Sharing the catch or catching the shares: Catch shares for the western Pacific region?

The applicability of catch shares programs is evaluated for the various fisheries of the Western Pacific Fishery Management Council region in each of the archipelagoes. Implementation of Catch Shares programs in the region is problematic, but would require better data to be done fairly and equitably. Catch shares are currently under initial consideration for the Hawaii and American Samoa longline fisheries and the Hawaii Deep 7 bottomfish fishery. It is argued that current conditions in all the other small boat fisheries in the region make them inappropriate for catch shares management. Overfishing and the “race for fish” are not yet an issue for these fisheries and some are underdeveloped. Catch share programs can cause significant negative social consequences for Western Pacific communities because data on fishermen's participation, catch histories, and motivations to fish for cultural needs is not adequate for any initial allocation scheme to be developed equitably. The prevailing Western Pacific cultural value of sharing the fish by gifting portions, sharing the catch widely and sharing fishing opportunities widely is in clear conflict with the individualized commercial profit motive philosophy of fisheries that are appropriate for catch shares. The small boat fisheries lack adequate monitoring and enforcement, and do not have a total allowable catch or quota. Nor do they usually have a demonstrated need for one. Preliminary community outreach by Council staff and community discussion of catch shares shows a general lack of information yet a potential for strong resistance to the imposition of catch shares.     

Assessment of IUU fishing for Southern Bluefin Tuna

Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is recognized as one of the largest threats to the sustainability of the world's fisheries. This paper focuses on IUU fishing in the context of unreported catches by members or co-operating non-members of regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) and their implications for scientific assessments of stock status and management advice. A review of Japanese market statistics was undertaken in 2006 by an independent panel in relation to catches of southern bluefin tuna (SBT). Based on this review, the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) concluded that very substantial and continuous unreported catches of SBT had been taken by longline vessels since at least the early 1990s. While uncertainty exists about the fleets contributing to these IUU catches, the assumption used within the CCSBT Scientific Committee is that a significant proportion of these were taken by Japanese longliners. Implications of these unreported catches for the stock assessments by RFMOs are discussed in light of the central role that Japanese vessel reported data have in the assessment of the world's tuna and billfish stocks. Results indicate that it is plausible that the unreported catches of SBT stem from the misreporting of catches as other tuna species and/or the location of fishing effort. The magnitude and extended period of the unreported SBT catches highlight the wide-spread risks of relying on fishery dependent logbook data in the absence of verification. An urgent need exists for minimum standards of verification of catch, effort and landing statistics for use in scientific assessments. The fisheries science community needs to be more pro-active in the development of such standards and the implementation of independent monitoring and verification. In addition, there is a need to reform the operation of the scientific bodies of RFMOs in terms of transparency, the treatment of uncertainty and the burden of proof if they are to be effective in providing objective scientific advice consistent with the intent of international agreements.     

Catch share programs in developing countries: A survey of the literature

The literature on catch shares is dominated by analyses of programs in developed countries. To address this research gap, this paper identifies and discusses programs in developing countries. The paper also investigates differences between countries that have and have not implemented programs across a number of relevant dimensions, including governance and resource value, and characterizes the relationship between catch share type (e.g., quota-based or space-based systems) and the species characteristics. The paper identifies programs in about 20 percent of coastal and developing countries and finds that countries with catch shares have higher governance rankings, stronger economies, more valuable fishery export industries, and fewer people employed in fisheries. For example, the average governance effectiveness rank is 38.7 for all coastal and developing countries and 60.8 for countries with quota-based fishing rights. Species managed under quota-based systems are also found to have the potential for strong recruitment externalities. The results support ideas from the fisheries economics literature on the pre-conditions that are more likely to lead to the adoption of a catch share program.     

Tradable permit programs: What are the lessons for the new Alaska halibut catch sharing plan?

To address long-standing allocation conflicts between the Pacific halibut commercial fishing sector and recreational charter (for-hire) sector in Alaska, an Alaska halibut catch sharing plan (CSP) is being implemented in 2014 that has a provision allowing the leasing of commercial individual fishing quota to recreational charter businesses. This one-way inter-sectoral trading allows for the charter sector to increase its share of the total allowable catch while compensating commercial fishermen. This type of catch shares program is novel in fisheries. In this paper, the literature on non-fisheries tradable permit programs (TPPs) that have similarities to the Alaska halibut CSP program is examined. Several successful TPPs are discussed, including ones from emissions trading programs, water quality trading programs, water markets, and transferable development rights programs. They are then evaluated in terms of their similarities and differences to the Alaska CSP program. Characteristics not part of the current CSP that other TPPs have used and that may increase the likelihood for the CSP to be effective in achieving its primary goals (if they are implemented) are identified, such as allowing more flexible transfers (e.g., internal transfers), intertemporal banking, cooperative structures, and multi-year leasing.     

Potential ecological and social benefits of a moratorium on transshipment on the high seas

One way that illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fish catch is laundered into the seafood market is through transshipments at-sea. This practice, which often occurs on the high seas (the areas of ocean beyond national jurisdiction), allows vessels fishing illegally to evade most monitoring and enforcement measures, offload their cargo, and resume fishing without returning to port. At the same time, transshipment at-sea can facilitate trafficking and exploitation of workers who are trapped and abused on fishing vessels. This study gives an overview of high seas transshipment as well as evaluates transshipment at-sea regulations across 17 Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs), which are responsible for regulating fisheries on the high seas. Transshipment at-sea regulations have become increasingly strict in most RFMOs since the late 1990s. However, only five RFMOs have mandated a partial ban, and only a single RFMO, the South East Atlantic Fisheries Organization (SEAFO), has mandated a total ban on transshipment at-sea. A total ban on transshipment at-sea across all RFMOs would support the ability of oversight and enforcement agencies to detect and prevent IUU fishing and also likely reduce human trafficking and forced labor on the high seas.     

Impacts of hegemony and shifts in dominance on marine capture fisheries

Catch data indicates that the world’s 25 largest marine capture fisheries have generally comprised some 40–50% of the total annual reported catch (1950–2012). From a game theory perspective, there is considerable diversity across these 25 fisheries, both in terms of the number of players and the management paradigms. Here, a dominance-oriented classification system is proposed, according to which fisheries are categorized into: (1) hegemonic systems with single-player dominance; (2) coupled systems with two-player dominance; (3) group systems with shared dominance; (4) systems with no dominant player. Among these categories, the fourth represents perhaps the greatest challenge to sustainable management, while also demonstrating the challenges of managing common pool marine ecosystem services in areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ). The survey and analysis highlights how hegemonic conditions tend to preclude the establishment of cooperative agreements irrespective of the number of players involved in the fishery. Shifts in dominance away from hegemony, as demonstrated most recently in the case of the highly migratory Pacific Saury, can open the door to greater cooperation. Movement of fish stocks and displacement of fishing activities, due for example to climate change, have the capacity to cause major shifts in dominance and, in some cases, destabilize existing cooperative mechanisms.     

US catch share markets: a review of data availability and impediments to transparent markets

A growing number of US fisheries are managed with catch share programs, which allocate exclusive shares of the total allowable catch from a fish stock to individuals, cooperatives, communities, or other entities. All of these catch share programs allow transferability of catch privileges in some form. Information on these transfers, particularly prices, could be valuable to fishery managers and to fishery participants to support management and business decisions and to increase efficiency of the catch share market itself. This article documents the availability and quality of data on transfers of catch privileges in fourteen US catch share programs. These catch share programs include several individual fishing quota (IFQ) programs and a number of programs that allocate catch privileges to self-organized cooperatives. Price information on catch share transfers is found to be limited or unavailable in most US catch share programs. Recommendations are made on how to improve the design of catch share programs and associated data collection systems to facilitate effective catch share markets, collection of catch share market data, and better use of information from catch share markets.     

How have catch shares been allocated?

A unique database was created that describes the methods used to allocate shares in nearly every major catch share fishery in the world. Approximately 54% of the major catch share fisheries in the world allocated the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) solely on the basis of historical catch records, 3% used auctions, and 6% used equal sharing rules. The remaining 37% used a combination of methods, including vessel-based rules. These results confirm the widely-held belief that nearly all catch share programs have “grandfathered” private access to fishery resources: 91% of the fisheries in the database allocated some fraction of the TAC on the basis of historical catch. This publicly available database should be a useful reference tool for policymakers, academics, and others interested in catch shares management in Hawai'i and across the globe.     

Catch share programs in the Western Pacific—A solution in search of a problem?

The movement toward catch shares by NOAA Fisheries and fisheries managers worldwide responds to dysfunctional fisheries plagued by a host of interrelated problems including radically shortened seasons, a race to fish, supply gluts, lowered product quality, increased bycatch, safety issues, excess capacity, and lack of profitability. However, the NOAA Catch Shares Policy recognizes that catch shares are not appropriate for every fishery, and others have agreed that the success of catch shares programs depends on their fit with ecological, economic, and social characteristics. This article describes the characteristics of the Hawaii-based deep-set longline fleet, identified by NOAA Fisheries as a possible candidate for catch shares because it operates under a bigeye tuna quota instituted by the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. One of the main concerns in the fishery is the potential for closing during the holiday season, a culturally important time for fish consumption in Hawaii. An evaluation of the fishery suggests that many of the problems leading to development of catch shares programs in other fisheries are not present, but that some warning signs exist which could be addressed by catch share programs or other management alternatives.     

区域渔业管理组织对脆弱海洋生态系统的保护浅析

21世纪以来底拖网渔业的快速发展给脆弱海洋生态系统（VME）带来极大威胁,导致公海深海渔业发展不可持续以及海洋生物多样性降低。为更好地实现养护海洋渔业资源和保护海洋生物多样性的目标,同时为我国在保护VME以及管理公海深海渔业方面提供参考,文章分析八大区域渔业管理组织（RFMO）针对VME保护采取的系列措施及其保护VME的可行性,针对存在的问题提出对策建议,并对我国在RFMO中保护VME进行展望。研究结果表明：《公海深海渔业管理国际准则》在RFMO保护VME的实践中发挥重要的指导作用;RFMO采取的措施限制深海渔业活动,但为保护VME和养护海洋渔业资源提供重要基础和保障;未来RFMO应加强信息共享和技术合作,发展VME分布预测技术,同时在保护海洋生物多样性方面积极开展双边和多边合作;我国应进一步研究和实践基于生态系统的渔业管理方法,平衡保护与开发利用的关系,积极参与国际渔业管理和VME保护并促进合作,加强南极海域海洋保护区综合治理。     

Why ITQs on target species are inefficient at achieving ecosystem based fisheries management outcomes

The effectiveness of managing fisheries through the allocation of catch rights, including Individual Transferrable Quota's (ITQs), has been the subject of a number of recent reviews. Inspection of these reviews suggests that the effectiveness of ITQ and similar catch rights schemes in meeting single species sustainability objectives differs from their effectiveness in meeting broader Ecosystem Based Fisheries Management objectives, especially in terms of managing effects on associated and dependent species and habitats. This should not be a surprise, given the attributes of rights-based neoliberal market policy instruments, as discussed here.     

Failing the high seas: A global evaluation of regional fisheries management organizations

Regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) collectively manage the largest distinct area of the world, the high seas, but their effectiveness in conserving the fish stocks therein has been questioned lately, as many stocks have declined. This study quantitatively assesses the effectiveness of the world's 18 RFMOs, based on a two-tiered approach, concentrating first on their performance ‘on paper’ and secondly, in practice. The former was determined by assessing how well RFMOs scored against 26 criteria that together reflect current RFMO best practices. The latter assessment referenced the current state of the stocks RFMOs manage, through biomass and fishing mortality reference points and biomass trends through time. Results show low performance of RFMOs for both assessments, i.e., average scores of 57% and 49%, respectively. The latter result is emphasized by findings that reflect two-thirds of stocks fished on the high seas and under RFMO management are either depleted or overexploited. Findings also indicate that there is no connection between the two sets of scores, suggesting a disparity between organization intent and action.     

Constructing logbook-like statistics for coastal fisheries using coastal surveillance radar and fish market data

As catch and effort statistics including fishing time and location are essential for producing abundance indices for utilized fish stocks, fishing states are encouraged under the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries to collect and maintain such statistics. However, for coastal fisheries (including artisanal fisheries) that are mainly composed of small-sized vessels which are usually too numerous to monitor, fisheries statistics collection systems are often either lacking or of insufficient quality (e.g. incomplete or inaccurate). Vessel monitoring system (VMS) data are commonly used to construct or improve estimation of fishing effort and fishing location in large-scale fisheries. Most coastal fisheries lack VMS but their countries do have coastal surveillance radar systems (CSRS) for security and enforcement purposes. This study illustrates and recommends opportunistic use of CSRS data to provide similar scientific benefits to VMS data for coastal fisheries. CSRS in combination with market landings data can construct logbook-like catch and effort statistics. This study introduces a method and demonstrates its usefulness for scientific research and management purposes, including the potential to obtain a higher accuracy and precision, particularly for fishing location and catch amount. Limitations of the CSRS data and challenges to managers involved in its application are also discussed.     

Politics and independent scientific advice in RFMO processes: A case study of crossing boundaries

Provision of independent scientific advice is central to the operation of regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) even though RFMOs are largely policy (and political) instruments. Political pressures and intervention in science and crossing of the boundaries between scientific and political processes, however, appear to be relatively common. A case study is presented to illustrate some ways in which this occurs. It involves a paper that was withdrawn from scientific meetings of two RFMOs as a result of largely political (rather than scientific) concerns. The details involved in this incident are important for understanding the ways in which political intervention in independent scientific process can and does occur. Moreover, unless one is directly involved in actions of this kind, it is impossible from the reports of RFMOs' scientific bodies to assess whether, and the extent to which, there has been political intervention in the scientific process. It is argued that the nature of the working arrangements in these scientific committees can engender deliberate or inadvertent crossing of the boundaries between scientific independence and the political processes of RFMOs, both of which are important components of RFMO operation. Further, there is very little documentation or assessment of the generic extent of such problems. No simple solutions or reforms exist for isolating scientific advice from political agenda in the processes of RFMOs but it is suggested that increased discussion of the problem along with better understanding and clarity of the role of science in the management process may lead to improved recognition of the importance of independent scientific analyses and advice.     

The evolution and trend of the traditional fishing rights

“Traditional fishing rights” were once universally accepted by the international community. However, under a regime of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982, these rights were treated as a reasonable allocation of the surplus of the total allowable catch (TAC) or dependence on phase-out arrangements in bilateral fisheries agreements. This has caused the gradual marginalization of traditional fishing rights. This paper analyzes the transformations and trends affecting the development of fishing industries around the world, especially the growth and decline of traditional fishing rights and EEZs.     

National comprehensive approaches for rebuilding fisheries in South Korea

Korea's coastal and offshore fisheries have experienced reduction in their catch in the early 2000. The amount of catch from coastal and offshore fisheries dropped from 1.7 million tons in 1986 to 1 million tons in 2004. To address such catch reduction, fish stock enhancement programs have been constantly developed and implemented. However, as fish stocks have been estimated to decrease since 2000 in spite of various management measures, the Korean Government genuinely acknowledges the necessity to enhance fisheries productivity through the recovery of depleted fish stocks. Based on such acknowledgement, a fish stock rebuilding plan (FSRP) combined with conventional fish stock enhancement programs was established in 2005. For stocks which have shown drastic decrease, a FSRP was set up and promoted. So far, 10 FSRPs have been established and operated, and plan is being made to expand them to 20 species by 2012. The result of pilot projects shows that stocks have been increasing after the introduction of FSRPs. For instance, the catch per unit effort (CPUE) of sandfish in the East Sea has increased from 0.44 in 2005 to 0.78 in 2011. Consequently, fishing income has increased by 15%. The key lessons learned during the implementation of FSRP are: the causes for the decrease of stock vary and are complicated and it is necessary to adjust and eliminate some conventional policies that could have unforeseen negative impacts on fish stocks. The FSRP-based fisheries management policy in Korea carries great significance, for it has changed the focus of policy from simply maintaining the status quo to stock recovery and it allows relevant stakeholders to get actively involved in the procedures of establishing and promoting the plan, leading to effective implementation of the plan. The current FSRP is operated with species, but if it can be gradually expanded to encompass the whole ecosystem, it will greatly contribute to more effective management and fish stock recovery for all species in offshore and coastal waters surrounding Korea.     

Evaluating the basic elements of transparency of regional fisheries management organizations

This paper reports on the first global study of regional fisheries management organization (RFMO) transparency. It was prompted by recent scholarship that suggests that RFMOs are failing to meet their conservation and management mandates and that transparency is a critical element of this performance. In this study, 11 RFMOs were evaluated using 34 questions, divided into three sections: (i) access to full, up-to-date and accurate information; (ii) public participation in decision-making; and (iii) access to outcomes. Secretariats for all 11 RFMOs were contacted, and all responded, to correct and comment on initial findings and to share additional information. The total scores in this study reflect transparency as measured against current good practices in RFMOs as a whole, rather than some sort of idealistic benchmark. Each question should therefore be seen as a diagnostic tool that shows where some RFMO(s) fall short and how they can correct the shortfall based on the practices of their peers. These results have highlighted a number of good practices amongst RFMOs, with no single RFMO standing out as having particularly poor transparency practices. On the other hand, there also were not any RFMOs that had exemplary transparency practices in every respect and all RFMOs still have room to improve upon their basic transparency practices. This first transparency assessment is necessarily broad in nature and considers only very basic elements of transparency. It is to be expected that as RFMO practices become more sophisticated, so will the techniques and criteria of future transparency assessments.     

Assessing catch shares' effects evidence from Federal United States and associated British Columbian fisheries

What are the effects of transitioning traditionally managed fisheries to incentive-based catch shares fisheries? In a study of all major United States federal catch share fisheries and associated shared stock fisheries in British Columbia, catch shares result in environmental improvements, economic improvements, and a mixture of changes in social performance, relative to the race for fish under traditional management. Environmentally, compliance with total allowable catch increases and discards decrease. Economically, vessel yields rise, total revenues grow, and long-term stock increases are encouraged. Socially, safety increases, some port areas modestly consolidate, needed processing capacity often reduces, and labor markets shift from part time jobs to full time jobs with similar total employment. Newer catch shares address many social concerns through careful design.     

Standards for the effective management of fisheries bycatch

Mitigating the environmental impact of commercial fishing, by avoiding, minimizing and compensating for adverse effects, is core business for fisheries management authorities globally. The complex interplay of ecological, economic, and social considerations has often resulted in bycatch management being reactive, confrontational and costly. In many cases it has been difficult to demonstrate success and to establish whether bycatch management has been efficient or effective. This article proposes standards for bycatch management following reviews of literature, international agreements and Australian domestic fishery management policies, and consideration by many technical experts and several stakeholder representatives. The standards have been developed using Australian Commonwealth fisheries – and the international fisheries agreements to which Australia is party – as a baseline, but should be applicable to both domestic and regional/international governance systems. The proposed standards involve quantifying fisheries bycatch, agreeing on operational objectives, assessing the effects of fishing on bycatch populations, establishing the cost-effectiveness of mitigation measures, and evaluating performance. The standards encourage domestic management measures that are consistent with the guidance and requirements of international agreements and regional fisheries management organisations. The importance of engaging stakeholders throughout the process is recognised. The standards provide a framework for measuring performance and a checklist of actions for managing bycatch at a fishery level. They have the potential to facilitate the development of more strategic and effective approaches to bycatch management, with defined goals, monitoring systems, and adaptive decision-making. This review of past bycatch management, including the application of the proposed standards to the mitigation of shark bycatch in an Australian longline fishery, demonstrates that the proposed standards are operationally feasible but that they have not always been applied. Specifically, monitoring the performance of bycatch management measures has not always followed their implementation.     

Fishery cooperatives and the Pacific Whiting Conservation Cooperative: Lessons and application to non-industrial fisheries in the Western Pacific

The last 20 years have seen a fundamental shift in fishery management from reliance on open access and regulated open access to systems based on individual user rights. In some cases, the allocation of harvest rights to defined harvest or community sectors has served as a catalyst to drive the formation of voluntary agreements among fishermen in creating self-governed systems of catch shares. A number of voluntary cooperatives including the Pacific Whiting Conservation Cooperative – which served as the model for the American Fisheries Act – provide examples of self-governing systems which have successfully achieved management objectives including greater economic performance, equity, and conservation. Cooperative arrangements have functioned to devolve some of the responsibilities of management to the cooperative – allowing fishermen greater operational flexibility in achieving individual or community goals, while reducing the burden of management on formal managing bodies. Analysis of voluntary cooperatives shows that their success is based on the existence of certain core conditions including relatively small homogeneous groups of players, secure sector-allocated and divisible rights, and the ability to form binding contracts among coop members. Cooperatives, however, face a number of internal and external threats that can undermine their success and existence. Whether voluntary or designed through regulation, cooperatives may be a promising approach for addressing challenges in non-industrial fisheries in the United States including the Western Pacific – especially if coupled with user rights based on geography, territory, and culture. However, the sheer geographical size and cultural diversity of regions such as the Western Pacific suggests that no single approach may be appropriate throughout the entire region.