“Reasons for concern” (about climate change) in the United States

Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change commits its parties to stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that “would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” Authors of the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2001a, b) offered some insight into what negotiators might consider dangerous by highlighting five “reasons for concern” (RFC’s) and tracking concern against changes in global mean temperature; they illustrated their assessments in the now iconic “burning embers” diagram. The Fourth Assessment Report reaffirmed the value of plotting RFC’s against temperature change (IPCC 2007a, b), and Smith et al. (2009) produced an unpated embers visualization for the globe. This paper applies the same assessment and communication strategies to calibrate the comparable RFC’s for the United States. It adds “National Security Concern” as a sixth RFC because many now see changes in the intensity and/or frequency of extreme events around the world as “risk enhancers” that deserve attention at the highest levels of the US policy and research communities. The US embers portrayed here suggest that: (1) US policy-makers will not discover anything really “dangerous” over the near to medium term if they consider only economic impacts that are aggregated across the entire country but that (2) they could easily uncover “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” by focusing their attention on changes in the intensities, frequencies, and regional distributions of extreme weather events driven by climate change.     

Political orientation moderates Americans’ beliefs and concern about climate change

I offer some theoretical insights to help us better understand the moderator effect of political orientation that Larry Hamilton and others have found in recent years. Reflexive modernization theory highlights an emerging tension between those who direct attention to the negative consequences of industrial capitalism such as climate change (e.g., the scientific community and environmental organizations) and those who defend the economic system against such critiques (e.g., the conservative movement). Political divisions in the American public increasingly map onto these societal divisions between critics and defenders of the industrial capitalist order—especially for the issue of climate change. This alignment is facilitated by increased polarization among political elites and balkanization of the news media. Strong evidence of the moderator effect is consistent with the expectations of information processing theory and elite cues hypothesis from political science. Recent empirical findings in political psychology and neuroscience also seem pertinent for explaining this moderator effect. I end by outlining a few implications for climate change research and communication.     

Are we adapting to climate change?

Human systems will have to adapt to climate change. Understanding of the magnitude of the adaptation challenge at a global scale, however, is incomplete, constrained by a limited understanding of if and how adaptation is taking place. Here we develop and apply a methodology to track and characterize adaptation action; we apply these methods to the peer-reviewed, English-language literature. Our results challenge a number of common assumptions about adaptation while supporting others: (1) Considerable research on adaptation has been conducted yet the majority of studies report on vulnerability assessments and natural systems (or intentions to act), not adaptation actions. (2) Climate change is rarely the sole or primary motivator for adaptation action. (3) Extreme events are important adaptation stimuli across regions. (4) Proactive adaptation is the most commonly reported adaptive response, particularly in developed nations. (5) Adaptation action is more frequently reported in developed nations, with middle income countries underrepresented and low-income regions dominated by reports from a small number of countries. (6) There is limited reporting on adaptations being developed to take advantage of climate change or focusing on women, elderly, or children.     

What do we know about UK household adaptation to climate change? A systematic review

The UK Government’s first National Adaptation Programme seeks to create a ‘climate-ready society’ capable of making well-informed and far-sighted decisions to address risks and opportunities posed by a changing climate, where individual households are expected to adapt when it is in their interest to do so. How, and to what extent, households are able to do this remains unclear. Like other developed countries, research on UK adaptation has focused predominately on public and private organisations. To fill that gap, a systematic literature review was conducted to understand what actions UK households have taken in response to, or in anticipation of, a changing climate; what drives or impedes these actions; and whether households will act autonomously. We found that UK households struggle to build long-term adaptive capacity and are reliant upon traditional reactive coping responses. Of concern is that these coping responses are less effective for some climate risks (e.g. flooding); cost more over the long-term; and fail to create household capacity to adapt to other stresses. While low-cost, low-skill coping responses were already being implemented, the adoption of more permanent physical measures, behavioural changes, and acceptance of new responsibilities are unlikely to happen autonomously without further financial or government support. If public policy on household adaptation to climate change is to be better informed than more high-quality empirical research is urgently needed.     

May we engineer the climate?

Not only is the science of climate engineering uncertain; the legal issues are also highly uncertain. Although existing international law does not specifically limit the freedom of states to undertake climate engineering, the international community would likely demand a say should climate engineering move from the realm of speculation to concrete proposals. The experience of other environmental regimes, however, suggests that developing an international decision-making mechanism would be difficult, and that the international community might opt for a simple prohibition on climate engineering on grounds of precaution.     

Evidence of climate change impact upon glaciers’ recession within the Italian Alps

We present evidence of climate change impact upon recent changes of glaciers within Lombardy region, in Northern Italy. We illustrate the recent area evolution of a set of 249 glaciers in the area using three surface area records for 1991, 1999 and 2003. The 1999 and 2003 surface area data are processed by combining glacier limits manually digitized upon registered color orthophotos and differential GPS (DGPS) glaciers’ surveys. Glaciers’ area was 117.4?km² in 1991, 104.7?km² in 1999, and to 92.4?km² 2003, with a 21% reduction. Glaciers smaller than 1?km² accounted for 53% of the total loss in area (13.1?km² during 1991–2003). The area change rate was higher lately, with ca. 11.7 % reduction during 1999–2003. We split Alps and fore Alps of Lombardy into six mountain groups, and we separately investigate relative area variations. We use climate series from local stations within each group to assess climate change during a 30-year window (1976–2005). We focus upon temperature and snow cover depth at thaw, known to impact glaciers’ changes. We compare local year-round temperature anomalies against global ones to evidence enhanced warming within this area, and we investigate the correlation of our target climate variables against NAO. Eventually, we highlight the link between the rate of change of our climate variables to the observed scaling of area loss against glaciers’ size, showing that in rapidly warming areas glaciers’ size affects less relative melting.     

Selling climate change? The limitations of social marketing as a strategy for climate change public engagement

Social marketing is the systematic application of marketing concepts and techniques to achieve specific behavioural goals relevant to the social good. Social marketing approaches are becoming increasingly popular among governmental and non-governmental actors seeking to engage the public on climate change. The effectiveness of social marketing in achieving specific behavioural goals is empirically well-supported. However, in the first systematic critique of social marketing as a strategy for engaging the public on climate change, we present evidence that social marketing alone is insufficient to build support for the more ambitious policy changes and interventions that constitute a proportional response to climate change. In some circumstances, social marketing approaches may even be counterproductive. We describe some alternative approaches for engaging the public, which may provide governmental and non-governmental actors with additional or preferable tools for promoting public engagement with climate change. Given the scale of the challenge, it seems critical that those seeking to engage the public are equipped with the most effective strategies available - a goal that this paper seeks to contribute to. We conclude that acknowledging the limitations of social marketing - and exploring alternative methods of engaging the public - is an urgent task for climate change communication researchers and practitioners.     

Climate change and infectious diseases: Can we meet the needs for better prediction?

The next generation of climate-driven, disease prediction models will most likely require a mechanistically based, dynamical framework that parameterizes key processes at a variety of locations. Over the next two decades, consensus climate predictions make it possible to produce forecasts for a number of important infectious diseases that are largely independent of the uncertainty of longer-term emissions scenarios. In particular, the role of climate in the modulation of seasonal disease transmission needs to be unravelled from the complex dynamics resulting from the interaction of transmission with herd immunity and intervention measures that depend upon previous burdens of infection. Progress is also needed to solve the mismatch between climate projections and disease projections at the scale of public health interventions. In the time horizon of seasons to years, early warning systems should benefit from current developments on multi-model ensemble climate prediction systems, particularly in areas where high skill levels of climate models coincide with regions where large epidemics take place. A better understanding of the role of climate extremes on infectious diseases is urgently needed.     

Unstoppable climate change? The influence of fatalistic beliefs about climate change on behavioural change and willingness to pay cross-nationally

Although climate change is an urgent problem, behavioural and policy responses have not yet been sufficient to either reduce the volume of greenhouse gas emissions or adapt to a disrupted climate system. Significant efforts have been made to raise public awareness of the dangers posed by climate change. One reason why these efforts might not be sufficient is rooted in people’s need to feel efficacy to solve complex problems; the belief that climate change is unstoppable might thwart action even among the concerned. This paper tests for the effect of fatalistic beliefs on behavioural change and willingness to pay to address climate change using two cross-national surveys representing over 50,000 people in 48 nations.

Key policy insights

• The perception that climate change poses a risk or danger increases the likelihood of behavioural change and willingness to pay to address climate change.

• The belief that climate change is unstoppable reduces the behavioural and policy response to climate change and moderates risk perception.

• Communicators and policy leaders should carefully frame climate change as a difficult, yet solvable, problem to circumvent fatalistic beliefs.

     

Who feels the impacts of climate change?

Feeling affected by climate change related disasters has the potential to mobilize belief in climate change, concern about the issue, and support for mitigation policies – even when accounting for the effects of physically living through a disaster. In this study we use a two-wave survey design where respondents in the United States were interviewed before and after Hurricane Florence to better understand who feels affected by such disasters. First, we find that being worried about climate change increases the feeling of being affected by the hurricane among those who regularly discuss climate change. Second, we find that those who are high in perspective taking are more likely to feel affected. However, those who are high in empathic concern, but feel obligated to help victims of disasters, are less likely to feel affected. This suggests that hurricanes may cause a collapse of compassion, where those who are especially sensitive to the suffering of others down-regulate their emotional response to costly disasters.     

The new national climate change documents of Mexico: what do the regional climate change scenarios represent?

This paper presents a review of the methodology applied for generating the regional climate change scenarios utilized in important National Documents of Mexico, such as the Fourth National Communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Fourth National Report to the Convention on Biological Diversity and The Economics of Climate Change in Mexico. It is shown that these regional climate change scenarios, which are one of the main inputs to support the assessments presented in these documents, are an example of the erroneous use of statistical downscaling techniques. The arguments presented here imply that the work based on such scenarios should be revised and therefore, these documents are inadequate for supporting national decision- making.     

Declining impacts of hot spells on mortality in the Czech Republic, 1986–2009: adaptation to climate change?

The study examines temporal changes in mortality associated with spells of large positive temperature anomalies (hot spells) in extended summer season in the population of the Czech Republic (Central Europe) during 1986?C2009. Declining trends in the mortality impacts are found in spite of rising temperature trends. The finding remains unchanged if possible confounding effects of within-season acclimatization to heat and the mortality displacement effect are taken into account. Recent positive socioeconomic development, following the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989, and better public awareness of heat-related risks are likely the primary causes of the declining vulnerability. The results suggest that climate change may have relatively little influence on heat-related deaths, since changes in other factors that affect vulnerability of the population are dominant instead of temperature trends. It is essential to better understand the observed nonstationarity of the temperature-mortality relationship and the role of adaptation and its limits, both physiological and technological, and to address associated uncertainties in studies dealing with climate change projections of temperature-related mortality.     

Do probabilistic expert elicitations capture scientists’ uncertainty about climate change?

Expert elicitation studies have become important barometers of scientific knowledge about future climate change (Morgan and Keith, Environ Sci Technol 29(10), 1995; Reilly et al., Science 293(5529):430–433, 2001; Morgan et al., Climate Change 75(1–2):195–214, 2006; Zickfeld et al., Climatic Change 82(3–4):235–265, 2007, Proc Natl Acad Sci 2010; Kriegler et al., Proc Natl Acad Sci 106(13):5041–5046, 2009). Elicitations incorporate experts’ understanding of known flaws in climate models, thus potentially providing a more comprehensive picture of uncertainty than model-driven methods. The goal of standard elicitation procedures is to determine experts’ subjective probabilities for the values of key climate variables. These methods assume that experts’ knowledge can be captured by subjective probabilities—however, foundational work in decision theory has demonstrated this need not be the case when their information is ambiguous (Ellsberg, Q J Econ 75(4):643–669, 1961). We show that existing elicitation studies may qualitatively understate the extent of experts’ uncertainty about climate change. We designed a choice experiment that allows us to empirically determine whether experts’ knowledge about climate sensitivity (the equilibrium surface warming that results from a doubling of atmospheric CO₂ concentration) can be captured by subjective probabilities. Our results show that, even for this much studied and well understood quantity, a non-negligible proportion of climate scientists violate the choice axioms that must be satisfied for subjective probabilities to adequately describe their beliefs. Moreover, the cause of their violation of the axioms is the ambiguity in their knowledge. We expect these results to hold to a greater extent for less understood climate variables, calling into question the veracity of previous elicitations for these quantities. Our experimental design provides an instrument for detecting ambiguity, a valuable new source of information when linking climate science and climate policy which can help policy makers select decision tools appropriate to our true state of knowledge.     

Do weather fluctuations cause people to seek information about climate change?

Learning about the causes and consequences of climate change can be an important avenue for supporting mitigation policy and efficient adaptation. This paper uses internet search activity data, a distinctly revealed preference approach, to examine if local weather fluctuations cause people to seek information about climate change. The results suggest that weather fluctuations do have an effect on climate change related search behavior, however not always in ways that are consistent with the projected impacts of climate change. While search activity increases with extreme heat in summer and extended periods of no rainfall and declines in extreme cold in winter, search activity also increases with colder winter and spring average temperatures. Some of the surprising results are magnified when heterogeneity by political ideology and educational attainment in responsiveness is modeled, which could suggest that different people have different perceptions about what types of weather define climate change or that climate science deniers seek information through Google. However, the results also indicate that for all groups in the political and educational spectrum, there exist weather events consistent with the predicted impacts of climate change that elicit increased information seeking.     

Public engagement with carbon and climate change: To what extent is the public ‘carbon capable’?

The relevance of climate change for society seems indisputable: scientific evidence points to a significant human contribution in causing climate change, and impacts which will increasingly affect human welfare. In order to meet national and international greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction targets, there is an urgent need to understand and enable societal engagement in mitigation. Yet recent research indicates that this involvement is currently limited: although awareness of climate change is widespread, understanding and behavioral engagement are far lower. Proposals for mitigative ‘personal carbon budgets’ imply a need for public understanding of the causes and consequences of carbon emissions, as well as the ability to reduce emissions. However, little has been done to consider the situated meanings of carbon and energy in everyday life and decisions. This paper builds on the concept of ‘carbon capability’, a term which captures the contextual meanings associated with carbon and individuals’ abilities and motivations to reduce emissions. We present empirical findings from a UK survey of public engagement with climate change and carbon capability, focusing on both individual and institutional dimensions. These findings highlight the diverse public understandings about ‘carbon’, encompassing technical, social, and moral discourses; and provide further evidence for the environmental value-action gap in relation to adoption of low-carbon lifestyles. Implications of these findings for promoting public engagement with climate change and carbon capability are discussed.     

What is climate change scepticism? Examination of the concept using a mixed methods study of the UK public

The holding of doubts about climate change is often referred to as ‘scepticism’. However, there has been a lack of clarity in previous work as to what exactly this scepticism comprises. We integrate data obtained from discussion groups and a nationally representative survey, to interrogate and refine the concept of climate change scepticism with respect to the views of members of the public. We argue that two main types should be distinguished: epistemic scepticism, relating to doubts about the status of climate change as a scientific and physical phenomenon; and response scepticism, relating to doubts about the efficacy of action taken to address climate change. Whilst each type is independently associated by people themselves with climate change scepticism, we find that the latter is more strongly associated with a lack of concern about climate change. As such, additional effort should be directed towards addressing and engaging with people's doubts concerning attempts to address climate change.