How stable are Australian farmers’ climate change risk perceptions? New evidence of the feedback loop between risk perceptions and behaviour

The exact relationship between people’s climate change attitudes and behaviour is a topic that engages policy-makers and researchers worldwide. Do climate change attitudes influence behaviour or is it possible that behaviour can change attitudes? This study uses a unique repeated survey dataset of 275 farmers (irrigators) in the southern Murray-Darling Basin from 2010–11 to 2015–16, to explore the dynamic relationship between climate change risk perceptions and farm adaptation behaviour. Farmers who had an increased risk exposure (expressed through higher debt, larger irrigated areas, greater share of permanent crops, and located in areas with higher temperatures and less rainfall) were more likely to agree climate change posed a risk. Whilst farmers became more accepting towards climate change over the time-period, a significant percentage of these attitudes were unstable. One reason suggested for this instability is the presence of a feedback loop between risk perceptions and behaviour. Namely, new evidence was found that farmers who agreed climate change was a risk in 2010–11, were more likely to undertake farm production decisions to reduce that risk (e.g. changing crop mix, reducing irrigated area and consequently selling water entitlements) – which had the impact of negatively feeding back and reducing their stated climate change risk perceptions in 2015–16. Conversely, farmers who were originally deniers were more likely to undertake somewhat riskier farm production decisions (e.g. increasing water utilisation rates and irrigation areas) – which consequently had the impact of positively increasing their climate change risk perceptions in 2015–16.     

‘Green’ on the ground but not in the air: Pro-environmental attitudes are related to household behaviours but not discretionary air travel

The rise in greenhouse gas emissions from air travel could be reduced by individuals voluntarily abstaining from, or reducing, flights for leisure and recreational purposes. In theory, we might expect that people with pro-environmental value orientations and concerns about the risks of climate change, and those who engage in more pro-environmental household behaviours, would also be more likely to abstain from such voluntary air travel, or at least to fly less far. Analysis of two large datasets from the United Kingdom, weighted to be representative of the whole population, tested these associations. Using zero-inflated Poisson regression models, we found that, after accounting for potential confounders, there was no association between individuals’ environmental attitudes, concern over climate change, or their routine pro-environmental household behaviours, and either their propensity to take non-work related flights, or the distances flown by those who do so. These findings contrasted with those for pro-environmental household behaviours, where associations with environmental attitudes and concern were observed. Our results offer little encouragement for policies aiming to reduce discretionary air travel through pro-environmental advocacy, or through ‘spill-over’ from interventions to improve environmental impacts of household routines.     

Scepticism and uncertainty about climate change: Dimensions, determinants and change over time

While scientific consensus and political and media messages appear to be increasingly certain, public attitudes and action towards the issue do not appear to be following suit. Popular and academic debate often assumes this is due to ignorance or misunderstanding on the part of the public, but some studies have suggested political beliefs and values may play a more important role in determining belief versus scepticism about climate change. The current research used two representative postal surveys of the UK public to: measure scepticism and uncertainty about climate change; determine how scepticism varies according to individual characteristics, knowledge and values; and examine how scepticism has changed over time. Findings show denial of climate change is less common than the perception that the issue has been exaggerated. Scepticism was found to be strongly determined by individuals’ environmental and political values (and indirectly by age, gender, location and lifestyle) rather than by education or knowledge. Between 2003 and 2008, public uncertainty about climate change has remained remarkably constant, although belief that claims about the issue are exaggerated has doubled over that period. These results are interpreted with reference to psychological concepts of motivated reasoning, confirmation bias and ‘finite pool of worry’. Implications for communication and policy are discussed.     

What is climate change scepticism? Examination of the concept using a mixed methods study of the UK public

The holding of doubts about climate change is often referred to as ‘scepticism’. However, there has been a lack of clarity in previous work as to what exactly this scepticism comprises. We integrate data obtained from discussion groups and a nationally representative survey, to interrogate and refine the concept of climate change scepticism with respect to the views of members of the public. We argue that two main types should be distinguished: epistemic scepticism, relating to doubts about the status of climate change as a scientific and physical phenomenon; and response scepticism, relating to doubts about the efficacy of action taken to address climate change. Whilst each type is independently associated by people themselves with climate change scepticism, we find that the latter is more strongly associated with a lack of concern about climate change. As such, additional effort should be directed towards addressing and engaging with people's doubts concerning attempts to address climate change.     

Use of aviation by climate change researchers: Structural influences,personal attitudes,and information provision

Aviation is a fast-growing sector, releasing more carbon dioxide per passenger kilometre than other transport modes. For climate change researchers, work-related travel – including for conferences and fieldwork – is a major carbon-emitting activity. At the same time, many argue that climate scientists have an important role in curbing their own aviation emissions to align their practices with their assertions in relation to emissions reduction. We examine the tensions between competing professional demands in relation to flying; measure levels of flying by climate and non-climate researchers; assess influences on choices and attitudes; and consider how information provision and structural changes might enable changes in practice. Study 1 entails a large, international survey of flying undertaken by climate change (including sustainability and environmental science) researchers and those from other disciplines (N = 1408). Study 2 tests effects of varying information provision on researchers’ behavioural intentions and policy support to reduce flying (N = 362). Unexpectedly, we find climate change researchers – particularly professors – fly more than other researchers, but are also more likely to have taken steps to reduce or offset their flying. Providing information about the impacts of aviation increases behavioural intentions and support for institutional policies to reduce flying, particularly amongst more pro-environmental respondents. However, while attitudinal factors (e.g., personal norm) predict willingness to reduce flying, structural/social factors (e.g., family commitments, location) are more important in predicting actual flying behaviour. Recent initiatives to develop a low-carbon and more inclusive research culture within climate science and the broader research community thus need to be supported by broader policies and technologies to encourage and enable low-carbon and avoided travel.     

Climate variability and inter-provincial migration in South America, 1970–2011

We examine the effect of climate variability on human migration in South America. Our analyses draw on over 21 million observations of adults aged 15–40 from 25 censuses conducted in eight South American countries. Addressing limitations associated with methodological diversity among prior studies, we apply a common analytic approach and uniform definitions of migration and climate across all countries. We estimate the effects of climate variability on migration overall and also investigate heterogeneity across sex, age, and socioeconomic groups, across countries, and across historical climate conditions. We also disaggregate migration by the rural/urban status of destination. We find that exposure to monthly temperature shocks has the most consistent effects on migration relative to monthly rainfall shocks and gradual changes in climate over multi-year periods. We also find evidence of heterogeneity across demographic groups and countries. Analyses that disaggregate migration by the rural/urban status of destination suggest that much of the climate-related migration is directed toward urban areas. Overall, our results underscore the complexity of environment-migration linkages and challenge simplistic narratives that envision a linear and monolithic migratory response to changing climates.     

Uncertain climate: An investigation into public scepticism about anthropogenic climate change

This study presents a detailed investigation of public scepticism about climate change in Britain using the trend, attribution, and impact scepticism framework of Rahmstorf (2004). The study found that climate scepticism is currently not widespread in Britain. Although uncertainty and scepticism about the potential impacts of climate change were fairly common, both trend and attribution scepticism were far less prevalent. It further showed that the different types of scepticism are strongly interrelated. Although this may suggest that the general public does not clearly distinguish between the different aspects of the climate debate, there is a clear gradation in prevalence along the Rahmstorf typology. Climate scepticism appeared particularly common among older individuals from lower socio-economic backgrounds who are politically conservative and hold traditional values; while it is less common among younger individuals from higher socio-economic backgrounds who hold self-transcendence and environmental values. The finding that climate scepticism is rooted in people's core values and worldviews may imply a coherent and encompassing sceptical outlook on climate change. However, attitudinal certainty appeared mainly concentrated in non-sceptical groups, suggesting that climate sceptical views are not held very firmly. Implications of the findings for climate change communication and engagement are discussed.     

Climate justice and global cities: Mapping the emerging discourses

Ever since climate change came to be a matter of political concern, questions of justice have been at the forefront of academic and policy debates in the international arena. Curiously, as attention has shifted to other sites and scales of climate change politics matters of justice have tended to be neglected. In this paper, we examine how discourses of justice are emerging within urban responses to climate change. Drawing on a database of initiatives taking place in 100 global cities and qualitative case-study research in Philadelphia, Quito and Toronto, we examine how notions of distributive and procedural justice are articulated in climate change projects and plans in relation to both adaptation and mitigation. We find that there is limited explicit concern with justice at the urban level. However, where discourses of justice are evident there are important differences emerging between urban responses to adaptation and mitigation, and between those in the north and in the south. Adaptation responses tend to stress the distribution of ‘rights’ to protection, although those in the South also stress the importance of procedural justice. Mitigation responses also stress ‘rights’ to the benefits of responding to climate change, with limited concern for ‘responsibilities’ or for procedural justice. Intriguingly, while adaptation responses tend to stress the rights of individuals, we also find discourses of collective rights emerging in relation to mitigation.     

Lights, camera … action? Altered attitudes and behaviour in response to the climate change film The Age of Stupid

The film The Age of Stupid depicts the world in 2055 devastated by climate change, combining this with documentary footage which illustrates many facets of the problems of climate change and fossil-fuel dependency. This study investigates the effects of the film on UK viewers’ attitudes and behaviour through a three-stage survey. Analysis of changes in attitudes focussed particularly on respondents’ concern about climate change, motivation to act, fear about the potential for catastrophe, beliefs about responsibility for action, and sense of agency. The film increased concern about climate change, motivation to act, and viewers’ sense of agency, although these effects had not persisted 10-14 weeks after seeing it. It was also successful in promoting some mitigation actions and behavioural change, although respondents reported barriers to further action, such as limited options for improving home energy efficiency among those in rented accommodation. However, filmgoers were atypical of the general public in that they exhibited very high levels of concern about climate change, knowledge about how to reduce their carbon emissions, and contact with organisations campaigning about climate change, before they saw the film. The paper considers how these factors may have enabled viewers to respond to the film as they did, as well as policy implications for those seeking to develop effective climate change communications.     

OK Boomer: A decade of generational differences in feelings about climate change

The emergence of concern about and evidence of climate change has been argued to create a cultural milieu unique to the Millennial generation (born between 1981 and 1996) and iGeneration (aka iGens or Generation Z born after 1997). The present research tested a) claims of unique angst about climate change among younger versus older generations, b) growing generational discrepancies over time in emotions about climate change, c) generational differences for several emotions about climate change, and d) the implications of these emotions for motivating people to discuss climate change with others, potentially aiding coping with climate change and facilitating action to address climate change. Survey data gathered from 2010 to 2019 of a representative sample of United States residents (N = 22,468) document greater increases in worry about climate change and, to a lesser degree, anger and guilt about climate change, within the two youngest generations relative to changes among Generation X, Baby Boomers, and the Silent and Greatest Generations. Although generational differences were small and suggest overstatements of unique effects for younger generations, increases in younger generations’ emotions transform into the two youngest generations reporting the strongest emotions in 2019. Over ten years, these differential shifts in emotions explain more substantial increases in the frequency of discussing climate in the youngest generations.     

Climate variability and educational attainment: Evidence from rural Ethiopia

This paper examines the effects of climate variability on schooling outcomes in rural Ethiopia. Investments in education serve as an important pathway out of poverty, yet reduced agricultural productivity due to droughts or temperature shocks may affect educational attainment if children receive poorer nutrition during early childhood, are required to participate in household income generation during schooling ages, or if households can no longer pay for school-related expenses. We link longitudinal socioeconomic, demographic, and schooling data from the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey to high-resolution gridded climate data to measure exposure to temperature and precipitation relative to historical norms. We then estimate a set of multivariate regression models to understand how climate variability impacts grade attainment and school enrollment. Results indicate that early life climatic conditions – namely milder temperatures during all seasons and greater rainfall during the summer agricultural season – are associated with an increased likelihood of a child having completed any education. In addition, greater summer rainfall during both early life and school ages is associated with having completed any schooling as well as with attending school at the time of the survey. These findings suggest that future climate change may reduce children’s school participation in rural Sub-Saharan Africa, slowing progress toward human development goals and poverty alleviation.     

“Natural cycles” in lay understandings of climate change

This article analyses lay understandings of climate change elicited through a longitudinal population-based survey of climate change, place and community among 1162 residents in the Hunter Valley, Southeast Australia. We explore how older residents in contrasting rural and coastal geographic areas perceive climate change information in terms of culturally relevant meanings and values, lived experiences and emotional responses to seasonal cycles, temperature fluctuations and altered landscapes. Thematic analysis of comments given by 467 interviewees to an open-ended question identified a significant subset for whom the concepts of “nature” and “science” express competing views about changing climatic conditions. For them, the idea of “natural cycles” is a significant cultural construct that links nature and humans through time in a way that structures stable and resilient understandings of environmental change, drawing on established cosmological frameworks for contemplating the future in relation to the past. In contrast to other studies that postulate scepticism and denial as individuals’ fear management strategies in the face of climate change threat, we found that the natural cycles view is founded on a reassuring deeper conviction about how nature works, and is linked to other pro-environmental values not commonly found in sceptical groups. It is a paradox of natural cycles thinking that it rejects the anthropocentrism that is at the heart of science-based environmentalism. By contrast, it places humans as deeply integrated with nature, rather than operating outside it and attempting with uncertain science to control something that is ultimately uncontrollable.     

The relative influence of climate and housing development on current and projected future fire patterns and structure loss across three California landscapes

Climate and land use patterns are expected to change dramatically in the coming century, raising concern about their effects on wildfire patterns and subsequent impacts to human communities. The relative influence of climate versus land use on fires and their impacts, however, remains unclear, particularly given the substantial geographical variability in fire-prone places like California. We developed a modeling framework to compare the importance of climatic and human variables for explaining fire patterns and structure loss for three diverse California landscapes, then projected future large fire and structure loss probability under two different climate (hot-dry or warm-wet) and two different land use (rural or urban residential growth) scenarios. The relative importance of climate and housing pattern varied across regions and according to fire size or whether the model was for large fires or structure loss. The differing strengths of these relationships, in addition to differences in the nature and magnitude of projected climate or land use change, dictated the extent to which large fires or structure loss were projected to change in the future. Despite this variability, housing and human infrastructure were consistently more responsible for explaining fire ignitions and structure loss probability, whereas climate, topography, and fuel variables were more important for explaining large fire patterns. For all study areas, most structure loss occurred in areas with low housing density (from 0.08 to 2.01 units/ha), and expansion of rural residential land use increased structure loss probability in the future. Regardless of future climate scenario, large fire probability was only projected to increase in the northern and interior parts of the state, whereas climate change had no projected impact on fire probability in southern California. Given the variation in fire-climate relationships and land use effects, policy and management decision-making should be customized for specific geographical regions.     

Communicating the climate impacts of meat consumption: The effect of values and message framing

Meat production for human consumption has serious environmental implications and contributes significantly to climate change. Changing people’s food choices is an important step towards reducing human impacts on the climate. Previous research shows that self-enhancement (i.e. self-interest) and self-transcendence (i.e. altruism) values are related to meat consumption. This study examined the effectiveness of the provision of information about climate impacts of meat consumption in influencing concern about these climate impacts of meat consumption, attitudes towards eating meat and behavioural intentions in a New Zealand sample (N = 848). Further, the study examined whether framing the message to align with people’s value sets would enhance the information’s effectiveness in affecting concern, attitudes and intentions. Survey participants were randomly assigned to a no-information control group, a message targeting self-enhancement values, or a message targeting self-transcendence values. Results indicated that the information provision was associated with significantly higher levels of concern about the climate impacts of meat consumption and significantly lower intentions to eat meat, but it did not affect attitudes towards meat consumption. However, the framing of the message did affect attitudes towards meat consumption, depending on existing values. Implications of this research can be applied to future climate change communication campaigns, through the use of targeted, value-congruent information.     

气候变化对中国国家安全的影响

基于政府间气候变化专门委员会(IPCC)第四次评估报告和2007年中国发布的气候变化国家评估报告的结果,整理、分类和提炼出关系中国国家安全的气候变化要素及其影响的演变趋势和区域响应特征,并分析其产生的安全后果.结果表明,基础设施的损毁、基础自然资源的缺失以及人民生命财产损失是气候变化产生的三个关键社会经济影响.气候变化...     

中国公众对气候变化和气象灾害认知的社会性别差异

对2015年全国公众气象服务评价调查结果的分析显示,我国公众中男性对气候变化认识程度以及对气象灾害预警的认知水平和满意度都比女性高。城镇女性选择环保产品、环保出行及愿意对生活或工作方式做出改变来应对气候变化的比例高于城镇男性,而农村男性选择调整或改变种植或养殖方式、改变种植或养殖品种及转换谋生方式的比例高于女性。男性选择购买相关气象或气候保险、参加培训或辅导的比例比女性高,而女性选择学习气象灾害和气候变化相关的专业知识比例高于男性。女性对气象服务信息的需求比例比男性高。建议：1)积极推进气候变化及其灾害认知的社会性别研究,建立灾害认知性别数据库,将社会性别融入到气象灾害风险管理的整个过程;2)在气象服务中引入社会性别视角,加强针对女性的宣传和指导,开发适合女性的服务产品和信息传播渠道,提升她们应对灾害的意识和能力。     

影响中国沿海地区青少年气候变化减缓意愿及行为的因子分析

对青少年开展气候变化教育是应对气候变化挑战的重要举措之一.了解哪些因素会影响青少年的气候变化减缓意愿及行为则是开展有效气候变化教育的前提.文中基于影响青少年气候变化行为因素的理论框架,针对厦门、深圳、宁波9所中学1539名学生,开展问卷调查.结果表明,我国沿海地区12～14岁青少年整体上对气候变化关注程度和气候变化减缓...     

The norms associated with climate change: Understanding social norms through acts of interpersonal activism

A growing body of research points to the role social norms may play in both maintaining carbon intensive lifestyles and soliciting changes towards more sustainable ways of living. However, despite highlighting the importance of pro-environmental social norms, such literature has said far less about the processes by which such norms might develop. We present a new approach to conceptualising social norms that focuses on understanding their dynamics within social interaction, by positioning interpersonal confrontation as a potential mechanism of change. We examine the normative dynamics of environmentalism by comparing the costs of interpersonally confronting climate change disregard with those associated with confronting racism. In two experimental studies, we presented participants with scenarios describing a person confronting (versus not confronting) contentious comments in each domain. We identified social costs to interpersonal confrontation of climate change disregard but not racism, as indicated by reduced ratings of perceived warmth of and closeness to the confronter (Study 1), and this effect was mediated by the perceived morality of the issue in question (Study 2). Our findings highlight how wider social constructions of (im)morality around climate change impact upon social interactions in ways that have important implications for processes of social (and ultimately environmental) change.     

北京气温日变化特征的城郊差异及其季节变化分析

本文利用北京地区近4年67个自动气象站的逐小时气温观测资料,基于北京地区气温的日变化特征,通过分析日最高、最低气温出现时间的概率分布,研究了城区、郊区气温的日变化差异及季节特征.此外,进一步分析研究了不同单位时间间隔变温的日变化特征,及最大变温出现时间的概率分布情况.研究结果表明:平均而言,城区最高温度出现的时间偏晚,而最低温度出现的时间城区偏早于郊区,与郊区相比,北京城区站点温度的日变化特征更为一致,最高(低)温度出现的时间更加集中;温度日变化的特征随季节有明显的变化,最高温度出现时间在秋、冬两季最为集中,在春季和夏季较为分散;而最低温度出现时间在春、夏两季最为集中,在秋季和冬季最为分散.一天中正、负变温过程具有非对称特征,正变温是比较急剧的过程,负变温相对比较缓慢,北京城区站点的变温幅度小于郊区,春、秋和冬季变温幅度较大,夏季变温幅度最小.不同单位时间内变温速率的分析表明,最强的变温过程一般在3小时以内;最大变温出现时间的概率分布分析表明,最大正变温出现时间在冬季最为集中,夏季最为分散;而最大负变温在秋季最为集中,在春季最为分散.最高(低)温度、变温的城、郊特征差异主要是由于城市热容量比郊区大,且具有更多变化的复杂性而形成的.温度日变化的特征和其区域、季节差异性的揭示,不仅有助于更好地认识和理解区域气候特征和城市化对气温的影响,也可以为做好精细化的天气预报提供气候背景参考.     

Developing a model of climate change behavior among adolescents

Research on adolescent climate change perceptions has uncovered key insights about how knowledge, concern, and hope might relate to behavior and the potential for educational interventions to influence these factors. However, few of these studies have employed treatment/control designs that might address causality and none have addressed how these factors might interact to influence behavior. We developed a model of behavior change where a climate education treatment impacted knowledge, knowledge impacted hope and concern, and hope and concern together impacted behavior. We empirically tested the utility of this model and the causal relationships within it using a pre/post, treatment/control evaluation of climate education among adolescents in North Carolina, USA (n?=?1041). We found support for a causal relationship between the treatment and gains in knowledge, but not between treatment and behavior. However, we did find support for a path model in which climate change knowledge positively relates to increased climate change concern and hope, and increases in concern and hope predict changes in pro-environmental behavior. Low SES was related to smaller gains in knowledge, concern, and behavior. Our results contribute to a theoretical understanding of climate change behaviors among adolescents and suggest that climate education aiming to change behavior should focus on building hope and concern.