Producers'' organizations and devolved fisheries management in the United Kingdom: Collective and individual quota systems

In the United Kingdom responsibility for the management of national catch quotas has since 1984 been extensively devolved to producers' organizations, Institutions created by the European Community in order to implement the common organization of the Community market for fish. The paper describes the development of the UK quota management system and the approaches adopted by different producers' organizations to the internal management of their quota allocations. Because of changes in the UK fishing vessel licensing rules as well as developments in the quota allocation system, there is an emerging market in quotas at both individual and collective levels. The implications of these developments are discussed, including the possible evolution, largely through industry-led innovation, of some sort of individual transferable quota (ITQ) system for the UK.     

Fishers’ opinions on marketization of property rights and the quota system in France

After many years of Common Fisheries Policies in the European Union, 88% of stocks are still being fished beyond their Maximum Sustainable Yield. While several Member States and the European Commission are moving toward Individual Transferable Quotas as a solution, France has declared its opposition to such marketization of fishing access rights and a national law has classified fisheries resources as a collective heritage. This paper discusses the evolution of the French system, principally its distribution of access rights by the Producer Organizations instead of the market. However, the Producer Organizations, which are more linked to the industrial fleet organizations, have not always modified their sharing formulae to include small-scale fisheries, resulting in a demand for more transparency and equity.     

Fish stocks and their management: The changing face of fisheries in South Africa

Transformation of South African marine fisheries over the past 10 years has had to balance economic stability, equity and sustainability. This is being done in three ways. First, access rights have been redistributed, increasing the number of rights holders 20-fold and the participation of historically disadvantaged individuals from 0.75% to 62%. Second, established companies have undergone internal transformation. Third, subsistence fishers have formally been recognised. New focuses include co-management, ecosystem-based management and marine protected areas. Further necessary steps include parity in salaries, attention to artisanal fishers, embracement of co-management, expansion of subsistence management and effective enforcement. Most stocks are healthy or recovering but exceptions, such as abalone, warn how quickly stocks can be decimated if co-operation is not achieved.     

A tenuous triumvirate: The role of independent biologists in Chile's co-management regime for shellfish

Fisheries co-management is usually defined by shared decision-making between fishers and the state. Chile's co-management regime for shellfish differs from the norm by incorporating a third party: independent biological consultants. This paper evaluates Chile's system and compares three-party co-management to two-party systems. It finds that consultants fulfill functions absent in two-party co-management, such as playing an intermediary role between fishers and the state, and also perform certain functions better than either of the other two entities involved, such as acting as a credible and objective source of information. It then discusses ways to perfect Chile's system, such as stepping up knowledge transfer activities so as to further empower fishers.     

Results based management in fisheries: Delegating responsibility to resource users

While the notion of results based management has been devoted recent attention in the context of reforming European fisheries management, it remains unclear what it entails. A conceptual model of results based management in fisheries is proposed as a way for public authorities to delegate specific management and documentation responsibilities to resource users. The model comprises three defining features: (1) That authorities define measurable objectives for the utilization of fisheries resources; (2) that resource users are made responsible for achieving these objectives and for (3) providing documentation that allows for an audit of the extent to which they are met. Selected cases are used to illustrate these features. Rationales and prospects of introducing results based management as an alternative in a European fisheries management context are discussed, giving consideration to how it may be pursued under the reformed common fisheries policy.     

Thirty years after privatization: A survey of Icelandic small-boat fishermen

Iceland's nationwide privatized Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system is over thirty years old but remains a topic of public and political debate, particularly because of the continued effects on small-scale fisheries. A national survey of small-boat fishermen was distributed to: (1) identify major defining characteristics of participants in ITQ and non-ITQ fisheries, (2) document and examine differences in satisfaction with fisheries management, and (3) evaluate the existing options for newcomers to participate in small-boat fisheries. Survey results indicate that Icelandic small-boat fishermen are engaged in multiple management systems within a wide range of boat sizes. Those who held quota were more satisfied with the current ITQ system compared to those who did not hold quota; however, nearly all fishermen were still critical of fisheries management in Iceland and the two major non-ITQ options of lumpfish and coastal fishing were not perceived to offer significant opportunity for entry-level fishermen. Dissatisfaction stemmed from the lack of decision-making power, a distrust of scientific advice, and the perception that the ITQ system did not serve the purpose of protecting fisheries resources, but was rather oriented only toward economic goals. The dynamic nature of Icelandic small-boat fishing livelihoods and the pervasive negative attitudes thirty years after ITQ implementation demonstrate the need for culturally appropriate and equitable fisheries management schemes where success is measured in social as well as economic and biological terms.     

Productivity change and fleet restructuring after transition to individual transferable quota management

Productivity change after transition to an individual transferable quota (ITQ) management system is driven by exit of some vessels, entry of other vessels, and changes in productivity of existing vessels. Generally, it is thought that an ITQ system boosts productivity due to the exit of less productive vessels. However, ITQ management systems also create an additional barrier to entry, and more productive vessels may not be able to enter the fishery. This study constructs the Färe–Primont index to measure productivity change for the Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery over a 32 year time period, which includes both pre and post-ITQ time periods. The index is then combined with a biomass change index to arrive at a measure of biomass adjusted productivity change. Results show that when biomass changes are considered, positive productivity gains occurred throughout the time period. Further examination of contributions from entering and survivor vessels show that entering vessels had little impact on aggregate productivity, but on an individual basis, they eventually were equal in productivity to survivor vessels.     

Determining the degree of 'small-scaleness' using fisheries in British Columbia as an example

Small-scale fisheries have been estimated to contribute up to 30% of the global landed value, which is caught by approximately 22 million fishers, some of which can be attributed to developed countries. Socio-economic analysis of small-scale fisheries often focuses on developing countries and fails to recognize the presence and contribution of small-scale fisheries in the developed world. Fisheries in British Columbia are diverse and often regarded as being industrialized and large-scale when analyzed in a global context. This study aims to demonstrate that features of small-scale fisheries are present within British Columbia's fleets. A list of re-occurring features of small-scale fisheries is curated from the literature to capture physical, economic and social features of small-scale fisheries. These commonly identified features of small-scale fisheries are applied to Aboriginal Food, Social and Ceremonial fisheries and all commercial fisheries in British Columbia are analyzed to determine the presence or absence of each small-scale fishery feature. The results of this research create a gradient of fisheries from smallest to largest scale. This approach determines that Aboriginal Food, Social and Ceremonial fisheries are the most small-scale, while the sablefish fishery is the largest scale. The qualitative nature of this framework creates an opportunity for any group of fisheries in the world to be compared.     

Community involvement in fisheries management: Experiences in the Gulf of Thailand countries

This paper examines the involvement of coastal communities in fisheries management among the countries of the Gulf of Thailand—Malaysia, Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand. Initiatives to decentralize management to local governing bodies, to utilize traditional management methods and to engage in community agreements to protect local resources are explored. An examination of recent experiences indicates some movement toward more local involvement in management. However, the study also leads to several suggestions for the future: in Vietnam and Cambodia, there is a need for significant legislation to control fisheries operations and greater clarity of the role of communities in management; in Malaysia, there is an overall need for more support to local fisheries management; and in Thailand, the need is for greater support of local-level enforcement and monitoring activities.     

How subsidies affect the economic viability of small-scale fisheries

This article presents the first bottom-up analysis of the proportion of global marine fisheries subsidies to small-scale fisheries (SSF). Using existing data, the reported national subsidy amounts are split into the fraction that goes to small- and large-scale fishing sectors. Results reveal a major imbalance in subsidy distribution, with SSF receiving only about 16% of the total global fisheries subsidy amount of $35 billion in 2009. To bring this into perspective, a person engaged in large-scale fishing received around 4 times the amount of subsidies received by their SSF counterparts. Furthermore, almost 90% of capacity-enhancing subsidies, which are known to exacerbate overfishing go to large-scale fisheries, thus increasing the unfair competitive advantage that large-scale fisheries already have. The developmental, economic and social consequences of this inequity are huge and impair the economic viability of the already vulnerable small-scale fishing sector. Conclusions indicate that taxpayers' money should be used to support sustainable fishing practices and in turn ocean conservation, and not to foster the degradation of marine ecosystems, often a result of capacity-enhancing subsidies. Reducing capacity-enhancing subsidies will have minimal negative effects on SSF communities since they receive very little of these subsidies to begin with. Instead, it will help correct the existing inequality, enhance SSF economic viability, and promote global fisheries sustainability.     

Comparison of simultaneous and combinatorial auction designs in fisheries quota market

Individual transferable quota (ITQ) markets are being used successfully to distribute quotas in single region and single species fisheries. In many parts of the world, the development of well crafted markets for multispecies or multiregional fisheries is still evolving. As a result, there exists an opportunity to inform policy by providing research insights into the relative merits of alternative market designs for such fisheries.This study explored the relative merits of a simultaneous ascending auction design and an iterative combinatorial auction design for a hypothetical multiple region quota market. In a simultaneous auction, separate auctions are run in parallel for individual species or regions. During intermediate rounds, fishers can adjust their bids in auction depending on their position in the other auction. In a combinatorial auction, a fisher can purchase a combination of quotas (or a package quota) for different fish species or regions in the same auction. Being able to acquire bundles of species or regions allows fishers to take advantage of complementarities. To date, the potentials of such auctions have not been thoroughly tested in fisheries quota markets. This study found that while a simultaneous auction design was more efficient than combinatorial auction design overall, combinatorial market design took fewer rounds to make final allocations and performed better in high synergy environments.     

Changes in fishing behaviour of two fleets under fully documented catch quota management: Same rules,different outcomes

A Dutch pilot study of fully documented fisheries provided the opportunity to observe actual changes in fishing behaviour under catch quota management (CQM). Interviews with fishers in the pilot study aided in interpreting the results and giving insight in the decision making process and reasoning of fishers. The CQM pilot study entailed a fleet of small and large demersal vessels. For these vessels, all cod catches were counted against quota, including catches of individuals below minimum landings size. To obtain reliable catch data all vessels were equipped with electronic monitoring (EM) systems. These systems recorded videos of all fishing and processing activities on board. In return, fishers received a 30% quota bonus for cod and were compensated with more flexibility on effort regulations. It was hypothesized that vessels in the CQM will (i) increase their landings by 30% according to their quota bonus, (ii) increase the use of gear with large mesh size, and (iii) change effort towards fishing locations with high catch rates of large cod and avoid areas with high catch rates of undersized cod. The results showed that CQM had no effect on fishing behaviour of the small vessels. In contrast, large vessels significantly increased their cod landings (216%) and avoided undersized cod. This difference in response of different fleets suggested that implementation of CQM, for instance in the context of the European Common Fisheries Policy, should consider fleet characteristics. It seemed that larger vessels in this study more easily adapted their behaviour to new management regimes and that the quota bonus opened up new fishing strategies, that were not envisaged during the implementation.     

Flexible management of fishing rights and a sustainable fisheries industry in Europe

Although overexploitation of commercial fish stocks in European waters has been in the public debate now for more than 20 years, the European Union has so far failed to implement sustainable fisheries management. Millions in subsidies paid to the fishing industry have led to significant excess capacity in the fishing fleet. Various feeble attempts to stop overexploitation of marine resources have failed. The cause is that fishing policy is highly dominated by short-term socioeconomic interests. There is an urgent need for a new fisheries management system in Europe that supports reductions in the fishing fleet, increases responsibility among fishers and guarantees long-term conservation of natural marine resources.Transferable rights to fish have proved a reliable and effective means of creating incentives to conserve marine resources. By strengthening individual fishing rights under flexible quota management systems, the EU Member States could, within the Common Fisheries Policy, make a significant contribution to conserving fish stocks, to reducing excess capacity and to raising the profitability of the fisheries industry. A closer look at existing reservations against a flexible management system shows most of the objections to be overstated or capable of resolution.     

Objectives of fisheries management: case studies from the UK, France, Spain and Denmark

The main objectives of fisheries management are generally similar throughout the world. These are often stated in policy documents such as the Common Fisheries Policy and the Magnuson–Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act. However, at the local level often the key objectives of management are more detailed, characterised by both the overriding management structure and the status and type of fishery concerned. In this paper, we consider case study fisheries from the UK, France, Spain and Denmark to compare some of the various types of fisheries and fisheries management systems that exist in the European Union. From this, we define the key objectives for each management system.     

Estimating the economic impact of the Prestige oil spill on the Death Coast (NW Spain) fisheries

This paper presents an estimation of the economic effects of the Prestige oil spill in Galicia, focusing on the Death Coast fisheries and using fish landings as a market technique. Examining the evolution of landings in the Death Coast before and after the accident, the analysis reveals two opposing trends, with landings of some species increasing and those of other species diminishing.     

Applicability of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) in Japanese fisheries: A comparison of rights-based fisheries management in Iceland, Japan, and United States

ITQs have not yet been introduced by the Government of Japan. In coastal areas, fishery cooperative associations have traditionally played an important role in managing fisheries through self-imposed rules and peer-monitoring systems. Recently, however, the economic competitiveness of Japanese fisheries in the international market is being questioned. In this paper, a detailed examination of the pros and cons of the current system in Japan is compared to the current fishery management measures of Iceland and the United States, where attaining economically or biologically efficient outcomes may be prioritized in making fisheries management decisions. For many coastal fisheries in Japan, maintaining a management scheme in which stakeholders play an active role in determining fisheries measures seems more relevant if their priority is to maintain the stability of coastal communities and equity of stakeholders. Intensive dialog among stakeholders would be necessary to identify shared objectives of their fishery operations and to make decisions to establish specific steps toward the goal of increasing economic efficiency, environmental sustainability, or stability of communities and equity of stakeholders.     

Controlling incidental catch: An economic analysis of six management options

The authors identify a management approach to the problem of incidental catch and utilize that approach to evaluate six management options which are being considered to control incidental catch in the US fishery conservation zone of the Bering Sea. The evaluation is in terms of the ability of management to minimize the impact and control costs of incidental catch. The authors conclude that the use of economic disincentives tends to be preferable due to the inefficiencies and extensive information requirements of the alternative options.     

Identifying channels of economic impacts: An inter-regional structural path analysis for Alaska fisheries

Alaska fisheries have strong spillover effects on economies of other states (especially the state of Washington) due to their dependence on imports from these other states. Several studies attempt to develop inter-regional or multi-regional economic impact models to investigate these spillover effects, and calculate the multipliers for Alaska fisheries. However, these multipliers measure only total economic impacts, failing to provide fishery managers with the information on how and along what channels these total economic impacts are generated and transmitted throughout the regions. This paper uses an inter-regional structural path analysis (IRSPA) to identify the various channels (paths) through which the economic impacts of an initial shock to a seafood sector are transmitted, amplified, and spilled over to other regions, within an inter-regional social accounting matrix (IRSAM) framework for two US regions – Alaska and the rest of US (RUS).     

Stakeholder participation in ecosystem-based approaches to fisheries management: A synthesis from European research projects

In this synthesis article, we claim that institutional innovation is required for ecosystem-based approaches to fisheries management (EBAFM), and that such innovation can best be achieved by engaging in a delicate process of societal decision making. Current instances of participation in fisheries shed light on the societal processes required for such institutional innovation. We apply the IBEFish analytical frame to examine findings from recent European research on participation in fisheries management at different jurisdictional levels. We distil several issues of major concern for institutional innovation towards EBAFM. These concern information management, legitimacy, social dynamics and costs, as well as aspects of cross-scale and cross-sector integration of fisheries governance.     

Development of an integrated fisheries co-management framework for new and emerging commercial fisheries in the Canadian Beaufort Sea

The Canadian Beaufort Sea is one of the last places on Earth that has not experienced large-scale commercial fisheries. The aboriginal people of the western Canadian Arctic, the Inuvialuit, have become increasingly concerned about the potential effects of large-scale commercial operations on key subsistence species of fish and marine mammals and the marine ecosystem upon which they depend. A 1984 comprehensive land settlement agreement (treaty) between Canada and the Inuvialuit established a co-management regime for limited aspects of fish and marine mammal resource management, and gave the Inuvialuit rights to subsistence fisheries and existing commercial fisheries but no preference for new commercial fisheries. The Fisheries Joint Management Committee (the fisheries co-management body), the Canada Department of Fisheries and Oceans, the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation and the Inuvialuit Game Council have developed an integrated fisheries management framework agreement for the review and assessment of any proposed commercial fisheries within the Canadian Beaufort Sea. The agreement provides clarity and transparency for decision making and strengthens the protection of fish stocks. The development of the framework depended upon a history of cooperation between the parties and a bridging initiative by the Fisheries Joint Management Committee and an NGO that brought together the Inuvialuit and the government.