Past connections and present similarities in slave ownership and fossil fuel usage

The first part of the paper demonstrates the connection between the abolition of slavery and the Industrial Revolution: steam power changed the perception of labour; new techniques facilitated diffusion of pro-abolition pamphlets; fewer threats to basic existence resulting from industrial advances fostered sensibilities and moral standards toward abolitionism; and, through industrial development, the North grasped victory in the American Civil War. The second part presents similarities between societies in the past that have used slave labour and those in the present that use fossil fuels. It argues that slaves and fossil-fuelled machines play(ed) similar economic and social roles: both slave societies and developed countries externalise(d) labour and both slaves and modern machines free(d) their owners from daily chores. Consequently, we are as dependent on fossil fuels as slave societies were dependent on bonded labour. It also suggests that, in differing ways, suffering resulting (directly) from slavery and (indirectly) from the excessive burning of fossil fuels are now morally comparable. When we emit carbon dioxide at a rate that exceeds what the ecosystem can absorb, when we deplete non-renewable resources, we indirectly cause suffering to other human beings. Similarly, cheap oil facilitates imports of goods from countries with little social protection and hence help externalise oppression. The conclusion draws on the lessons which may be learned by Climate Change campaigners from the campaigns to abolish slavery: environmental apathy can be opposed effectively if we learn from what worked in the fight against this inhuman institution.     

Alternative climate policy pathways in the US

Although it is likely that the political–economic coalition required for implementing a federal cap-and-trade programme for GHGs in the US is now sufficiently strong, the structural impediments that have prevented its legislative passage remain impressively durable and can be expected to continue to lay waste to congressional proposals for the foreseeable future. Indeed, given the complex history of environmental policy gridlock in Washington since the early 1980s, any expectations that a cap-and-trade programme could have been realistically achieved through the traditional legislative passage in Congress are fundamentally misplaced. Building on previous research, it is argued that – as with most other forms of environmental policy in the US over the past three decades – a national carbon market is more plausible given alternative policy pathways, which if taken are capable of circumventing the Federal Congress altogether. In particular, the interaction between litigation against the federal government and the ‘rulemaking’ authority possessed by the Executive Branch provides the potential space for the current administration to unilaterally establish a model rule for a national carbon-trading programme.

Policy relevance

This article aims to contribute to American climate policy debates by re-thinking the policy mechanisms most capable of establishing a national carbon market in the US. By taking into account the array of structural factors that have prevented the legislative passage of such a programme in federal Congress, a range of alternative policy ‘pathways’ is considered that have historically allowed progressive environmental policies to endure in Washington (despite increased Congressional gridlock over the past few decades). Two specific alternative strategies and the relationship between them are assessed: the use of litigation to impose legal obligations on federal agencies to regulate effluents, and the use of executive authority to define the nature and scope of environmental regulation. The administration's current potential to unilaterally develop a model-rule for a cap-and-trade programme under the Clean Air Act is emphasized, and the political implications of such a strategy are considered.     

Would constraining US fossil fuel production affect global CO<Subscript>2</Subscript> emissions? A case study of US leasing policy

Avoiding dangerous climate change will require a rapid transition away from fossil fuels. By some estimates, global consumption and production of fossil fuels—particularly coal and oil—will need to end almost entirely within 50 years. Given the scale of such a transition, nations may need to consider policies that constrain growth in fossil fuel supplies in addition to those that reduce demand. Here, we examine the emissions implications of a supply-constraining measure that was rapidly gaining momentum in the United States (US) under the Obama administration: ceasing the issuance of new leases for fossil fuel extraction on federal lands and waters. Such a measure could reduce global carbon dioxide emissions by an estimated 280 million tons annually by 2030, comparable to that of other major climate policies adopted or considered by the Obama administration. Our findings suggest that measures to constrain fossil fuel supply—though not currently viable in a US Trump administration—deserve further consideration at subnational levels in the US or by other countries now, and by future US administrations.     

Climate effects on atmospheric carbon dioxide over the last century

The buildup of atmospheric CO₂ since 1958 is surprisingly well explained by the simple premise that 57% of the industrial emissions (fossil fuel burning and cement manufacture) has remained airborne. This premise accounts well for the rise both before and after 1980 despite a decrease in the growth rate of fossil fuel CO₂ emissions, which occurred at that time, and by itself should have caused the airborne fraction to decrease. In contrast, the buildup prior to 1958 was not simply proportional to cumulative fossil fuel emissions, and notably included a period during the 1940s when CO₂ growth stalled despite continued fossil fuel emissions. Here we show that the constancy of the airborne fraction since 1958 can be in part explained by decadal variations in global land air temperature, which caused a warming-induced release of CO₂ from the land biosphere to the atmosphere. We also show that the 1940s plateau may be related to these decadal temperature variations. Furthermore, we show that there is a close connection between the phenomenology producing CO₂ variability on multidecadal and El Niño timescales.     

Prospects for steam coal exporters in the era of climate policies: a case study of Colombia

Continued global action on climate change has major consequences for fossil fuel markets, especially for coal as the most carbon-intensive fuel. This article summarizes current market developments in the most important coal-producing and coal-consuming countries, resulting in a critical qualitative assessment of prospects for future coal exports. Colombia, as the world’s fourth largest exporter, is strongly affected by these global trends, with more than 90% of its production being exported. Market analysis finds Colombia in a strong competitive position, owing to its low production costs and high coal quality. Nevertheless, market trends and enhanced climate policies suggest a gloomy outlook for future exports. Increasing competition on the Atlantic as well as Pacific market will keep coal prices low and continue pressure on mining companies. Increasing numbers of filed bankruptcies and lay-offs might be just the beginning of a carbon bubble devaluing fossil fuel investments and leaving them stranded. Colombia largely supplies European and Mediterranean consumers but also delivers some quantities to the US Gulf Coast, and to Central and South America. Future coal demand in most of these countries will continue to decline in the next decades. Newly constructed power plants in emerging economies (India, China) are unlikely to compensate for this downturn owing to increasing domestic supply and decreasing demand. Therefore, maintaining or even increasing mining volumes in Colombia should be re-evaluated, taking into account new economic realities as well as local externalities. Ignoring these risks could lead to additional stranded investments, aggravating the local resource curse and hampering sustainable economic development.

Key policy insights

• The climate policies of most of Colombia’s traditional trade partners target steam coal as the more emission-intensive fossil fuel, with many countries implementing or considering a coal phase-out.

• Coal exporters should re-evaluate their operations and new investments taking into account this new policy environment.

• To prevent a race to the bottom among coal producers that would favour weak regulation, climate policy makers should also consider the local social and external costs of coal mining, including on health and the local environment.

     

The geographies of community disaster resilience

There is increasing policy and research interest in disaster resilience, yet the extant literature is still mired in definitional debates, epistemological orientations of researchers, and differences in basic approaches to measurement. As a consequence, there is little integration across domains and disciplines on community resilience assessment, its driving forces, and geographic variability. Using US counties as the study unit, this paper creates an empirically-based resilience metric called the Baseline Resilience Indicators for Communities (BRIC) that is both conceptually and theoretically sound, yet, easy enough to compute for use in a policy context. A common set of variables were used to measure the inherent resilience of counties in the United States according to six different domains or capitals as identified in the extant literature – social, economic, housing and infrastructure, institutional, community, and environmental. Data were from public and freely accessible data sources. Counties in the US Midwest and Great Plains states have the most inherent resilience, while counties in the west, along the US-Mexico border, and along the Appalachian ridge in the east contain the least resilience. Further, it was found that inherent resilience is not the opposite of social vulnerability, but a distinctly different construct both conceptually and empirically. While understanding the overall variability in resilience, the BRIC is easily deconstructed to its component parts to provide guidance to policy makers on where investments in intervention strategies may make a difference in the improvement of scores. Such evidence-based research has an opportunity to influence public policy focused on disaster risk.     

Energy transitions and the global land rush: Ultimate drivers and persistent consequences

While the recent emergence of a global land rush has initiated large debates and conflicts over the use and access to land, further investigation into the underlying drivers is required to enhance the understanding of the potential trajectories of the land grab phenomenon. This paper takes a biophysical perspective and explores how declining fossil stocks and a global transition towards renewable energies ultimately drive the land rush. The paper addresses, in qualitative terms, how societal needs for land change with different patterns of societal energy metabolism. The potential spatial expansions of renewables are illustrated in quantitative terms, based on the power density concept and energy provision forecasts for the year 2020. The transition from an energy system based on fossils stocks, with high power densities, to one based on renewables, with low power densities, drastically boosts societal demand for land. This drives the land rush directly through land acquisitions for the expansion of energy systems. The energy transition also drives the land rush indirectly, in particular through food security threats motivated by the growing competition over farmland uses and changes in crop supply. Although currently fossil stocks are still relatively abundant, future declines are expected to trigger the demand for land to even greater extents. Given the inevitability of the energy transition, we believe that the land rush will have persistence, bearing long-term consequences for land use and struggles over access to land.     

Potential Scale-Related Problems in Estimating the Costs of CO2 Mitigation Policies

The scale-related problem addressed here relates to a difficulty in substituting away from fossil fuels as part of a policy designed to mitigate climate change. The replacement of fossil fuels by renewable forms of energy is a widely advocated means of reducing the build-up greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. However, the substitution, on a large-scale, of renewable, non-fossil fuel energy sources for fossil fuels requires using vast amounts of land to produce energy. It is shown that, with the exception of nuclear energy, almost all non-fossil fuel energy sources are highly land using, or land-intensive. In particular, the widespread substitution of renewables such as biomasses, wind, solar, and hydro for fossil fuels would require adapting large amounts of land to energy production, land which may have good alternative uses. Thus, the economic feasibility of producing, globally, relatively small amounts of renewable energies is not a good indicator of the feasibility of producing them on a large scale. This implies that substantial reduction in the use of fossil fuels requires the discovery and development of new non-land intensive energy technologies.     

The impact of the US retreat from the Paris Agreement: Kyoto revisited?

The United States’ decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement (pending possible re-engagement under different terms) may have significant ramifications for international climate policy, but the implications of this decision remain contested. This commentary illustrates how comparative analysis of US participation in multilateral environmental agreements can inform predictions and future assessments of the decision. We compare and contrast US non-participation in the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, focusing on four key areas that may condition the influence of US treaty decisions on international climate policy: (i) global momentum on climate change mitigation; (ii) the possibility of US non-participation giving rise to alternative forms of international collaboration on climate policy; (iii) the timing and circumstances of the US decision to exit; and (iv) the influence of treaty design on countries’ incentives to participate and comply. We find that differences across the two treaties relating to the first three factors are more likely to reduce the negative ramifications of US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement compared to the Kyoto Protocol. However, the increased urgency of deep decarbonization renders US non-participation a major concern despite its declining share of global emissions. Moreover, key design features of the Paris Agreement suggest that other countries may react to the US decision by scaling back their levels of ambition and compliance, even if they remain in the Agreement.

Key policy insights

• Increasing global momentum on mitigation since 1997 means that US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement is potentially less damaging than its non-participation in the Kyoto Protocol

• Despite the declining US share of global emissions, greater urgency of deep decarbonization means that the non-participation of a major player, such as the US, remains problematic for global cooperation and achieving the Paris Agreement’s goals

• Differences in the design of the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement suggest that US non-participation is more likely to prompt reluctant countries to stay within the Paris framework but reduce levels of ambition and compliance, rather than exit the Agreement altogether

     

Global carbon budgets and the viability of new fossil fuel projects

Policy-makers of some fossil fuel-endowed countries wish to know if a given fossil fuel supply project is consistent with the global carbon budget that would prevent a 2 °C temperature rise. But while some studies have identified fossil fuel reserves that are inconsistent with the 2 °C carbon budget, they have not shown the effect on fossil fuel production costs and market prices. Focusing on oil, we develop an oil pricing and climate test model to which we apply future carbon prices and oil consumption from several global energy-economy-emissions models that simulate the energy supply and demand effects of the 2 °C carbon budget. Our oil price model includes key oil market attributes, notably upper and lower market share boundaries for different oil producer categories, such as OPEC. Using the distribution of the global model results as an indicator of uncertainty about future carbon prices and oil demand, we estimate the probability that a new investment of a given oil source category would be economically viable under the 2 °C carbon budget. In our case study of Canada’s oil sands, we find a less than 5% probability that oil sands investments, and therefore new oil pipelines, would be economically viable over the next three decades under the 2 °C carbon budget. Our sensitivity analysis finds that if OPEC agreed to reduce its market share to 30% by 2045, a significant reduction from its steady 40–45% of the past 25 years, then the probability of viable oil sands expansion rises to 30%.     

Ethics and public perception of climate change: Exploring the Christian voices in the US public debate

Climate change raises many questions with strong moral and ethical dimensions that are important to address in climate-policy formation and international negotiations. Particularly in the United States, the public discussion of these dimensions is strongly influenced by religious groups and leaders. Over the past few years, many religious groups have taken positions on climate change, highlighting its ethical dimensions. This paper aims to explore these ethical dimensions in the US public debate in relation to public support for climate policies. It analyzes in particular the Christian voices in the US public debate on climate change by typifying the various discourses. Three narratives emerge from this analysis: ‘conservational stewardship’ (conserving the ‘garden of God’ as it was created), ‘developmental stewardship’ (turning the wilderness into a garden as it should become) and ‘developmental preservation’ (God's creation is good and changing; progress and preservation should be combined). The different narratives address fundamental ethical questions, dealing with stewardship and social justice, and they provide proxies for public perception of climate change in the US. Policy strategies that pay careful attention to the effects of climate change and climate policy on the poor – in developing nations and the US itself – may find support among the US population. Religious framings of climate change resonate with the electorates of both progressive and conservative politicians and could serve as bridging devices for bipartisan climate-policy initiatives.     

The participation of core stakeholders in the design of,and challenges to,the US Clean Power Plan

We examine the participation of stakeholders in the rule-making process leading to the design of the US Clean Power Plan (CPP), which was the cornerstone regulation developed during the Obama administration to lower GHG emissions from power plants in the US. Using publicly available information, we identify the core stakeholders that participated in the different stages of the rulemaking process, from the early draft of the rule to its publication in final form, and examine variables that could help explain their decisions to litigate, either against or in favour of the final version of the rule. We show that the ‘pro-CPP’ stakeholders were (a) more likely to participate during the early stages of the rule-making process, attending meetings with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) staff to discuss rule content, and (b) less likely to get involved during the litigation process. ‘Anti-CPP’ stakeholders, on the other hand, did the opposite, being in general less active during the rulemaking stages, and more active during the litigation stage. However, we also find that the ‘anti-CPP’ stakeholders were more tightly organized as a coalition when compared to the ‘pro-CPP’ stakeholders throughout the process (even in the early stages when they participated less). Our results shed new light on the way advocacy coalitions operate in the climate policy subsystem in the US, and help inform debates about the likelihood of conflict and cooperation across a variety of environmental policy topics.

Key policy insights

• The design of the Clean Power Plan was a long and contentious process in which ‘Pro’ and ‘Anti-CPP’ coalitions operated to support and undermine the rule, respectively.

• ‘Pro-CPP’ stakeholders were more active in meetings organized to discuss the CPP with EPA staff, and in submitting written comments.

• ‘Anti-CPP’ stakeholders were more active during litigation, in response to perceived EPA overreach in designing the rule and negative financial impacts on states’ economies.

• Joint participation by ‘Anti-CPP’ stakeholders in meetings conveyed by the EPA to discuss the potential content of the rule helps explain their joint litigation efforts, which hints at their considerable capacity to self-organize as a coalition throughout the process.

     

Climate policy strength compared: China,the US,the EU,India, Russia,and Japan

The few systematic international comparisons of climate policy strength made so far have serious weaknesses, particularly those that assign arbitrary weightings to different policy instrument types in order to calculate an aggregate score for policy strength. This article avoids these problems by ranking the six biggest emitters by far – China, the US, the EU, India, Russia, and Japan – on a set of six key policy instruments that are individually potent and together representative of climate policy as a whole: carbon taxes, emissions trading, feed-in tariffs, renewable energy quotas, fossil fuel power plant bans, and vehicle emissions standards. The results cast strong doubt on any idea that there is a clear hierarchy on climate policy with Europe at the top: the EU does lead on a number of policies but so does Japan. China, the US, and India each lead on one area. Russia is inactive on all fronts. At the same time climate policy everywhere remains weak compared to what it could be.

Policy relevance

This study enables climate policy strength, defined as the extent to which the statutory provisions of climate policies are likely to restrict GHG emissions if implemented as intended, to be assessed and compared more realistically across space and time. As such its availability for the six biggest emitters, which together account for over 70% of global CO₂ emissions, should facilitate international negotiations (1) by giving participants a better idea of where major emitters stand relative to each other as far as climate policy stringency is concerned, and (2) by identifying areas of weakness that need action.     

Virtue and vulnerability: Discourses on women, gender and climate change

In the limited literature on gender and climate change, two themes predominate - women as vulnerable or virtuous in relation to the environment. Two viewpoints become obvious: women in the South will be affected more by climate change than men in those countries and that men in the North pollute more than women. The debates are structured in specific ways in the North and the South and the discussion in the article focuses largely on examples from Sweden and India. The article traces the lineage of the arguments to the women, environment and development discussions, examining how they recur in new forms in climate debates. Questioning assumptions about women's vulnerability and virtuousness, it highlights how a focus on women's vulnerability or virtuousness can deflect attention from inequalities in decision-making. By reiterating statements about poor women in the South and the pro-environmental women of the North, these assumptions reinforce North-South biases. Generalizations about women's vulnerability and virtuousness can lead to an increase in women's responsibility without corresponding rewards. There is need to contextualise debates on climate change to enable action and to respond effectively to its adverse effects in particular places.     

Climate uncertainties and their discontents: increasing the impact of assessments on public understanding of climate risks and choices

US public awareness of the reality and risks of human-caused climate change remains limited, despite strong evidence presented in the IPCC and other major climate assessments. One contributing factor may be that the immense collective effort to produce periodic climate assessments is typically not well matched with public communication and outreach efforts for these reports, leaving a vacuum to be filled by less authoritative sources. Print and online media coverage provides one metric of the US public reach of selected climate assessments between 2000 and 2010. The number of Lexis-Nexis articles for the search terms “climate change” or “global warming” within 14 days of each report’s release varied significantly over time with a peak occurring in 2007. When compared to background “chatter” relating to climate change, each assessment had widely diverse penetration in the US media (~4% for US National Climate Assessment in 2000; ~17% for Arctic Climate Impacts Assessment in 2004; ~19% and ~10% for Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report Working Group I and Working Group II respectively in 2007; ~4% for the US Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) assessment report in 2009; and ~5% for US National Research Council’s America’s Climate Choices reports in 2010). We propose ways to improve the public reach of climate assessments, focusing in particular on approaches to more effectively characterize and communicate the role of uncertainty in human actions as distinct from other sources of uncertainty across the range of possible climate futures.     

Natural gas and climate finance

Should energy projects to extend the use of natural gas be considered for funding under public climate finance commitments? This article provides an overview of evidence for and against climate finance for natural gas projects. The argument focuses on a case study, the UK’s International Climate Fund (ICF). This synthesis concludes that gas-related projects will rarely be eligible for funding under public climate finance, save a few exceptions in which they provide energy access to households directly. Although gas power plants have generally lower emissions than those which use other fossil fuels such as coal, their impact will depend on the material constraints to calculate emissions reductions, the context of implementation, and the political economy of the target country. Three case studies demonstrate that energy access projects need to be understood as providing a whole range of sustainable benefits, from improving local health to reducing emissions. Overall, gas-related projects are complex interventions that require context-specific knowledge of both the effects of technology and the possible business models that can work in context.

POLICY RELEVANCE

This article investigates whether projects related to natural gas constitute an appropriate use of public climate finance, with a particular focus on the UK’s International Climate Fund. Policy makers in developed countries will decide in the coming years how to use public climate finance; that is, the fraction of overseas development assistance (ODA) for climate change mitigation and adaptation. In the UK, for example, the ICF is the most important instrument to provide climate finance for developing countries. In 2013, the UK set out a clear position ‘to end support for public financing of new coal-fired power plants overseas, except in rare circumstances.’ This ban has fostered debate about whether similar positions should follow for other fossil fuels such as natural gas, specifically in the context of ICF funding. Similar debates are taking place in other countries such as Germany and Norway, and are informing the implementation of international facilities such as the Green Climate Fund.     

A decision aid tool for equity issues analysis in emission permit allocations

Abstract

In the long term, the Kyoto Protocol will be insufficient to stabilize the greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere; quantified commitments will also be essential for major developing countries (and the US). International cooperation mechanisms, such as permit trading systems, can help achieve global economic efficiency. However, the initial allocation of emission permits raises many debates on equity. The main objective is to propose a decision aid tool for decision makers, which is capable of providing relevant information on various equitable permit allocation schemes and burden sharing. A dynamic multicriteria model is proposed to share the global quantity of permits among 15 regions, taking into account multiple definitions of equity and regional interests. The World-MARKAL energy model is used to compute the gross reduction cost (before permit exchanges) for each region. Afterward, it is possible to calculate their net reduction costs (after permit exchanges) according to different allocation schemes. A realistic simulation of the tool provides examples of results, i.e. ranges of permit allocations and net costs for each region. Finally, some recommendations are proposed to policy makers to design a decision process adapted to the global context of negotiations.     

Assessing decarbonization pathways and their implications for energy security policies in Japan

For countries without sufficient fossil fuel resources such as Japan, climate policies in the mid- to long term need to satisfy requirements not only for decarbonisation but also for energy security in the context of limitations on renewable energies and nuclear power. This study assesses the feasibility of decarbonization pathways to 2050 and their effects on energy security, considering the latest energy and climate policies in Japan using the AIM/Enduse model. The analysis illustrates that deep decarbonization by 2050 is technically feasible even without nuclear power based on three elements: energy efficiency improvements, low-carbon electricity and electrification in end-use sectors. These decarbonization pathways, in the long term, could also contribute to enhanced energy security, reducing import dependency to less than a half of the total primary energy and reducing import bills for fossil fuels by around 70% compared with the current level. Notably, renewable energies could play a strategically significant role in satisfying both climate and energy security requirements. In the mid-term (to 2030), however, although GHG emissions are reduced by 14–20% from 1990 levels, import dependency is relatively stable at today's levels, particularly without the restart of nuclear power. Given the limited potential for renewable energies in the mid-term, it is suggested that the availability of nuclear power will have negative impacts on carbon intensity and energy security, and policies to enhance the security of fossil fuels, including diversification of fuel sources and supply routes, will be required for the foreseeable future.

Policy relevance

Considering the scarcity of indigenous fossil fuel resources and the uncertain availability of nuclear power in Japan, renewable energy could play a strategically significant role in replacing unabated fossil fuels, which would contribute to satisfying both climate and energy security requirements in the long term. However, the renewable energy potential is insufficient to eliminate the requirement for fossil fuels by 2030; therefore the unavailability of nuclear power would affect energy security considerably. Thus, policies in the mid-term would still require enhancement of the energy security of fossil fuels, including the diversification of fuel sources and supply routes, as well as alleviation of the impacts of price volatility.     

Capturing the stories of corporations: A comparison of media debates on carbon capture and storage in Norway and Sweden

The development and deployment of carbon capture and storage (CCS) are sensitive to public debates that socially frame the technology. This study examines the evolving CCS debates, focusing on the media's framing of firms. Corporations are central CCS actors, and we analyze them in light of the nation-state, which has been emphasized in previous research as the primary context of CCS politics. Empirically, we compare framings of Statoil and Vattenfall in the Norwegian and Swedish media, drawing on a qualitative dataset of news media articles published between 2005 and 2009. We conclude that firms make regular media statements either to foster legitimacy or to respond to criticism of CCS. We also conclude that framing is not necessarily linked to technological success or failure and that interpretations of the technology have different forms depending on whether the related activity occurs in domestic or foreign markets. Finally, we explain the media framings based on the domestic energy situation and politics.     

Carbon capture and storage, bio-energy with carbon capture and storage, and the escape from the fossil-fuel lock-in

Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is increasingly depicted as an important element of the carbon dioxide mitigation portfolio. However, critics have warned that CCS might lead to “reinforced fossil fuel lock-in”, by perpetuating a fossil fuel based energy provision system. Due to large-scale investments in CCS infrastructure, the fossil fuel based ‘regime’ would be perpetuated to at least the end of this century.In this paper we investigate if and how CCS could help to avoid reinforcing fossil fuel lock-in. First we develop a set of criteria to estimate the degree of technological lock-in. We apply these criteria to assess the lock-in reinforcement effect of adding CCS to the fossil fuel socio-technical regime (FFR).In principle, carbon dioxide could be captured from any carbon dioxide point source. In the practice of present technological innovations, business strategies, and policy developments, CCS is most often coupled to coal power plants. However, there are many point sources of carbon dioxide that are not directly related to coal or even fossil fuels. For instance, many forms of bio-energy or biomass-based processes generate significant streams of carbon dioxide emissions. Capturing this carbon dioxide which was originally sequestered in biomass could lead to negative carbon dioxide emissions.We use the functional approach of technical innovations systems (TIS) to estimate in more detail the strengths of the “niches” CCS and Bio-Energy with CCS (BECCS). We also assess the orientation of the CCS niche towards the FFR and the risk of crowding out BECCS. Next we develop pathways for developing fossil energy carbon capture and storage, BECCS, and combinations of them, using transition pathways concepts. The outcome is that a large-scale BECCS development could be feasible under certain conditions, thus largely avoiding the risk of reinforced fossil fuel lock-in.