Sharing the catch or catching the shares: Catch shares for the western Pacific region?

The applicability of catch shares programs is evaluated for the various fisheries of the Western Pacific Fishery Management Council region in each of the archipelagoes. Implementation of Catch Shares programs in the region is problematic, but would require better data to be done fairly and equitably. Catch shares are currently under initial consideration for the Hawaii and American Samoa longline fisheries and the Hawaii Deep 7 bottomfish fishery. It is argued that current conditions in all the other small boat fisheries in the region make them inappropriate for catch shares management. Overfishing and the “race for fish” are not yet an issue for these fisheries and some are underdeveloped. Catch share programs can cause significant negative social consequences for Western Pacific communities because data on fishermen's participation, catch histories, and motivations to fish for cultural needs is not adequate for any initial allocation scheme to be developed equitably. The prevailing Western Pacific cultural value of sharing the fish by gifting portions, sharing the catch widely and sharing fishing opportunities widely is in clear conflict with the individualized commercial profit motive philosophy of fisheries that are appropriate for catch shares. The small boat fisheries lack adequate monitoring and enforcement, and do not have a total allowable catch or quota. Nor do they usually have a demonstrated need for one. Preliminary community outreach by Council staff and community discussion of catch shares shows a general lack of information yet a potential for strong resistance to the imposition of catch shares.     

US catch share markets: a review of data availability and impediments to transparent markets

A growing number of US fisheries are managed with catch share programs, which allocate exclusive shares of the total allowable catch from a fish stock to individuals, cooperatives, communities, or other entities. All of these catch share programs allow transferability of catch privileges in some form. Information on these transfers, particularly prices, could be valuable to fishery managers and to fishery participants to support management and business decisions and to increase efficiency of the catch share market itself. This article documents the availability and quality of data on transfers of catch privileges in fourteen US catch share programs. These catch share programs include several individual fishing quota (IFQ) programs and a number of programs that allocate catch privileges to self-organized cooperatives. Price information on catch share transfers is found to be limited or unavailable in most US catch share programs. Recommendations are made on how to improve the design of catch share programs and associated data collection systems to facilitate effective catch share markets, collection of catch share market data, and better use of information from catch share markets.     

Catch share programs in the Western Pacific—A solution in search of a problem?

The movement toward catch shares by NOAA Fisheries and fisheries managers worldwide responds to dysfunctional fisheries plagued by a host of interrelated problems including radically shortened seasons, a race to fish, supply gluts, lowered product quality, increased bycatch, safety issues, excess capacity, and lack of profitability. However, the NOAA Catch Shares Policy recognizes that catch shares are not appropriate for every fishery, and others have agreed that the success of catch shares programs depends on their fit with ecological, economic, and social characteristics. This article describes the characteristics of the Hawaii-based deep-set longline fleet, identified by NOAA Fisheries as a possible candidate for catch shares because it operates under a bigeye tuna quota instituted by the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. One of the main concerns in the fishery is the potential for closing during the holiday season, a culturally important time for fish consumption in Hawaii. An evaluation of the fishery suggests that many of the problems leading to development of catch shares programs in other fisheries are not present, but that some warning signs exist which could be addressed by catch share programs or other management alternatives.     

How have catch shares been allocated?

A unique database was created that describes the methods used to allocate shares in nearly every major catch share fishery in the world. Approximately 54% of the major catch share fisheries in the world allocated the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) solely on the basis of historical catch records, 3% used auctions, and 6% used equal sharing rules. The remaining 37% used a combination of methods, including vessel-based rules. These results confirm the widely-held belief that nearly all catch share programs have “grandfathered” private access to fishery resources: 91% of the fisheries in the database allocated some fraction of the TAC on the basis of historical catch. This publicly available database should be a useful reference tool for policymakers, academics, and others interested in catch shares management in Hawai'i and across the globe.     

Economic characteristics and management challenges of the Hawaii pelagic longline fisheries: Will a catch share program help?

To date, none of the fisheries in the U.S. Pacific Islands Region is managed under a catch share program. In light of the NOAA policy to encourage the use of catch shares as a fishery management tool, the Western Pacific Fishery Management Council (WPFMC) listed six commercial fisheries, including the Hawaii pelagic longline fishery, the largest in the region, as potential candidates for catch share programs. This study examines the baseline economic characteristics and the main challenges facing the Hawaii pelagic longline fishery and evaluates the impact of these on the desirability and feasibility of a catch share program for this particular fishery.     

Tradable permit programs: What are the lessons for the new Alaska halibut catch sharing plan?

To address long-standing allocation conflicts between the Pacific halibut commercial fishing sector and recreational charter (for-hire) sector in Alaska, an Alaska halibut catch sharing plan (CSP) is being implemented in 2014 that has a provision allowing the leasing of commercial individual fishing quota to recreational charter businesses. This one-way inter-sectoral trading allows for the charter sector to increase its share of the total allowable catch while compensating commercial fishermen. This type of catch shares program is novel in fisheries. In this paper, the literature on non-fisheries tradable permit programs (TPPs) that have similarities to the Alaska halibut CSP program is examined. Several successful TPPs are discussed, including ones from emissions trading programs, water quality trading programs, water markets, and transferable development rights programs. They are then evaluated in terms of their similarities and differences to the Alaska CSP program. Characteristics not part of the current CSP that other TPPs have used and that may increase the likelihood for the CSP to be effective in achieving its primary goals (if they are implemented) are identified, such as allowing more flexible transfers (e.g., internal transfers), intertemporal banking, cooperative structures, and multi-year leasing.     

Constructing logbook-like statistics for coastal fisheries using coastal surveillance radar and fish market data

As catch and effort statistics including fishing time and location are essential for producing abundance indices for utilized fish stocks, fishing states are encouraged under the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries to collect and maintain such statistics. However, for coastal fisheries (including artisanal fisheries) that are mainly composed of small-sized vessels which are usually too numerous to monitor, fisheries statistics collection systems are often either lacking or of insufficient quality (e.g. incomplete or inaccurate). Vessel monitoring system (VMS) data are commonly used to construct or improve estimation of fishing effort and fishing location in large-scale fisheries. Most coastal fisheries lack VMS but their countries do have coastal surveillance radar systems (CSRS) for security and enforcement purposes. This study illustrates and recommends opportunistic use of CSRS data to provide similar scientific benefits to VMS data for coastal fisheries. CSRS in combination with market landings data can construct logbook-like catch and effort statistics. This study introduces a method and demonstrates its usefulness for scientific research and management purposes, including the potential to obtain a higher accuracy and precision, particularly for fishing location and catch amount. Limitations of the CSRS data and challenges to managers involved in its application are also discussed.     

Moving beyond catch in allocation approaches for internationally shared fish stocks

Allocation schemes are one way to combat the tragedy of the commons, the situation whereby individual users of a shared resource put their own interests above the collective good. In the case of shared fisheries, developing equitable and transparent allocation schemes can help to ensure stable cooperative management agreements, which in turn will facilitate sustainable fisheries. Allocation schemes for shared fisheries resources, which have been in existence for decades, have recently been facilitated by Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs). These schemes vary in the scale of interested parties, from simple two-country systems sharing Pacific salmon, to multi-country systems sharing Atlantic bluefin tuna. Most RFMOs tend to base allocation schemes on historical catch records, spatial stock abundance estimates, or a combination of these. Socio-economic factors do not appear to influence allocation to any major extent. Unfortunately, previous attempts at creating and enforcing allocation programs have not, by and large, been able to curb the serial depletion of fish stocks, particularly when the number of fishing countries is large. Several RFMOs are currently in the process of initiating or reformulating allocation programs. In this paper, current allocation approaches are reviewed and discussed in the context of their possible transference to new or evolving programs. Specifically, lessons from game theory are drawn on, and the potential for better incorporation of socio-economic circumstances in allocation decisions, which can incentivize improved compliance, is explored. The relevance of conclusions from the literature analyzing international water agreements is also discussed, and a combined socio-economic-ecological construct whereby allocation programs can be based on the sharing of benefits other than catch is proposed.     

Can vessel buybacks pay off: An evaluation of an industry funded fishing vessel buyback

Fishing vessel and permit buyback programs have been implemented to reduce excess capacity and improve profitability in a number of fisheries around the world. These programs are generally publicly funded, but in a few cases they have been financed by loans to be paid back by the remaining fleet. In 2003, a buyback permanently removed 91 vessels and 239 fishing permits from the Pacific groundfish trawl fishery and associated corollary fisheries of Dungeness crab and pink shrimp. The buyback was financed with $10 million in public funding and a $36 million loan to be repaid over 30 years with fees on landings. In the same year, a control date was set for catch share program in the groundfish trawl fishery. When the catch share program was implemented in 2011, the permit owners that remained in the fishery after the buyback were allocated the quota shares that would otherwise have been issued to the permits bought back in 2003. Estimates of the annual profits generated by this quota are compared to the cost of servicing the buyback loan. The results provide evidence that a buyback program, when implemented in conjunction with catch shares, can enable a sustained increase in profitability for the remaining vessels sufficient to justify its cost. However, using landings taxes as the mechanism to repay the loan may result in a mismatch between those who benefit from and pay for the buyback.     

Decomposing productivity and efficiency changes in the Alaska head and gut factory trawl fleet

Fishing fleets are subject to numerous factors that affect economic performance, making identification and attribution of such impacts difficult. This paper separately identifies the effects of changing input and output prices, fishery management, and quota allocations on total factor productivity using a Lowe Index. Indices account for technical change and decompose productivity estimates into its technical, environmental, and scale-mix components. This results in measures that reflect shifts in the production frontier, and movements by vessels toward and around the frontier, to capture economies of scale and mix after a policy shift to a catch share program that includes fishing cooperatives and a limited access fishery. The difference between cooperative and limited access vessels is exploited to compare the changes in economic performance between the groups after the introduction of the shift to catch shares and cooperative management, which allowed the vessels to improve the timing and coordination across multi-species fisheries and to decrease incidental catch of quota-limited bycatch species that had closed the target fisheries prematurely in the past. Results indicate that total factor productivity increased significantly after the move to a catch share program, largely due to increases in technical change that shifted out the production frontier of the fishery.     

Assessing catch shares' effects evidence from Federal United States and associated British Columbian fisheries

What are the effects of transitioning traditionally managed fisheries to incentive-based catch shares fisheries? In a study of all major United States federal catch share fisheries and associated shared stock fisheries in British Columbia, catch shares result in environmental improvements, economic improvements, and a mixture of changes in social performance, relative to the race for fish under traditional management. Environmentally, compliance with total allowable catch increases and discards decrease. Economically, vessel yields rise, total revenues grow, and long-term stock increases are encouraged. Socially, safety increases, some port areas modestly consolidate, needed processing capacity often reduces, and labor markets shift from part time jobs to full time jobs with similar total employment. Newer catch shares address many social concerns through careful design.     

Ecosystem-based fisheries management in small-scale tropical marine fisheries: Emerging models of governance arrangements in the Philippines

There has been a gradual evolution in fisheries management over the past decades from a focus on sustainability of a single species or stock and resources to a focus on marine ecosystems. Among the issues to be addressed for effective implementation of ecosystem based fisheries management (EBFM) are the appropriate governance arrangements and scale for management. The purpose of this paper is to examine these issues of governance and scale as related to EBFM in tropical developing countries through an analysis of approaches being taken in the Philippines to manage fisheries on a multi-jurisdictional level. The management of fisheries and coastal resources in a number of bays and gulfs, which represent marine ecosystems, is presented. The opportunities and constraints to ecosystem based fisheries management in the Philippines are discussed and lessons for broader application of these governance structures in tropical developing country marine ecosystems are presented.     

Where could catch shares prevent stock collapse?

In a widely received study Costello and his colleagues found that catch shares give better stock persistence and higher catch for fishermen. The conclusions made by Costello et al. were further supported by Grafton and McIlgorm where they suggested a framework in order to determine the costs and benefits of separate ITQ management in seven Australian commonwealth fisheries, and what the alternatives should be if the net benefits do not justify ITQs. This raises the question why we do not see catch shares being used more often. We explore at a global scale which countries would have the potential to, and indeed do, fulfil the conditions necessary to implement such a management strategy.     

Sharing a fish resource: Bargaining theoretical analysis of an applied allocation rule

Besides fish-stock considerations, fisheries managers must often take into account competing heterogeneous harvest groups. A long-run allocation rule in a fishery decides more than just shares to the interested parties, it must also take into account the dynamic questions regarding how to divide a changing stock, between changing harvesting groups. Using the axiomatic approach in bargaining theory, we analyse two resource allocation rules that were consecutively implemented in the Norwegian cod fishery in order to distribute the allowable catch between coastal vessels and trawlers. The two allocation rules are compared with one another and with existing theoretic bargaining solutions. The actual allocation rules show little likeness to the well-known Nash bargaining solution, while there are some similarities to the less familiar Salukvadze solution, since shares vary for changing total allowable catch. The Generalised Nash bargaining solutions using man-years as relative weights, is closest to the actual allocations. The trawlers are shown to gain from the change in actual allocation rule at the expense of the coastal vessels.     

WTO fisheries subsidies negotiations: implications for fisheries access arrangements and sustainable management

The paper considers the WTO negotiations on fisheries subsidies and the implications that envisaged disciplines will have on coastal developing countries. This is considered in relation to fisheries access agreements in the Central and Western Pacific where several least developed but resource rich island states such as Kiribati and Tuvalu are highly exposed to the risks associated with new WTO fisheries subsidies disciplines that do not consider their particular vulnerabilities. The paper considers some of the issues that coastal developing countries should incorporate into their emerging negotiating positions at the WTO. State-to-Sate fisheries access agreements which are often highly subsidised but where fishing vessel owners pay the equivalent of lump sum tax are paradoxically, the least distortionary and damaging to the environment. Strategies for managing the possible new disciplines are considered.     

One size does not fit all: Critical insights for effective community-based resource management in Melanesia

In recent years, Fiji's approach of combining traditional systems of community-based coastal management and modern management systems has become a successful blueprint for marine conservation, particularly the Locally Managed Marine Area (LMMA) network model. As a result of this success, conservation practitioners have imported the Fiji LMMA model to the Solomon Islands and in Vanuatu in hope of replicating the purported success attained in Fiji. This paper argues that because tenure systems and associated political systems in Fiji, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu are substantially different, one cannot simply extrapolate the more centralized tenurial and political Fiji model to the decentralized tenurial and politically eclectic Solomons and Vanuatu. This paper provides an analysis of some of the various approaches used in these countries to make a case for why socio-political diversity and historical particulars matter to resource management and conservation-in-practice (and for any development interventions). By examining examples of various nested and polycentric governance approaches—family, community, tribal, confederations, local community-based organizations (CBOs), and Church—it elucidate not only some of the differences between Fiji and Solomon Islands/Vanuatu, but also between Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands. This provides critical insights into some of the myriad of factors impinging on conservation aspirations in these countries and may offer some alternative ways forward not currently considered by conservation practitioners. Finally, the paper provides some guidelines to how to increase the long-term success of marine conservation programs for fisheries management and community-based management initiatives in the region.     

Impact evaluation of a fisheries development project

A number of fisheries development projects are undertaken every year in recognition of the important role fisheries play in many coastal communities. The objectives vary, but typically go beyond a limited focus on fisheries management and the ecosystem. This makes it difficult to evaluate the contribution of a project, particularly in data poor environments such as most developing countries. This paper used the recently developed Fisheries Performance Indicators (FPIs) to evaluate the impact of a World Bank development project in a Liberian coastal community. FPIs are designed to capture economic and social performance of a fisheries system in addition to the management and environmental impacts. The results show improvements in most ecological dimensions, and also in many social and economic dimensions targeted by the project. Hence, the project intervention appears to be positive. However, some indicators, particularly in relation to general governance in Liberia, showed a negative development which was not caused by the project.     

National comprehensive approaches for rebuilding fisheries in South Korea

Korea's coastal and offshore fisheries have experienced reduction in their catch in the early 2000. The amount of catch from coastal and offshore fisheries dropped from 1.7 million tons in 1986 to 1 million tons in 2004. To address such catch reduction, fish stock enhancement programs have been constantly developed and implemented. However, as fish stocks have been estimated to decrease since 2000 in spite of various management measures, the Korean Government genuinely acknowledges the necessity to enhance fisheries productivity through the recovery of depleted fish stocks. Based on such acknowledgement, a fish stock rebuilding plan (FSRP) combined with conventional fish stock enhancement programs was established in 2005. For stocks which have shown drastic decrease, a FSRP was set up and promoted. So far, 10 FSRPs have been established and operated, and plan is being made to expand them to 20 species by 2012. The result of pilot projects shows that stocks have been increasing after the introduction of FSRPs. For instance, the catch per unit effort (CPUE) of sandfish in the East Sea has increased from 0.44 in 2005 to 0.78 in 2011. Consequently, fishing income has increased by 15%. The key lessons learned during the implementation of FSRP are: the causes for the decrease of stock vary and are complicated and it is necessary to adjust and eliminate some conventional policies that could have unforeseen negative impacts on fish stocks. The FSRP-based fisheries management policy in Korea carries great significance, for it has changed the focus of policy from simply maintaining the status quo to stock recovery and it allows relevant stakeholders to get actively involved in the procedures of establishing and promoting the plan, leading to effective implementation of the plan. The current FSRP is operated with species, but if it can be gradually expanded to encompass the whole ecosystem, it will greatly contribute to more effective management and fish stock recovery for all species in offshore and coastal waters surrounding Korea.     

Putting the seafood in sustainable food systems

Increasing attention by consumers to the social and environmental dimensions of the food they eat has generated many different responses, including certification programs, watch lists and local/slow food movements. This article examines the more recent entry of seafood into these consumer social movements. Although a concern with the family farm—as well as tendency to equate national security with food security—has long connected terrestrial food production with other cultural concerns, fisheries have tended to be regarded more as natural resources. Considering seafood as part of the “food system” would enhance the management of fisheries, while the long engagement in fisheries with co- and adaptive management and the politics of knowledge would enrich the debate in the agri-foods literature. The article also offers suggestions on how fisheries management could better govern for sustainable food systems, and provides further ideas about food, sustainability and governance.