The elephant in the room: The hidden costs of leasing individual transferable fishing quotas

Despite the increasingly positive reviews of individual transferable quotas (ITQs), few studies have considered how quota leasing activities can reduce the economic benefits to society and to fishermen operating under the ITQ fisheries system. This analysis reveals negative economic impacts of ITQs previously overlooked by examining the extent of quota leasing and the relationship between the catch value, the cost of fishing, and the quota lease price in the BC halibut fishery, long considered a poster child for ITQs. Findings challenge assumptions of economic theory used to promote the benefits of ITQs.     

Social and economic consequences of 40 years of Dutch quota management

The Netherlands was one of the first nations to introduce ITQs in their fisheries to manage national yearly Total Allowable Catches (TACs). These ITQs have gradually developed from an individual quota system in 1976 to an ITQ system in the 1980s. In 1993 the system was reformed into a co-management system. In this paper it is argued that many of the usual negative socio-economic consequences of ITQs mentioned in the literature have been largely absent, due to the embeddedness of ITQs in co-management arrangements. However, cracks have appeared lately in this combined management system, allowing an identification of its vulnerabilities. These findings show that the social and economic structure of Dutch fisheries is changing from a rather cooperative to a more competitive and exclusive system, more like conventional ITQs.     

Designing ITQ programs for commercial recreational fishing

This paper discusses the potential for implementing individual transferable quota (ITQ) schemes in commercial recreational fisheries, focusing particularly on charter and headboat fisheries. After a brief discussion of ITQs in commercial fisheries, the paper discusses the manner in which rents get dissipated in commercial recreational fisheries. Fishing mortality in recreational fisheries is determined as a joint outcome of angler behavior and trip supply. In the recreational sector under open access conditions, there are likely to be too many vessels providing too many trips at prices that are too low. Vessel input configurations are likely to be distorted in a manner that generates excessive fishing mortality. Designing ITQs for recreational fisheries requires consideration of issues not prominent in the design of commercial fisheries. Among the most important is the manner in which angler preferences and types affect overall mortality from both landings and discards. While catch and release fisheries and pure food fish recreational fisheries are relatively easy to manage with recreational ITQs, fisheries with both angler types present difficult monitoring problems that add complexities to ITQ design. Various ways to design programs that account for both landings and discard mortalities and that generate incentives for anglers and vessel owners to reduce discard mortality are discussed.     

Ex ante evaluation of the costs and benefits of individual transferable quotas: A case-study of seven Australian commonwealth fisheries

Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) have been introduced in a number of different countries, including Australia. Using seven Australian commonwealth fisheries the paper undertakes an ex ante cost–benefit analysis whether to introduce ITQs into these fisheries. The analysis uses five cost–benefit criteria, and in particular the gross value of production (GVP), to evaluate whether ITQs should be introduced or not. For fisheries where the net benefits do not currently justify ITQs, a pathway is provided to improve management outcomes with the use of individual transferable efforts units (ITEs).     

Lesser-known consequences of managing marine fisheries using individual transferable quotas

Managing marine fisheries using output controls in the form of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) can be an attractive alternative to more traditional input controls. There are now a number of examples of where ITQ-managed fisheries have been able to reduce the impact of the major management problems in global fisheries, namely, gross over-capitalisation and effort. However, ITQs are not the perfect management tool and one of the lesser known consequences of ITQ-managed fisheries where ITQs consist of a harvest right is the implicit relationship between ITQ property rights and rights of access to the fishing grounds. This implicit spatial right to the grounds can provide obstacles in the way of allocating water-space within fishing grounds for alternative uses such as marine-protected areas, large-scale aquaculture, and wind farms. These lesser-known consequences of ITQ-managed fisheries are discussed here.     

Figuring fish and measuring men: the individual transferable quota system in the Icelandic cod fishery

This article discusses inequality in the Icelandic cod fishery, focusing on changes in the actual distribution of fishing quotas and the ways in which Icelanders currently talk about equity and ownership. The individual transferable quota (ITQ) system, introduced in 1984, divided access to an important resource among those who happened to be boat owners at that time. Statistical findings with respect to the cod fishery - based on a database (the ‘Quotabase’) constructed using detailed information on all vessels that have been allotted ITQs from the onset of the system - show that ITQs have been increasingly concentrated in the hands of the biggest companies. Many of the small-scale boat owners that still hold ITQs are increasingly compelled to enter into contracts that involve fishing for larger ITQ holders. It is suggested that the distribution of ITQs, as well as their evaluation in social discourse, represents an important field of research. In Iceland, public discontent with the concentration of fishing rights and the ensuing social repercussions is increasingly articulated in terms of loaded metaphors, including ‘profiteering’, ‘tenancy’ and ‘lords of the sea’. It is argued that the ultimate efficiency of management programs may be jeopardized if managers ignore the history and culture of the fisheries involved and the likely social and ecological consequences of their programs.     

Privatization,financialization and ocean grabbing in New Brunswick herring fisheries and salmon aquaculture

The growing literature on individual transferable quotas (ITQs) and on intensive salmon aquaculture and its negative impacts on the environment and other users of related marine space has been little connected to the developing literature on financialization and to the literature on ocean grabbing within fisheries. This paper seeks to address this gap through a case study of the recent history of herring fisheries and intensive aquaculture in New Brunswick, Canada, exploring how specific neoliberal processes – including privatization and marketization (in herring fleet ITQs and aquaculture lease systems), (re)regulation, financialization and globalization – have interacted to support the reshaping of regional fisheries from mixed small-scale, family-based, petty commodity fisheries towards vertically-integrated, corporate, financialized fisheries characterized by ocean grabbing.     

Distributional issues in the operation of rights-based fisheries management systems

Rights-based management regimes are considered by economists as an important solution to the problems of excess capacity and biological over-harvesting of fisheries. In practice, adoption of such regimes, and particularly of those relying on individual quota allocations, has often met with resistance from within the fisheries concerned. A key reason for this resistance appears to be the distributional conflicts which arise in the process of implementing the regimes. An economic analysis of the nature of these conflicts in the different contexts in which they have been observed is proposed. The approach centres on the way in which distributional conflicts can influence the operation of management systems and their impacts on fisheries, from the country to the individual firm level. As an illustration, an analysis of the economic processes at firm level is developed based on the simulation of a fishery managed under individual transferable quotas.     

The cost-benefit ledger of quota leasing

Bruce Turris recently presented an analysis of the expenses and earnings of British Columbia fishermen who lease halibut quota (ITQs). The BC Longline Fishermen's Association, which represents active halibut fishermen has quite a different analysis of these costs and benefits, and also takes issue with Turris’ analysis of the state of the fishery in general under quotas.     

Unreported bycatch in the New Zealand West Coast South Island hoki fishery

There are recognised benefits to managing fisheries by individual transferable quotas (ITQs), but ITQs may increase incentives to discard fish.     

Tangled lines in New Zealand's quota management system: The process of including recreational fisheries

This article uses New Zealand as a case study of processes relating to the inclusion of recreational fisheries in modern fisheries management systems based on Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs). The New Zealand case highlights challenges governments often meet when attempting to integrate the recreational sector into fisheries management, including: (a) resistance to restrictions on what has historically been free-of-charge public access to fish for recreational purposes and (b) the fragmented character of the recreational sector, which makes it difficult to have recreational interests attend to their management role and responsibilities.     

Are input controls required in individual transferable quota fisheries to address ecosystem based fisheries management objectives?

This study examined the use of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) to effectively manage fishing impacts on all ecosystem components, as required under Ecosystem Based Fisheries Management (EBFM) principles. A consequence of changing from input controls to output-based (catch) management is that the control of the regulating authority tends to be reduced, which may affect the outcomes for ecosystem management. This study reviewed the use of input controls across six fishing methods in 18 ITQ fisheries, which have been independently accredited as ecologically sustainable by the Marine Stewardship Council (12 fisheries) or under Australian environmental legislation for Wildlife Trade Operation (six fisheries). Input controls were retained across a range of ITQ fisheries, with non-selective fisheries such as trawl, gillnet and line employing more input controls than selective fisheries such as purse-seine, pot/trap and dredge. Further case-studies confirmed the widespread and recent use of input controls (spatial and temporal closures) with the aim of managing ecosystem impacts of fishing. The retention of input controls, particularly closures affects the security (quality of title) characteristic of the fishing use right and the theoretical ability of fishers to manage their right for their future benefit. The security characteristic is weakened by closures through loss of access, which undermines industry trust and incentive for long-term decision making. By reducing the security of ITQs, individual fisher incentives and behaviour may separate from societal objectives for sustainability, which was one of the foremost reasons for introducing ITQ management.     

Norway's experience with ITQs

This paper discusses the development of ITQs in Norway. Even if some would deny that anything such exists, fisheries management in Norway has some unmistakable characteristics of an ITQ system. Both boatowners and policy makers have discovered the attractions of transferable quotas, the former as a means to increase their private profits, the latter as a vehicle to reduce fleet overcapacity. The slow evolution of transferability is mainly the result of ideological opposition and opposition to structural changes, the latter involving falling number of fishermen, changes in location of the fishing industry, and changed composition of the fishing fleet. The development of this system in the purse seine fleet and the fleet fishing for cod and similar species is traced. Then the concept of resource rent is discussed, as well as how it has become capitalized in quota values, which show up as a rise in value of long term assets of the fishing industry.     

Spatial conflicts in New Zealand fisheries: The rights of fishers and protection of the marine environment

New Zealand fisheries legislation provides commercial fishing rights to holders of individual transferable quota (ITQ). The settlement of fisheries claims against the Crown by Mäori, New Zealand's indigenous people, brought about the transfer of ITQ holdings to Mäori, and an obligation on the Crown to recognise and provide for indigenous (customary) fishing rights over fishing grounds and other areas that have been of special significance to Mäori. Some types of customary fishing areas exclude commercial fishing and could affect recreational fishing. Fisheries legislation requires that regulatory measures be put in place to avoid, remedy or mitigate the adverse effects of fishing. The Government also aims to protect marine biodiversity by having 10% of New Zealand waters in some form of protection by 2010. The legislative processes for protecting the marine environment and establishing customary fishing areas include assessment of effects on fishing rights. This paper explores the conflicts that arise from legislative obligations to uphold the rights of fishers, to sustain fishstocks and to protect the marine environment. The paper concludes that inconsistent legislative obligations and their disparate processes have led to spatial conflicts and a race for the allocation of space. Legislative obligations need to be integrated to maintain a balance between use of fisheries resources and protection of the marine environment.     

Alternatives to ITQs in equity–efficiency–effectiveness trade-offs: How the lay-up system spread effort in the BC halibut fishery

Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs), also called “catch shares”, have been broadly adopted in the last two decades, at the same time that concerns about their equity and effectiveness in delivering the predicted outcomes have increased. This paper documents how an alternative fishermen-designed and operated system of spreading fishing effort to avoid the race for fish—called the lay-up system—worked effectively and equitably for four decades in the British Columbia halibut fishery before ITQs were introduced in this fishery. Why the lay-up system was allowed to collapse and its history ignored illustrates important roles played by conflicting ideologies, bureaucratic rationality, and the inability to imagine an alternative way of solving fisheries management problems. Trade-offs between the efficiency, equity, and effectiveness of halibut and other management systems are considered.     

Networks of capital: Reframing knowledge in the Namibian hake fishery

This paper explores the failures of the quota allocation system in the hake fishery in Walvis Bay, Namibia through an examination of the complex processes that link commodities, labour, production, markets, and knowledge in the industrial setting. The relationships between state regulations and public nature point to a specific engagement in which nature is divided, distributed, and owned, namely through the market driven prospects of transferable quotas. This article examines fishing quota as a set of relations that links the transformation of fish from biological organism to global product and thus weaves science, the state, markets, and social relationships into an entanglement of different forms of capital. In this context, the tension between the quota holder, the value of that quota, and their participation in the industry reflects a complex network of capital mediated through various strategies. Based on ethnographic research in the Namibian trawl sector, this article surfaces these modes of capital in the dynamics of the fishing operations. As such, the fishing industry, the company that holds the fishing rights, the government׳s role in quota allocations, the vessels, gear, and technologies, and the relationships and roles of the crewmembers and skippers׳ knowledge all contribute to a particular formulation of fishing practices. Fisher׳s knowledge in industrial fishing practices becomes a site in which to explore the consequences of ITQs that may also begin to destabilise the neoliberal business model for fisheries in times of crisis.     

Private rights,public benefits: Industry-driven seabed protection

New Zealand has a large exclusive economic zone (EEZ) that contains a variety of marine habitats and commercially-important species. The commercial fishing industry operating within New Zealand's EEZ is of significant value to the economy and fisheries resources are managed through the extensive use of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs). One of the benefits of ITQs has been to better align some of the private incentives of quota owners with the public interest. These incentives contributed to an initiative proposed by the fishing industry to close large areas of New Zealand's EEZ to protect the seabed from trawling. These closed areas are termed benthic protection areas (BPAs) and protect the benthic biodiversity of about 1.1 million square kilometres of seabed—approximately 30% of New Zealand's EEZ. A significant proportion of New Zealand's known seamounts and active hydrothermal vents are protected by these closed areas. We describe and discuss the criteria used to select BPAs and some of the criticism of this marine protection initiative. We argue that the assignment of strong property rights in fishing resources was an important precondition to an industry initiative that has a significant public benefit. Where private and public interests are well aligned, government can adopt an enabling and facilitation role, ceding direct control of processes in order to get the results the align with the public interest.     

New Zealand seafood firm competitiveness in export markets: The role of the quota management system and aquaculture legislation

New Zealand's quota management system (QMS) was implemented in 1986 to address problems caused by a regulated open entry management system in place for the previous two decades. Excess capacity in the inshore fisheries caused several stocks to become depleted and conflicts to intensify between fishing sectors. The allocation of individual transferable quota (ITQ) was viewed as the best way to improve efficiency within the over-capitalised inshore fisheries and provide incentives for developing the deepwater fisheries. The expected benefits of the QMS fit with the political climate at that time, as the government was using market forces to address the deteriorating economy. This article outlines the results of a research project that involved four medium to large-sized, highly vertically integrated New Zealand seafood firms. The purpose of the project was to identify these firms’ sources of competitiveness in export markets and the process the firms used to develop sources of competitiveness, while adapting to rapid and radical changes to the political and business environment and transformation of the fisheries management system. The project's results show that the basis to seafood firm competitiveness is the security of supply to the fisheries resource provided by the QMS and aquaculture legislation. The project also outlines the role that government policies have in sustaining firm- and industry-level competitiveness. This article contributes to the broader discussion on the application of ITQ and other types of long-term access rights to the management of fisheries and does not express the views of the Ministry of Fisheries.     

Swedish coastal herring fisheries in the wake of an ITQ system

The European common fisheries policy (CFP) advocates measures to sustain small-scale fisheries; hence, in the European Commission's proposal for a reformed CFP, these are exempted from a mandatory system with tradable fishing concessions. This opens up for management actions designed for small-scale fisheries, but also implies new management issues. This article provides insights into the topic based on a Swedish small-scale herring fishery in the western Baltic Sea that was exempted from an ITQ-system. The fishery has been profitable since the system was introduced, and the increasing effort of both incumbent fishermen and new entrants implies a situation where fishermen compete for a limited quota. The migratory pattern of the herring implies high densities in the southern parts of the fishing areas during spring and in the northern parts during autumn. This forms the basis for two different fisheries in the area, as well as for the current management proposal to divide the quota into a spring and an autumn part. This and other management proposals are discussed in the paper. The main conclusion from the case study is that, when exempting a fishery from tradable fishing concessions, it is important to build other institutions dealing with the fundamental problem of access to the quota. Failure to do so might result in an over-capacity issue and threaten the long-run development of an otherwise successful small-scale fishery.