A rose by any other name ...?: What members of the general public prefer to call “climate change”

Unlike many other environmental problems, the terms used to describe the phenomenon of increasing atmospheric concentrations of anthropogenic greenhouse gases are many, with multiple and sometimes conflicting meanings. Whether there are meaningful distinctions in public perceptions of “global warming,” “climate change,” and “global climate change” has been a topic of research over the past decade. This study examines public preferences for these terms based on respondent characteristics, including climate change beliefs, political affiliation, and audience segment status derived from the “Global Warming’s Six Americas” classification. Certainty of belief in global warming, political affiliation and audience segment status were found to be the strongest predictors of preference, although “I have no preference” was the modal response. Global warming appears to be a more polarizing term than climate change, preferred most by people already concerned about the issue, and least by people who don’t believe climate change is occurring. Further research is needed to identify which of these two names promotes the engagement of people across the spectrum of climate change beliefs in constructive dialogue about the issue.     

Public concern over global warming correlates negatively with national wealth

It has been shown previously that the awareness and concern of the general public about global warming is not only a function of scientific information. Both psychological and sociological factors affect the willingness of laypeople to acknowledge the reality of global warming, and to support climate policies of their home countries. In this paper, I analyse a cross-national dataset of public concern about global warming, utilising data from 46 countries. Based on earlier results at the national and regional level, I expect concern to be negatively correlated to national measures of wealth and carbon dioxide emissions. I find that gross domestic product is indeed negatively correlated to the proportion of a population that regards global warming as a serious problem. There is also a marginally significant tendency that nations’ per capita carbon dioxide emissions are negatively correlated to public concern. These findings suggest that the willingness of a nation to contribute to reductions in greenhouse gas emissions decreases with its share of these emissions. This is in accordance with psychological findings, but poses a problem for political decision-makers. When communicating with the public, scientists ought to be aware of their responsibility to use a language that is understood by laypeople.     

Who remembers a hot summer or a cold winter? The asymmetric effect of beliefs about global warming on perceptions of local climate conditions in the U.S.

This paper explores the phenomenon of local climate perception and the extent to which public perceptions match climate conditions as recorded in instrumental climate data. We further examine whether perceptions of changes in local climates are influenced by prior beliefs about global warming, through the process of motivated reasoning. Using national survey data collected in the United States in 2011, we find that subjective experiences of seasonal average temperature and precipitation during the previous winter and summer were related to recorded conditions during each season. Beliefs about global warming also had significant effects on subjective experiences with above-normal temperatures, particularly among those who believed that global warming is not happening. When asked about the summer of 2010, those who believed that global warming is not happening were significantly less likely to report that they had experienced a warmer-than-normal summer, even when controlling for demographics and local climate conditions. These results suggest that the subjective experience of local climate change is dependent not only on external climate conditions, but also on individual beliefs, with perceptions apparently biased by prior beliefs about global warming.     

Perceived scientific agreement and support for government action on climate change in the USA

Given the well-documented campaign in the USA to deny the reality and seriousness of anthropogenic climate change (a major goal of which is to “manufacture uncertainty” in the minds of policy-makers and the general public), we examine the influence that perception of the scientific agreement on global warming has on the public’s beliefs about global warming and support for government action to reduce emissions. A recent study by Ding et al. (Nat Clim Chang 1:462–466, 2011) using nationally representative survey data from 2010 finds that misperception of scientific agreement among climate scientists is associated with lower levels of support for climate policy and beliefs that action should be taken to deal with global warming. Our study replicates and extends Ding et al. (Nat Clim Chang 1:462–466, 2011) using nationally representative survey data from March 2012. We generally confirm their findings, suggesting that the crucial role of perceived scientific agreement on views of global warming and support for climate policy is robust. Further, we show that political orientation has a significant influence on perceived scientific agreement, global warming beliefs, and support for government action to reduce emissions. Our results suggest the importance of improving public perception of the scientific agreement on global warming, but in ways that do not trigger or aggravate ideological or partisan divisions.     

My neighbourhood,my country or my planet? The influence of multiple place attachments and climate change concern on social acceptance of energy infrastructure

Research on place attachments and identities has made an important contribution to understanding social acceptance of low carbon infrastructure, which are often objected to by local communities. However, a focus on local attachments predominates in studies to date, neglecting the potential role of national and global attachments and identities on energy beliefs and attitudes, despite the fact that large energy infrastructures are not only local in significance or function. To investigate this, survey data was collected from a representative sample of UK adults (N = 1519), capturing place attachments at local, national and global levels, climate change concern, beliefs about power lines and support for energy system change. Findings show significant differences in infrastructure beliefs and attitudes depending upon relative strength of attachments at different levels, controlling for personal characteristics. Analyses of variance revealed that individuals with stronger national than local or global attachments were less likely to support European grid integration; those with relatively stronger global attachment were most likely to support decentralised energy and those with relatively stronger local attachment were most likely to protest against a nearby power line. In addition, those with strong attachments at local, national and global levels were most willing to reduce energy demand, and those with weak attachments were least likely to trust grid companies. Relatively stronger global than national attachment was positively associated with support for decentralised energy, with this effect partially mediated by climate change concern. Explanations for the findings and implications for future research are discussed.     

The 60-year solar modulation of global air temperature: the Earth’s rotation and atmospheric circulation connection

Summary Spectral analysis of geomagnetic activity, global air temperature, Earth’s rotation rate and zonal circulation, when smoothed from secular trend and periods shorter than 23 years, shows a concentration of energy around the 60-year period explaining more than 80% of the entire variance. This information has enabled the set-up of a cascade physical model that integrates the Sun-atmosphere-Earth system as a single unit and ties solar corpuscular radiation to global warming through Earth’s rotation and atmospheric circulation. Our results suggest that changes in geomagnetic activity, and in the Earth’s rotation, could be used as long- and short-term indicators, respectively, of future changes in global air temperature.     

How do people update? The effects of local weather fluctuations on beliefs about global warming

Global warming has become a controversial public policy issue in spite of broad scientific consensus that it is real and that human activity is a contributing factor. It is likely that public consensus is also needed to support policies that might counteract it. It is therefore important to understand how people form and update their beliefs about climate change. Using unique survey data on beliefs about the occurrence of the effects of global warming, I estimate how local temperature fluctuations influence what individuals believe about these effects. I find that some features of the updating process are consistent with rational updating. I also test explicitly for the presence of several heuristics known to affect belief formation and find strong evidence for representativeness, some evidence for availability, and no evidence for spreading activation. I find that very short-run temperature fluctuations (1 day–2 weeks) have no effect on beliefs about the occurrence of global warming, but that longer-run fluctuations (1 month–1 year) are significant predictors of beliefs. Only respondents with a conservative political ideology are affected by temperature abnormalities.     

Thinking About Global Warming

Attitudes toward global warming are influenced by various heuristics, which may distort policy away from what is optimal for the well-being of people. These possible distortions, or biases, include: a focus on harms that we cause, as opposed to those that we can remedy more easily; a feeling that those who cause a problem should fix it; a desire to undo a problem rather than compensate for its presence; parochial concern with one’s own group (nation); and neglect of risks that are not available. Although most of these biases tend to make us attend relatively too much to global warming, other biases, such as wishful thinking, cause us to attend too little. I discuss these possible effects and illustrate some of them with an experiment conducted on the World Wide Web.     

Volcanic and solar impacts on climate since 1700

 Numerical experiments have been carried out with a two-dimensional sector averaged global climate model with a detailed radiative scheme in order to assess the possible impact of solar and volcanic activities on the Earth’s surface temperature at the secular time scale from 1700 to 1992. Our results indicate that while the general trend of the observed temperature variations on the century time scale can be generated in response to both the solar and volcanic forcings, these are clearly not sufficient to explain the observed 20th century warming and more specifically the warming trend which started at the beginning of the 1970s. However, the lack of volcanism during the period 1925–1960 could account, at least partly, for the observed warming trend in this period. Finally, while Schlesinger and Ramankutty (1994) assumed that random forcing could not be a possible source of the 65–70 year oscillation they detected in the global climate system, our results indicate that the volcanic forcing over the past 150 years could have introduced an oscillation of around 70 years in the Earth’s surface temperature. Received: 25 August 1997/Accepted: 27 November 1998     

Global warming vs. climate change, taxes vs. prices: Does word choice matter?

Does ??climate change?? seem like a less serious problem than ??global warming?? to Americans and Europeans? Does describing the costs of climate change mitigation in terms of ??higher taxes?? instead of ??higher prices?? reduce public support for such efforts? In an experiment embedded in an American national survey, respondents were randomly assigned to rate the seriousness of ??global warming,?? ??climate change,?? or ??global climate change.?? Contrary to predictions made by a leading political strategist, the full sample and political Independents perceived ??climate change?? and ??global warming?? to be equally serious. Among Republicans, ??climate change?? was perceived to be more serious than ??global warming,?? whereas the reverse was true among Democrats. A similar experiment embedded in a survey of residents of 31 European countries showed that ??global warming?? and ??climate change?? were perceived to be equally serious problems. And an experiment embedded in an American survey showed that describing the increased costs of climate change mitigation legislation via ??higher taxes?? instead of via ??higher prices?? did not reduce popular support for such legislation, also contradicting a political strategy memo. Thus, word choice may sometimes affect public perceptions of the climate change seriousness or support for mitigation policies, but a single choice of terminology may not influence all people the same way, making strategic language choices difficult to implement.     

Do people “personally experience” global warming,and if so how,and does it matter?

For most people, the direct and personally observable signals of climate change should be difficult to detect amid the variability of everyday weather. Yet, previous research has shown that some people believe they have personally experienced global warming. Through four related studies, our paper sheds light on what signals of global warming some people believe they are detecting, why, and whether or not it matters. These studies were conducted using population survey and climatic data from a single county in Michigan. Study 1 found that 27% of the county's adult residents felt that they had personally experienced global warming. Study 2 – based on content analysis of people's open-ended responses – found that the most frequently described personal experiences of global warming were changes in seasons (36%), weather (25%), lake levels (24%), animals and plants (20%), and snowfall (19%). Study 3 – based on NOAA climatic data – found that most, but not all, of these detected signals are borne out in the climatic record. Study 4 – using the survey data – found that personal experience of global warming matters in that it predicts perceptions of local risk of global warming, controlling for demographics, political affiliation, and cultural beliefs about national policy outcomes. We conclude that perceived personal experience of global warming appears to heighten people's perception of the risks, likely through some combination of direct experience, vicarious experience (e.g., news media stories), and social construction.     

Is it hot in here or is it just me? Temperature anomalies and political polarization over global warming in the American public

Do temperature anomalies affect political polarization over global warming? Americans’ attitudes about global warming are affected by whether they reside in states experiencing unseasonably warm (or cold) temperatures versus those experiencing milder temperatures. Specifically, in terms of causal attribution, political polarization over global warming is more pronounced in states experiencing temperature anomalies. Using pooled data collected during 2013–2014, this study utilizes logistic regression to explore how temperature anomalies exacerbate the political polarization among Americans over perceptions of whether global warming impacts are immediately evident as well as the attribution of global warming to human activity. Results indicate that very cold or warm temperature anomalies from a 5-year baseline predict perceptions of global warming impacts and exacerbate existing political polarization over the causal attribution of global warming. These effects are particularly noticeable among Democrats. This analysis provides a contribution to understanding how temperature anomalies from the recent past shape the sociophysical context of global warming attitudes.     

How does framing affect policy support for emissions mitigation? Testing the effects of ocean acidification and other carbon emissions frames

Public support for carbon emissions mitigation is crucial to motivate action to address global issues like climate change and ocean acidification (OA). Yet in the public sphere, carbon emissions mitigation policies are typically discussed in the context of climate change and rarely in the context of OA or other global change outcomes. In this paper, we advance research on OA and climate change perceptions and communication, by (i) examining causal beliefs about ocean acidification, and (ii) measuring support for mitigation policies from individuals presented with one of five different policy frames (climate change, global warming, carbon pollution, air pollution, and ocean acidification). Knowledge about OA causes and consequences is more widespread than we anticipated, though still generally low. Somewhat surprisingly, an “air pollution” mitigation frame elicits the highest degree of policy support overall, while “carbon pollution” performs no better than “climate change” or “global warming.” Framing effects are in part contingent on prior knowledge and attitudes, and mediated by concern. Perhaps due to a lack of OA awareness, the OA frame generates the least support overall, although it seems to close the gap in support associated with political orientation: the OA frame increases support among those (few) conservatives who report having heard of OA before the survey. These findings complement previous work on climate change communication and suggest the need for further research into OA as an effective way to engage conservatives in carbon emissions mitigation policy. Potentially even more promising is the air pollution framing.     

A transient climate change simulation with greenhouse gas and aerosol forcing: projected climate to the twenty-first century

 The potential climatic consequences of increasing atmospheric greenhouse gas (GHG) concentration and sulfate aerosol loading are investigated for the years 1900 to 2100 based on five simulations with the CCCma coupled climate model. The five simulations comprise a control experiment without change in GHG or aerosol amount, three independent simulations with increasing GHG and aerosol forcing, and a simulation with increasing GHG forcing only. Climate warming accelerates from the present with global mean temperatures simulated to increase by 1.7 °C to the year 2050 and by a further 2.7 °C by the year 2100. The warming is non-uniform as to hemisphere, season, and underlying surface. Changes in interannual variability of temperature show considerable structure and seasonal dependence. The effect of the comparatively localized negative radiative forcing associated with the aerosol is to retard and reduce the warming by about 0.9 °C at 2050 and 1.2 °C at 2100. Its primary effect on temperature is to counteract the global pattern of GHG-induced warming and only secondarily to affect local temperatures suggesting that the first order transient climate response of the system is determined by feedback processes and only secondarily by the local pattern of radiative forcing. The warming is accompanied by a more active hydrological cycle with increases in precipitation and evaporation rates that are delayed by comparison with temperature increases. There is an “El Nino-like” shift in precipitation and an overall increase in the interannual variability of precipitation. The effect of the aerosol forcing is again primarily to delay and counteract the GHG-induced increase. Decreases in soil moisture are common but regionally dependent and interannual variability changes show considerable structure. Snow cover and sea-ice retreat. A PNA-like anomaly in mean sea-level pressure with an enhanced Aleutian low in northern winter is associated with the tropical shift in precipitation regime. The interannual variability of mean sea-level pressure generally decreases with largest decreases in the tropical Indian ocean region. Changes to the ocean thermal structure are associated with a spin-down of the Atlantic thermohaline circulation together with a decrease in its variability. The effect of aerosol forcing, although modest, differs from that for most other quantities in that it does not act primarily to counteract the GHG forcing effect. The barotropic stream function in the ocean exhibits modest change in the north Pacific but accelerating changes in much of the Southern Ocean and particularly in the north Atlantic where the gyre spins down in conjunction with the decrease in the thermohaline circulation. The results differ in non-trivial ways from earlier equilibrium 2 × CO₂ results with the CCCma model as a consequence of the coupling to a fully three-dimensional ocean model and the evolving nature of the forcing. Received: 24 September 1998 / Accepted: 8 October 1999     

Urban reactions to the global warming issue: Agenda setting in Toronto and Chicago

Little research has been done about what cities could or should do concerning potential global warming. A few cities have adopted programs to deal with impacts they perceive may occur, and a worldwide network of 100 cities involved with CO₂ reduction has recently emerged. Global warming is a new issue for cities and most are only dimly aware of how it may affect them. Toronto, through the efforts of a few leaders, has become a pioneer in the development of an urban response program to global warming. It has charged a city agency to deal with global warming issues, in particular emissions reduction. Chicago is aware of the issue and is concerned about the negative impacts global warming could produce. While behind Toronto, Chicago is moving forward in a number of areas. These two cities illuminate the policy-making process for global warming at the urban level and the role {atpolicy entrepreneurs} can play at this level. In comparing the two cities, a common model of policy development is utilized.     

Where are Germany’s gains from Kyoto? Estimating the effects of global warming on agriculture

Motivated by the high abatement costs of the Kyoto Protocol for Germany, this paper is estimating the economic impact of global warming on agriculture in that country. The hedonic approach is used as theoretical background. Stating that land prices are – among others – determined by climatic factors, this approach can consequently be used to value global warming. To avoid a priori restrictions stemming from functional forms, the land price function is modeled as quadratic Box–Cox function that nests a wide range of specifications. In a second step, the estimated results are used to forecast the impact of climate change. The results indicate that German farmers will be winners of climate change in the short run, with maximum gains occurring at a temperature increase of +0.6°C against current levels. In the long run, there may be losses from global warming. However, the net present value from climate change is under the most probable scenarios positive.     

My country or my planet? Exploring the influence of multiple place attachments and ideological beliefs upon climate change attitudes and opinions

Research on people-place relations, specifically place attachment and place identity, is beginning to make an important contribution to understanding human responses to climate change. However, to date there has been a dearth of research on how place attachments at multiple scales, particularly the global, and individual level ideological beliefs combine to influence climate change attitudes and opinions. To address these gaps, survey data was collected from a representative sample of Australian citizens (N = 1147), capturing attachments at neighbourhood, city/town, state/territory, country and global scales, as well as a range of climate change belief and individual difference measures. Results show the importance of the interplay between national and global place attachments. Individuals expressing stronger global than national attachments were more likely to attribute climate change to anthropogenic causes, to oppose hierarchy-enhancing myths that legitimize climate inaction, and to perceive positive economic impacts arising from climate change responses, in comparison to individuals indicating stronger national over global place attachments. Individuals with stronger global than national attachments were more likely to be female, younger, and self-identify as having no religion, to be more likely to vote Green and to be characterized by significantly lower levels of right wing authoritarian and social dominance beliefs. Right wing authoritarian and social dominance beliefs mediated the effects of place attachments upon climate change skepticism. Explanations for the findings and implications for future research are discussed.     

Relationship between the increase temperature and variation of ozone level over the Antarctica and Tibetan plateau in spring

Based on the ozone and aerological sounding data at Syowa Station (69o 00'S, 39o35'E), Antarctica during 1966－1979 and Lhasa Station (39o40'N, 91o08'E), Tibetan Plateau during 1979－1983, the processes of temperature increase in spring over the Tibetan Plateau and the Antarctica are compared in this paper, and the relationship between the increase of air temperature and variation of total ozone and ozone partial pressure is analyzed. It is found that: (1) The process of temperature increase over the Tibetan Plateau is quite different from that over the Antarctica in spring. This is a proof that the heating effects of their ground surface on the atmosphere are of great difference; (2) Sudden increase of total ozone is always associated with sudden warming in the stratosphere over the Antarctica, but sudden decrease of total ozone is associated with sudden warming in the troposphere over the Tibetan Plateau in spring; and (3) There is a good positive correlation, with a correlation coefficient of about 0.85, between the temperature increase and variation of ozone partial pressure in the stratosphere over the Antarctica in spring.