Can national policy blockages accelerate the development of polycentric governance? Evidence from climate change policy in the United Kingdom

Many factors can conspire to limit the scope for policy development at the national level. In this paper, we consider whether blockages in national policy processes − resulting for example from austerity or small state political philosophies − might be overcome by the development of more polycentric governance arrangements. Drawing on evidence from three stakeholder workshops and fifteen interviews, we address this question by exploring the United Kingdom’s recent retrenchment in the area of climate change policy, and the ways in which its policy community have responded. We identify two broad strategies based on polycentric principles: ‘working with gatekeepers’ to unlock political capital and ‘collaborate to innovate’ to develop policy outputs. We then empirically examine the advantages that these actions bring, analysing coordination across overlapping sites of authority, such as those associated with international regimes, devolved administrations and civic and private initiatives that operate in conjunction with, and sometimes independently of, the state. Despite constraining political and economic factors, which are by no means unique to the UK, we find that a polycentric climate policy network can create opportunities for overcoming central government blockages. However, we also argue that the ambiguous role of the state in empowering but also in constraining such a network will determine whether a polycentric approach to climate policy and governance is genuinely additional and innovative, or whether it is merely a temporary ‘sticking plaster’ for the retreat of the state and policy retrenchment during austere times.     

The discursive politics of ‘fracking’: Frames,storylines, and the anticipatory contestation of shale gas development in the United Kingdom

How contested sources of energy such as shale gas are perceived in frontier countries considering their development is incredibly important to national and international climate policies. The UK shale development case is of particular interest currently as the Government attempts to position the UK as a pioneer of European, safe, sustainable shale gas development. We conduct a mixed-methods analysis of the UK policy debate on shale gas development involving 30 stakeholder interviews and 1557 political documents. This empirical focus extends the existing literature by identifying the use of frames in and through the institutions and practices of formal UK politics. We identify nine key frames and their associated storylines, analyse their use over time, and compare these findings with other national case studies. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given most UK Governments within our timeframe have supported shale development, pro-shale development frames dominate in the policy debate; however, we also find a high level of anti-shale development frame use, suggesting a deep and ongoing framing contest in national formal political sites. We find in particular a more prominent focus on land-use issues and impacts on the landscape than other UK studies or other national contexts. Conceptually, the study puts forward an integrative approach to the related concepts of frames and storylines, as well as arguments concerning the impotence of storylines in anticipatory political debate and the polyvalence of framing strategies. Questions about governance are raised by the general lack of consensus over the framing of shale development within formal political sites, let alone amongst the broader public; and by the lack of a coherent response from the Government to criticisms of its approach. Finally, we reflect on the apparent lack of evidence for Hajer’s ‘communicative miracle’ in our case, and speculate as to whether the lack of broad-based resonance of the ‘bridge’ storyline signals trouble for the positive-sum thinking of ecological modernisation.     

Implications of Japan’s long term climate mitigation target and the relevance of uncertain nuclear policy

Achieving long-term climate mitigation goals in Japan faces several challenges, starting with the uncertain nuclear power policy after the 2011 earthquake, the uncertain availability and progress of energy technologies, as well as energy security concerns in light of a high dependency on fuel imports. The combined weight of these challenges needs to be clarified in terms of the energy system and macroeconomic impacts. We applied a general equilibrium energy economic model to assess these impacts on an 80% emission reduction target by 2050 considering several alternative scenarios for nuclear power deployment, technology availability, end use energy efficiency, and the price of fossil fuels. We found that achieving the mitigation target was feasible for all scenarios, with considerable reductions in total energy consumption (39%–50%), higher shares of low-carbon sources (43%–72% compared to 15%), and larger shares of electricity in the final energy supply (51%–58% compared to 42%). The economic impacts of limiting nuclear power by 2050 (3.5% GDP loss) were small compared to the lack of carbon capture and storage (CCS) (6.4% GDP loss). Mitigation scenarios led to an improvement in energy security indicators (trade dependency and diversity of primary energy sources) even in the absence of nuclear power. Moreover, preliminary analysis indicates that expanding the range of renewable energy resources can lower the macroeconomic impacts of the long term target considerably, and thus further in depth analysis is needed on this aspect.

Key policy insights

• For Japan, an emissions reduction target of 80% by 2050 is feasible without nuclear power or CCS.

• The macroeconomic impact of such a 2050 target was largest without CCS, and smallest without nuclear power.

• Energy security indicators improved in mitigation scenarios compared to the baseline.

     

The ‘co’ in co-production of climate action: Challenging boundaries within and between science,policy and practice

Effective action taken against climate change must find ways to unite scientific and practice-based knowledges associated with the various stakeholders who see themselves as invested in the global delivery of climate governance. Political decision-makers, climate scientists and practitioners approach this challenge from what are often radically different perspectives and experiences. While considerable work has been done to develop the idea of ‘co-production’ in the development of climate action outputs, questions remain over how to best unite the contrasting epistemological traditions and norms associated with different stakeholders. Drawing on the existing literatures on climate action co-production and from translational perspectives on the science-policy interface, in this paper we develop the concept of ‘boundary agency’. Defining this as the agency ‘possessed’ when willing and able to translate between different epistemological communities invested in a similar policy and governance challenge such as climate change, we offer it as a useful means to reflect on participants’ understanding of the ‘co’ in co-production. This is in contrast to the more established (often academic-led) focus on what it is that is being produced by co-production processes. We draw from two complementary empirical studies, which explicitly encouraged i) engagement and ii) reflection on cross-boundary co-production between climate action stakeholders from different backgrounds. Reflecting on the two studies, we discuss the benefits of (and barriers to) encouraging more active and sustained engagement between climate action stakeholders so as to try to actively blur the boundaries between science and policy and, in doing so, invent new epistemological communities of practice.     

Discursive stability meets climate instability: A critical exploration of the concept of ‘climate stabilization’ in contemporary climate policy

The goals and objectives of ‘climate stabilization’ feature heavily in contemporary environmental policy and in this paper we trace the factors that have contributed to the rise of this concept and the scientific ideas behind it. In particular, we explore how the stabilization-based discourse has become dominant through developments in climate science, environmental economics and policymaking. That this discourse is tethered to contemporary policy proposals is unsurprising; but that it has remained relatively free of critical scrutiny can be associated with fears of unsettling often-tenuous political processes taking place at multiple scales. Nonetheless, we posit that the fundamental premises behind stabilization targets are badly matched to the actual problem of the intergenerational management of climate change, scientifically and politically, and destined to fail. By extension, we argue that policy proposals for climate stabilization are problematic, infeasible, and hence impede more productive policy action on climate change. There are gains associated with an expansion and reconsideration of the range of possible policy framings of the problem, which are likely to help us to more capably and dynamically achieve goals of decarbonizing and modernizing the energy system, as well as diminishing anthropogenic contributions to climate change.     

Empirical calibration of climate policy using corporate solvency: a case study of the UK’s carbon price support

Emission reductions improve the chances that dangerous anthropogenic climate change will be averted, but could also cause some firms financial distress. Corporate failures, especially if they are unnecessary, add to the social cost of abatement. Social value can be permanently destroyed by the dissolution of organizational capital, deadweight losses paid to liquidators, and unemployment. This article proposes using measures of corporate solvency as an objective tool for policy makers to calibrate the optimal stringency of climate change policies, so that they can deliver the least loss of corporate solvency for a given level of emission reductions. They could also be used to determine the generosity of any compensation to address losses to corporate solvency. We demonstrate this approach using a case study of the UK’s Carbon Price Support (a carbon tax).

Key policy insights

• Solvency metrics could be used to empirically calibrate the optimal stringency of climate policies.

• An idealized solvency trajectory for firms affected by climate change policy would cause corporate solvency to initially decline – approaching but not exceeding ‘distressed’ levels – and then gradually improve to a new ‘steady state’ once the low-carbon transition had been achieved.

• In terms of the UK’s Carbon Price Support, corporate solvency of energy-intensive industries was found to be stable subsequent to its introduction. Therefore, the available evidence does not support its later weakening.

     

Exploring the climate problems of Brazil’s Nordeste: a review

This article reviews the exploration of the climate dynamics of Brazil’s Nordeste in the course of a century. The drought-prone and semi-arid northern Nordeste of Brazil experiences a short rainy season around March–April, when the interhemispheric gradient of sea surface temperature (SST) in the tropical Atlantic is weakest and the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) reaches its southernmost position in the course of the annual cycle. The recurrent Secas (droughts) have a severe socio-economic impact. During drought years, the interhemispheric SST gradient in the tropical Atlantic is steep and the ITCZ stays far North, while the waters of the eastern equatorial Pacific tend to be anomalously warm. Based on the extensive diagnostic exploration of the circulation mechanisms of interannual climate variability, empirical methods have been developed for the forecasting of the Nordeste rainy season. These have been applied in the real-time prediction of seasonal rainfall anomalies throughout the last decade of the 20th century.     

Counting only the hits? The risk of underestimating the costs of stringent climate policy

This paper warns against the risk of underestimating the costs—and the uncertainty about the costs—of achieving stringent stabilization targets. We argue that a straightforward review of integrated assessment models results produces biased estimates for the more ambitious climate objectives such as those compatible with the 2°C of the European Union and the G8. The magnitude and range of estimates are significantly reduced because only the most optimistic results are reported for such targets. We suggest a procedure that addresses this partiality. The results show highly variable costs for the most ambitious scenarios.     

China’s future emission reduction challenge and implications for global climate policy

In December 2015, China joined 190 plus nations at Paris in committing to the goal of limiting the rise in global average temperature to ‘well below’ 2°C. Carbon budget analysis indicates that goal will require not only that the European Union and US reduce their emissions by greater than 80% by 2050, but that China at least comes close to doing so as well, if any budget is to be left over for the rest of the world (RoW). Given that RoW emissions are, and will come from, low-income and emerging nations, China’s emission reduction potential is of no small consequence. In this paper, we use the Kaya identity to back out changes in the drivers of CO₂ emissions, including gross domestic product (GDP), energy intensity (E/GDP) and the carbon content of energy (C/E), the latter two calculated to be consistent with China’s long-term GDP growth rate forecasts and specified 2050 CO₂ emission reduction targets. Our results suggest that even achieving China’s highly optimistic renewable energy targets will be very far from sufficient to reduce China’s CO₂ emissions from 9.1?Gt it emitted in 2015 to much below 3?Gt by 2050. Even reducing its emissions to 5?Gt will be challenging, yet this falls far short of what is needed if the world is to meet its ‘well below’ 2°C commitment.

Key policy insights

• Under the Paris Agreement there is great pressure on China to very substantially reduce its emissions by 2050.

• While China has attached great importance to renewables and nuclear energy development, even achieving the most optimistic targets would not be sufficient to reduce China’s emissions from 9.1?Gt in 2015 to much below 3?Gt by 2050.

• China’s emission reduction potential falls far short of what is needed if the world is to meet its Paris ‘well below’ 2°C commitment, even if the EU and US reduce their emissions to zero by 2050.

• Emission cuts consistent with the Paris Agreement will require that China and the world give much greater weight to advancing research and development of scalable low-, zero- and negative-carbon sources and technologies.

     

California’s local health agencies and the state’s climate adaptation strategy

A changing climate will exacerbate many of the problems currently faced by California’s public health institutions. The public health impacts of climate change include: an increase in extreme heat events and associated increases in heat-related morbidity and mortality, increases in the frequency and severity of air pollution episodes, shifts in the range and incidence of vector-borne diseases, increases in the severity of wildfire, increased risks of drought and flooding, and other extreme events. This article assesses the readiness of California’s public health institutions to cope with the changes that will accompany a changing climate and how they relate to strategies laid out in the state’s Climate Adaptation Strategy. County-level health offices are the front line actors to preserve public health in the face of numerous threats, including climate change. Survey results show that local health officers in California believe that climate change is a serious threat to public health, but feel that they lack the funding and resources to reduce this risk. Local health agencies also have a number of tools in place that will be helpful for preparing for a changing climate.     

The AVOID programme’s new simulations of the global benefits of stringent climate change mitigation

Quantitative simulations of the global-scale benefits of climate change mitigation are presented, using a harmonised, self-consistent approach based on a single set of climate change scenarios. The approach draws on a synthesis of output from both physically-based and economics-based models, and incorporates uncertainty analyses. Previous studies have projected global and regional climate change and its impacts over the 21st century but have generally focused on analysis of business-as-usual scenarios, with no explicit mitigation policy included. This study finds that both the economics-based and physically-based models indicate that early, stringent mitigation would avoid a large proportion of the impacts of climate change projected for the 2080s. However, it also shows that not all the impacts can now be avoided, so that adaptation would also therefore be needed to avoid some of the potential damage. Delay in mitigation substantially reduces the percentage of impacts that can be avoided, providing strong new quantitative evidence for the need for stringent and prompt global mitigation action on greenhouse gas emissions, combined with effective adaptation, if large, widespread climate change impacts are to be avoided. Energy technology models suggest that such stringent and prompt mitigation action is technologically feasible, although the estimated costs vary depending on the specific modelling approach and assumptions.     

The extremely late freezing of the European Russia’s rivers in the winter 2006–2007 and climate warming

In this paper, anomalies of freezing of the European Russia’s rivers in 2006–2007 are considered. Multiyear observation data are used for analysing of trends in time series, which express terms of the first floating ice appearance in the European territory of Russia. It is shown that, in the end of the 20th and beginning of 21st centuries, a tendency of later freezing of rivers in this territory was detected. Linear equations that describe temporal trends were obtained for various rivers. Three variants of terms of the first floating ice appearance until 2020 were computed in accordance with the basic climatic scenarios. It was shown that changes in the climatologic norms are significant for all the scenarios. In comparison with the present values, future changes in the norms can reach 5 through 15 days.     

Erratum to: Simulating the impacts of climate change, prices and population on California’s residential electricity consumption

We discovered an error in the computer code generating the simulation results in section 5 of Auffhammer and Aroonruengsawat (Clim Chang 109(Supplement 1):191–210, 2011). While four out of five main findings are unaffected, the simulated impacts of climate change on annual residential electricity consumption are an order of magnitude smaller, which is consistent with findings in the previous literature.     

The stresses and dynamics of smallholder coffee systems in Jamaica’s Blue Mountains: a case for the potential role of climate services

Access to climate information has the potential to build adaptive capacity, improve agricultural profitability, and help manage risks. To achieve these benefits, knowledge of the local context is needed to inform information development, delivery, and use. We examine coffee farming in the Jamaican Blue Mountains (BM) to understand farmer livelihoods, opportunities for climate knowledge to benefit coffee production, and the factors that impinge on farmers’ ability to use climate information. Our analysis draws on interviews and 12 focus groups involving 143 participants who largely cultivate small plots. BM farmers currently experience stresses related to climate, coffee leaf rust, and production costs that interrelate concurrently and with time lags. Under conditions that reduce income, BM farmers compensate by adjusting their use of inputs, which can increase their susceptibility to future climate and disease stresses. However, farmers can also decrease impacts of future stressors by more efficiently and effectively allocating their limited resources. In this sense, managing climate, like the other stresses, is an ongoing process. While we identify climate products that can help farmers manage climate risk, the local context presents barriers that argue for interactive climate services that go beyond conventional approaches of information production and delivery. We discuss how dialogs between farmers, extension personnel, and climate scientists can create a foundation from which use can emerge.     

Factors affecting rural landholders’ adaptation to climate change: Insights from formal institutions and communities of practice

This study explores the factors affecting rural landholders’ adaptation to climate change from the perspectives of formal institutions and communities of practice. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with formal institutions (e.g. South Australian government agencies) and communities of practice (e.g. farm systems groups) within two natural resource management regions in South Australia. Both groups noted that rural landholders autonomously adapt to a variety of risks, including those induced by climate variability; however, the types and levels of adaptation varied among individuals as a result of variety of barriers to adaptation. The lack of communication and engagement processes established between formal institutions and communities of practice was one major barrier. The paper presents and discusses a model for transferring knowledge and information on climate change among formal institutions, communities of practice, trusted individual advisors and rural landholders, and for supporting the co-management of climate change across multiple groups in rural agricultural areas in Australia and elsewhere.     

The danger of overvaluing methane’s influence on future climate change

Minimizing the future impacts of climate change requires reducing the greenhouse gas (GHG) load in the atmosphere. Anthropogenic emissions include many types of GHG’s as well as particulates such as black carbon and sulfate aerosols, each of which has a different effect on the atmosphere, and a different atmospheric lifetime. Several recent studies have advocated for the importance of short timescales when comparing the climate impact of different climate pollutants, placing a high relative value on short-lived pollutants, such as methane (CH₄) and black carbon (BC) versus carbon dioxide (CO₂). These studies have generated confusion over how to value changes in temperature that occur over short versus long timescales. We show the temperature changes that result from exchanging CO₂ for CH₄ using a variety of commonly suggested metrics to illustrate the trade-offs involved in potential carbon trading mechanisms that place a high value on CH₄ emissions. Reducing CH₄ emissions today would lead to a climate cooling of approximately ~0.5 °C, but this value will not change greatly if we delay reducing CH₄ emissions by years or decades. This is not true for CO₂, for which the climate is influenced by cumulative emissions. Any delay in reducing CO₂ emissions is likely to lead to higher cumulative emissions, and more warming. The exact warming resulting from this delay depends on the trajectory of future CO₂ emissions but using one business-as usual-projection we estimate an increase of 3/4 °C for every 15-year delay in CO₂ mitigation. Overvaluing the influence of CH₄ emissions on climate could easily result in our “locking” the earth into a warmer temperature trajectory, one that is temporarily masked by the short-term cooling effects of the CH₄ reductions, but then persists for many generations.     

Who and what are carbon markets for? Politics and the development of climate policy

Why have carbon markets been rapidly adopted as policy solutions to climate change in the last decade? Perhaps surprisingly, this question has attracted virtually no attention in the large literature on such markets. The standard arguments given for why carbon markets are good ways to respond to climate change do not explain why such markets have flourished as governance mechanisms in relation to climate. Carbon markets have spread and become taken-for-granted because of the potential they give to certain powerful actors (financiers, specifically) to create new cycles of investment, profits and growth. As a consequence, they make possible a political coalition combining financiers with environmentalists. This coalition has considerable potential to legitimize substantial cuts in carbon emissions in the face of continued opposition from other interests. It is the combination of these two elements – the promotion of specific growth sectors and the construction of a political coalition – that constitutes the principal political virtue of carbon markets. In order to demonstrate this claim, the history of emissions trading is traced and the implication of this analysis is explored for the further building of climate governance centred on carbon markets.     

Subjective measures of climate resilience: What is the added value for policy and programming?

Subjective approaches to resilience measurement are gaining traction as a complementary approach to the standard frameworks that typically contain objective measures. Proponents suggest that subjective approaches may add value to existing measures in three areas: by improving our understanding of the drivers of resilience, reducing the questionnaire burden on respondents, and potentially offering more valid cross-cultural comparisons. This perspective assesses the potential, evidence and uncertainties around each of these claims, drawing from decades of research using subjective techniques in the wellbeing and psychological resilience literatures. Overall we find that subjective approaches can theoretically add value in each of these three areas. However the design of appropriate indicators must proceed with specificity and rigour for subjective measures to add value to programming and policy for climate resilience.