Social and economic consequences of 40 years of Dutch quota management

The Netherlands was one of the first nations to introduce ITQs in their fisheries to manage national yearly Total Allowable Catches (TACs). These ITQs have gradually developed from an individual quota system in 1976 to an ITQ system in the 1980s. In 1993 the system was reformed into a co-management system. In this paper it is argued that many of the usual negative socio-economic consequences of ITQs mentioned in the literature have been largely absent, due to the embeddedness of ITQs in co-management arrangements. However, cracks have appeared lately in this combined management system, allowing an identification of its vulnerabilities. These findings show that the social and economic structure of Dutch fisheries is changing from a rather cooperative to a more competitive and exclusive system, more like conventional ITQs.     

Catch shares have not led to catch-quota balancing in two North American multispecies trawl fisheries

Catch shares, where annual catch limits are divided among individuals, communities or cooperatives, are a commonly used fisheries management strategy to increase profits and reduce overcapitalization. Usually these quota shares can be sold or leased, which is theorized to allow for greater utilization of fleet-wide quota. However, this catch-quota balancing may not be achieved in multispecies trawl fisheries where it is difficult to selectively target valuable species while avoiding overfished species. Two similar catch-share-managed, multispecies trawl fisheries were compared to evaluate whether catch shares lead to catch-quota balancing. The U.S. West Coast Groundfish fishery has several species with low total allowable catches (TACs) while the Canadian British Columbia Trawl fishery has comparatively higher TACs. Results indicate that the West Coast fishery had a statistically significant decrease in catch-quota ratios from 0.41 in the three years before catch shares to 0.29 in the three years after catch shares. In contrast, the BC fishery experience no statistically significant change in fishery-wide average catch-quota ratios, which were 0.70 in the three years before and 0.62 in the three years after catch shares. In the West Coast fishery, the risk of exceeding quotas for some species may be so high that fishers are unable to achieve high degrees of catch-quota balancing and instead focus on species that can be easily selected with changes in fishing behavior. Multispecies fisheries management has direct tradeoffs between maximizing yield and achieving conservation goals, and these results may highlight the tradeoff between rebuilding overfished species by reducing TACs, and the achievement of catch-quota balancing.     

Determining primary and companion species in a multi-species fishery: Implications for TAC setting

The use of ITQ management in multi-species fisheries has been the subject of much debate and the complexities and difficulties of managing multi-species fisheries are well known. A major problem is that the species mix in fishery catches may not necessarily match the mix in combined TACs or in quota holdings. While a number of solutions have been proposed or implemented to improve transferability of quota and other incentives to reduce over-quota fishing and discarding, it is surprising that there has been little focus on TAC-setting itself and coordinating this across multiple species/stocks as a means of dealing with some of these issues. In this paper, data were analysed from the trawl sector of the Australian Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark Fishery to determine the relationship between primary species and companion species and the implications this has for TAC setting. The primary species is the species being considered when setting an individual species TAC. The companion species are ones that should also be considered when setting the TAC of the primary species, because a considerable proportion of the primary species catch is taken as a companion species non-target catch. The target species in each fishing operation was determined and was used to characterize recent multi-species catch data into primary and companion components. This approach provides an empirical means to examine the impact of individual species TAC decisions across all of the quota species in a fishery.     

Impacts of current EU regulation on the UK whitefish value chain

Cod and haddock are two of the “big 5” UK supermarket fish species and intrinsic to fish and chip shops nationwide. UK whitefish fleets produce a significant amount, however there is a reliance on imports to maintain supply. The UK is in a strong position to compete for raw material from Iceland and Norway given high prices paid for imports and investment by Icelandic and Norwegian companies in the UK. Regarding UK production of whitefish, the European Common Fisheries Policy landing obligation has introduced significant uncertainty. To avoid discarding of any quota stock, fishing may be stopped before all target stocks quota is reached. For demersal fleets, there is a transition period between 2016 and 18 where target stocks are introduced according to Advisory Council and EU agreement and Article 15, with all quota stocks from 2019. As the capacity of the fleets balance to the new regulations, supply will likely return and if maximum sustainable yield (MSY) is reached in 2020 then an increase in TACs from current levels is likely too. However, markets and industries can change in a short period. Particularly, most processing companies are small to medium size enterprises and those that concentrate on cod and haddock may have to adjust their business. Fleets could be resilient to such short term reductions in landings however this cannot be assumed. The competitiveness of producers will surely be affected in the short to medium term as a result.     

Fishing without quota: The ACE fisher in New Zealand's inshore fishery

The annual catch entitlement (ACE) scheme was added to New Zealand's quota management system for fisheries in 2001. The scheme allocates quota owners an annual share of the total allowable commercial catch (TACC) in proportion to their quota holding of a particular fishstock. With ACE being transferable, the change made it simpler for fishers (permit holders) who did not own quota to purchase ACE to match catch for specific fishstocks. But to be viable, non-quota-owning (ACE reliant) fishers need access to a reliable, long-term supply of ACE. This study examines the relationships between ACE reliant purchasers and their suppliers of ACE in New Zealand's Fishing Management Area Three during the 2014-15 fishing year. The study found that most buyers and sellers of ACE form enduring relationships to their mutual benefit. This symbiotic relationship bodes well for the survival of small fishers with the expertise to land fish in an efficient manner.     

The IVQ regime in Norway: A stable alternative to an ITQ regime?

Since the introduction of quotas and licences as important management tools, Norway has insisted on an individual vessel quota regime (IVQ). The main argument has been to avoid market-based transactions of quotas and vessels and secure stability in regard to a diverse fleet structure and decentralized ownership of scarce cod resources. Thus, an individual transferable quota system (ITQ) with a high degree of transactions and the potential for a heavy concentration of quota ownership and fewer vessels has never been an alternative. However, since the late 80s, the trawler fleet has been trapped within a web of unprofitable overcapacity. Within the frame of a closed management regime and a path-dependent IVQ system, the quota regime has been forced towards a market-orientated system for transactions. In this article, we analyze the Norwegian IVQ system and discuss whether the aggregate effects of the IVQ regime are congruent with the models’ profound ideals.     

Figuring fish and measuring men: the individual transferable quota system in the Icelandic cod fishery

This article discusses inequality in the Icelandic cod fishery, focusing on changes in the actual distribution of fishing quotas and the ways in which Icelanders currently talk about equity and ownership. The individual transferable quota (ITQ) system, introduced in 1984, divided access to an important resource among those who happened to be boat owners at that time. Statistical findings with respect to the cod fishery - based on a database (the ‘Quotabase’) constructed using detailed information on all vessels that have been allotted ITQs from the onset of the system - show that ITQs have been increasingly concentrated in the hands of the biggest companies. Many of the small-scale boat owners that still hold ITQs are increasingly compelled to enter into contracts that involve fishing for larger ITQ holders. It is suggested that the distribution of ITQs, as well as their evaluation in social discourse, represents an important field of research. In Iceland, public discontent with the concentration of fishing rights and the ensuing social repercussions is increasingly articulated in terms of loaded metaphors, including ‘profiteering’, ‘tenancy’ and ‘lords of the sea’. It is argued that the ultimate efficiency of management programs may be jeopardized if managers ignore the history and culture of the fisheries involved and the likely social and ecological consequences of their programs.     

Producers'' organizations and devolved fisheries management in the United Kingdom: Collective and individual quota systems

In the United Kingdom responsibility for the management of national catch quotas has since 1984 been extensively devolved to producers' organizations, Institutions created by the European Community in order to implement the common organization of the Community market for fish. The paper describes the development of the UK quota management system and the approaches adopted by different producers' organizations to the internal management of their quota allocations. Because of changes in the UK fishing vessel licensing rules as well as developments in the quota allocation system, there is an emerging market in quotas at both individual and collective levels. The implications of these developments are discussed, including the possible evolution, largely through industry-led innovation, of some sort of individual transferable quota (ITQ) system for the UK.     

New Zealand's indigenous people and their claims to fisheries resources

New Zealand's fisheries are perhaps best known for the individual transferable quota (ITQ) system brought about by the Fisheries Amendment Act 1986. The 1986 Act allocated quota to fishing firms and individuals that met the allocation criteria. Part-time fishers, many of whom were Maori, New Zealand's indigenous people, were excluded from the initial allocation. The 1986 Act did not address claims by Maori of having indigenous rights guaranteed by the Treaty of Waitangi 1840. Since the Treaty, Maori have protested against government actions and legislation that have eroded their rights guaranteed by the Treaty. The implementation of the 1986 Act prompted further Treaty-based claims to large areas of fisheries, and the ITQ system was used to settle several claims. This paper explores Maori views on resource use and claims to fisheries resources, legislative changes enacted to settle Maori fisheries claims, and claims that remain outstanding. The insights of this paper have relevance to the broader discussion on the position of indigenous peoples throughout the world.     

What is good for the fishermen, is good for the nation: co-management in the Norwegian fishing industry in the 1990s

This paper analyses the concept of ‘co-management’ and tries to explain why co-management has recently become important to different types of fisheries administration. A preliminary analytical framework is sketched, before going on to describe the Norwegian co-management system, known as ‘centrally directed consultation’, where fishermen's representatives are established on a wide range of organisations that exert a direct influence on fisheries policy, including not only quota management but grant aid, sales, research and education. The final section is devoted to the lessons that may be learned from the Norwegian experience, bearing in mind the particular background of Norway and its historical setting.     

Correlation between successive wave heights and periods in mixed sea states

The degree of dependence between successive wave heights and periods is examined for sea states resulting from the combination of a remotely generated wave field and a locally generated wave system, based on simulated wave records. The sea states analysed represent situations that are swell dominated, wind–sea dominated or they have equivalent energy in the wind–sea and swell components. Results of the analysis of the simulated data have been compared with those expected from the theories for the joint distributions of consecutive wave heights and periods and with the results from a Pierson–Moskowitz target spectrum.     

Unsuitability of TAC management within an ecosystem approach to fisheries: An ecological perspective

Fisheries management in European waters is gradually moving from a single-species perspective towards a more holistic ecosystem approach to management (EAM), acknowledging the need to take all ecosystem components into account. Prerequisite within an EAM is the need for management processes that directly influence the ecological effects of fishing, such as the mortality of target and non-target species. Up until recently, placing limits on the quantities of fish that can be landed, through the imposition of annual total allowable catches (TACs) for the target species, has been the principal management mechanism employed. However, pressure on non-target components of marine ecosystems is more closely linked to prevailing levels of fishing activity, so only if TACs are closely related to subsequent fishing effort will TAC management serve to control the broader ecosystem impacts of fishing. We show that in the mixed fisheries that characterise the North Sea, the linkage between variation in TAC and the resulting fishing effort is in fact generally weak. Reliance solely on TACs to regulate fishing activity is therefore unlikely to mitigate the impacts of fishing on non-target species. Consequently, we conclude that the relationship between TACs and effort is insufficient for TACs to be used as the principal management tool within an EAM. The implications, and some alternatives, for fisheries management are discussed.     

Management strategy evaluation for rock lobster,Jasus edwardsii,off Victoria,Australia: Accounting for uncertainty in stock structure

The management strategy evaluation (MSE) approach was used to evaluate management strategies based on the current method of stock assessment for rock lobster (Jasus edwardsii) off Victoria, Australia, and decision rules inferred from the management plan for Victorian rock lobster and past practice when selecting total allowable catches, TACs. The results are expressed in terms of whether it is possible to keep stocks above limit reference points with high probability and recover over‐exploited stocks to the target level. Three categories of management strategy were examined using the MSE, which differed in whether assessments were conducted, and TACs set, by management zone or by region within management zone. A management strategy based on conducting assessments and setting TACs by management zone is most similar to the way assessments are currently conducted and management regulations implemented for rock lobster off Victoria. However, this management strategy performed poorest in recovering stocks to target levels. Alternative management strategies which involved conducting assessments and setting TACs by region performed better, but may have practical limitations. The assessment method was found to be generally relatively accurate and precise, although estimation performance was poor/imprecise on occasion.     

The elephant in the room: The hidden costs of leasing individual transferable fishing quotas

Despite the increasingly positive reviews of individual transferable quotas (ITQs), few studies have considered how quota leasing activities can reduce the economic benefits to society and to fishermen operating under the ITQ fisheries system. This analysis reveals negative economic impacts of ITQs previously overlooked by examining the extent of quota leasing and the relationship between the catch value, the cost of fishing, and the quota lease price in the BC halibut fishery, long considered a poster child for ITQs. Findings challenge assumptions of economic theory used to promote the benefits of ITQs.     

Compliance costs and the small fisher: A study of exiters from the New Zealand fishery

Over 3000 predominantly small-scale fishers have exited the New Zealand's quota management system (QMS) between its inception in 1986 and 2000. This study, based on the Ministry of Fisheries database and a questionnaire sent to the exiters, establishes that compliance costs in general, and those specifically related to the QMS, were one of the most consistent reasons for exit. Uncertainty about future QMS policy and the high cost of quota were also significant factors. It appears that the small fishers’ perception of high compliance cost can be supported by industry data.     

Networks of capital: Reframing knowledge in the Namibian hake fishery

This paper explores the failures of the quota allocation system in the hake fishery in Walvis Bay, Namibia through an examination of the complex processes that link commodities, labour, production, markets, and knowledge in the industrial setting. The relationships between state regulations and public nature point to a specific engagement in which nature is divided, distributed, and owned, namely through the market driven prospects of transferable quotas. This article examines fishing quota as a set of relations that links the transformation of fish from biological organism to global product and thus weaves science, the state, markets, and social relationships into an entanglement of different forms of capital. In this context, the tension between the quota holder, the value of that quota, and their participation in the industry reflects a complex network of capital mediated through various strategies. Based on ethnographic research in the Namibian trawl sector, this article surfaces these modes of capital in the dynamics of the fishing operations. As such, the fishing industry, the company that holds the fishing rights, the government׳s role in quota allocations, the vessels, gear, and technologies, and the relationships and roles of the crewmembers and skippers׳ knowledge all contribute to a particular formulation of fishing practices. Fisher׳s knowledge in industrial fishing practices becomes a site in which to explore the consequences of ITQs that may also begin to destabilise the neoliberal business model for fisheries in times of crisis.     

Trade measures and the combat of IUU fishing: Institutional interplay and effective governance in the Northeast Atlantic

The use of trade measures to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the Northeast Atlantic has evolved from unilateral denial of the landing of fish taken outside international quota arrangements to a multilateral Scheme of Control and Enforcement under the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC). International trade rules have not constrained this development, mostly due to successful management of the interplay between international resource management and trade regimes. States protect resource management objectives from such constraint by inserting clauses that establish a normative hierarchy, or they employ various means for adapting IUU measures to the ‘environmental window’ of the global trade regime. The fact that regional states have introduced trade restrictions only when non-restrictive or less restrictive measures have failed enhances such compatibility, as do the gradual shift from unilateral to multilateral measures and the rise in transparency, openness and target-state involvement. None of those features reduces the effectiveness of regional trade measures; they minimize tension with trade commitments and largely strengthen their clout in the struggle to combat IUU fishing in the Northeast Atlantic.     

Challenges for New Zealand's individual transferable quota system: Processor consolidation,fisher exclusion, & Māori quota rights

This paper identifies three management initiatives in New Zealand's Individual Transferable Quota system that facilitated consolidation of the processing sector and limited market access for fishers, even those with quota rights. They are: (1) the placement of responsibility onto a Māori trust in 1992 and tribes (iwi) in 2004 to manage a limited amount of quota to benefit all Māori, fishers and non-fishers, which increased the use of quota as an investment asset; (2) the creation of Annual Catch Entitlement (ACE) as a fish access right separate from the quota ownership right, which made it possible to overcome consolidation limits by leasing ACE; (3) the 1997 Licensed Fish Receiver Act that made it illegal for fishers to sell fish off the boat without food safety certification. This account of the fishery policy environment in New Zealand explains why, despite owning significant portions of New Zealand's fishing quota, few Māori are fishing, processing, or selling fish caught by Māori quota.     

Quota concentration in the New Zealand fishery: Annual catch entitlement and the small fisher

New Zealand's quota management system (QMS) was introduced in 1986 to enhance the sustainability of New Zealand's fishery. This paper examines trends in quota and catch share concentration across a range of important fish stocks. It demonstrates that continuing concentration is occurring in the ownership of quota for deepwater species. At the same time there has been an increase in participation by small scale fishers in the inshore fishery. This appears to be driven by the introduction of the Annual Catch Entitlement (ACE) regime, allowing annual catch shares to be accessed at reduced transaction cost.     

New Zealand’s quota management system: the first ten years

This paper has two aims. First, New Zealand’s quota management system is analysed using a simple analytical economic model. Second, the paper describes how the system has evolved in response to pressures since implementation. The quota management system has provided a remarkably robust platform for addressing fisheries management problems during its first ten years of operation. It also provided the government with an instrument for settling Maori fishing claims. In 1996, the unsubsidised New Zealand fishing industry exported most of its harvest to highly competitive international markets. The paper concludes with a discussion of contemporary challenges.