Lesser-known consequences of managing marine fisheries using individual transferable quotas

Managing marine fisheries using output controls in the form of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) can be an attractive alternative to more traditional input controls. There are now a number of examples of where ITQ-managed fisheries have been able to reduce the impact of the major management problems in global fisheries, namely, gross over-capitalisation and effort. However, ITQs are not the perfect management tool and one of the lesser known consequences of ITQ-managed fisheries where ITQs consist of a harvest right is the implicit relationship between ITQ property rights and rights of access to the fishing grounds. This implicit spatial right to the grounds can provide obstacles in the way of allocating water-space within fishing grounds for alternative uses such as marine-protected areas, large-scale aquaculture, and wind farms. These lesser-known consequences of ITQ-managed fisheries are discussed here.     

Can formalisation help? The introduction of fisheries co-management in the inshore fisheries of Dingle,Co. Kerry,Ireland

Fisheries co-management is claimed to increase the legitimacy of regulations by allocating management authority to selected users. In this article, experiences from a case study in the inshore fisheries of Ireland involving the establishment of a fisheries co-management system are used to discuss the specific problem of finding an unit to whom regulatory authority may be delegated. Here, the fishers who will benefit from the co-management scheme will also carry the costs, and it is argued that establishment of formal economic liability between those granted management privileges and those excluded can optimise the legitimacy of management authority in fisheries co-management systems.     

Co-management of Caribbean Community (CARICOM) fisheries

The countries of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) have a relatively poor record of fisheries management and the need to reform fisheries governance is urgent. There is now increasing interest in getting fishers and other stakeholders more involved in management through co-management and community-based management approaches. The purpose of this paper is to examine the potentials of co-management as an alternative fisheries management strategy for the countries in the CARICOM region. Co-management is found to have potential but there will need to be capacity-building and institutional strengthening of fisheries departments, fishers and NGOs to participate in co-management. Pilot projects should be initiated to gain practical experience in co-management.     

From community-based to co-management: Improvement or deterioration in fisheries governance in the Cherai Poyil fishery in the Cochin Estuary,Kerala, India?

During the last 50 years, several different forms of fisheries governance have been tried and failed in the Cochin Estuary, Kerala, India. The latest shift has been from a community-based system to a co-management system, and this paper evaluates the current system in the light of the theoretical debate over the respective merits of community-based management and co-management. The paper is based on documentary material and data from interviews carried out during fieldwork in 2004, from which it concludes that provided the co-management system incorporates community principles within it, it will be an effective form of fisheries governance.     

Ex ante evaluation of the costs and benefits of individual transferable quotas: A case-study of seven Australian commonwealth fisheries

Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) have been introduced in a number of different countries, including Australia. Using seven Australian commonwealth fisheries the paper undertakes an ex ante cost–benefit analysis whether to introduce ITQs into these fisheries. The analysis uses five cost–benefit criteria, and in particular the gross value of production (GVP), to evaluate whether ITQs should be introduced or not. For fisheries where the net benefits do not currently justify ITQs, a pathway is provided to improve management outcomes with the use of individual transferable efforts units (ITEs).     

Fisheries co-management as empowerment

Empowerment is both a condition and a goal of fisheries co-management. In this paper I attempt to explain what empowerment means, what it requires, and what can be expected from it. The concept emphasizes psychological as well as sociological factors. It works at an individual and a collective level. For fisheries co-management to become sustainable, empowerment must occur at both levels. Thus, co-management entails more than institutional design and participatory democracy. It also requires capacity enhancement. The good news is that these processes are mutually dependent and reinforcing. They should therefore proceed hand in hand, and it does not matter very much which of them is undertaken first.     

Applicability of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) in Japanese fisheries: A comparison of rights-based fisheries management in Iceland, Japan, and United States

ITQs have not yet been introduced by the Government of Japan. In coastal areas, fishery cooperative associations have traditionally played an important role in managing fisheries through self-imposed rules and peer-monitoring systems. Recently, however, the economic competitiveness of Japanese fisheries in the international market is being questioned. In this paper, a detailed examination of the pros and cons of the current system in Japan is compared to the current fishery management measures of Iceland and the United States, where attaining economically or biologically efficient outcomes may be prioritized in making fisheries management decisions. For many coastal fisheries in Japan, maintaining a management scheme in which stakeholders play an active role in determining fisheries measures seems more relevant if their priority is to maintain the stability of coastal communities and equity of stakeholders. Intensive dialog among stakeholders would be necessary to identify shared objectives of their fishery operations and to make decisions to establish specific steps toward the goal of increasing economic efficiency, environmental sustainability, or stability of communities and equity of stakeholders.     

Designing ITQ programs for commercial recreational fishing

This paper discusses the potential for implementing individual transferable quota (ITQ) schemes in commercial recreational fisheries, focusing particularly on charter and headboat fisheries. After a brief discussion of ITQs in commercial fisheries, the paper discusses the manner in which rents get dissipated in commercial recreational fisheries. Fishing mortality in recreational fisheries is determined as a joint outcome of angler behavior and trip supply. In the recreational sector under open access conditions, there are likely to be too many vessels providing too many trips at prices that are too low. Vessel input configurations are likely to be distorted in a manner that generates excessive fishing mortality. Designing ITQs for recreational fisheries requires consideration of issues not prominent in the design of commercial fisheries. Among the most important is the manner in which angler preferences and types affect overall mortality from both landings and discards. While catch and release fisheries and pure food fish recreational fisheries are relatively easy to manage with recreational ITQs, fisheries with both angler types present difficult monitoring problems that add complexities to ITQ design. Various ways to design programs that account for both landings and discard mortalities and that generate incentives for anglers and vessel owners to reduce discard mortality are discussed.     

The elephant in the room: The hidden costs of leasing individual transferable fishing quotas

Despite the increasingly positive reviews of individual transferable quotas (ITQs), few studies have considered how quota leasing activities can reduce the economic benefits to society and to fishermen operating under the ITQ fisheries system. This analysis reveals negative economic impacts of ITQs previously overlooked by examining the extent of quota leasing and the relationship between the catch value, the cost of fishing, and the quota lease price in the BC halibut fishery, long considered a poster child for ITQs. Findings challenge assumptions of economic theory used to promote the benefits of ITQs.     

The tyranny of the past: why local histories matter in the South African fisheries

Co-management is widely advocated internationally as the solution to the purported failure of state management in the fisheries and has won adherents in South Africa. The theory, however, rests on a set of unexamined modernist assumptions, which raise serious doubts about its likely successful import to South Africa. These problems are demonstrated through a review of indigenous co-management in the South African inshore fisheries c.1905–1939. This suggests that co-management in South Africa was a historical compromise between a weak, pre-scientific state and the patrons of client fishing communities menaced by industrialisation whereby control was granted over marine resources within defined sea territories in exchange for governance at the coastal margins. The factors sustaining indigenous co-management have long since passed and the alignment of forces in the current conjuncture is hostile to its re-imposition from outside.     

Privatization,financialization and ocean grabbing in New Brunswick herring fisheries and salmon aquaculture

The growing literature on individual transferable quotas (ITQs) and on intensive salmon aquaculture and its negative impacts on the environment and other users of related marine space has been little connected to the developing literature on financialization and to the literature on ocean grabbing within fisheries. This paper seeks to address this gap through a case study of the recent history of herring fisheries and intensive aquaculture in New Brunswick, Canada, exploring how specific neoliberal processes – including privatization and marketization (in herring fleet ITQs and aquaculture lease systems), (re)regulation, financialization and globalization – have interacted to support the reshaping of regional fisheries from mixed small-scale, family-based, petty commodity fisheries towards vertically-integrated, corporate, financialized fisheries characterized by ocean grabbing.     

A decade of ITQ-management in Icelandic fisheries: consolidation without consensus

Icelandic fisheries have been managed by individual transferable quotas (ITQs) for a decade but there is still no consensus about the quota issue. Distributional effects of ITQs, in terms of income distribution between owner and crew, and the vulnerability of fisheries communities short of quota, have been in the centre of the debate.The author discusses changes in stakeholder involvement in policy-making, conflicts of interest and legal disputes linked to the ITQ-system. By way of conclusion, some options for resolving conflicts and reaching consensus on the fisheries management issue are discussed.     

Alternatives to ITQs in equity–efficiency–effectiveness trade-offs: How the lay-up system spread effort in the BC halibut fishery

Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs), also called “catch shares”, have been broadly adopted in the last two decades, at the same time that concerns about their equity and effectiveness in delivering the predicted outcomes have increased. This paper documents how an alternative fishermen-designed and operated system of spreading fishing effort to avoid the race for fish—called the lay-up system—worked effectively and equitably for four decades in the British Columbia halibut fishery before ITQs were introduced in this fishery. Why the lay-up system was allowed to collapse and its history ignored illustrates important roles played by conflicting ideologies, bureaucratic rationality, and the inability to imagine an alternative way of solving fisheries management problems. Trade-offs between the efficiency, equity, and effectiveness of halibut and other management systems are considered.     

Fisheries rent creation and distribution—the imaginary case of Codland

This paper discusses actual and possible achievements and failures of Codland and examines it from the point of view of efficiency and in terms of distribution. Joint analysis of the two approaches is needed when contemplating fisheries management reforms, since such reforms may create both winners and losers. The analysis demonstrates how rent drain from fishing communities and countries may occur despite significant resource rent creation. The change in the Codland economy is illustrated and compared to that of actual countries and to resource economic theory. It is concluded that if distributional and equity objectives matter, other instruments than ITQs, such as conditional tradeable fish quotas and vessel licences, resource taxes, co-management, public ownership, auctions, leases, time limited rights, time and area regulations, territorial user rights (TURFs) and marine protected areas (MPAs), should also be used.     

Figuring fish and measuring men: the individual transferable quota system in the Icelandic cod fishery

This article discusses inequality in the Icelandic cod fishery, focusing on changes in the actual distribution of fishing quotas and the ways in which Icelanders currently talk about equity and ownership. The individual transferable quota (ITQ) system, introduced in 1984, divided access to an important resource among those who happened to be boat owners at that time. Statistical findings with respect to the cod fishery - based on a database (the ‘Quotabase’) constructed using detailed information on all vessels that have been allotted ITQs from the onset of the system - show that ITQs have been increasingly concentrated in the hands of the biggest companies. Many of the small-scale boat owners that still hold ITQs are increasingly compelled to enter into contracts that involve fishing for larger ITQ holders. It is suggested that the distribution of ITQs, as well as their evaluation in social discourse, represents an important field of research. In Iceland, public discontent with the concentration of fishing rights and the ensuing social repercussions is increasingly articulated in terms of loaded metaphors, including ‘profiteering’, ‘tenancy’ and ‘lords of the sea’. It is argued that the ultimate efficiency of management programs may be jeopardized if managers ignore the history and culture of the fisheries involved and the likely social and ecological consequences of their programs.     

Swedish coastal fisheries—From conflict mitigation to participatory management

Several research projects have studied Swedish coastal fishery to investigate the conflict between seals and fishery. In recent years, a strategy of participation by means of co-management has been unfolding. Realising that maintaining the coastal fishery requires societal support and knowledge integration, attempts have been made to introduce the principle of participatory management into the centralised Swedish fisheries management system. However, this co-management approach, presently implemented in six pilot projects, will take a long time to develop through a sustained process of experimentation and improvement.     

Unfinished business: Taiwan's experience with rights-based coastal fisheries management

This paper examines a case involving a mix of Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries, co-management and the competition for using coastal zones. In the 2000s, Taiwan's government initiated a remodeling of the fishery right system, which is a rights-based approach to fisheries management, as an attempt to address conflicts between fishers and developers regarding the use of coastal space and to put community-based co-management into practice. The paper particularly compares the system before and after 2000 and identifies areas of concern in the implementation of the remodeled system. The results show that the government's support for this system signifies progress in the right direction. However, concerns emerge, mostly involving fishers' low participation, fishermen's association's lack of technical skills and financial resources, and the division of management responsibility. The government is advised to play a more active role in dealing with these concerns. Finally, the paper reveals that the factor of competition for using coastal zones poses a challenge to co-management, and suggests a holistic view with integrated coastal management or marine spatial planning practices, for developing co-management under the fishery right system.     

Limitations of the Korean conventional fisheries management regime and expanding Korean TAC system toward output control systems

In this paper, we focus on the status and trends of the current Korean fisheries management regime. Specifically, this paper briefly introduces the Korean conventional fisheries management regime (KCFMR) and discusses its problems and limitations. In describing policy evolution, this paper finds reasons why the Korean government has chosen a TAC system, an output control approach, besides input control approaches in force for almost a century. This paper also describes the evolution of the Korean TAC system, which is carrying out a pivotal role in Korean fisheries development, and analyzes problems of the Korean TAC system. Finally, this paper gives a perspective on expanding the Korean TAC system toward Output Control Systems (OCSs) such as Individual Quotas (IQs), Individual Vessel Quotas (IVQs), Individual Transferable Traps (ITTs), Community Quotas (CQs), and Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs).