Self-governance within a QMS framework—The evolution of self-governance in the New Zealand Bluff oyster fishery

This paper examines efforts to develop stakeholder led self-governance in the Bluff oyster fishery. The paper focuses on collaborative management and its ability to address some of the unintended consequences of management. The Bluff oyster fishery's administrative, biological, and economic performances are analysed to assess whether or not the participatory management model, in this case fisheries self-governance, complements individual transferable quota (ITQ) for this inshore shellfish fishery.The paper argues that the Bluff oyster fishery's current self-governance model, based on a fishery plan, aids in improving the performance of the fishery, and that the Bluff oyster fishery has the capacity to shift further towards a stakeholder led self-regulated fishery.     

Development in fleet fishing capacity in rights based fisheries

Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) fisheries management systems are supposed to remedy the over-capacity problem associated with traditional command-and-control management systems. This paper provides some insight with respect to the impact of ITQs on vessel numbers in six different countries. The results indicate that the number of vessels was reduced by at least 30% within a few years of the implementation of individual vessel quotas. Thereafter a slow reduction in vessel numbers continued, indicating that it may take time period before over-capacity is fully removed. Moreover, the total effect on vessel numbers is surprisingly similar across countries and fisheries despite different degrees of transferability in the different cases analysed.     

An evaluation of self-governance in the New Zealand Bluff oyster fishery – The indicator system approach

The use of self-governance as a fisheries management tool is increasing in New Zealand and elsewhere. Researchers argue that in theory self-governance can lead to improved outcomes, but evaluating actual benefits is difficult because of the need to distinguish self-governance impacts from other influences on fisheries performance. An indicator system was developed in this paper to evaluate the contribution of selfgovernance to the performance of the Bluff Oyster fishery (OYU5), which is also managed under New Zealand's Quota Management System. There is evidence that self-governance makes a positive contribution to economic efficiency, institutional effectiveness and resource preservation in the Bluff Oyster fishery.     

Productivity change and fleet restructuring after transition to individual transferable quota management

Productivity change after transition to an individual transferable quota (ITQ) management system is driven by exit of some vessels, entry of other vessels, and changes in productivity of existing vessels. Generally, it is thought that an ITQ system boosts productivity due to the exit of less productive vessels. However, ITQ management systems also create an additional barrier to entry, and more productive vessels may not be able to enter the fishery. This study constructs the Färe–Primont index to measure productivity change for the Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery over a 32 year time period, which includes both pre and post-ITQ time periods. The index is then combined with a biomass change index to arrive at a measure of biomass adjusted productivity change. Results show that when biomass changes are considered, positive productivity gains occurred throughout the time period. Further examination of contributions from entering and survivor vessels show that entering vessels had little impact on aggregate productivity, but on an individual basis, they eventually were equal in productivity to survivor vessels.     

Fisheries management in Iceland

This paper describes the main elements of fisheries management in Iceland and its development in recent years. The system of fishery management has failed to prevent serious depletion of the cod stock. The comprehensive ITQ system in Iceland seems to be functioning well and has led to increased economic efficiency. The authorities have taken the crisis in the cod-fishery seriously and reduced the catches substantially. They have introduced a TAC rule that will lead to a recovery of the cod stock and to an optimal exploitation, providing that the authorities are prepared to persevere with the system.     

Distributional issues in the operation of rights-based fisheries management systems

Rights-based management regimes are considered by economists as an important solution to the problems of excess capacity and biological over-harvesting of fisheries. In practice, adoption of such regimes, and particularly of those relying on individual quota allocations, has often met with resistance from within the fisheries concerned. A key reason for this resistance appears to be the distributional conflicts which arise in the process of implementing the regimes. An economic analysis of the nature of these conflicts in the different contexts in which they have been observed is proposed. The approach centres on the way in which distributional conflicts can influence the operation of management systems and their impacts on fisheries, from the country to the individual firm level. As an illustration, an analysis of the economic processes at firm level is developed based on the simulation of a fishery managed under individual transferable quotas.     

US catch share markets: a review of data availability and impediments to transparent markets

A growing number of US fisheries are managed with catch share programs, which allocate exclusive shares of the total allowable catch from a fish stock to individuals, cooperatives, communities, or other entities. All of these catch share programs allow transferability of catch privileges in some form. Information on these transfers, particularly prices, could be valuable to fishery managers and to fishery participants to support management and business decisions and to increase efficiency of the catch share market itself. This article documents the availability and quality of data on transfers of catch privileges in fourteen US catch share programs. These catch share programs include several individual fishing quota (IFQ) programs and a number of programs that allocate catch privileges to self-organized cooperatives. Price information on catch share transfers is found to be limited or unavailable in most US catch share programs. Recommendations are made on how to improve the design of catch share programs and associated data collection systems to facilitate effective catch share markets, collection of catch share market data, and better use of information from catch share markets.     

Thirty years after privatization: A survey of Icelandic small-boat fishermen

Iceland's nationwide privatized Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system is over thirty years old but remains a topic of public and political debate, particularly because of the continued effects on small-scale fisheries. A national survey of small-boat fishermen was distributed to: (1) identify major defining characteristics of participants in ITQ and non-ITQ fisheries, (2) document and examine differences in satisfaction with fisheries management, and (3) evaluate the existing options for newcomers to participate in small-boat fisheries. Survey results indicate that Icelandic small-boat fishermen are engaged in multiple management systems within a wide range of boat sizes. Those who held quota were more satisfied with the current ITQ system compared to those who did not hold quota; however, nearly all fishermen were still critical of fisheries management in Iceland and the two major non-ITQ options of lumpfish and coastal fishing were not perceived to offer significant opportunity for entry-level fishermen. Dissatisfaction stemmed from the lack of decision-making power, a distrust of scientific advice, and the perception that the ITQ system did not serve the purpose of protecting fisheries resources, but was rather oriented only toward economic goals. The dynamic nature of Icelandic small-boat fishing livelihoods and the pervasive negative attitudes thirty years after ITQ implementation demonstrate the need for culturally appropriate and equitable fisheries management schemes where success is measured in social as well as economic and biological terms.     

New Zealand seafood firm competitiveness in export markets: The role of the quota management system and aquaculture legislation

New Zealand's quota management system (QMS) was implemented in 1986 to address problems caused by a regulated open entry management system in place for the previous two decades. Excess capacity in the inshore fisheries caused several stocks to become depleted and conflicts to intensify between fishing sectors. The allocation of individual transferable quota (ITQ) was viewed as the best way to improve efficiency within the over-capitalised inshore fisheries and provide incentives for developing the deepwater fisheries. The expected benefits of the QMS fit with the political climate at that time, as the government was using market forces to address the deteriorating economy. This article outlines the results of a research project that involved four medium to large-sized, highly vertically integrated New Zealand seafood firms. The purpose of the project was to identify these firms’ sources of competitiveness in export markets and the process the firms used to develop sources of competitiveness, while adapting to rapid and radical changes to the political and business environment and transformation of the fisheries management system. The project's results show that the basis to seafood firm competitiveness is the security of supply to the fisheries resource provided by the QMS and aquaculture legislation. The project also outlines the role that government policies have in sustaining firm- and industry-level competitiveness. This article contributes to the broader discussion on the application of ITQ and other types of long-term access rights to the management of fisheries and does not express the views of the Ministry of Fisheries.     

Tropical shrimp trawl fisheries: Fishers’ knowledge of and attitudes about a doomed fishery

Tropical shrimp trawl fisheries are unsustainable, and similar sets of management measures are used globally to address the direct and indirect costs of their practices. Yet little is known about shrimp fishers’ perceptions, despite the clear importance of human behaviour in determining the success of fisheries management. This article presents the results of interviews with industrial shrimp trawl fishers from the southern Gulf of California, Mexico, and reveals fishers’ knowledge and attitudes that should be considered when developing management plans for industrial shrimp trawl fisheries. Fishers were asked to comment on problems facing the fishery, management options to address the issues, and the future of the fishery in general. The interviews also elicited new knowledge on effort and valuable components of bycatch, useful to the management process. Among the problems facing the Gulf of California fishery, fishers tended to identify those generated externally—fluctuations in shrimp populations, increases in fishing effort, decreases in shrimp prices and increasing overheads—and thus distance themselves from responsibility for management options. The successes of any mitigation measures for the fishery are likely to depend on proper enforcement and reliable governance, as our study indicates. Should strong enforcement be put in place, then trawl free areas seem to be the most pragmatic way to alleviate problems associated with the fishery; our effort data point to areas that might have greatest acceptance among fishers. A reduction in capacity would clearly complement marine zoning for trawl free areas. In the long run, however, it may be economic extinction of the fishery that reduces pressure on the marine ecosystem.     

Figuring fish and measuring men: the individual transferable quota system in the Icelandic cod fishery

This article discusses inequality in the Icelandic cod fishery, focusing on changes in the actual distribution of fishing quotas and the ways in which Icelanders currently talk about equity and ownership. The individual transferable quota (ITQ) system, introduced in 1984, divided access to an important resource among those who happened to be boat owners at that time. Statistical findings with respect to the cod fishery - based on a database (the ‘Quotabase’) constructed using detailed information on all vessels that have been allotted ITQs from the onset of the system - show that ITQs have been increasingly concentrated in the hands of the biggest companies. Many of the small-scale boat owners that still hold ITQs are increasingly compelled to enter into contracts that involve fishing for larger ITQ holders. It is suggested that the distribution of ITQs, as well as their evaluation in social discourse, represents an important field of research. In Iceland, public discontent with the concentration of fishing rights and the ensuing social repercussions is increasingly articulated in terms of loaded metaphors, including ‘profiteering’, ‘tenancy’ and ‘lords of the sea’. It is argued that the ultimate efficiency of management programs may be jeopardized if managers ignore the history and culture of the fisheries involved and the likely social and ecological consequences of their programs.     

The incentives of a resource owner: Evidence from a private oyster fishery

European flat oyster Ostrea edulis fisheries were once abundant around the UK coastline. The sole remaining productive O. edulis fishery in Scotland is in Loch Ryan. This fishery has been privately owned and managed by a single family since 1701. Economic theory predicts that ownership, whether public or private, is a necessary condition for rational fishery management. In this paper, a series of four leases and a licence are examined, covering an 85-year period over the 20th and 21st century, to examine whether the management of the Loch Ryan fishery conforms to the expected norms of rational management. The leases show that, over this period, the owners appear more willing to expend resources on regulating tenant behaviour, supporting the conclusion that successive generations of owners developed an evolving sense of what “rational management” might require. The results of this study could inform the management of other fisheries – both public and private – by emphasising the importance of learning from experience.     

Are input controls required in individual transferable quota fisheries to address ecosystem based fisheries management objectives?

This study examined the use of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) to effectively manage fishing impacts on all ecosystem components, as required under Ecosystem Based Fisheries Management (EBFM) principles. A consequence of changing from input controls to output-based (catch) management is that the control of the regulating authority tends to be reduced, which may affect the outcomes for ecosystem management. This study reviewed the use of input controls across six fishing methods in 18 ITQ fisheries, which have been independently accredited as ecologically sustainable by the Marine Stewardship Council (12 fisheries) or under Australian environmental legislation for Wildlife Trade Operation (six fisheries). Input controls were retained across a range of ITQ fisheries, with non-selective fisheries such as trawl, gillnet and line employing more input controls than selective fisheries such as purse-seine, pot/trap and dredge. Further case-studies confirmed the widespread and recent use of input controls (spatial and temporal closures) with the aim of managing ecosystem impacts of fishing. The retention of input controls, particularly closures affects the security (quality of title) characteristic of the fishing use right and the theoretical ability of fishers to manage their right for their future benefit. The security characteristic is weakened by closures through loss of access, which undermines industry trust and incentive for long-term decision making. By reducing the security of ITQs, individual fisher incentives and behaviour may separate from societal objectives for sustainability, which was one of the foremost reasons for introducing ITQ management.     

Applicability of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) in Japanese fisheries: A comparison of rights-based fisheries management in Iceland, Japan, and United States

ITQs have not yet been introduced by the Government of Japan. In coastal areas, fishery cooperative associations have traditionally played an important role in managing fisheries through self-imposed rules and peer-monitoring systems. Recently, however, the economic competitiveness of Japanese fisheries in the international market is being questioned. In this paper, a detailed examination of the pros and cons of the current system in Japan is compared to the current fishery management measures of Iceland and the United States, where attaining economically or biologically efficient outcomes may be prioritized in making fisheries management decisions. For many coastal fisheries in Japan, maintaining a management scheme in which stakeholders play an active role in determining fisheries measures seems more relevant if their priority is to maintain the stability of coastal communities and equity of stakeholders. Intensive dialog among stakeholders would be necessary to identify shared objectives of their fishery operations and to make decisions to establish specific steps toward the goal of increasing economic efficiency, environmental sustainability, or stability of communities and equity of stakeholders.     

Capacity and economic efficiency in small-scale fisheries: Evidence from the Mediterranean Sea

To design an effective capacity management plan for small-scale fisheries one must understand what one is measuring and define its capacity. As recognized by some authors, overcapacity is a problem that generally affects small-scale fisheries just as much as it does other types of fishing. This study aims to estimate fishing capacity, technical efficiency, scale efficiency and capacity utilization in a particular small-scale fishery in the Mediterranean, i.e., the Northwest Sardinian fleet in Italy. A non-parametric approach using a data envelopment analysis (DEA) model was applied to a sample of trawls in order to estimate their economic capacity, and related measurements were taken. The capacity and efficiency with reference to two different alternative scenarios were also calculated.     

Free form property rights for fisheries: The decentralized design of rights-based management through groundfish “sectors” in New England

Harvest cooperatives were implemented in several US fisheries over the last decade during a period when US law prohibited implementation of any new individual fishery quota (IFQ) systems. Harvest cooperatives provided an alternative to individual quotas as a means to end the race for fish and increase fishery profitability. The prohibition on new IFQ systems in the US was lifted, but harvest cooperatives remain a more feasible and perhaps a superior alternative to IFQs for some fisheries. The New England Fishery Management Council is on the verge of implementing a new management system for the groundfish fishery based on harvest cooperatives known as “sectors”. This paper describes the New England sector management system and discusses a number of advantages but also some drawbacks relative to IFQs. It argues that a hybrid of the two approaches could have advantages over either.     

The IVQ regime in Norway: A stable alternative to an ITQ regime?

Since the introduction of quotas and licences as important management tools, Norway has insisted on an individual vessel quota regime (IVQ). The main argument has been to avoid market-based transactions of quotas and vessels and secure stability in regard to a diverse fleet structure and decentralized ownership of scarce cod resources. Thus, an individual transferable quota system (ITQ) with a high degree of transactions and the potential for a heavy concentration of quota ownership and fewer vessels has never been an alternative. However, since the late 80s, the trawler fleet has been trapped within a web of unprofitable overcapacity. Within the frame of a closed management regime and a path-dependent IVQ system, the quota regime has been forced towards a market-orientated system for transactions. In this article, we analyze the Norwegian IVQ system and discuss whether the aggregate effects of the IVQ regime are congruent with the models’ profound ideals.     

The role of archaeological and cultural-historical records in long-range coastal fisheries resources management strategies and policies in the Pacific Islands

The usefulness of conventional fisheries science for long-term fisheries management and policies in the resource-poor islands of the Pacific is very limited. Fishery managers can, however, make use of such alternative sources of information as archaeological and historical data to develop fishery management initiatives. Most Pacific Islands were settled by humans over the last three millennia, although human settlement in Western Melanesia dates from the late Pleistocene, a period of about 40 millennia. Archaeological studies over the past half-century contain information on the long-term subsistence exploitation of fish and invertebrates from nearshore coral reefs and lagoons. Molluscs appear to have been a very important food source for early human colonists in the Pacific Islands, but declines in abundance through harvest pressure and environmental changes forced a greater reliance on fin-fish capture and on agriculture. There is no firm evidence from the archaeological record to suggest that long-term subsistence exploitation of reef fish populations has had any serious negative effects on abundance or structure of reef fish communities. Sources for more recent historical information are also exemplified and briefly examined for their usefulness in assessing the impacts of commercial fishing. It is argued that fishery managers who adopt a data-less approach to fishery management could profitably use these sources of information to enrich their assessment of the impacts of various management scenarios.     

Transferable quotas,efficiency and crew ownership in Whalsay,Shetland

The resource economic theory tells us that individual transferable quotas (ITQs) improve efficiency in the fishing industry by removing the least efficient actors from a fishery and allowing ownership to concentrate in the hands of the most efficient operators. Assertions about the nature of this allocative efficiency are, however, often based on purely theoretical assumptions. This paper presents a case study of the efficient operators remaining in the UK pelagic fishing fleet. After over 30 years of rights-based management (RBM) and 12 years of ITQs, the UK pelagic fleet numbers only 31 large-scale boats. Seven of these operate from the island of Whalsay in Shetland, which, with a population of approximately 1000 people (0.000016% of the population of the UK), is entitled to land around 22% of the UK pelagic catch. A key characteristic of the economically efficient Whalsay fleet is a crew ownership structure. This is now under threat from the long-term dynamics of the UK's ITQ system, as the high price of quota prevents the renewal of the fishery through new entrants. In the majority of global fisheries, where vessel ownership structures do not follow an assumed economic norm, fully marketised transferable rights may not be the most efficient method of management.     

Private property and public interest in fisheries management: the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery

In 1998 a management system based on individual transferable quota (ITQ) was introduced in the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery. This marked the continuation of a management trend that has favoured economic efficiency at the cost of reduced employment and greater restrictions on access to the fishery. The authors discuss management trends in the fishery in the context of Tasmania's history, and social and political characteristics, which it is argued, have shaped development of Tasmania's resource management culture. Implications for social equality, economic well-being and environmental sustainability are discussed. In conclusion the difficulty of reforming policy that has been shaped by vested interests and which establishes rent-seeking activity is considered.