Catch share programs in the Western Pacific—A solution in search of a problem?

The movement toward catch shares by NOAA Fisheries and fisheries managers worldwide responds to dysfunctional fisheries plagued by a host of interrelated problems including radically shortened seasons, a race to fish, supply gluts, lowered product quality, increased bycatch, safety issues, excess capacity, and lack of profitability. However, the NOAA Catch Shares Policy recognizes that catch shares are not appropriate for every fishery, and others have agreed that the success of catch shares programs depends on their fit with ecological, economic, and social characteristics. This article describes the characteristics of the Hawaii-based deep-set longline fleet, identified by NOAA Fisheries as a possible candidate for catch shares because it operates under a bigeye tuna quota instituted by the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. One of the main concerns in the fishery is the potential for closing during the holiday season, a culturally important time for fish consumption in Hawaii. An evaluation of the fishery suggests that many of the problems leading to development of catch shares programs in other fisheries are not present, but that some warning signs exist which could be addressed by catch share programs or other management alternatives.     

Catch shares have not led to catch-quota balancing in two North American multispecies trawl fisheries

Catch shares, where annual catch limits are divided among individuals, communities or cooperatives, are a commonly used fisheries management strategy to increase profits and reduce overcapitalization. Usually these quota shares can be sold or leased, which is theorized to allow for greater utilization of fleet-wide quota. However, this catch-quota balancing may not be achieved in multispecies trawl fisheries where it is difficult to selectively target valuable species while avoiding overfished species. Two similar catch-share-managed, multispecies trawl fisheries were compared to evaluate whether catch shares lead to catch-quota balancing. The U.S. West Coast Groundfish fishery has several species with low total allowable catches (TACs) while the Canadian British Columbia Trawl fishery has comparatively higher TACs. Results indicate that the West Coast fishery had a statistically significant decrease in catch-quota ratios from 0.41 in the three years before catch shares to 0.29 in the three years after catch shares. In contrast, the BC fishery experience no statistically significant change in fishery-wide average catch-quota ratios, which were 0.70 in the three years before and 0.62 in the three years after catch shares. In the West Coast fishery, the risk of exceeding quotas for some species may be so high that fishers are unable to achieve high degrees of catch-quota balancing and instead focus on species that can be easily selected with changes in fishing behavior. Multispecies fisheries management has direct tradeoffs between maximizing yield and achieving conservation goals, and these results may highlight the tradeoff between rebuilding overfished species by reducing TACs, and the achievement of catch-quota balancing.     

Decomposing productivity and efficiency changes in the Alaska head and gut factory trawl fleet

Fishing fleets are subject to numerous factors that affect economic performance, making identification and attribution of such impacts difficult. This paper separately identifies the effects of changing input and output prices, fishery management, and quota allocations on total factor productivity using a Lowe Index. Indices account for technical change and decompose productivity estimates into its technical, environmental, and scale-mix components. This results in measures that reflect shifts in the production frontier, and movements by vessels toward and around the frontier, to capture economies of scale and mix after a policy shift to a catch share program that includes fishing cooperatives and a limited access fishery. The difference between cooperative and limited access vessels is exploited to compare the changes in economic performance between the groups after the introduction of the shift to catch shares and cooperative management, which allowed the vessels to improve the timing and coordination across multi-species fisheries and to decrease incidental catch of quota-limited bycatch species that had closed the target fisheries prematurely in the past. Results indicate that total factor productivity increased significantly after the move to a catch share program, largely due to increases in technical change that shifted out the production frontier of the fishery.     

Considering community allocations: Power and the politics of enclosure in the Gulf of Alaska

In 2012, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council initiated the process of designing a new management structure for the Gulf of Alaska trawl groundfish fleet. The new program is currently structured as a catch share program and driven by the need to end the ‘race for fish’ and provide the trawl fleet with the tools to reduce bycatch. To date much of the discussion among policy makers and stakeholders has centered on community protection measures and how best to avoid the negative social and economic impacts of catch share programs including impacts to crew, consolidation and the flight of quota and resource wealth from Gulf of Alaska fishery dependent communities. This paper examines how community protection measures related to the distribution of benefits and access to fishery resources are considered and challenged in the North Pacific today. Special attention is given to the ongoing debate surrounding the potential inclusion of an initial allocation to place-based Gulf of Alaska communities via a Community Fishing Association. As part of this effort, this paper examines the political space and underlying power dynamics in which consideration of alternatives to the commodification of fishing rights occurs.     

Local permit ownership in Alaska salmon fisheries

Changes in ownership of limited entry permits by “local” residents of the region where a fishery occurs may have significant economic and social implications for fishery-dependent regions. This paper examines changes in local permit ownership in Alaska salmon fisheries, for which a long-term decline in rural local permit ownership is an important policy concern. Theoretically, permit markets allocate permits over time to the individuals who are willing to pay the most for them. Any factors that differentially affect what local and non-local residents are willing to pay for permits may affect the equilibrium share of permits held by local residents. For remote rural fisheries in particular, these may include differences between local and non-local residents with respect to access to and costs of financing permits and boats, costs of travel to the fishery, opportunity costs of participation in the fishery, and many other factors. As a fishery increases in profitability, differences between local and non-local residents in access to financing matter more while differences in costs of travel and opportunity costs matter less in the relative ranking of what local and non-local residents are willing to pay for permits. This tends to increase the share of non-local residents among buyers willing to pay the market price for permits, reducing the equilibrium share of permits held by local residents. This leads to a conflict between two important policy goals: increasing fishery profitability and maintaining rural local permit ownership. Consistent with predictions of this theory, the local share of permit ownership in Alaska salmon fisheries is negatively related to permit prices (an indicator of fishery profitability).     

Economic characteristics and management challenges of the Hawaii pelagic longline fisheries: Will a catch share program help?

To date, none of the fisheries in the U.S. Pacific Islands Region is managed under a catch share program. In light of the NOAA policy to encourage the use of catch shares as a fishery management tool, the Western Pacific Fishery Management Council (WPFMC) listed six commercial fisheries, including the Hawaii pelagic longline fishery, the largest in the region, as potential candidates for catch share programs. This study examines the baseline economic characteristics and the main challenges facing the Hawaii pelagic longline fishery and evaluates the impact of these on the desirability and feasibility of a catch share program for this particular fishery.     

Estimating the economic impacts of bycatch in U.S. commercial fisheries

Bycatch presents a challenge to optimizing yield in commercial fisheries, where bycatch can total more than 1 million mt per year in the United States. Yet the economic impacts of bycatch have rarely been evaluated in the scientific literature. These economic impacts largely occur from the loss of landings through (1) early closure of fisheries when catch limits of bycatch species are reached; and (2) discards of marketable catch due to regulatory requirements in the fishery. This paper illustrates the economic impacts of early closures due to bycatch in U.S. fisheries by describing past case studies, as well as evaluating the economic impacts of discarding fish in U.S. commercial fisheries. Premature closures in the fisheries reviewed resulted in potential losses ranging from $34.4 million to $453.0 million annually. Nationally, bycatch estimates in the form of regulatory discards are annually reducing the potential yield of fisheries by $427.0 million in ex-vessel revenues, and as much as $4.2 billion in seafood-related sales, $1.5 billion in income, and 64,000 jobs. Our review also shows that some of the most promising work to reduce bycatch over the last decade has been the development of gears or gear modifications, termed “conservation engineering.”     

Free form property rights for fisheries: The decentralized design of rights-based management through groundfish “sectors” in New England

Harvest cooperatives were implemented in several US fisheries over the last decade during a period when US law prohibited implementation of any new individual fishery quota (IFQ) systems. Harvest cooperatives provided an alternative to individual quotas as a means to end the race for fish and increase fishery profitability. The prohibition on new IFQ systems in the US was lifted, but harvest cooperatives remain a more feasible and perhaps a superior alternative to IFQs for some fisheries. The New England Fishery Management Council is on the verge of implementing a new management system for the groundfish fishery based on harvest cooperatives known as “sectors”. This paper describes the New England sector management system and discusses a number of advantages but also some drawbacks relative to IFQs. It argues that a hybrid of the two approaches could have advantages over either.     

US catch share markets: a review of data availability and impediments to transparent markets

A growing number of US fisheries are managed with catch share programs, which allocate exclusive shares of the total allowable catch from a fish stock to individuals, cooperatives, communities, or other entities. All of these catch share programs allow transferability of catch privileges in some form. Information on these transfers, particularly prices, could be valuable to fishery managers and to fishery participants to support management and business decisions and to increase efficiency of the catch share market itself. This article documents the availability and quality of data on transfers of catch privileges in fourteen US catch share programs. These catch share programs include several individual fishing quota (IFQ) programs and a number of programs that allocate catch privileges to self-organized cooperatives. Price information on catch share transfers is found to be limited or unavailable in most US catch share programs. Recommendations are made on how to improve the design of catch share programs and associated data collection systems to facilitate effective catch share markets, collection of catch share market data, and better use of information from catch share markets.     

From krill to convenience stores: Forecasting the economic and ecological effects of fisheries management on the US West Coast

There is a need to better understand the linkages between marine ecosystems and the human communities and economies that depend on these systems. Here those linkages are drawn for the California Current on the US West Coast, by combining a fishery ecosystem model (Atlantis) with an economic model (IO-PAC) that traces how changes in seafood landings impact the broader economy. The potential effects of broad fisheries management options are explored, including status quo management, switching effort from trawl to other gears, and spatial management scenarios. Relative to Status Quo, the other scenarios here involved short-term ex-vessel revenue losses, primarily to the bottom trawl fleet. Other fleets, particularly the fixed gear fleet that uses pots and demersal longlines, gained revenue in some scenarios, though spatial closures of Rockfish Conservation Areas reduced revenue to fixed gear fleets. Processor and wholesaler revenue tracked trends in the bottom trawl fleet, which accounted for 58% of total landings by value. Income impacts (employee compensation and earnings of business owners) on the broader economy mirrored the revenue trends. The long-term forecast (15 years) from the Atlantis ecosystem model predicted substantial stock rebuilding and increases in fleet catch. The 15 year projection of Status Quo suggested an additional ∼$27 million in revenue for the fisheries sectors, and an additional $23 million in income and 385 jobs in the broader economy, roughly a 25% increase. Linking the ecological and economic models here has allowed evaluation of fishery management policies using multiple criteria, and comparison of potential economic and conservation trade-offs that stem from management actions.     

Sharing the catch or catching the shares: Catch shares for the western Pacific region?

The applicability of catch shares programs is evaluated for the various fisheries of the Western Pacific Fishery Management Council region in each of the archipelagoes. Implementation of Catch Shares programs in the region is problematic, but would require better data to be done fairly and equitably. Catch shares are currently under initial consideration for the Hawaii and American Samoa longline fisheries and the Hawaii Deep 7 bottomfish fishery. It is argued that current conditions in all the other small boat fisheries in the region make them inappropriate for catch shares management. Overfishing and the “race for fish” are not yet an issue for these fisheries and some are underdeveloped. Catch share programs can cause significant negative social consequences for Western Pacific communities because data on fishermen's participation, catch histories, and motivations to fish for cultural needs is not adequate for any initial allocation scheme to be developed equitably. The prevailing Western Pacific cultural value of sharing the fish by gifting portions, sharing the catch widely and sharing fishing opportunities widely is in clear conflict with the individualized commercial profit motive philosophy of fisheries that are appropriate for catch shares. The small boat fisheries lack adequate monitoring and enforcement, and do not have a total allowable catch or quota. Nor do they usually have a demonstrated need for one. Preliminary community outreach by Council staff and community discussion of catch shares shows a general lack of information yet a potential for strong resistance to the imposition of catch shares.     

Measures of fishing fleet diversity in the New England groundfish fishery

After 16 years under a limited access program with effort controls, the New England groundfish fishery transitioned to a catch share management system in 2010. For much of its earlier management history, issues related to fishing capacity were paramount as effort controls were increasingly restrictive to meet biological objectives. As the size of the active fleet declined from over 1000 vessels from 1994 to 2001 to less than 400 vessels in 2012, the management concern shifted to fleet diversity. Fleet diversity has been cast in terms of vessels based on characteristics such as size, gear, and region rather than their share in landings or economic value. Measuring fleet diversity with indices commonly used in the biodiversity literature such as richness, effective diversity based on the Shannon index, and evenness appears appropriate for this context. In this paper these indices were applied to measure changes in diversity of the active New England groundfish fleet from 1996 to 2012. Fleet diversity as measured by the Shannon Index has declined by approximately 35% from 1996 to 2012, but has remained relatively stable since 2007. Forty vessel types were present in all 17 years, which accounted for about 85% of active groundfish vessels and over 90% of total groundfish landings in all years. Even though the fleet size and overall diversity have declined the “core” groundfish fleet remains stable.     

Tradable permit programs: What are the lessons for the new Alaska halibut catch sharing plan?

To address long-standing allocation conflicts between the Pacific halibut commercial fishing sector and recreational charter (for-hire) sector in Alaska, an Alaska halibut catch sharing plan (CSP) is being implemented in 2014 that has a provision allowing the leasing of commercial individual fishing quota to recreational charter businesses. This one-way inter-sectoral trading allows for the charter sector to increase its share of the total allowable catch while compensating commercial fishermen. This type of catch shares program is novel in fisheries. In this paper, the literature on non-fisheries tradable permit programs (TPPs) that have similarities to the Alaska halibut CSP program is examined. Several successful TPPs are discussed, including ones from emissions trading programs, water quality trading programs, water markets, and transferable development rights programs. They are then evaluated in terms of their similarities and differences to the Alaska CSP program. Characteristics not part of the current CSP that other TPPs have used and that may increase the likelihood for the CSP to be effective in achieving its primary goals (if they are implemented) are identified, such as allowing more flexible transfers (e.g., internal transfers), intertemporal banking, cooperative structures, and multi-year leasing.     

Catch share programs in developing countries: A survey of the literature

The literature on catch shares is dominated by analyses of programs in developed countries. To address this research gap, this paper identifies and discusses programs in developing countries. The paper also investigates differences between countries that have and have not implemented programs across a number of relevant dimensions, including governance and resource value, and characterizes the relationship between catch share type (e.g., quota-based or space-based systems) and the species characteristics. The paper identifies programs in about 20 percent of coastal and developing countries and finds that countries with catch shares have higher governance rankings, stronger economies, more valuable fishery export industries, and fewer people employed in fisheries. For example, the average governance effectiveness rank is 38.7 for all coastal and developing countries and 60.8 for countries with quota-based fishing rights. Species managed under quota-based systems are also found to have the potential for strong recruitment externalities. The results support ideas from the fisheries economics literature on the pre-conditions that are more likely to lead to the adoption of a catch share program.     

Catch-quota balancing mechanisms in the Icelandic multi-species demersal fishery: Are all species equal?

In this study, utilization of catch-quota balancing mechanisms in the Icelandic demersal fishery, which allow for individual transferable quota to be transformed among species and transferred between years, is analyzed to determine whether annual catches closely adhere to total allowable catches on average. Icelandic landings data for 14 demersal fish species during 2001–2013 are compared to implemented total allowable catches as well as catch limits recommended by the Marine Research Institute (MRI) and a proxy for annual market values. Landings surpassed legal limits of total allowable catch in 27% of the cases (landings by species by fishing year), mostly due to species transformations, but TAC overages were not consistent for any species. Instead, catches of some species were consistently less than legal limits, with some indications that landings were related to profitability (i.e. landings were correlated with market value). However, landings surpassed MRI recommendations in 67% of the cases, and landings of four species (Atlantic wolffish, haddock, monkfish and redfish) consistently exceeded MRI recommendations. Therefore, discrepancies between scientific recommendations for catch limits and quotas selected through the political process may represent a higher risk to long-term sustainability than catch-quota balancing mechanisms.     

Determining primary and companion species in a multi-species fishery: Implications for TAC setting

The use of ITQ management in multi-species fisheries has been the subject of much debate and the complexities and difficulties of managing multi-species fisheries are well known. A major problem is that the species mix in fishery catches may not necessarily match the mix in combined TACs or in quota holdings. While a number of solutions have been proposed or implemented to improve transferability of quota and other incentives to reduce over-quota fishing and discarding, it is surprising that there has been little focus on TAC-setting itself and coordinating this across multiple species/stocks as a means of dealing with some of these issues. In this paper, data were analysed from the trawl sector of the Australian Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark Fishery to determine the relationship between primary species and companion species and the implications this has for TAC setting. The primary species is the species being considered when setting an individual species TAC. The companion species are ones that should also be considered when setting the TAC of the primary species, because a considerable proportion of the primary species catch is taken as a companion species non-target catch. The target species in each fishing operation was determined and was used to characterize recent multi-species catch data into primary and companion components. This approach provides an empirical means to examine the impact of individual species TAC decisions across all of the quota species in a fishery.     

Changes in fishing behaviour of two fleets under fully documented catch quota management: Same rules,different outcomes

A Dutch pilot study of fully documented fisheries provided the opportunity to observe actual changes in fishing behaviour under catch quota management (CQM). Interviews with fishers in the pilot study aided in interpreting the results and giving insight in the decision making process and reasoning of fishers. The CQM pilot study entailed a fleet of small and large demersal vessels. For these vessels, all cod catches were counted against quota, including catches of individuals below minimum landings size. To obtain reliable catch data all vessels were equipped with electronic monitoring (EM) systems. These systems recorded videos of all fishing and processing activities on board. In return, fishers received a 30% quota bonus for cod and were compensated with more flexibility on effort regulations. It was hypothesized that vessels in the CQM will (i) increase their landings by 30% according to their quota bonus, (ii) increase the use of gear with large mesh size, and (iii) change effort towards fishing locations with high catch rates of large cod and avoid areas with high catch rates of undersized cod. The results showed that CQM had no effect on fishing behaviour of the small vessels. In contrast, large vessels significantly increased their cod landings (216%) and avoided undersized cod. This difference in response of different fleets suggested that implementation of CQM, for instance in the context of the European Common Fisheries Policy, should consider fleet characteristics. It seemed that larger vessels in this study more easily adapted their behaviour to new management regimes and that the quota bonus opened up new fishing strategies, that were not envisaged during the implementation.     

How have catch shares been allocated?

A unique database was created that describes the methods used to allocate shares in nearly every major catch share fishery in the world. Approximately 54% of the major catch share fisheries in the world allocated the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) solely on the basis of historical catch records, 3% used auctions, and 6% used equal sharing rules. The remaining 37% used a combination of methods, including vessel-based rules. These results confirm the widely-held belief that nearly all catch share programs have “grandfathered” private access to fishery resources: 91% of the fisheries in the database allocated some fraction of the TAC on the basis of historical catch. This publicly available database should be a useful reference tool for policymakers, academics, and others interested in catch shares management in Hawai'i and across the globe.     

The economic sustainability of artisanal fisheries: the case of the trawl ban in the Gulf of Castellammare, NW Sicily

Small-scale fisheries and the communities they support are often given the protection of designated fishing zones from which non-artisanal vessels are excluded. This paper looks at one example of this approach, the trawl ban introduced in the Gulf of Castellammare (NW Sicily), focussing on the economic sustainability of the artisanal fishery currently operating within the protected area. The consequences of lifting the trawl ban and how far this would jeopardise the sustainability of the artisanal fishery are explored via an analysis of the financial viability of trammel net vessels under alternative assumptions concerning catch rates. The paper also investigates fishermen's attitudes towards the trawl ban and their predisposition either to remain in the fishery or to quit in the event of the ban being removed.