My country or my planet? Exploring the influence of multiple place attachments and ideological beliefs upon climate change attitudes and opinions

Research on people-place relations, specifically place attachment and place identity, is beginning to make an important contribution to understanding human responses to climate change. However, to date there has been a dearth of research on how place attachments at multiple scales, particularly the global, and individual level ideological beliefs combine to influence climate change attitudes and opinions. To address these gaps, survey data was collected from a representative sample of Australian citizens (N = 1147), capturing attachments at neighbourhood, city/town, state/territory, country and global scales, as well as a range of climate change belief and individual difference measures. Results show the importance of the interplay between national and global place attachments. Individuals expressing stronger global than national attachments were more likely to attribute climate change to anthropogenic causes, to oppose hierarchy-enhancing myths that legitimize climate inaction, and to perceive positive economic impacts arising from climate change responses, in comparison to individuals indicating stronger national over global place attachments. Individuals with stronger global than national attachments were more likely to be female, younger, and self-identify as having no religion, to be more likely to vote Green and to be characterized by significantly lower levels of right wing authoritarian and social dominance beliefs. Right wing authoritarian and social dominance beliefs mediated the effects of place attachments upon climate change skepticism. Explanations for the findings and implications for future research are discussed.     

Who remembers a hot summer or a cold winter? The asymmetric effect of beliefs about global warming on perceptions of local climate conditions in the U.S.

This paper explores the phenomenon of local climate perception and the extent to which public perceptions match climate conditions as recorded in instrumental climate data. We further examine whether perceptions of changes in local climates are influenced by prior beliefs about global warming, through the process of motivated reasoning. Using national survey data collected in the United States in 2011, we find that subjective experiences of seasonal average temperature and precipitation during the previous winter and summer were related to recorded conditions during each season. Beliefs about global warming also had significant effects on subjective experiences with above-normal temperatures, particularly among those who believed that global warming is not happening. When asked about the summer of 2010, those who believed that global warming is not happening were significantly less likely to report that they had experienced a warmer-than-normal summer, even when controlling for demographics and local climate conditions. These results suggest that the subjective experience of local climate change is dependent not only on external climate conditions, but also on individual beliefs, with perceptions apparently biased by prior beliefs about global warming.     

How does framing affect policy support for emissions mitigation? Testing the effects of ocean acidification and other carbon emissions frames

Public support for carbon emissions mitigation is crucial to motivate action to address global issues like climate change and ocean acidification (OA). Yet in the public sphere, carbon emissions mitigation policies are typically discussed in the context of climate change and rarely in the context of OA or other global change outcomes. In this paper, we advance research on OA and climate change perceptions and communication, by (i) examining causal beliefs about ocean acidification, and (ii) measuring support for mitigation policies from individuals presented with one of five different policy frames (climate change, global warming, carbon pollution, air pollution, and ocean acidification). Knowledge about OA causes and consequences is more widespread than we anticipated, though still generally low. Somewhat surprisingly, an “air pollution” mitigation frame elicits the highest degree of policy support overall, while “carbon pollution” performs no better than “climate change” or “global warming.” Framing effects are in part contingent on prior knowledge and attitudes, and mediated by concern. Perhaps due to a lack of OA awareness, the OA frame generates the least support overall, although it seems to close the gap in support associated with political orientation: the OA frame increases support among those (few) conservatives who report having heard of OA before the survey. These findings complement previous work on climate change communication and suggest the need for further research into OA as an effective way to engage conservatives in carbon emissions mitigation policy. Potentially even more promising is the air pollution framing.     

Political ideology and climate change-mitigating behaviors: Insights from fixed world beliefs

Political conservatives are less likely to adopt climate change-mitigating behaviors, at least compared to their politically liberal counterparts. There thus have been extensive research explaining the so-called left–right divide. In the current research, we propose and test a novel explanation for this divide within the United States. Specifically, it is hypothesized that conservatives are more likely to see the world as fixed and unmalleable, in the sense that what they (as human beings) do to it will have little impact on diminishing the impacts of climate change. This perception and consequence of behavior should be independent of whether or not conservatives believe that global climate change is real and happening. In a study with 1,096 Americans, we find evidence for our hypotheses. Mediation analyses show that greater political conservatism predicts fewer climate change-mitigating behaviors due to greater fixed world beliefs and, consequently, lower perceptions of instrumentality of one’s actions to fight climate change, independent of climate change beliefs. Our work provides the first empirical evidence for a novel insight into why conservatives are less likely to act against climate change. Doing so, we also discuss the theoretical and practical contributions.     

The influence of national temperature fluctuations on opinions about climate change in the U.S. since 1990

Public opinion in the United States about human-caused climate change has varied over the past 20 years, despite an increasing consensus about the issue in the expert community. Attitudes about climate change have been attributed to a number of factors including personal values, political ideology, the media environment and personal experience. Recent studies have found evidence that the temperature can influence one’s opinion about climate change and willingness to change behaviour and/or support climate policy. Although there is some evidence that individual cool or warm years have influenced large-scale opinion about climate change, the extent to which temperature can explain the past variability in public opinion and public discourse about climate change at the national level is not known. Here we isolate the relationship between opinion about climate change and temperature at the national scale, using data from opinion polls, a discourse analysis of opinion articles from five major daily newspapers, and a national air temperature database. The fraction of respondents to national polls who express “belief in” or “worry about” climate change is found to be significantly correlated to U.S. mean temperature anomalies over the previous 3–12 months. In addition, the fraction of editorial and opinion articles which “agree” with the expert consensus on climate change is also found to be significantly correlated to U.S. mean temperature anomalies at seasonal and annual scales. These results suggest that a fraction of the past variance in American views about climate change could potentially be explained by climate variability.     

Does socioeconomic status moderate the political divide on climate change? The roles of education,income, and individualism

Previous research documents that U.S. conservatives, and conservative white males in particular, tend to dismiss the threat of climate change more than others in the U.S. public. Other research indicates that higher education and income can each exacerbate the dismissive tendencies of the political Right. Bridging these lines of research, the present study examines the extent to which higher education and/or income moderate the ideological divide and the “conservative white male effect” on several climate change opinions, and whether these effects are mediated by an individualistic worldview (e.g., valuing individual liberty and limited government). Using nationally representative survey data of U.S. adults from 2008 to 2017 (N = 20,024), we find that across all beliefs, risk perceptions, and policy preferences examined, the ideological divide strengthens with both higher education and higher income. However, educational attainment plays a stronger role than income in polarizing the views of conservative white males. Further analyses support the hypothesis that differences in individualism partially explain the increased political polarization among more educated and higher-income adults, as well as greater dismissiveness among conservative white males relative to other demographic groups. These results highlight key moderators of opinion polarization, as well as ideological differences among conservatives, that are often overlooked in public discourse about climate change. Implications for climate change education and communication across demographic groups are considered.     

Considering attitudinal uncertainty in the climate change skepticism continuum

In this paper we present an empirically driven language to discuss climate change skepticism. We conceptualize skeptic/skepticism as an umbrella term that includes those who actively reject climate science and those who are uncertain about climate change. We propose four categories for better empirical analysis of climate skepticism: epistemic deniers, epistemic doubters (borrowing from Capstick and Pidgeon 2014), attribution deniers, and attribution doubters (borrowing from Rahmstorf 2004). Using a unique dataset of surveys (n = 1000) and interviews (n = 33) with residents of the U.S. Pacific Northwest who are skeptical about climate change, we compare those four groups across several predictors and demographic variables (age, race, gender, political ideology, religiosity, income, education, and level of trust in science) and outcome variables (environmental concern, policy support, and conspiracy ideation (adherence to the belief that climate change is a “hoax”). We demonstrate the importance of considering attitudinal uncertainty in the analysis of climate skepticism by providing evidence for the presence of a continuum of thought wherein epistemic deniers and attribution doubters make up the two ends of a continuum with more complicated distinctions between epistemic doubters and attribution deniers.     

Cool dudes: The denial of climate change among conservative white males in the United States

We examine whether conservative white males are more likely than are other adults in the U.S. general public to endorse climate change denial. We draw theoretical and analytical guidance from the identity-protective cognition thesis explaining the white male effect and from recent political psychology scholarship documenting the heightened system-justification tendencies of political conservatives. We utilize public opinion data from ten Gallup surveys from 2001 to 2010, focusing specifically on five indicators of climate change denial. We find that conservative white males are significantly more likely than are other Americans to endorse denialist views on all five items, and that these differences are even greater for those conservative white males who self-report understanding global warming very well. Furthermore, the results of our multivariate logistic regression models reveal that the conservative white male effect remains significant when controlling for the direct effects of political ideology, race, and gender as well as the effects of nine control variables. We thus conclude that the unique views of conservative white males contribute significantly to the high level of climate change denial in the United States.     

My neighbourhood,my country or my planet? The influence of multiple place attachments and climate change concern on social acceptance of energy infrastructure

Research on place attachments and identities has made an important contribution to understanding social acceptance of low carbon infrastructure, which are often objected to by local communities. However, a focus on local attachments predominates in studies to date, neglecting the potential role of national and global attachments and identities on energy beliefs and attitudes, despite the fact that large energy infrastructures are not only local in significance or function. To investigate this, survey data was collected from a representative sample of UK adults (N = 1519), capturing place attachments at local, national and global levels, climate change concern, beliefs about power lines and support for energy system change. Findings show significant differences in infrastructure beliefs and attitudes depending upon relative strength of attachments at different levels, controlling for personal characteristics. Analyses of variance revealed that individuals with stronger national than local or global attachments were less likely to support European grid integration; those with relatively stronger global attachment were most likely to support decentralised energy and those with relatively stronger local attachment were most likely to protest against a nearby power line. In addition, those with strong attachments at local, national and global levels were most willing to reduce energy demand, and those with weak attachments were least likely to trust grid companies. Relatively stronger global than national attachment was positively associated with support for decentralised energy, with this effect partially mediated by climate change concern. Explanations for the findings and implications for future research are discussed.     

Climate change perceptions and their individual-level determinants: A cross-European analysis

There is now an extensive literature on the question of how individual-level factors affect climate change perceptions, showing that socio-political variables, notably values, worldviews and political orientation, are key factors alongside demographic variables. Yet little is known about cross-national differences in these effects, as most studies have been conducted in a single or small number of countries and cross-study comparisons are difficult due to different conceptualisations of key climate change dimensions. Using data from the European Social Survey Round 8 (n = 44,387), we examine how key socio-political and demographic factors are associated with climate change perception across 22 European countries and Israel. We show that human values and political orientation are important predictors of climate change beliefs and concern, as are the demographics of gender, age, and education. Certain associations with climate change perceptions, such as the ones for the self-transcendence versus self-enhancement value dimension, political orientation, and education, are more consistent across countries than for gender and age. However, even if the direction of the associations are to a large extent consistent, the sizes of the effects are not. We demonstrate that the sizes of the effects are generally smaller in Central and Eastern European countries, and that some demographic effects are larger in Northern European as compared to Western European countries. This suggests that findings from one country do not always generalize to other national contexts.     

It's political: How the salience of one's political identity changes climate change beliefs and policy support

Previous research has demonstrated a striking difference in climate change beliefs and policy support between people who identify with the right-wing of politics and with the left-wing of politics. But are we destined to continue with this divergence? We suggest that there is movement around these differences based on the politicization of climate change and we conducted two experimental studies with 126 and 646 people, respectively, to examine this effect. We found that those people whose political identity was made salient were less likely to believe in an anthropogenic cause of climate change and less likely to support government climate change policies than those whose identity was not made salient; particularly when those people were aligned with the right-wing of politics. The results demonstrate the importance of the salience of one's political identity in determining attitudes and beliefs even for scientific facts such as climate change. Our research also identifies some ways forward in dealing with climate change-based on depoliticizing the issue.     

Perceived scientific agreement and support for government action on climate change in the USA

Given the well-documented campaign in the USA to deny the reality and seriousness of anthropogenic climate change (a major goal of which is to “manufacture uncertainty” in the minds of policy-makers and the general public), we examine the influence that perception of the scientific agreement on global warming has on the public’s beliefs about global warming and support for government action to reduce emissions. A recent study by Ding et al. (Nat Clim Chang 1:462–466, 2011) using nationally representative survey data from 2010 finds that misperception of scientific agreement among climate scientists is associated with lower levels of support for climate policy and beliefs that action should be taken to deal with global warming. Our study replicates and extends Ding et al. (Nat Clim Chang 1:462–466, 2011) using nationally representative survey data from March 2012. We generally confirm their findings, suggesting that the crucial role of perceived scientific agreement on views of global warming and support for climate policy is robust. Further, we show that political orientation has a significant influence on perceived scientific agreement, global warming beliefs, and support for government action to reduce emissions. Our results suggest the importance of improving public perception of the scientific agreement on global warming, but in ways that do not trigger or aggravate ideological or partisan divisions.     

Global warming vs. climate change, taxes vs. prices: Does word choice matter?

Does ??climate change?? seem like a less serious problem than ??global warming?? to Americans and Europeans? Does describing the costs of climate change mitigation in terms of ??higher taxes?? instead of ??higher prices?? reduce public support for such efforts? In an experiment embedded in an American national survey, respondents were randomly assigned to rate the seriousness of ??global warming,?? ??climate change,?? or ??global climate change.?? Contrary to predictions made by a leading political strategist, the full sample and political Independents perceived ??climate change?? and ??global warming?? to be equally serious. Among Republicans, ??climate change?? was perceived to be more serious than ??global warming,?? whereas the reverse was true among Democrats. A similar experiment embedded in a survey of residents of 31 European countries showed that ??global warming?? and ??climate change?? were perceived to be equally serious problems. And an experiment embedded in an American survey showed that describing the increased costs of climate change mitigation legislation via ??higher taxes?? instead of via ??higher prices?? did not reduce popular support for such legislation, also contradicting a political strategy memo. Thus, word choice may sometimes affect public perceptions of the climate change seriousness or support for mitigation policies, but a single choice of terminology may not influence all people the same way, making strategic language choices difficult to implement.     

Climate change beliefs in an agricultural context: what is the role of values held by farming and non-farming groups?

Climate change in many agricultural contexts will increase tensions between farming and non-farming populations over adaptations in land use and water conservation strategies. How adequately these future tensions may be mitigated will be partially determined by each groups' beliefs about climate change. A voluminous literature shows that climate change beliefs are crucial for understanding engagement with climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies, and that values motivate climate change beliefs, but the role of values remains unclear, and comparisons of farming and non-farming populations are scant. We develop a model of climate change beliefs that integrates four main motivating factors - values, political ideology, knowledge, and worldview - and we explicitly compare members of farming and non-farming populations in an agricultural watershed in the Central Great Plains, USA. Our findings highlight the role of held values in motivating climate change beliefs and point to areas of potential consensus and tension within and among members of these two groups. The results provide an empirical basis for developing future climate change engagement strategies in contexts of growing divides and conflicts among farming and non-farming groups.     

The genesis of climate change activism: from key beliefs to political action

Climate change activism has been uncommon in the U.S., but a growing national movement is pressing for a political response. To assess the cognitive and affective precursors of climate activism, we hypothesize and test a two-stage information-processing model based on social cognitive theory. In stage 1, expectations about climate change outcomes and perceived collective efficacy to mitigate the threat are hypothesized to influence affective issue involvement and support for societal mitigation action. In stage 2, beliefs about the effectiveness of political activism, perceived barriers to activist behaviors and opinion leadership are hypothesized to influence intended and actual activism. To test these hypotheses, we fit a structural equation model using nationally representative data. The model explains 52 percent of the variance in a latent variable representing three forms of climate change activism: contacting elected representatives; supporting organizations working on the issue; and attending climate change rallies or meetings. The results suggest that efforts to increase citizen activism should promote specific beliefs about climate change, build perceptions that political activism can be effective, and encourage interpersonal communication on the issue.     

A rose by any other name ...?: What members of the general public prefer to call “climate change”

Unlike many other environmental problems, the terms used to describe the phenomenon of increasing atmospheric concentrations of anthropogenic greenhouse gases are many, with multiple and sometimes conflicting meanings. Whether there are meaningful distinctions in public perceptions of “global warming,” “climate change,” and “global climate change” has been a topic of research over the past decade. This study examines public preferences for these terms based on respondent characteristics, including climate change beliefs, political affiliation, and audience segment status derived from the “Global Warming’s Six Americas” classification. Certainty of belief in global warming, political affiliation and audience segment status were found to be the strongest predictors of preference, although “I have no preference” was the modal response. Global warming appears to be a more polarizing term than climate change, preferred most by people already concerned about the issue, and least by people who don’t believe climate change is occurring. Further research is needed to identify which of these two names promotes the engagement of people across the spectrum of climate change beliefs in constructive dialogue about the issue.     

Great-power politics,order transition,and climate governance: insights from international relations theory

The complex politics of climate change cannot be properly understood without reference to deeper geopolitical trends in the wider international system. Chief among these is the growing resurgence of ‘great-power politics’ between China and the US, along with failures of socialization and enmeshment into global governance structures in relation to these two powers. Traditional theoretical frameworks have failed to adequately account for these developments. Nonetheless, this current great-power contestation is at the core of an order transition that has prevented the large-scale institutional redesign required to remove deadlocks in existing global governance structures, including climate governance. Examples from the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference provide ample evidence for these claims. The slow progress of the climate change negotiations are due not just to the politics of the issue itself, but to the absence of a new political bargain on material power structures, normative beliefs, and the management of the order amongst the great powers. Without such a grand political bargain, which could be promoted through a forum of major economies whose wide-ranging remit would go beyond single issues, the climate change regime is only ever likely to progress in a piecemeal fashion.

Policy relevance

Despite the achievements of the 2012 Doha Climate Change Conference, the climate negotiations are not on course to limit warming to 2 °C, and thereby avoid ‘dangerous’ climate change. Several factors have been invoked to account for such slow progress: notably, the nature of the climate change problem itself, the institutional structure of the climate regime, and lack of political will among key players. An alternative explanation is proposed such that the failure to seriously address climate change – as well as other global problems – reflects a resurgent meta-struggle between the ‘great powers’ of China and the US over the nature of the global order. Without such a broader understanding of the deeper dynamics underlying the stalemates of the climate change negotiations, there is little chance of turning those negotiations around.     

Public climate-change skepticism,energy preferences and political participation

Many studies have shown a general decline of public concern about climate change or vice versa a rise in public climate-change skepticism, in particular in the U.S. and other Anglo-Saxon countries. There is a vivid debate on whether this is a global phenomenon, on which factors explain the decline, and on the broader societal implications of these trends in the context of the transformation toward a low-carbon society. We add to this literature by presenting the results of a recent general population survey in Germany in which we looked for systematic linkages between public climate-change skepticism on one hand, and energy preferences and political participation on the other. Germany is an interesting testbed as it is currently involved in a large-scale restructuring of its system of energy supply toward renewable energy sources (the “Energiewende”). Our results indicate that climate-change skepticism has not diffused widely in Germany, but that it correlates with less support of renewable energy sources. However, skepticism correlates negatively with political participation, and there is no strong political outlet for public climate-change skepticism in Germany. Alternative potential barriers for the successful implementation of the “Energiewende” are also discussed.     

Scales of perception: public awareness of regional and neighborhood climates

Understanding public perceptions of climate is critical for developing an effective strategy to mitigate the effects of human activity on the natural environment and reduce human vulnerability to the impacts of climate change. While recent climate assessments document change among various physical systems (e.g., increased temperature, sea level rise, shrinking glaciers), environmental perceptions are relatively under-researched despite the fact that there is growing skepticism and disconnect between climate science and public opinion. This study utilizes a socio-ecological research framework to investigate how public perceptions compared with environmental conditions in one urban center. Specifically, air temperature during an extreme heat event was examined as one characteristic of environmental conditions by relating simulations from the Weather Research and Forecast (WRF) atmospheric model with self-reported perceptions of regional and neighborhood temperatures from a social survey of Phoenix, AZ (USA) metropolitan area residents. Results indicate that: 1) human exposure to high temperatures varies substantially throughout metropolitan Phoenix; 2) public perceptions of temperature are more strongly correlated with proximate environmental conditions than with distal conditions; and 3) perceptions of temperature are related to social characteristics and situational variables. The social constructionist paradigm explains public perceptions at the regional scale, while experience governs attitude formation at the neighborhood scale.     

1980—2005年海南岛尖峰岭热带山地雨林区气候突变与异常的初步研究

海南尖峰岭热带山地雨林作为典型的热带雨林生态系统之一,其长期的气候动态变化研究对全球变化研究有着重要的作用。采用1980—2005年海南尖峰岭森林生态系统国家野外科学观测研究站天池气象站地面常规气象观测资料,利用累积距平法和Mann-Kendall检验法分析了尖峰岭热带山地雨林区气候突变和气候异常,结果表明：该区26 a来,年平均气温、年平均地温、年平均最高最低气温、年积温和平均水汽压在1990年前后经历一次由低到高的突变,年平均风速在1993年经历由大到小的突变。在高强度ENSO事件发生的1998年,气温、地温均出现异常偏高,这些都表明该林区的森林气候变化正是对全球气候异常的明显响应过程。