The impact of biofuel-induced food-price inflation on dietary energy demand and dietary greenhouse gas emissions

Dramatic increases in liquid biofuel production have led to concerns about associated impacts on food prices, with many modeling studies showing significant biofuel-related price inflation. In turn, by changing patterns of food demand, biofuel production may indirectly influence greenhouse gas emissions. We estimated changes to dietary energy (calorie) demand and greenhouse gas emissions embodied in average diets under different biofuel-related food-price scenarios for Brazil, China and the United States, using food-price projections and food-price elasticities. Average energy demand decreased in all countries, from about 40 kcal per person per day in Brazil under a moderate price inflation scenario – a reduction of 1% relative to the (2009) reference scenario – to nearly 300 per day in the United States with high price inflation – almost 8% of reference levels. However, emissions per calorie increased slightly in all three countries. In terms of total greenhouse gas emissions, the results are suggestive of overall reductions only in the United States, where average reductions ranged from about 40 to 110 kg of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions per person per year. In China, the direction of impact is unclear, but the net change is likely to be small. Brazilian results were sensitive to parameter values and the direction and magnitude of impact is therefore uncertain. Despite the uncertainty, even small changes (positive or negative) in individual dietary emissions can produce large changes at the population level, arguing for the inclusion of the dietary pathway in greenhouse gas accounting of liquid biofuels.     

Quota allocation rules in Romania assessed by a dynamic CGE model

Alternative mechanisms for EU ETS (European Union Emissions Trading Scheme) quota allocations within the Romanian economy were evaluated using a general equilibrium model within a dynamic intertemporal framework. Several distribution rules were simulated based on: the historical emissions, the least-cost approach, and the auctioning scheme with and without a preliminary selection of eligible sectors. We found that the resulting marginal abatement cost in ETS-eligible sectors is only €5.75/tCO₂ for reducing pollution by 20.7%. Such a low cost is explained by low energy prices and by substitution possibilities with low carbon content resources (nuclear and hydroelectricity). Including all sectors in the trade creates a more flexible market than in the ETS, since more reduction options are available. The ETS has high feasibility for monitoring. All eligible sectors (except refineries and metallurgy) present the lowest abatement costs in the economy. Auctioning introduces a strong carbon price signal, which reduces emission intensity but creates distortions in terms of trade and worsens the country's energy dependency. Environmental policy has modest macroeconomic results and tends to correct the resources allocation. The strong double dividend obtained under certain circumstances indicates Romania's potential for improving its energy efficiency and carbon intensity.     

Post-2012 CDM multi-criteria analysis of industries in six Asian countries: Iranian case study

The prospects of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and for carbon income, up to and beyond 2012, in the industrial sectors of Iran and five other Asian countries are investigated. The attractiveness and suitability of each host country, the status of their industrial sectors (based on four post-2012 scenarios), and the post-2012 potential of the CDM (or similar carbon projects) in these sectors are all examined. A multi-criteria analysis of Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, China, and India, based on seven sets of criteria (institutional, regulatory, economic, political, social, CDM experience, and energy production/consumption), is conducted, and the post-2012 potential carbon incomes of each country – based on CO₂e emissions of industrial processes – are calculated. Finally, the Iranian industrial sector and the impact of deregulation of energy prices are examined. The post-2012 potential savings in the Iranian industrial sector are calculated based on energy savings, carbon income, and environmental savings. The results indicate that there is strong demand for investment and new technology in this sector to combat several-fold energy price increases. Moreover, high-priced carbon credits could play a meaningful role in post-2012 energy policies in this sector.

Policy relevance

This research is the first study to quantify the carbon market potentials in the industrial sectors of the selected Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) members. The Kyoto Protocol is considered by most OPEC countries to be a mixed bag of threats and opportunities and they have shown ambivalence towards it, mainly due to the threat a reduction of fossil fuel consumption poses to their economies. On the other hand, energy efficiency is a desirable goal for their industrial sectors. Iran, as an OPEC member country with vast energy resources, has mostly ignored the CDM during the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and has performed poorly on CDM implementation. However, the current deregulation of energy prices in Iran, with profound cuts in energy subsidies, would definitely alter the perspective of its industrial decision makers on the post-2012 carbon potentials.     

Aligning emissions trading and feed-in tariffs in China

In 2013, China launched its domestic pilot emissions trading scheme (ETS) as a cost-effective strategy to reduce CO₂ emissions. Theoretically, the ETS can interact with the feed-in tariffs (FITs) applied to renewable energies (REN). This article presents a simple method to demonstrate how FITs can be adjusted based on the evolution of ETS carbon prices in order to provide a cost-effective climate policy package in China. First, by using provincial data and wind and solar power as examples, it calculates the implicit carbon prices that FITs generate in different Chinese provinces and finds that they are much higher than current carbon prices in the pilot ETS. This shows the necessity of using both instruments to guarantee current level incentives to develop REN for climate change purposes, at least in the short and medium terms. Second, by keeping the annual total carbon price level stable (the sum of the implicit FIT carbon price and the ETS carbon price), and taking into account the cost evolution of REN development, this article demonstrates, for the 2018–2020 period, that FIT should decrease at an annual rate of 3.04–4.63% (for wind) and 7.84–8.87% (for solar) based on different growth rates for progressive national ETS carbon prices.

Policy relevance

There are a number of studies and debates on the interactions between climate policies in Europe in particular, ETS and subsidies for REN. The key issue is that a climate policy package should be cost-efficient and the implementation of one policy should not jeopardise the performance of another. For a country like China, a considerable scale effect on climate target achievement and total cost savings could be produced by the careful design of the climate policy package. FIT and ETS, which are cost-efficient policies if implemented separately, will very probably constitute a major climate policy package in the future in China, which is aiming to limit the use of command-and-control policies. So far, there is some debate on how to reduce FIT for wind power in China due to development cost changes. But discussions are lacking on the linkage between FIT and ETS. This paper fills this gap.     

EU 20-20-20 energy policy as a model for global climate mitigation

The EU has established an aggressive portfolio with explicit near-term targets for 2020 – to reduce GHG emissions by 20%, rising to 30% if the conditions are right, to increase the share of renewable energy to 20%, and to make a 20% improvement in energy efficiency – intended to be the first step in a long-term strategy to limit climate forcing. The effectiveness and cost of extending these measures in time are considered along with the ambition and propagation to the rest of the world. Numerical results are reported and analysed for the contribution of the portfolio's various elements through a set of sensitivity experiments. It is found that the hypothetical programme leads to very substantial reductions in GHG emissions, dramatic increases in use of electricity, and substantial changes in land-use including reduced deforestation, but at the expense of higher food prices. The GHG emissions reductions are driven primarily by the direct limits. Although the carbon price is lower under the hypothetical protocol than it would be under the emissions cap alone, the economic cost of the portfolio is higher, between 13% and 22%.     

Stabilizing CO2 concentrations with incomplete international cooperation

Many stabilization scenarios have examined the implications of stabilization on the assumption that all regions and all sectors of all of the world's economies undertake emissions mitigations wherever and whenever it is cheapest to do so. This idealized assumption is just one of many ways in which emissions mitigation actions could play out globally, but not necessarily the most likely. This paper explores the implications of generic policy regimes that lead to stabilization of CO₂ concentrations under conditions in which non-Annex I regions delay emissions reductions and in which carbon prices vary across participating regions. The resulting stabilization scenarios are contrasted with the idealized results. Delays in the date by which non-Annex I regions begin to reduce emissions raise the price of carbon in Annex I regions relative to the price of carbon in Annex I in an idealized regime for any given CO₂ concentration limit. This effect increases the longer the delay in non-Annex I accession, the lower the non-Annex I carbon prices relative to the Annex I prices, and the more stringent the stabilization level. The effect of delay is very pronounced when CO₂ concentrations are stabilized at 450 ppmv, however the effect is much less pronounced at 550 ppmv and above. For long delays in non-Annex I accession, 450 ppmv stabilization levels become infeasible.     

Estimating the value of carbon sequestration ecosystem services in the Mediterranean Sea: An ecological economics approach

Ocean and marine ecosystems provide a range of valuable services to humans, including benefits such as carbon sequestration, whose economic value are as yet poorly understood. This paper presents a novel contribution to the valuation of carbon sequestration services in marine ecosystems with an application to the Mediterranean Sea. We combine a state-of-the-art biogeochemical model with various estimates of the social cost of carbon emissions to provide a spatially explicit characterization of the current flow of values that are attributable to the various sequestration processes, including the biological component. Using conservative estimates of the social cost of carbon, we evaluate the carbon sequestration value flows over the entire basin to range between 127 and 1722 million €/year. Values per unit area range from −135 to 1000 €/km² year, with the exclusive economic zone of some countries acting as net carbon sources. Whereas the contribution of physical processes can be either positive or negative, also depending on the properties of incoming Atlantic water, the contribution of biological processes to the marine “blue carbon” sequestration is always positive, and found to range between 100 to 1500 million €/year for the whole basin.     

Energy markets,capital inertia and economic instrument impacts

Despite the importance of emissions trading and energy taxes to the EU and national climate strategies, limited research exists on their impact on emissions from the perspective of industry sectors targeted by economic instruments. This article contributes to redressing this deficit by critically analysing whether economic instruments applied within the UK provide sufficiently strong price incentives to overcome barriers to investment in energy-intensive sectors created by the capital and finance costs of replacing ‘legacy’ infrastructure and fluctuating base energy prices. Results from a survey of 189 companies from the cement, aluminium and chemicals sectors and 23 interviews with sector associations and businesses from these and other energy-intensive industries indicate that economic instruments have raised awareness of energy efficiency but have had a minimal impact on investment decisions. EU-wide economic instruments such as the EU emissions trading scheme have yet to be fully tested but may encounter similar difficulties. On this basis, we argue that economic instruments may need to be complemented by more interventionist programmes focusing on large-scale investment in energy modernization and we also discuss how economic instruments can contribute to this agenda.     

A case for introducing an explicit carbon price into China's export tax

In recent years, export value-added tax (VAT) refund rebate and export tax (EVRRET) measures have been adopted for energy-intensive products in China. They are proclaimed to be climate policy, yet there is no explicit and unique carbon cost set on export, and the implicit export carbon tax rates vary dramatically across sectors and over different periods. A method is provided to introduce an explicit and unique carbon cost into the current EVRRET. By setting a comparable carbon cost (US$20/tCO₂ and US$30/tCO₂) for eight major energy-intensive sectors to which the EVRRET is widely applied, it derives the corresponding ad valorem average rate for each sector. The introduction of a carbon cost into export VAT refund rebate policy would not increase the current export VAT refund rebate rate (except for the chemical sector), but would simply define a ceiling. However, the same introduction into the export tax policy would lead to an overall increase in sectoral export tax rates. In terms of competitiveness and World Trade Organisation concerns, the better option for introducing a carbon cost into Chinese exports would be through reforming export VAT refund rebate policy.     

Risk mitigation and the social cost of carbon

The social cost of carbon – i.e., the marginal present-value cost imposed by greenhouse gas emissions – is determined by a complex interaction between factual assumptions, modeling methods, and value judgments. Among the most crucial factors is society's willingness to tolerate potentially catastrophic environmental risks. To explore this issue, the present analysis employs a stochastic climate–economy model that accounts for uncertainties in baseline economic growth, baseline emissions, greenhouse gas mitigation costs, carbon cycling, climate sensitivity, and climate change damages. In this model, preferences are specified to reflect the high degree of risk aversion revealed by private investment decisions, signaled by the large observed gap between the average rates of return paid by safe and risky financial instruments. In contrast, most climate–economy models assume much lower risk aversion. Given high risk aversion, the analysis finds that investment in climate stabilization yields especially large net benefits by forestalling low-probability threats to long-run human well-being. Accordingly, the social cost of carbon attains the markedly high value of $25,700 per metric ton of carbon dioxide in a baseline scenario in which emissions are unregulated. This value falls to just $4 per ton as the stringency of control measures is successively increased. These results cast doubt on the idea that the social cost of carbon takes on a uniquely defined, objective value that is independent of policy decisions. This does not, however, rule out the use of carbon prices to achieve the benefits of climate stabilization using least-cost mitigation measures.     

Linking the CDM with domestic carbon markets

Certified emission reductions (CERs) from Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects have traditionally served as an indirect link between cap and trade systems around the world. However, since 2010, import restrictions have increased. Reasons for import limitations include the supplementarity principle, genuine concerns about the environmental integrity of CERs and social benefits of CDM projects, pressure from domestic emissions mitigation industries, concerns about competition in the industries in which reductions take place, as well as the attempt to pressure advanced developing countries to accept national emissions commitments under a future international climate policy regime. It is shown that import limitations lead to a decrease in CER prices and a race to generate CERs as quickly as possible. Such effects are visible in the CDM market after the EU announced its import limitations. The exclusion of CERs from specific project types will distort the CDM supply curve and increase the CER price unless the marginal abatement costs of the excluded project type are above the CER world market price. Similarly, exclusion of CERs from specific host countries will increase the price. Substantial differences are found in CER access to national carbon markets around the world.Policy relevanceCDM regulators could try to improve access of CERs to cap and trade schemes through improvements to additionality testing, standardizing baseline and monitoring methodologies and stakeholder consultation. However, regulators should be aware that standardization is no panacea, and controversies may resurface if standardized additionality determination (e.g. through benchmarks or positive lists) are applied for a certain period and found to be problematic. However, domestic policy concerns such as an unwillingness to send money abroad to buy credits, an inability to control market prices, and competitiveness impacts cannot be resolved by CDM reforms. If, despite such reforms of the CDM, blatant protectionism continues, a challenge before the World Trade Organisation (WTO) could be launched to stop discrimination of service exports from specific countries.     

Regulatory control of vehicle and power plant emissions: how effective and at what cost?

Passenger vehicles and power plants are major sources of GHG emissions. While economic analyses generally indicate that a broader market-based approach to GHG reduction would be less costly and more effective, regulatory approaches have found greater political success. We evaluate a global regulatory regime that replaces coal with natural gas in the electricity sector and imposes technically achievable improvements in the efficiency of personal transport vehicles. Its performance and cost are compared with other scenarios of future policy development including a no-policy world, achievements under the Copenhagen Accord, and a price-based policy to reduce global emissions by 50% by 2050. The assumed regulations applied globally achieve a global emissions reduction larger than projected for the Copenhagen agreements, but they do not prevent global GHG emissions from continuing to grow. The reduction in emissions is achieved at a high cost compared to a price-based policy. Diagnosis of the reasons for the limited yet high-cost performance reveals influences including the partial coverage of emitting sectors, small or no influence on the demand for emissions-intensive products, leakage when a reduction in fossil use in the covered sectors lowers the price to others, and the partial coverage of GHGs. If these regulatory measures are in part correcting other barriers or behavioural limitations consumers face, the benefits of overcoming these could offset at least some of the costs we estimate. The extent of any efficiency gap – the difference between engineering estimates of best practice and what actually happens – is highly contested, and offers an important avenue for future research.

Policy relevance

While analysts concerned with national cost of GHG control have long advocated a GHG pricing policy, by a cap-and-trade system or a tax, covering all emissions sources and gases, governments more often pursue sectoral policies and technology standards. Given these political realities, the regulations represent a more politically practical approach to GHG reductions, focusing on solutions that are within reach and that do not depend on technological breakthroughs. If regulations are imposed as a way to get started on larger emissions reductions, and then combined with a broader GHG pricing policy pursuing a deep global cut in emissions, its requirements will eventually be overtaken by the pricing policy. The remaining higher costs of the regulatory targets become diluted so that in later years the difference in average cost per ton between a least-cost approach and one preceded by a period of regulatory action becomes very small.     

International and national climate policies for aviation: a review

Aviation constitutes about 2.5% of all energy-related CO₂ emissions and in addition there are non-CO₂ effects. In 2016, the ICAO decided to implement a Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) and in 2017 the EU decided on faster emission reductions in its Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), which since 2012 includes the aviation sector. The effects of these policies on the expected development of air travel emissions from 2017 to 2030 have been analyzed. For the sample country Sweden, the analysis shows that when emissions reductions in other sectors are attributed to the aviation sector as a result of the EU ETS and CORSIA, carbon emissions are expected to reduce by ?0.8% per year (however if non-CO₂ emissions are included in the analysis, then emissions will increase). This is much less than what is needed to achieve the 2°C target. Our analysis of potential national aviation policy instruments shows that there are legally feasible options that could mitigate emissions in addition to the EU ETS and CORSIA. Distance-based air passenger taxes are common among EU Member States and through increased ticket prices these taxes can reduce demand for air travel and thus reduce emissions. Tax on jet fuel is an option for domestic aviation and for international aviation if bilateral agreements are concluded. A quota obligation for biofuels is a third option.

Key policy insights

• Existing international climate policies for aviation will not deliver any major emission reductions.

• Policymakers who want to significantly push the aviation sector to contribute to meeting the 2°C target need to work towards putting in place tougher international policy instruments in the long term, and simultaneously implement temporary national policy instruments in the near-term.

• Distance-based air passenger taxes, carbon taxes on jet fuel and quota obligations for biofuels are available national policy options; if they are gradually increased, and harmonized with other countries, they can help to significantly reduce emissions.

     

Creating a global warming implementation regime

This paper proposes a global warming implementation regime which addresses the issues of equity, flexibility, cost minimization, and population growth. Previously proposed international policy instruments, such as country by country targets, carbon taxes, and tradable permits, face major difficulties as stand alone proposals. The key element of the regime proposed here is to combine annual tradable permits which are allocated based on population in a fixed year with a small carbon tax ($5–10/tonne) on emissions in excess of permits. Both permits and carbon taxes are applied to national level governments, which in turn would use whatever mix of policies desired to reduce national emissions. It is suggested that the initial number of permits correspond to total global emissions in the base year; over time, the number of permits could be reduced and the tax rate increased if improved scientific knowledge so dictates. By allocating permits based on population the equity concerns of developing countries are addressed, while taxing emissions in excess of permit holdings removes the rigidity of a quota system and limits resource transfers by effectively capping the permit trading price, which is a major concern of industrialized countries. To accommodate the difficulties of countries which have not yet achieved the demographic transition, the permit allocation scheme could be subject to a one-time adjustment after 10–15 years based on some weighting of the initial and then-current populations. The proposed scheme is based on the premise that there is a large potential for reducing emissions in developed countries or limiting emission increases in developing countries, and the intention is to create competition between national level governments in implementing cost-effective emission reduction.     

河北省贸易隐含二氧化碳排放及其影响因素研究

针对全球气候变化而引发国家间减排责任的争吵,需要各国从生产和消费的角度来认识二氧化碳排放,国家内部区域之间减排责任的分担也应该从生产和消费两个角度加以认识。为此,本文利用投入产出分析方法和EEBT(双边贸易隐含排放)核算方法核算河北省的二氧化碳排放,发现河北省生产型二氧化碳排放远大于其消费型二氧化碳排放,其中国内流出/流入引发的二氧化碳排放量较大。在利用SDA(结构分解分析法)分析影响贸易隐含二氧化碳排放变化因素时,发现行业二氧化碳排放强度变化对隐含二氧化碳排放具有积极影响,而国民经济行业之间技术经济关系的变化对隐含二氧化碳排放具有消极影响。因此,河北省在利用技术手段降低行业二氧化碳排放强度的同时,还要筛选关键性部门加以重点管理。同时,河北省贸易隐含二氧化碳排放及其影响因素变化对国家制定区域减排责任也有较强参考价值。     

碳市场、行业竞争力与碳泄漏：以钢铁行业为例

全国碳市场的建设已启动。钢铁行业是被纳入碳市场的主要行业之一,碳市场政策势必对其竞争力带来一定的影响。文中通过构建局部均衡模型,从价格、产量、贸易和碳泄漏等方面定量研究分析碳市场对我国钢铁行业竞争力的影响,并对影响模型结果的关键参数做敏感性分析,包括减排成本曲线、配额分配方式和贸易弹性。研究结果表明,碳市场对于钢铁行业的竞争力影响不太大,但是需要高度关注碳泄漏问题。     

Sector-based approach to the post-2012 climate change policy architecture

A sectoral approach to GHG emissions reductions in developing countries is proposed as a key component of the post-2012 climate change mitigation framework. In this approach, the ten highest-emitting developing countries in the electricity and other major industrial sectors pledge to meet voluntary, ‘no-lose’ GHG emissions targets in these sectors. No penalties are incurred for failing to meet a target, but emissions reductions achieved beyond the target level earn emissions reduction credits (ERCs) that can be sold to industrialized nations. Participating developing countries establish initial ‘no-lose’ emissions targets, based upon their national circumstances, from sector-specific energyintensity benchmarks that have been developed by independent experts. Industrialized nations then offer incentives for the developing countries to adopt more stringent emissions targets through a ‘Technology Finance and Assistance Package’, which helps to overcome financial and other barriers to technology transfer and deployment. These sectorspecific energy-intensity benchmarks could also serve as a means for establishing national economy-wide targets in developed countries in the post-2012 regime. Preliminary modelling of a hybrid scenario, in which Annex I countries adopt economy-wide absolute GHG emissions targets and high-emitting developing countries adopt ‘no-lose’ sectoral targets, indicates that such an approach significantly improves the likelihood that atmospheric concentrations of CO₂ can be stabilized at 450 ppmv by the end of the century.     

Escaping the climate policy uncertainty trap: options contracts for REDD+

Climate policy uncertainty significantly hinders investments in low-carbon technologies, and the global community is behind schedule to curb carbon emissions. Strong actions will be necessary to limit the increase in global temperatures, and continued delays create risks of escalating climate change damages and future policy costs. These risks are system-wide, long-term and large-scale and thus hard to diversify across firms. Because of its unique scale, cost structure and near-term availability, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation in developing countries (REDD+) has significant potential to help manage climate policy risks and facilitate the transition to lower greenhouse gas emissions. ‘Call’ options contracts in the form of the right but not the obligation to buy high-quality emissions reduction credits from jurisdictional REDD+ programmes at a predetermined price per ton of CO₂ could help unlock this potential despite the current lack of carbon markets that accept REDD+ for compliance. This approach could provide a globally important cost-containment mechanism and insurance for firms against higher future carbon prices, while channelling finance to avoid deforestation until policy uncertainties decline and carbon markets scale up.

Key policy insights

• Climate policy uncertainty discourages abatement investments, exposing firms to an escalating systemic risk of future rapid increases in emission control expenditures.

• This situation poses a risk of an abatement ‘short squeeze,’ paralleling the case in financial markets when prices jump sharply as investors rush to square accounts on an investment they have sold ‘short’, one they have bet against and promised to repay later in anticipation of falling prices.

• There is likely to be a willingness to pay for mechanisms that hedge the risks of abruptly rising carbon prices, in particular for ‘call’ options, the right but not the obligation to buy high-quality emissions reduction credits at a predetermined price, due to the significantly lower upfront capital expenditure compared to other hedging alternatives.

• Establishing rules as soon as possible for compliance market acceptance of high-quality emissions reductions credits from REDD+ would facilitate REDD+ transactions, including via options-based contracts, which could help fill the gap of uncertain climate policies in the short and medium term.

     

Achievability of the Paris Agreement targets in the EU: demand-side reduction potentials in a carbon budget perspective

Limiting global warming to ‘well below’ 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5°C is an integral part of the 2015 Paris Agreement. To achieve these aims, cumulative global carbon emissions after 2016 should not exceed 940 – 390?Gt of CO₂ (for the 2°C target) and 167 – ?48?Gt of CO₂ (for the 1.5°C target) by the end of the century. This paper analyses the EU’s cumulative carbon emissions in different models and scenarios (global models, EU-focused models and national carbon mitigation scenarios). Due to the higher reductions in energy use and carbon intensity of the end-use sectors in the national scenarios, we identify an additional mitigation potential of 26–37 Gt cumulative CO₂ emissions up to 2050 compared to what is currently included in global or EU scenarios. These additional reductions could help to both reduce the need for carbon dioxide removals and bring cumulative emissions in global and EU scenarios in line with a fairness-based domestic EU budget for a 2°C target, while still remaining way above the budget for 1.5°C.

Key policy insights

• Models used for policy advice such as global integrated assessment models or EU models fail to consider certain mitigation potential available at the level of sectors.

• Global and EU models assume significant levels of CO₂ emission reductions from carbon capture and storage to reach the 1.5°C target but also to reach the 2°C target.

• Global and EU model scenarios are not compatible with a fair domestic EU share in the global carbon budget either for 2°C or for 1.5°C.

• Integrating additional sectoral mitigation potential from detailed national models can help bring down cumulative emissions in global and EU models to a level comparable to a fairness-based domestic EU share compatible with the 2°C target, but not the 1.5°C aspiration.

     

On the importance of baseline setting in carbon offsets markets

Incorporating carbon offsets in the design of cap-and-trade programs remains a controversial issue because of its potential unintended impacts on emissions. At the heart of this discussion is the issue of crediting of emissions reductions. Projects can be correctly, over- or under-credited for their actual emissions reductions. We develop a unified framework that considers the supply of offsets within a cap-and-trade program that allows us to compare the relative impact of over-credited offsets and under-credited emissions reductions on overall emissions under different levels of baseline stringency and carbon prices. In the context of a national carbon pricing scheme that includes offsets, we find that the emissions impacts of over-credited offsets can be fully balanced out by under-credited emissions reductions without sacrificing a significant portion of the overall supply of offsets, provided emissions baselines are stringent enough. In the presence of high predicted business-as-usual (BAU) emissions uncertainty or low carbon prices, to maintain the environmental integrity of the program, baselines need to be set at stringent levels, in some cases below 50 percent of predicted BAU emissions. As predicted BAU emissions uncertainty declines or as the carbon market achieves higher equilibrium prices, however, less stringent baselines can balance out the emissions impacts of over-credited offsets and under-credited emissions reductions. These results imply that to maintain environmental integrity of offsets programs, baseline stringency should be tailored to project characteristics and market conditions that influence the proportion of over-credited offsets to under-credited emissions reductions.