Promiscuous corroboration and climate change translation: A case study from the Marshall Islands

Public knowledge of global warming depends on the translation of climate science from specialist communities to citizens, and from scientific language to the vernacular; yet, no two cultures or languages being perfectly commensurable, this process of translation necessarily entails a transformation of the climate change concept. I explore this transformation, and the unexpected consequences it spells for local acceptance and understanding of climate science, through a case study in the Marshall Islands, a low-lying nation endangered by sea level rise and other climate change impacts. Various framings of this threat have been communicated to Marshall Islanders via local media, NGO, and government outlets. ‘Climate’ is here translated as Marshallese mejatoto, the closest equivalent in this Austronesian language. Yet mejatoto refers not only to climate/weather but also to the environment or cosmos in general, including the social sphere, a result of the Marshallese conceptual conflation of ‘nature’ and ‘culture.’ As a result, locals point to processes as disparate, and un-‘climatic,’ as a solar eclipse, accelerating time, and weakening tradition as examples of, and evidence for, climate change. In a society already vigorously possessed of narratives of change, this ‘promiscuous corroboration’ makes the prediction of climate change extremely easy to trust. While this ‘mistranslation’ carries with it certain dangers, when viewed instead as a reinterpretation it is rife with opportunity. Climate change communicators both abroad and at home must therefore carefully consider the transformations introduced by various translations of ‘climate change,’ yet also appreciate ‘mistranslation’ for its ability to render concepts meaningful to local actors and to stimulate citizen–scientist dialogue.     

The effects of increased stream temperatures on juvenile steelhead growth in the Yakima River Basin based on projected climate change scenarios

Stakeholders within the Yakima River Basin expressed concern over impacts of climate change on mid-Columbia River steelhead (Oncorhynchus mykiss), listed under the Endangered Species Act. We used a bioenergetics model to assess the impacts of changing stream temperatures—resulting from different climate change scenarios—on growth of juvenile steelhead in the Yakima River Basin. We used diet and fish size data from fieldwork in a bioenergetics model and integrated baseline and projected stream temperatures from down-scaled air temperature climate modeling into our analysis. The stream temperature models predicted that daily mean temperatures of salmonid-rearing streams in the basin could increase by 1–2 °C and our bioenergetics simulations indicated that such increases could enhance the growth of steelhead in the spring, but reduce it during the summer. However, differences in growth rates of fish living under different climate change scenarios were minor, ranging from about 1–5 %. Because our analysis focused mostly on the growth responses of steelhead to changes in stream temperatures, further work is needed to fully understand the potential impacts of climate change. Studies should include evaluating changing stream flows on fish activity and energy budgets, responses of aquatic insects to climate change, and integration of bioenergetics, population dynamics, and habitat responses to climate change.     

Disruption,not displacement: Environmental variability and temporary migration in Bangladesh

Mass migration is one of the most concerning potential outcomes of global climate change. Recent research into environmentally induced migration suggests that relationship is much more complicated than originally posited by the ‘environmental refugee’ hypothesis. Climate change is likely to increase migration in some cases and reduce it in others, and these movements will more often be temporary and short term than permanent and long term. However, few large-sample studies have examined the evolution of temporary migration under changing environmental conditions. To address this gap, we measure the extent to which temperature, precipitation, and flooding can predict temporary migration in Matlab, Bangladesh. Our analysis incorporates high-frequency demographic surveillance data, a discrete time event history approach, and a range of sociodemographic and contextual controls. This approach reveals that temporary migration declines immediately after flooding but quickly returns to normal. In contrast, high temperatures have sustained positive effects on temporary migration that persist over one to two year periods, while migrations decrease during extended periods of extreme precipitation. Building on previous studies of long-term migration, these results challenge the common assumption that flooding, precipitation extremes, and high temperatures will consistently increase temporary migration. Instead, our results are consistent with a livelihoods interpretation in which long-standing household livelihood strategies (both temporary migration and agriculture) are disrupted by environmental variability.     

Decreased takeoff performance of aircraft due to climate change

Climate change will likely affect aviation; however, it is not well understood. In particular, the effects of climate change on aircraft’s takeoff performance have seldom been studied. Here, we explore the effects of climate change on the takeoff performance of aircraft, including takeoff distance and climb rate. Takeoff performance normally decreases as temperature and pressure altitude increase. Our study confirms an increasing trend of temperature at 30 major international airports. However, the trend of pressure altitude is shown to be either positive or negative at these airports. Such changes of temperature and pressure altitude lead to longer takeoff distance and lower climb rate in the following century. The average takeoff distance in summer will increase by 0.95–6.5% and 1.6–11% from the historical period (1976–2005) to the mid-century (2021–2050) and from the mid- to late-century (2071–2100). The climb rate in summer will decrease by 0.68–3.4% and 1.3–5.2% from the history to the mid-century and from the mid- to late-century, respectively. Taking Boeing 737-800 aircraft as an example, our results show that it will require additional 3.5–168.7 m takeoff distance in future summers, with variations among different airports.     

How does carbon dioxide emission change with the economic development? Statistical experiences from 132 countries

Issues concerning what measures should be adopted to achieve a sustainable world with less carbon dioxide emission and in what magnitude should we reduce our emission have been on agenda in both international negotiations and countries’ policy making aimed at coping with potential global climate change. These issues cannot be easily addressed unless comprehensive understanding about the countries’ status quo as well as historical relationship between economic development and carbon dioxide emission are gained. In this paper, we examine the historical relationship between economic development and carbon dioxide emission; the ex ante restrictions on function forms and the poorly handled robustness issues rife in economics literature are synthetically addressed. Evidence from recent four decades indicates that per capita carbon dioxide emission first significantly and monotonously increase at low income level and flattens after per capita income reaches at about 22,000 $ (2005 constant price). We perform various robustness checks by employing different data sources, different model specifications and different econometric estimates. The captured development–emission relationship is robust. Our empirical results indicate factors such as urbanization, population density, trade, energy mix and economic environment impact the absolute level of carbon dioxide emission not the overall income elasticity structure of carbon dioxide emission.     

Living with limits: growth,resources, and climate change

Is it possible for all of humanity to enjoy the standards of living of today's high-income countries? What would happen if these limits were reached, perhaps because of climate change or a shortage of natural resources essential to production? How would society manage – or fail to manage – such limits? Notwithstanding the current financial and economic crises, these are perhaps the biggest questions confronting our species (and of a host of other species, who are the victims of our decisions). The article begins by considering the biggest economic event of our lifetimes – the ‘great convergence’ and its implications for the demand for resources. The discussion then turns to a specific limit on our development, climate change, which is different from most other limits, because it involves a global public good: the atmosphere. What such limits might mean for our civilization is discussed. One can persuade people to tackle climate change only if those concerned with the dangers persuade ordinary people that action will not come at the expense of their prosperity.     

“A sky of brass and burning winds”: documentary evidence of rainfall variability in the Kingdom of Lesotho, Southern Africa, 1824–1900

Forecasting austral summer rainfall in southern Africa is hampered by a lack of long-term instrumental data. This paper extends the historical record for the subcontinent by presenting the first extensive 19th century climate history for Lesotho derived from documentary evidence. The data sources included unpublished English-, French- and Sesotho-language materials archived in Lesotho, South Africa and the UK. These included letters, journals and reports written by missionaries and colonial authorities, which were supplemented by newspapers, diaries, travelogues and other historical sources. Each source was read in chronological order, with any climate information recorded verbatim. Observations were classified into five categories (Very Wet, Relatively Wet, ‘Normal’, Relatively Dry, and Very Dry) based upon the predominant documented climate during each ‘rain-year’ (July to June). The latter portion of the chronology was then compared for accuracy against available instrumental precipitation records from Maseru (1886–1900). The results yield a semi-continuous record of climate information from 1824 to 1900. Data are restricted to lowland areas, but reveal drought episodes in 1833–34, 1841–42, 1845–47, 1848–51, 1858–63, 1865–69, 1876–80, 1882–85 and 1895–99 (the most severe drought years being 1850–51 and 1862–63) and wet periods or floods in 1835–36, 1838–41, 1847–48, 1854–56, 1863–65, 1873–75, 1880–81, 1885–86 and 1890–94. The rainfall chronology is compared with similar records for South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe. Linkages to possible forcing mechanisms, including ENSO teleconnections and historical coral-derived southwest Indian Ocean sea surface temperature variations are also explored.     

Recurring droughts or social shifts? Exploring drivers of large-scale transformations in a transformed country

As climate change intensifies, the need for large-scale transformations that reform vulnerable systems’ prevailing values and development pathways is increasingly recognized. However, there is limited understanding of the factors that underlie such changes. This study sheds light on these factors by examining the case of Israel – a largely arid to semi-arid country with highly scarce natural water resources and a historical rural-agricultural ideology. Adopting an historically-informed systems perspective, I analyze two transformations that diminished Israel’s vulnerability to recurring droughts: the 1960s’ economic transformation from agriculture to industry, and the shift to seawater desalination in the mid-2000s. These changes are examined using causal-loop diagrams based on multiple data sources, including archival records, statistical reports and a systematic review of grey and academic literature.The findings show that both transformations, instigated by state institutions during exceptionally severe droughts, were driven by shifts away from development paradigms embedded in the nation-building ideology, as well as by social stresses that exceeded the natural limits of the agricultural system and water supply system. Repeated drought shocks activated and later reactivated the shift to desalination, intended to a certain degree to reduce drought vulnerability. However, drought did not significantly affect the economic transformation, initiated mainly due to saturation in agricultural development. Thus, I argue that alongside concerted adaptation efforts state institutions should dedicate greater attention to the management of broader social challenges and crises in a manner that fosters greater resilience against future climate changes. Ideological shifts and consequent restructuring of development paths, as well as the interaction between population growth and limited natural resources, may constitute important entry points. These entry points are particularly pertinent to emerging economies in other dry areas, many of which face similar social and economic trends to those experienced in Israel over the last decades.     

How climate change impacted the collapse of the Ming dynasty

Based on the reconstructed temperatures, precipitation changes, and occurrences of extreme climate events, together with historical records on fiscal deterioration, food crises, and the frequencies of popular unrest, rebellions and wars, we identified three principal ways in which climate change contributed to the collapse in the Ming dynasty. Firstly, cooling, aridification, and desertification during a cold period destroyed the military farm system, which was the main supply system for the provisioning of government troops on the northern frontiers; these impacts increased the military expenditure from 64 % of total government expenditure in 1548–1569 to 76 % in 1570–1589 and thus aggravated the national fiscal crisis that occurred during the late Ming dynasty. Secondly, climate deterioration (e.g., cooling, aridification, and an increase in the frequencies of frost- and drought-related disasters, etc.) led to a 20–50 % reduction in the per capita production of raw grain in most areas of China, which resulted in widespread food crises and exacerbated the vulnerability of social structures during the last several decades of the Ming dynasty. Thirdly, the severe droughts occurring in 1627–1643 were a key trigger to the peasantry uprising. These droughts also played a significant role to promote the peasantry uprising, especially reviving the peasantry troops by recruitment of famine victims when they nearly perished in 1633 and 1638, and severely disrupting the food supply for the government troops, resulting in the final defeat of the government troops by the peasantry troops. This study contributes to an understanding of the climate-related mechanisms behind the collapse of the Ming dynasty, and provides a historical case study that enhances our understanding of the nature of interactions between climate change and social vulnerability.     

Framing the application of adaptation pathways for rural livelihoods and global change in eastern Indonesian islands

In developing countries adaptation responses to climate and global change should be integrated with human development to generate no regrets, co-benefit strategies for the rural poor, but there are few examples of how to achieve this. The adaptation pathways approach provides a potentially useful decision-making framework because it aims to steer societies towards sustainable futures by accounting for complex systems, uncertainty and contested multi-stakeholder arenas, and by maintaining adaptation options. Using Nusa Tenggara Barat Province, Indonesia, as an example we consider whether generic justifications for adaptation pathways are tenable in the local context of climate and global change, rural poverty and development. Interviews and focus groups held with a cross-section of provincial leaders showed that the causes of community vulnerability are indeed highly complex and dynamic, influenced by 20 interacting drivers, of which climate variability and change are only two. Climate change interacts with population growth and ecosystem degradation to reduce land, water and food availability. Although poverty is resilient due to corruption, traditional institutions and fatalism, there is also considerable system flux due to decentralisation, modernisation and erosion of traditional culture. Together with several thresholds in drivers, potential shocks and paradoxes, these characteristics result in unpredictable system trajectories. Decision-making is also contested due to tensions around formal and informal leadership, corruption, community participation in planning and female empowerment. Based on this context we propose an adaptation pathways approach which can address the proximate and systemic causes of vulnerability and contested decision-making. Appropriate participatory processes and governance structures are suggested, including integrated livelihoods and multi-scale systems analysis, scenario planning, adaptive co-management and ‘livelihood innovation niches’. We briefly discuss how this framing of adaptation pathways would differ from one in the developed context of neighbouring Australia, including the influence of the province's island geography on the heterogeneity of livelihoods and climate change, the pre-eminence and rapid change of social drivers, and the necessity to ‘leap-frog’ the Millennium Development Goals by mid-century to build adaptive capacity for imminent climate change impacts.     

Historicizing climate change—engaging new approaches to climate and history

This introduction to a special issue of Climatic Change argues that it is timely and welcome to intensify historical research into climate change and climate as factors of history. This is also already an ongoing trend in many disciplines. The article identifies two main strands in historical work on climate change, both multi-disciplinary: one that looks for it as a driver of historical change in human societies, the other that analyzes the intellectual and scientific roots of the climate system and its changes. In presenting the five papers in this special issue the introduction argues that it is becoming increasingly important to also situate “historicizing climate change” within the history of thought and practice in wider fields, as a matter of intellectual, political, and social history and theory. The five papers all serve as examples of intellectual, political, and social responses to climate-related phenomena and their consequences (ones that have manifested themselves relatively recently and are predominantly attributable to anthropogenic climate change). The historicizing work that these papers perform lies in the analysis of issues that are rising in societies related to climate change in its modern anthropogenic version. The history here is not so much about past climates, although climate change itself is always directly or indirectly present in the story, but rather about history as the social space where encounters take place and where new conditions for humans and societies and their companion species and their life worlds in natures and environments are unfolding and negotiated. With climate change as a growing phenomenon historicizing climate change in this version will become increasingly relevant.     

The ‘co’ in co-production of climate action: Challenging boundaries within and between science,policy and practice

Effective action taken against climate change must find ways to unite scientific and practice-based knowledges associated with the various stakeholders who see themselves as invested in the global delivery of climate governance. Political decision-makers, climate scientists and practitioners approach this challenge from what are often radically different perspectives and experiences. While considerable work has been done to develop the idea of ‘co-production’ in the development of climate action outputs, questions remain over how to best unite the contrasting epistemological traditions and norms associated with different stakeholders. Drawing on the existing literatures on climate action co-production and from translational perspectives on the science-policy interface, in this paper we develop the concept of ‘boundary agency’. Defining this as the agency ‘possessed’ when willing and able to translate between different epistemological communities invested in a similar policy and governance challenge such as climate change, we offer it as a useful means to reflect on participants’ understanding of the ‘co’ in co-production. This is in contrast to the more established (often academic-led) focus on what it is that is being produced by co-production processes. We draw from two complementary empirical studies, which explicitly encouraged i) engagement and ii) reflection on cross-boundary co-production between climate action stakeholders from different backgrounds. Reflecting on the two studies, we discuss the benefits of (and barriers to) encouraging more active and sustained engagement between climate action stakeholders so as to try to actively blur the boundaries between science and policy and, in doing so, invent new epistemological communities of practice.     

Countries’ contributions to climate change: effect of accounting for all greenhouse gases, recent trends, basic needs and technological progress

In the context of recent discussions at the UN climate negotiations we compared several ways of calculating historical greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and assessed the effect of these different approaches on countries’ relative contributions to cumulative global emissions. Elements not covered before are: (i) including recent historical emissions (2000–2010), (ii) discounting historical emissions to account for technological progress; (iii) deducting emissions for ‘basic needs’; (iv) including projected emissions up to 2020, based on countries’ unconditional reduction proposals for 2020. Our analysis shows that countries’ contributions vary significantly based on the choices made in the calculation: e.g. the relative contribution of developed countries as a group can be as high as 80 % when excluding recent emissions, non-CO₂ GHGs, and land-use change and forestry CO₂; or about 48 % when including all these emissions and discounting historical emissions for technological progress. Excluding non-CO₂ GHGs and land-use change and forestry CO₂ significantly changes relative historical contributions for many countries, altering countries’ relative contributions by multiplicative factors ranging from 0.15 to 1.5 compared to reference values (i.e. reference contribution calculations cover the period 1850-2010 and all GHG emissions). Excluding 2000–2010 emissions decreases the contributions of most emerging economies (factor of up to 0.8). Discounting historical emissions for technological progress reduces the relative contributions of some developed countries (factor of 0.8) and increases those of some developing countries (factor of 1.2–1.5). Deducting emissions for ‘basic needs’ results in smaller contributions for countries with low per capita emissions (factor of 0.3–0.5). Finally, including projected emissions up to 2020 further increases the relative contributions of emerging economies by a factor of 1.2, or 1.5 when discounting pre-2020 emissions for technological progress.     

Allocating planetary boundaries to large economies: Distributional consequences of alternative perspectives on distributive fairness

The planetary boundaries (PBs) framework proposes global quantitative precautionary limits for human perturbation of nine critical Earth system processes. Together they define a global safe operating space for human development. Translating the global limits to the national level increases their policy relevance. Such translation essentially divides up the global safe operating space. What is considered fair distribution is a political decision and there is no globally agreed principle that can be applied. Here, we analyse the distributional consequences of alternative perspectives on distributive fairness. We scale the global limits of selected PBs to resource budgets for the EU, US, China and India, using three allocation approaches from the climate change literature. Furthermore, we compare the allocated budgets to 2010 environmental footprints of the four economies, to assess their performance with respect to the selected PBs. The allocation approaches are based on (1) current shares of global environmental pressure (‘grandfathering’); (2) ‘equal per capita’ shares, and (3) ‘ability to pay’ to reduce environmental pressure. The results show that the four economies are not living within the global safe operating space. Their 2010 environmental footprints are larger than the allocated budgets for all approaches and parameterisations analysed for the PBs for climate change and biogeochemical flows, and, except for India, also for the PB for biosphere integrity. Grandfathering was found to be most favourable for the EU and US for all PBs, and ability to pay as least favourable. For climate change and biogeochemical flows, ability to pay even resulted in negative resource budgets for the two economies. In contrast, for China and India, equal per capita allocation and ability to pay were most favourable. Results were sensitive to the parameterisation. Accounting for future population growth in the equal per capita approach benefits India, with lower budgets for the EU, US and China, while accounting for future economic growth in ability to pay benefits the EU and US, with lower budgets for China and India. Our results underline the need for all four economies to act, while hinting at diverging preferences for specific allocation approaches. The methodology and results may help countries to define policy targets in line with global ambitions, such as those defined by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), accounting for differences in countries’ circumstances and capacities. Further attention is required for PB-specific allocation approaches and integration of biophysical and socioeconomic considerations in the allocation.     

Northward migration under a changing climate: a case study of blackgum (Nyssa sylvatica)

Species are predicted to shift their distribution ranges in response to climate change. Region-wide, empirically-based studies, however, are still limited to support these predictions. We used a model tree species, blackgum (Nyssa sylvatica), to study climate-induced range shift. Data collected from two separate sampling periods (1980s and 2007) by the USDA’s Forestry and Inventory Analysis (FIA) Program were used to investigate changes in abundance and dominance, and shifts in distribution, of blackgum in four ecoregions of the eastern United States. Our results indicated new recruitment of blackgum in the northern portion of its range, along with increases in both density and annual rates of change in importance value (IV). Conversely, declines in recruitment were found in the southern portion of blackgum’s range, along with decreases in density and IV. The center portion of blackgum’s range had mixed patterns of change (i.e., both increases and decreases) throughout. A northward range expansion was also detected by comparing blackgum’s historic range to where it was detected during our two more-recent sampling periods. Our findings suggest that blackgum is migrating north in response to climate change. Our study also suggests two broader implications about tree migration patterns in response to climate change: (1) species can respond to changing climate in relatively short time periods, at least for generalist species such as blackgum, and (2) climate-induced vegetation dynamic patterns can be detected at the regional level, but are inherently complex.     

Uncertainty, scepticism and attitudes towards climate change: biased assimilation and attitude polarisation

‘Scepticism’ in public attitudes towards climate change is seen as a significant barrier to public engagement. In an experimental study, we measured participants’ scepticism about climate change before and after reading two newspaper editorials that made opposing claims about the reality and seriousness of climate change (designed to generate uncertainty). A well-established social psychological finding is that people with opposing attitudes often assimilate evidence in a way that is biased towards their existing attitudinal position, which may lead to attitude polarisation. We found that people who were less sceptical about climate change evaluated the convincingness and reliability of the editorials in a markedly different way to people who were more sceptical about climate change, demonstrating biased assimilation of the information. In both groups, attitudes towards climate change became significantly more sceptical after reading the editorials, but we observed no evidence of attitude polarisation—that is, the attitudes of these two groups did not diverge. The results are the first application of the well-established assimilation and polarisation paradigm to attitudes about climate change, with important implications for anticipating how uncertainty—in the form of conflicting information—may impact on public engagement with climate change.     

Indigenous perceptions of climate anomalies in Malaysian Borneo

Local perceptions of climate anomalies influence adaptation behaviour. Specifically, perceptions that are more accurate and homogenous at the community-level are more likely to facilitate the collective action required to adapt to the local effects of climate anomalies experienced by many indigenous communities. We combine primary data on perceptions of climate anomalies from 200 individuals in six Penan villages in Sarawak, Malaysia with instrumental climate data. We find that perceptions of climate anomalies vary substantially in terms of occurrence and magnitude, and do not generally correlate with instrumental climate data. We operationalise the Penan forest sign language (Oroo’) as a measure of traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) and find only weak evidence of a systematic statistical association with perceptions of climate anomalies among our sampled respondents. Our findings suggest caution in advancing adaptation strategies in indigenous communities that are predominantly premised on TEK. Instead, our findings suggest that in designing adaptation measures, indigenous communities may benefit by engaging in forums where community members and external stakeholders can come together, share their perceptions and observations of climate change, and reach a collective consensus on the community-level effects of climate change and pathways towards adaptation.     

Impact of climate and socioeconomic changes on fire carbon emissions in the future: Sustainable economic development might decrease future emissions

Fires and their associated carbon and air pollutant emissions have a broad range of environmental and societal impacts, including negative effects on human health, damage to terrestrial ecosystems, and indirect effects that promote climate change. Previous studies investigated future carbon emissions from the perspective of response to climate change and population growth, but the compound effects of other factors like economic development and land use change are not yet well known. We explored fire carbon emissions throughout the 21st century by changing five factors (meteorology, biomass, land use, population density, and gross domestic product [GDP] per capita). Compared to the historical period (2006–2015), global future fire carbon emissions decreased, mainly caused by an increase in GDP per capita, which leads to improvement in fire management and capitalized agriculture. We found that the meteorological factor has a strong individual effect under higher warming cases. Fires in boreal forests were particularly expected to increase because of an increase in fuel dryness. Our research should help climate change researchers consider fire-carbon interactions. Incorporating future spatial changes under diverse scenarios will be helpful to develop national mitigation and adaptation plans.     

Governing-by-aspiration? Assessing the nature and implications of including negative emission technologies (NETs) in country long-term climate strategies

In order to address the pressing challenge of climate change, countries are now submitting long-term climate strategies to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process. These strategies include within them potential future use of ‘negative emissions technologies’ (NETs). NETs are interventions that remove carbon from the atmosphere, ranging from large-scale terrestrial carbon sequestration in forests, wetlands and soils, to use of carbon capture and storage technologies. We assess here how NETs are discussed in 29 long-term climate strategies, in order to ascertain the risk that including the promise of future NETs may delay the taking of short-term mitigation actions. Our analysis shows that almost all countries plan to rely on NETs, particularly enhanced use of natural carbon sinks, even as a wide array of challenges and trade-offs in doing so are highlighted. Many strategies call for improved accounting systems and market incentives in realizing future NETs. While no strategy explicitly suggests that NETs can be a substitute for short-term mitigation, most estimate substantial potential for future use of NETs even in the face of acknowledged uncertainties. This, we suggest, may have the consequence of resulting in what we describe here as ‘a spiral of delay’ characterized by the promise of future NET options juxtaposed with the simultaneous uncertainty around these future options. Our analysis highlights that this inter-connected delaying dynamic may be intrinsic to what we term ‘governing-by-aspiration’ within global climate politics, wherein the voicing of lofty future ambition risks replacing current action and accountability.