Comparison of simultaneous and combinatorial auction designs in fisheries quota market

Individual transferable quota (ITQ) markets are being used successfully to distribute quotas in single region and single species fisheries. In many parts of the world, the development of well crafted markets for multispecies or multiregional fisheries is still evolving. As a result, there exists an opportunity to inform policy by providing research insights into the relative merits of alternative market designs for such fisheries.This study explored the relative merits of a simultaneous ascending auction design and an iterative combinatorial auction design for a hypothetical multiple region quota market. In a simultaneous auction, separate auctions are run in parallel for individual species or regions. During intermediate rounds, fishers can adjust their bids in auction depending on their position in the other auction. In a combinatorial auction, a fisher can purchase a combination of quotas (or a package quota) for different fish species or regions in the same auction. Being able to acquire bundles of species or regions allows fishers to take advantage of complementarities. To date, the potentials of such auctions have not been thoroughly tested in fisheries quota markets. This study found that while a simultaneous auction design was more efficient than combinatorial auction design overall, combinatorial market design took fewer rounds to make final allocations and performed better in high synergy environments.     

Fisheries quota allocation: Laboratory experiments on simultaneous and combinatorial auctions

Markets for individual tradeable fishing quota are evolving and maturing in many countries throughout the world. Synergies in spatial and temporal packages of fishing quotas have yet to be explored and exploited. The relative performance of simultaneous multi-round and combinatorial auctions has been well documented and explored in a number of environments including the allocation of spectrum rights by the US Federal Communications Commission, aircraft take-off and landing slots, as well as pollution emissions allowances. It is therefore timely and policy relevant to explore the relative performance of simultaneous and combinatorial fishery quota markets in controlled experimental environments. This paper reports the results of a series of economic experiments exploring the relative merits of these alternative fishing quota markets. The results provide important insights into the future development of individual tradeable fishing quotas.     

Fish quota auctions in the Russian Far East: a failed experiment

For three years (2001–2003), fish quotas in the Russian far east (REE) were allocated by auction. First, a short overview of the RFE fisheries is provided and how the total allowable catch (TAC) is allocated between regions and (before the auctions) enterprises. Then the auction system is discussed. The purpose of the auctions was to divert some of the resource rent to the state budget and to increase the transparency of the quota allocation mechanism. In the end, a lot less of the TAC than intended was sold by auctions. Nevertheless, the auctions provided a substantial income for the government. On the other hand they led to a decline in industry profits and greater indebtedness of the industry. Arguably they also led to more of illegal fishing, as firms bought quotas in order to cover operations on a greater scale that were not well monitored. In 2004 the auction system was abandoned, in part due to pressures from the industry.     

US catch share markets: a review of data availability and impediments to transparent markets

A growing number of US fisheries are managed with catch share programs, which allocate exclusive shares of the total allowable catch from a fish stock to individuals, cooperatives, communities, or other entities. All of these catch share programs allow transferability of catch privileges in some form. Information on these transfers, particularly prices, could be valuable to fishery managers and to fishery participants to support management and business decisions and to increase efficiency of the catch share market itself. This article documents the availability and quality of data on transfers of catch privileges in fourteen US catch share programs. These catch share programs include several individual fishing quota (IFQ) programs and a number of programs that allocate catch privileges to self-organized cooperatives. Price information on catch share transfers is found to be limited or unavailable in most US catch share programs. Recommendations are made on how to improve the design of catch share programs and associated data collection systems to facilitate effective catch share markets, collection of catch share market data, and better use of information from catch share markets.     

Theory and practice of why auctions differ—a study of two fish auctions in Norway

In this paper we will study two auctions for fish found in Norway, and compare them applying auction theoretical assumptions. We will use the Revenue Equivalence Theorem (RET) as a basis to explain why these two different auction mechanisms are chosen for the sale of fish. It is shown that the issues of risk aversion, common values and inclusion of travel costs may explain the choice of auction institution.     

Efficiency of the New Zealand annual catch entitlement market

Balancing catch with annual catch entitlement (ACE) is crucial both for the financial viability of fishers and for the efficient operation of the New Zealand quota management system (QMS). This study examines the information channels that are used by fishers to search for ACE availability, and notes how these channels differ between large and small fishers. Special attention is given to the viability of small independent fishers whose participation in the fishery is dependent on their acquiring ACE in the open ACE market. An ACE market survey along with extensive consultation captured the views of fishers, fish processors, and quota brokers. These sources provide valuable insights into the day-to-day operation of the ACE market. They suggest that while elements of market power are evident in the ACE market there are also characteristics of an efficient market.     

Networks of capital: Reframing knowledge in the Namibian hake fishery

This paper explores the failures of the quota allocation system in the hake fishery in Walvis Bay, Namibia through an examination of the complex processes that link commodities, labour, production, markets, and knowledge in the industrial setting. The relationships between state regulations and public nature point to a specific engagement in which nature is divided, distributed, and owned, namely through the market driven prospects of transferable quotas. This article examines fishing quota as a set of relations that links the transformation of fish from biological organism to global product and thus weaves science, the state, markets, and social relationships into an entanglement of different forms of capital. In this context, the tension between the quota holder, the value of that quota, and their participation in the industry reflects a complex network of capital mediated through various strategies. Based on ethnographic research in the Namibian trawl sector, this article surfaces these modes of capital in the dynamics of the fishing operations. As such, the fishing industry, the company that holds the fishing rights, the government׳s role in quota allocations, the vessels, gear, and technologies, and the relationships and roles of the crewmembers and skippers׳ knowledge all contribute to a particular formulation of fishing practices. Fisher׳s knowledge in industrial fishing practices becomes a site in which to explore the consequences of ITQs that may also begin to destabilise the neoliberal business model for fisheries in times of crisis.     

The effects of fisheries management on the Icelandic demersal fish value chain

Iceland׳s fishing industry has outperformed fishing industries in neighboring countries in recent years. This paper identifies key factors in market structure in recent decades that contribute to long run profitability of the Icelandic fishing (and fish processing) industry using semi-structured interviews with industry participants, and compares those with similar results from Norway. Further, the development of profitability in the Icelandic and Norwegian demersal fishing industries is used to assess the long run effects of different management systems on quality, product focus and profitability. The results indicate that three key changes in Icelandic regulation during the 1980s were important to the development of long run profitability within the fishing industry: the abolition of export barriers, the introduction of an individual transferable quota (ITQ) system and the establishment of fish auctions. A large and growing literature supports the role of ITQs in ensuring long run profitability. The importance of market structure for profitability has only recently been identified, affecting the ability of value chains to become market oriented and supply homogenous product flow from heterogeneous raw material. Comparison with Norway indicates that while individual transferable quota management does improve profitability in fishing to a certain extent, management systems must facilitate a strong market connection from consumers, through the stages of retail and processing, to fishers for the full realization of profit potential in the fishing industry.     

New Zealand seafood firm competitiveness in export markets: The role of the quota management system and aquaculture legislation

New Zealand's quota management system (QMS) was implemented in 1986 to address problems caused by a regulated open entry management system in place for the previous two decades. Excess capacity in the inshore fisheries caused several stocks to become depleted and conflicts to intensify between fishing sectors. The allocation of individual transferable quota (ITQ) was viewed as the best way to improve efficiency within the over-capitalised inshore fisheries and provide incentives for developing the deepwater fisheries. The expected benefits of the QMS fit with the political climate at that time, as the government was using market forces to address the deteriorating economy. This article outlines the results of a research project that involved four medium to large-sized, highly vertically integrated New Zealand seafood firms. The purpose of the project was to identify these firms’ sources of competitiveness in export markets and the process the firms used to develop sources of competitiveness, while adapting to rapid and radical changes to the political and business environment and transformation of the fisheries management system. The project's results show that the basis to seafood firm competitiveness is the security of supply to the fisheries resource provided by the QMS and aquaculture legislation. The project also outlines the role that government policies have in sustaining firm- and industry-level competitiveness. This article contributes to the broader discussion on the application of ITQ and other types of long-term access rights to the management of fisheries and does not express the views of the Ministry of Fisheries.     

Fishing rights and small communities: Alaska halibut IFQ transfer patterns

In the Alaska halibut individual fishing quota (IFQ) fishery, small remote fishing communities (SRFCs) have disproportionately lost fishing rights. Our analysis of quota market participation from 1995 to 1999 confirms that SRFC residents are more likely to sell than buy quota. Alaska Native heritage is another important predictor of quota market behavior. Residents of Alaska Native villages have an increased likelihood of selling quota. Loss of fisheries participation in small indigenous communities can be an unintended consequence of quota systems. Mitigation measures should take into account the social factors that can lead to such a redistribution of fishing rights in privatized access fisheries.     

Vessel buybacks in fisheries: The role of auction and financing structures

Vessel buyback programs intended to address overcapacity and excess capitalization in fisheries can lead to dramatically different levels of decapitalization depending on program structure and availability of vessel-specific information. This paper develops a simple theoretical model of self-financing vessel buybacks to examine equilibrium outcomes using sequential versus take-it-or-leave-it auctions, and financing schemes which allocate costs either homogeneously or according to rents captured through the buyback. This model demonstrates that programs which spread costs evenly among remaining vessels limit the possible extent of buybacks, as do programs which buy vessels one at a time in sequence rather than all at once. In addition to the theoretical modeling, a stylized case study inspired by the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Fishery is also provided. This analysis suggests that a wide range of auction structures could roughly half the size of the existing fleet, and starkly demonstrates how information poor settings can entirely derail a buyback.     

A survey of US halibut IFQ holders: Market participation,attitudes, and impacts

This paper presents the results of a survey of US halibut IFQ holders exploring market participation, opinions about IFQs, and perceived fishery and community effects of IFQs. A four-step mail survey was sent to a stratified random sample of 14% of the total population of quota holders, producing a response rate of 46%, or 506 returned surveys. Survey results suggest that while there is a wide diversity of opinions and perceptions of IFQs, there are some predictable trends in the ways that different groups of fishery participants experience and respond to these programs. Gender, income, age, employment and ethnicity are linked to IFQ market behavior. Income, residency, and ethnicity are linked to attitudes about IFQs. A discriminate function analysis indicates that older individuals, individuals who make less money, and indigenous fishermen are more likely to sell quota and less likely to buy quota. Women and those who are primarily employed in fishing are more likely to be buyers of quota rather than sellers. Fishermen who identify as Alaska Native, residents of small remote fishing communities in the Gulf of Alaska, and low-income fishermen show the least support for IFQ management. Quota holders who have high incomes, do not consider their communities to be dependent on fishing, and residents of Community Development Quota communities express the most support for IFQs. Overall, 84% of survey respondents believe that IFQs are changing the fishing lifestyle; 75% state that IFQs are changing the values in fishing; and 75% perceive of IFQs as private property. A majority of surveyed IFQs holders perceive both positive and negative impacts of IFQs to fisheries and to communities. Perceived positive impacts include: improved safety; improved price; market stability; improved management; consumer benefits; environmental benefits; longer fishing season; and professionalization and stability of the fishing fleet. Perceived negative impacts include: limitations on access and barriers to entry; consolidation and job loss; inequities experienced by small boats, rural fishermen, and crew; creation of a privileged class of fishermen; negative environmental impacts; and less local participation.     

Producers'' organizations and devolved fisheries management in the United Kingdom: Collective and individual quota systems

In the United Kingdom responsibility for the management of national catch quotas has since 1984 been extensively devolved to producers' organizations, Institutions created by the European Community in order to implement the common organization of the Community market for fish. The paper describes the development of the UK quota management system and the approaches adopted by different producers' organizations to the internal management of their quota allocations. Because of changes in the UK fishing vessel licensing rules as well as developments in the quota allocation system, there is an emerging market in quotas at both individual and collective levels. The implications of these developments are discussed, including the possible evolution, largely through industry-led innovation, of some sort of individual transferable quota (ITQ) system for the UK.     

Factors contributing to effective management in the Sakuraebi (Sergia lucens) fishery of Donggang,Taiwan

An in-depth assessment was conducted on the functioning of a Taiwanese Sakuraebi (Sergia lucens) fishery management institution to understand the role of leadership in the context of long-term incentive creation. Interviews with relevant stakeholders and statistical analysis of fisheries data indicated that the daily vessel quota system and fishers’ collective efforts to influence the market resulted in increased sales value, while simultaneously allowing for the equitable distribution of benefits from the Sakuraebi fishery in Donggang, Taiwan. Local fishers expressed a high level of satisfaction with the corresponding activities initiated by the fisher's organization. Interview respondents felt that promotional marketing activities led by the organization to enhance domestic consumption were particularly effective, and statistical analysis suggests that these activities helped to reduce the dependency of Taiwanese Sakuraebi fishers on export markets. A notable characteristic of this fishery is that it combines a large-scale sales organization, which enables the exertion of market influence, with a small-sized subsidiary organization for fisheries management. An annually rotating leadership system for managing fishery operations also provides members with the opportunity to share a sense of participation and responsibility, while keeping long-term policy goals. This study reinforces previous findings that leadership, social cohesion, and the nature of the resource are key factors determining the effectiveness and success of fisheries management.     

The Global Seafood Market Performance Index: A theoretical proposal and potential empirical applications

The objective of this paper is to create the Global Seafood Market Performance Index (GSMPI) in order to compare fisheries-related impacts of different countries across spatial and temporal scales. The article presents the first effort to investigate the trade-offs among marine ecosystems, seafood markets, poverty alleviation, food security and governance at worldwide level by creating the GSMPI. The GSMPI will provide relevant information on environmental, governance, socioeconomic, food security, corruption, seafood market, and corporate social responsibility issues for individual decision-makers and scientists, national governments, and stakeholders as well as international fishing and aquaculture industries.     

The elephant in the room: The hidden costs of leasing individual transferable fishing quotas

Despite the increasingly positive reviews of individual transferable quotas (ITQs), few studies have considered how quota leasing activities can reduce the economic benefits to society and to fishermen operating under the ITQ fisheries system. This analysis reveals negative economic impacts of ITQs previously overlooked by examining the extent of quota leasing and the relationship between the catch value, the cost of fishing, and the quota lease price in the BC halibut fishery, long considered a poster child for ITQs. Findings challenge assumptions of economic theory used to promote the benefits of ITQs.     

Vertical integration in the post-IFQ halibut fishery

In some fisheries, claims have been made that quota programs have led to increased vertical integration, with processors controlling quota and fishermen. In the US halibut fishery a quota program was designed specifically to maintain the small-scale vessel nature of the fishery. This paper reports on what changes have been seen in the vertical structure of the halibut fishery and offers some explanation for these changes. Results indicate that the specific rights granted can have significantly different effects on the vertical structure of the industry. In the case of the halibut fishery vertical integration was avoided and market transactions actually increased.     

Distribution of economic returns in small-scale fisheries for international markets: A value-chain analysis

Small-scale fishers are often believed to receive marginal earnings for seafood relative to other value- chain actors but proportionate incomes across different traded species are rarely compared. This study compares value chains for 15 species of sea cucumbers between Fiji and Kiribati using data collected on sale prices of dried products (bêche-de-mer) from fishers to middlemen and exporters, export prices and market retail prices in China. Pacific islanders comprised almost all fishers, but represented only some middlemen and few exporters. Proportional increases in prices along the value chains differed greatly among sea cucumber species and between countries. Fishers’ earnings varied greatly among species. The relative share of the end market value they received was negatively related to product end-market value; on average 50% of the end retail value for the lowest-value species but <10% for the highest-value species. Most fishers lacked information about market prices. The gross markup of exporters differed greatly between the two countries. Downstream actors reaped increasingly higher proportions of the product value for higher value species. Variation in sale prices between countries and fishers for the same product indicates a potential for higher earnings to fishers. Improved transparency of prices to fishers could empower them to negotiate higher prices, especially for more valuable species. Upgrading of value-chain governance, e.g. through fisher cooperatives or auction systems, could improve efficiency and fisher incomes, potentially reducing the need for high fishing rates. Such interventions will benefit from understanding the value-chain patterns among different species harvested in multispecies fisheries.     

The certification of small-scale fisheries

Eco-labeling is a market-driven mechanism to promote sustainable fisheries. The most widely used certification scheme for seafood eco-labeling is issued by the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), but the MSC has been criticized for favoring large-scale industrial fisheries. The benefits from eco-labeling can potentially be significant, ranging from price premiums to enriched understanding of fisheries management among fishers; however, anecdotal evidence from MSC-certified fisheries across various countries highlights the struggle of many small-scale fisheries to meet the costs of certification. The lack of environmental awareness in domestic markets can impede the spread of MSC eco-labeling among small-scale fisheries. In the absence of consumer preferences for seafood sustainability, and without subsidies, the certification may not be an appropriate tool for small-scale seafood producers. Examination of the case of an MSC-certified small-scale fishery suggests some efforts to achieve economies of scale; multi-species fisheries can apply for MSC certification as a single unit of assessment, and fisheries can cooperate with neighboring fisheries that target the same fish stock to share assessment costs. In a market where no price premium has been generated, effective face-to-face marketing is pivotal. The MSC will need to be committed to pursuing price premiums in new markets if it is to extend its reach further to small-scale fisheries.     

Challenges for New Zealand's individual transferable quota system: Processor consolidation,fisher exclusion, & Māori quota rights

This paper identifies three management initiatives in New Zealand's Individual Transferable Quota system that facilitated consolidation of the processing sector and limited market access for fishers, even those with quota rights. They are: (1) the placement of responsibility onto a Māori trust in 1992 and tribes (iwi) in 2004 to manage a limited amount of quota to benefit all Māori, fishers and non-fishers, which increased the use of quota as an investment asset; (2) the creation of Annual Catch Entitlement (ACE) as a fish access right separate from the quota ownership right, which made it possible to overcome consolidation limits by leasing ACE; (3) the 1997 Licensed Fish Receiver Act that made it illegal for fishers to sell fish off the boat without food safety certification. This account of the fishery policy environment in New Zealand explains why, despite owning significant portions of New Zealand's fishing quota, few Māori are fishing, processing, or selling fish caught by Māori quota.