Uncertainty,cost-effectiveness and environmental safety of robust carbon trading: integrated approach

Carbon markets, like other commodity markets, are volatile. They react to stochastic “disequilibrium” spot prices, which may be affected by inadequate policies, speculations and bubbles. The market-based emission trading, therefore, does not necessarily minimize abatement costs and achieve emission reduction goals. We introduce a basic stochastic model integrating emissions reduction, monitoring and trading costs allowing us to analyze the robustness of emission and uncertainty reduction policies under environmental safety constraints asymmetric information and other multiple anthropogenic and natural uncertainties. Explicit treatment of uncertainties provides incentives for reducing them before trading. We illustrate functioning of the robust market with numerical results involving such countries as the US, Australia, Canada, Japan, EU27, Russia, Ukraine. In particular, we analyze if the knowledge about uncertainties may affect portfolios of technological and trade policies or structure of the market and how uncertainty characteristics may affect market prices and change the market structure.     

Great expectations: can international emissions trading deliver an equitable climate regime?

Climate change equity debates tend to focus on achieving a fair and global ‘allocation’ of emission rights among countries. Allocation proposals typically envision, if implicitly, two purposes for international emissions trading. First, trading is expected to serve as a cost-effective means of promoting compliance with emissions targets. Second, trading is posited as a means to generate financial transfers, typically from industrialized to transitioning and developing countries.This article investigates the common assumption that international emissions trading will effectively serve both of these purposes. We conclude that the two purposes might not be mutually supportive, and that efforts to use international emissions trading as a financial transfer mechanism may potentially undermine cost-effectiveness goals. International emissions trading on a global scale would create new risks in terms of both cost-effectiveness and environmental performance, some of which will be challenging to manage. In particular, uncertainties over market prices and trading eligibility, coupled with the costs of participation, may together be the Achilles heel of some allocation proposals that entail large financial transfers from industrialized to developing countries. Any proposal for an ‘equitable’ allocation of emission allowances, we conclude, must be cognizant of the risks and costs implied by a reliance on international emissions trading. We offer some suggestions to this end.     

Great expectations: can international emissions trading deliver an equitable climate regime?

Abstract

Climate change equity debates tend to focus on achieving a fair and global ‘allocation’ of emission rights among countries. Allocation proposals typically envision, if implicitly, two purposes for international emissions trading. First, trading is expected to serve as a cost-effective means of promoting compliance with emissions targets. Second, trading is posited as a means to generate financial transfers, typically from industrialized to transitioning and developing countries.

This article investigates the common assumption that international emissions trading will effectively serve both of these purposes. We conclude that the two purposes might not be mutually supportive, and that efforts to use international emissions trading as a financial transfer mechanism may potentially undermine cost-effectiveness goals. International emissions trading on a global scale would create new risks in terms of both cost-effectiveness and environmental performance, some of which will be challenging to manage. In particular, uncertainties over market prices and trading eligibility, coupled with the costs of participation, may together be the Achilles heel of some allocation proposals that entail large financial transfers from industrialized to developing countries. Any proposal for an ‘equitable’ allocation of emission allowances, we conclude, must be cognizant of the risks and costs implied by a reliance on international emissions trading. We offer some suggestions to this end.     

不同监管强度下碳排放权交易违约行为的实验研究

2017年底中国全国碳市场启动,全球正式运行的碳排放权交易体系达到21个。伴随碳排放权交易的广泛开展,加之产品市场不确定性的冲击,控排企业的违约行为也日益多样化和复杂化。基于此,根据中国碳市场试点地区的通行交易规则,通过在产品市场中引入随机冲击,分析在具有储蓄机制且存在不确定性需求的碳交易体系中,企业违约行为的方式以及监管强度对企业违约行为的影响。研究结果表明:抽查比例较高的强监管设置下被试不会产生系统动机来排放违约,弱监管设置下明显的报告违约会导致排放总量上升。即使面临不确定性冲击,储蓄机制依然能促进控排企业以一个相对有效的方式跨期分配生产量。因此给出如下建议:违约处罚应该分级,报告违约处罚力度应大于排放违约;为提高实际履约率,各地应提高排放报告抽查比例;完善配额储蓄机制。     

Cap-and-trade versus carbon taxes: which market mechanism gets the most attention?

In the debate between carbon taxes and cap-and-trade as a policy response to curbing greenhouse gas emissions, which market-based policy tool tends to garner the most (favorable) media attention? Furthermore, what is the public coverage like of topics such as trade, energy prices, and economic growth and green jobs? Understanding the media’s response to market-based policy mechanisms is important for understanding their ultimate acceptance, or rejection, beyond the academic sphere. One interesting result from this research is that cap-and-trade wins hands down over carbon taxes—it received more, and more positive, media attention in the US in the 22-year time period under study.     

Optimal carbon dioxide abatement and technological change: should emission taxes start high in order to spur R&;D?

Many European politicians argue that the EU should set tougher emission targets than what is required by the Kyoto protocol, and moreover, that emission trading with other countries outside EU should be limited so as to keep emission quota prices high. One of the arguments, frequently cited for such a policy, is the need for technological development. However, the literature on climate change and technological innovation does not unambiguously support the need for setting high emission taxes today. In this paper we investigate the relationship between emission taxes and technological change further by modeling innovation activity explicitly. In our model both the amount of R&D and the amount of carbon abatement are decided in a decentralized way by the market as a response to an emission tax. Moreover, we introduce several distinct failures in the market for new innovations, among others, insufficient patent protection and intertemporal knowledge spill-overs. Our findings suggest that governments should under some circumstances set a higher carbon tax today if we have technological change driven by R&D than if we have pure exogenous technological change. Based on numerical simulations these circumstances are (a) positive intertemporal knowledge spillovers and/or (b) weak patent protection.     

Creating a global warming implementation regime

This paper proposes a global warming implementation regime which addresses the issues of equity, flexibility, cost minimization, and population growth. Previously proposed international policy instruments, such as country by country targets, carbon taxes, and tradable permits, face major difficulties as stand alone proposals. The key element of the regime proposed here is to combine annual tradable permits which are allocated based on population in a fixed year with a small carbon tax ($5–10/tonne) on emissions in excess of permits. Both permits and carbon taxes are applied to national level governments, which in turn would use whatever mix of policies desired to reduce national emissions. It is suggested that the initial number of permits correspond to total global emissions in the base year; over time, the number of permits could be reduced and the tax rate increased if improved scientific knowledge so dictates. By allocating permits based on population the equity concerns of developing countries are addressed, while taxing emissions in excess of permit holdings removes the rigidity of a quota system and limits resource transfers by effectively capping the permit trading price, which is a major concern of industrialized countries. To accommodate the difficulties of countries which have not yet achieved the demographic transition, the permit allocation scheme could be subject to a one-time adjustment after 10–15 years based on some weighting of the initial and then-current populations. The proposed scheme is based on the premise that there is a large potential for reducing emissions in developed countries or limiting emission increases in developing countries, and the intention is to create competition between national level governments in implementing cost-effective emission reduction.     

全国碳排放权交易市场下电解铝行业基准线法研究

2011年以来,我国碳排放权交易市场建设不断加快,碳排放权交易机制不断健全完善,其中基准线法被确定为全国碳交易初始配额分配的主要方法。电解铝行业是我国能源消耗和碳排放的重点部门,尽早将该行业纳入碳市场对于行业减排、纵深推进全国碳市场交易以及应对国际碳边境调节机制政策均有重要意义。基于2018年电解铝行业直报的碳排放相关数据,确定了我国电解铝行业开展全国碳交易的基准线方案。结果显示,电解铝行业宜选取8.12~8.15 t CO₂/t铝作为基准线取值,不需设置区域差异调整系数。同时为保证电解铝行业碳交易的顺利开展,还需尽快确定行业配额方案,进一步完善企业排放量的监测、报告和核查以提高核查填报数据质量,以及进一步研究电解铝行业碳排放核算的范围。     

Russia at GHG Market

In the first Kyoto commitment period Russia could be the major supplier for the greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions market. Potential Russian supply depends on the ability of Russia to keep GHG emissions lower than the Kyoto target. In the literature there is no common understanding of the total trading potential of Russia at the international carbon market. In this paper we focus on CO₂ emission, which constituted nearly 80%of Russian GHG emission. We compare different projections of Russian CO₂emission and analyze the most important factors, which predetermine the CO₂emission growth. In a transition economy these factors are: Gross Domestic Product(GDP) dynamic, changes of GDP structure, innovation activity, transformation of export-import flows and response to the market signals. The input-output macroeconomic model with the two different input-output tables representing old and new production technologies has been applied for the analysis to simulate technological innovations and structural changes in the Russian economy during transition period. The Russian supply at the international GHG market without forest sector may be up to 3 billion metric ton of CO₂ equivalent. Earlier actions to reduce CO₂ emission are critical to insure theRussiansupply at the international carbon market. With regard to the current status of the Russian capital market, the forward trading with OECD countries is only the possibility to raise initial investments to roll no-regret and low-cost GHG reduction. This paper discusses uncertainties of RussianCO₂emission dynamics and analyzes the different incentives to lower the emission pathway.     

Economic,institutional and technological uncertainties of emissions trading—a system dynamics modeling approach

System dynamics models are employed for analyzing the impact of different uncertainties on carbon emission trading–both on national and business levels. Economic, institutional and technological uncertainties significantly influence any country's benefits from emission permit trading. If a country participates in trading on the international market then the possible price range becomes the source of additional uncertainty. In the case of business investment decisions for implementing resource‐saving technology, our system dynamics model shows that the first‐mover investor will get significantly fewer advantages than his followers, which leads to delay in primary investment to the sector.     

Carbon taxes and greenhouse gas emissions trading systems: what have we learned?

Systematic evidence relating to the performance of carbon pricing – carbon taxes and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading systems (ETSs) – is sparse. In 2015, 17 ETSs were operational in 55 jurisdictions while 18 jurisdictions collected a carbon tax. The papers in this special thematic section review the performance of many of these instruments over the 2005–2015 period. The performance of existing carbon taxes and GHG ETSs can help policy makers make informed choices about whether to introduce these instruments and to improve their design. The purpose of carbon pricing instruments is to reduce GHG emissions cost effectively. Assessing their performance is difficult because emissions are also affected by other policies and exogenous factors such as economic conditions. Carbon taxes in Europe prior to 2008 and in British Columbia reduced emissions from business-as-usual but actual emissions continued to rise. Since 2008 emissions subject to European carbon taxes have declined, but in most countries, other mitigation policies have probably contributed more to the reductions than the carbon taxes. Emissions subject to ETSs, with the exception of four systems without emissions caps, have declined. The ETSs contributed to the emissions reductions, but their share of the overall reduction is not known. Most tax rates are low relative to levels thought to be needed to achieve climate change objectives. Few jurisdictions regularly adjust their tax rates. All ETSs have accumulated surplus allowances and implemented measures to reduce these surpluses. The largest ETSs now specify annual reductions in their emissions cap several years into the future. Emissions trading system allowance prices are generally lower than the tax rates.

Key policy insights

• Theoretical discussions usually portray carbon taxes and GHG ETSs as alternatives. In practice, a jurisdiction often implements both instruments to address emissions by different sources.

• Designs of ETSs have evolved based on experience shared bilaterally and via dedicated institutions.

• Carbon tax designs, in contrast, have hardly evolved and there are no institutions dedicated to sharing experience.

• Every jurisdiction with an ETS and/or carbon tax also has other policies that affect its GHG emissions.

     

Coal taxes as supply-side climate policy: a rationale for major exporters?

The shift away from coal is at the heart of the global low-carbon transition. Can governments of coal-producing countries help facilitate this transition and benefit from it? This paper analyses the case for coal taxes as supply-side climate policy implemented by large coal exporting countries. Coal taxes can reduce global carbon dioxide emissions and benefit coal-rich countries through improved terms-of-trade and tax revenue. We employ a multi-period equilibrium model of the international steam coal market to study a tax on steam coal levied by Australia alone, by a coalition of major exporting countries, by all exporters, and by all producers. A unilateral export tax has little impact on global emissions and global coal prices as other countries compensate for reduced export volumes from the taxing country. By contrast, a tax jointly levied by a coalition of major coal exporters would significantly reduce global emissions from steam coal and leave them with a net sector level welfare gain, approximated by the sum of producer surplus, consumer surplus, and tax revenue. Production taxes consistently yield higher tax revenues and have greater effects on global coal consumption with smaller rates of carbon leakages. Questions remain whether coal taxes by major suppliers would be politically feasible, even if they could yield economic benefits.     

The economic impacts of introducing CCER trading and offset mechanism into the national carbon market of China北大核心CSCD

基于中国风电及光伏国家核证自愿减排量(CCER)现状及发展趋势,针对CCER供给、抵销和价格形成等关键机制问题,运用电力部门细分的递推动态可计算一般均衡(CGE)模型,模拟了在取消电价补贴的背景下全国碳市场引入风电及光伏CCER交易及抵销机制的经济影响。研究发现:引入CCER交易及抵销机制会降低碳配额交易价格,并缓解取消电价补贴对风电和光伏电力的负面影响,但也会削弱全国碳市场的碳减排效果,且随着CCER供给总量增加这些作用更明显;全国碳市场引入CCER交易及抵销机制后,碳排放强度较高的控排行业将选择购买更多的CCER,其中火电行业是主要的CCER需求方;未来我国如果不放开CCER项目备案审批则风电行业将是主要受益方,而未来适度放开CCER项目备案审批则风电和光伏行业都将从中受益。因此,全国碳市场在引入CCER交易及抵销机制的同时需从紧设置初始碳配额发放量,并可考虑适时重启CCER项目备案审批工作以更好地促进风电和光伏电力的发展,但允许的CCER清缴比例上限应结合碳减排目标合理设定,以避免对全国碳市场产生较大冲击。     

Foreign policy ‘trilemmas’: understanding China's stance on international cap-and-trade

This article uses a policy analogy approach to explore China's attitude toward the possibility of global carbon market integration, including the development of a common cap-and-trade market for the global civil aviation industry. Like in other foreign policy domains, in international cap-and-trade, China faces a ‘trilemma’ between carbon market integration, state sovereignty and policy flexibility. By referring to how China has approached a comparable trilemma in foreign exchange policy making, we analyse China's possible stance on international cap-and-trade. We argue that China will prefer to gradually establish and strengthen, to a limited extent, intergovernmental governance mechanisms, which allow nation-states to prioritize sovereignty and policy flexibility in carbon trading policy making. In the conclusion we use this argument to explain China's responses to the carbon-trading initiatives of Australia, the EU, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the World Bank.

Policy relevance

The international community has reached a consensus on the use of market mechanisms for mitigating climate change. While opposing the EU's plan to include Chinese airlines in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, China has started to co-explore with Australia the possibility of linking their carbon markets, and has adopted a supportive attitude toward the carbon trading initiatives led by the ICAO and the World Bank. Considering China's status as the largest emitting country of GHGs and its interdependence with major developed and developing countries, China's substantial participation would be crucial to the success of the global market-based efforts to reduce GHG emissions. This article presents an initial attempt to develop a better understanding of China's stance on international cap-and-trade.     

Challenges to the development of carbon markets in China

China has introduced several pilot emission trading schemes to build the basis for a national scheme. The potential scale of this initiative raises prospects for a regional carbon trading network as a way to further engage other major Asian economies. However, the Chinese carbon markets rest upon a unique political-economic context and institutional environment that are likely to limit their development and viability. This article offers an overview of such structural economic and political constraints. Four main challenges are identified, namely, inadequate domestic demand, limited financial involvement, incomplete regulatory infrastructure, and excessive government intervention. The first two challenges concern economic dimensions and may be partially addressed by the incentives created by the newly introduced emission trading schemes. The other two are more deeply entrenched in the dominant political system and governing practice. They require fundamental changes to the ways in which the state and the market interact. The success of China's carbon market reform depends crucially on the ability of the ongoing efforts to transform the distorted state–market relationship.

Policy relevance

The burgeoning carbon markets offer opportunities for emissions mitigation at lower costs and enable circulation of a new form of capital, i.e. carbon credits, across borders. China accounts for a gigantic share of global GHG emissions and has the potential to significantly scale up these opportunities. There are clear implications for market developers and participants worldwide, including climate policy makers who attempt to link their emission trading schemes to other schemes, firms who seek to take advantage of the inexpensive carbon offsets generated in developing countries, international financial institutions who endeavour to establish their business in an emerging major carbon market, etc. This article can inform their decisions by identifying key issues that may undermine their ability to achieve these goals. Policy makers and stakeholders will benefit from this analysis, which shows how the Chinese carbon markets operate in ways that may be different from their experience elsewhere.     

公共建筑运营企业温室气体排放核算方法探讨

本文从完整性的角度提出了中国公共建筑运营企业温室气体排放核算方法,进行了案例分析,并对其在中国未来碳排放交易市场中的应用提出了建议。研究表明,公共建筑运营企业排放核算主要采用活动数据法,核算范围包括化石燃料燃烧排放、逸散型排放、新种植树木的排放抵消、外购电力和热力的排放。案例分析表明,电力和热力引起的排放占88.32%;制冷剂逸散排放、灭火器使用引起的排放、化粪池CH₄的排放、树木吸收的CO₂（即排放量为负值）占比都较小;汽车移动源的排放占11.99%,是否应纳入主要依据核算排放量的用途。对中国未来碳排放交易市场,公共建筑物排放的核算范围,初期仅考虑化石燃料燃烧排放、外购电力和热力的排放是合理的。     

Combining cap-and-trade with offsets: lessons from the EU-ETS

Linking a cap-and-trade with an offset mechanism has many theoretical advantages: it reduces compliance costs, extends the price signal outside the cap-and-trade, and triggers technology transfer. However, it is feared that such linking will induce outsourcing of emissions reduction at a low price and undermine the price incentive in the cap-and-trade. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the first full-scale example of a cap-and-trade system linked to project-based mechanisms such that offsets have effectively been used by industrial installations. This article is an ex post analysis of EU ETS data for the years 2008 and 2009, and the characteristics of the link and its efficiency are evaluated. Although offsets have been much used, their use is concentrated and not very intense or frequent, which allays the fear that offsets will flood the market. Although the majority of surrendered CERs effectively come from the largest and oldest projects, the credits surrendered are similar to those available on the market. Possible factors that contribute towards inefficiency are the rules for using offsets, transaction costs affecting the participation of small installations, awareness and openness to market-based instruments, and uncertainties regarding CERs offer and demand from other markets. However, the impact on EUA equilibrium price still needs to be quantified.     

《巴黎协定》下市场机制建设中的风险与对策

《巴黎协定》（《协定》）第6条设立了合作方法和可持续发展机制两种市场机制。受国家自主贡献（NDC）减排目标多样性和未来减排努力不确定性等因素的影响,《协定》下市场机制在设计和实施中面临着巨大的风险和挑战,主要包括缺乏稳健的核算规则、不恰当的额外性评估带来的环境完整性风险以及经济激励下缔约方不积极扩大减排目标覆盖范围、提高减排行动力度的风险。为了降低风险给全球减排行动可能带来的负面影响,必须建立稳健的核算规则,在额外性评估中合理考虑东道国NDC下的减排承诺,并通过设立参与资质要求等方式确保市场机制促进缔约方扩大减排目标覆盖范围。建议中国结合国内碳市场的发展现状,从识别《协定》下市场机制对我国的要求和影响、进行相关能力建设、设立严格的监管措施和建立所需机构等方面入手,为我国有效参与做好充分准备。     

Mitigating methane emissions from livestock: a global analysis of sectoral policies

Methane emissions from livestock enteric fermentation and manure management represent about 40% of total anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions from the agriculture sector and are projected to increase substantially in the coming decades, with most of the growth occurring in non-Annex 1 countries. To mitigate livestock methane, incentive policies based on producer-level emissions are generally not feasible because of high administrative costs and producer transaction costs. In contrast, incentive policies based on sectoral emissions are likely administratively feasible, even in developing countries. This study uses an economic model of global agriculture to estimate the effects of two sectoral mitigation policies: a carbon tax and an emissions trading scheme based on average national methane emissions per unit of commodity. The analysis shows how the composition and location of livestock production and emissions change in response to the policies. Results illustrate the importance of global mitigation efforts: when policies are limited to Annex 1 countries, increased methane emissions in non-Annex 1 countries offset approximately two-thirds of Annex 1 emissions reductions. While non-Annex 1 countries face substantial disincentives to enacting domestic carbon taxes, developing countries could benefit from participating in a global sectoral emissions trading scheme. We illustrate one scheme in which non-Annex 1 countries collectively earn USD 2.4 billion annually from methane emission permit sales when methane is priced at USD 30/t CO₂-eq.     

Effectiveness of pilot carbon emissions trading systems in China

China is in the process of establishing a national emissions trading system (ETS). Evaluating the implementation effectiveness of the seven pilot ETSs in China is critical for designing this national system. This study administered a questionnaire survey to assess the behaviour of enterprises covered by the seven ETS pilots from the perspective of: the strictness of compliance measures; rules for monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV); the mitigation pressure felt by enterprises; and actual mitigation and trading activities. The results show that the pilot MRV and compliance rules have not yet been fully implemented. The main factors involved are the lack of compulsory force of the regulations and the lack of policy awareness within the affected enterprises. Most enterprises have a shortage of free allowances and thus believe that the ETSs have increased their production costs. Most enterprises have already established mitigation targets. Some of the covered enterprises are aware of their own internal emission reduction costs and most of these have used this as an important reference in trading. Many enterprises have accounted for carbon prices in their long-term investment. The proportion of enterprises that have participated in trading is fairly high; however, reluctance to sell is quite pervasive in the market, and enterprises are mostly motivated to trade simply in order to achieve compliance. Few enterprises are willing to manage their allowances in a market-oriented manner. Different free allowance allocation methods directly affect the pathways enterprises take to control emissions.

Key policy insights

• In the national ETS, the compulsory force of ETS provisions should be strengthened.

• A reasonable level of free allowance shortage should be ensured to promote emission reduction by enterprises.

• Sufficient information should be provided to guide enterprises in their allowance management to activate the market.

• To promote the implementation of mitigation technologies by enterprises, actual output-based allocation methods should be used.

• The government should use market adjustment mechanisms, such as a price floor and ceiling, to ensure that carbon prices are reasonable and stable, so as to guide long-term low carbon investment.