measuring performance and a checklist of actions for managing bycatch at a fishery level. They have the potential to facilitate the development of more strategic and effective approaches to bycatch management, with defined goals, monitoring systems, and adaptive decision-making. This review of past bycatch management, including the application of the proposed standards to the mitigation of shark bycatch in an Australian longline fishery, demonstrates that the proposed standards are operationally feasible but that they have not always been applied. Specifically, monitoring the performance of bycatch management measures has not always followed their implementation.     

An evaluation of self-governance in the New Zealand Bluff oyster fishery – The indicator system approach

The use of self-governance as a fisheries management tool is increasing in New Zealand and elsewhere. Researchers argue that in theory self-governance can lead to improved outcomes, but evaluating actual benefits is difficult because of the need to distinguish self-governance impacts from other influences on fisheries performance. An indicator system was developed in this paper to evaluate the contribution of selfgovernance to the performance of the Bluff Oyster fishery (OYU5), which is also managed under New Zealand's Quota Management System. There is evidence that self-governance makes a positive contribution to economic efficiency, institutional effectiveness and resource preservation in the Bluff Oyster fishery.     

Constraints and solutions for managing Pacific Island sea cucumber fisheries with an ecosystem approach

The ecosystem approach to fisheries (EAF) is a holistic paradigm that considers stocks of exploitable species, marine ecosystems and stakeholders. Management agencies must strike a balance between their capacity constraints and the requisites of management measures. Most small-scale sea cucumber fisheries of Pacific Islands have been plundered while others are being opened to commercial exploitation. Data from fishery managers and a regional workshop were used to assess the current problems, institutional constraints and solutions to the management of sea cucumber fisheries in 13 Pacific Island countries (PICs). Technical capacity was often strong for some management actions such as developing marine reserves but weak for others, such as enforcement. Using multi-disciplinary indicators, half of the fisheries were diagnosed by their managers as being overfished or depleted, despite evidence of optimistic bias. Fishery governance varied greatly among the PICs, and co-management frameworks were not typical of any cultural region. Management objectives were prioritised differently among managers but most highly ranked was to protect ecological resilience. The fishery managers proposed different sets of regulatory measures and various management actions, such as surveys to collect socio-economic and fishery-dependent data, support for local governance and strong enforcement – all widely under-practised. Pacific sea cucumber fisheries exemplify how the transition to an EAF by management institutions must involve reorganisation of their technical and human-resource capacities among management tasks. Levies on exports need to be internalised to fund improved management. Management agencies should consider a shift in resources from developing marine reserves, conducting underwater surveys and aquaculture-based restocking to strengthening enforcement capacity, stakeholder involvement and communication with fishers. In concert with these actions, short fishing seasons, shortlists of allowable species and tighter enforcement at export points may serve to turn the tide on boom-and-bust exploitation and safeguard biodiversity.