What controls equatorial Atlantic winds in boreal spring?

The factors controlling equatorial Atlantic winds in boreal spring are examined using both observations and general circulation model (GCM) simulations from the coupled model intercomparison phase 5. The results show that the prevailing surface easterlies flow against the attendant pressure gradient and must therefore be maintained by other terms in the momentum budget. An important contribution comes from meridional advection of zonal momentum but the dominant contribution is the vertical transport of zonal momentum from the free troposphere to the surface. This implies that surface winds are strongly influenced by conditions in the free troposphere, chiefly pressure gradients and, to a lesser extent, meridional advection. Both factors are linked to the patterns of deep convection. Applying these findings to GCM errors indicates, that, consistent with the results of previous studies, the persistent westerly surface wind bias found in most GCMs is due mostly to precipitation errors, in particular excessive precipitation south of the equator over the ocean and deficient precipitation over equatorial South America. Free tropospheric influences also dominate the interannual variability of surface winds in boreal spring. GCM experiments with prescribed climatological sea-surface temperatures (SSTs) indicate that the free tropospheric influences are mostly associated with internal atmospheric variability. Since the surface wind anomalies in boreal spring are crucial to the development of warm SST events (Atlantic Niños), the results imply that interannual variability in the region may rely far less on coupled air–sea feedbacks than is the case in the tropical Pacific.     

International climate policy: a “second best” solution for a “second best” world?

In the current political environment, it is highly unlikely that all countries will agree to take on immediate commitments to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. In particular, developing countries will look to their wealthier neighbors to be the “first movers.” In this paper, we assume that developing countries will eventually accede to an international emission reductions regime under two alternative scenarios. In the first, the decision on the part of developing countries to join the coalition is not made until just before accession. There is no planning to reconfigure their capital stock in advance of joining the coalition. In the second, we assume that developing countries commit to prespecified reductions beginning at an agreed upon date in the future; that is, they anticipate accession. We find that with an agreement now to future reductions, developing countries will modify their technology investment decisions in advance of accession to avoid being saddled with costly stranded assets, substantially reducing their GDP losses. Developed countries also benefit from not having to make as drastic reductions in the near-term to preserve the feasibility of stringent stabilization goals.     

Energy-GDP decoupling in a second best world—a case study on India

Reference emission scenarios in the literature have been the target of criticisms that suggest they convey too optimistic views on spontaneous energy-GDP decoupling of emerging countries economies. This article focuses on the case of India. It explores the role of current suboptimalities of the Indian power sector (structural under-investment in the sector leading to capacity shortage, power cuts and low efficiency) on future energy-GDP decoupling. To do so, it uses a hybrid general equilibrium framework, in which these suboptimalities are explicitly introduced. The results highlight that whether the constraints on investments in the power sector persist or not leads to contrasted trends in energy-GDP decoupling and GHG emissions. Over the short-term, capital scarcity in the power sector constrains the development of energy-intensive activities and therefore leads to higher energy-GDP decoupling. But on the longer-term, constrains on the power sector capacity limits substitution from fossil fuels to electricity, which entails both a low energy-GDP decoupling and a constraint on GDP growth when oil prices are high. The alleviation of suboptimalities appears thus as an insurance policy towards future oil price increase.     

What future for primary aluminium production in a decarbonizing economy?

Aluminium is an energy intensive material with an environmental footprint strongly dependent on the electricity mix consumed by the smelting process. This study models prospective environmental impacts of primary aluminium production according to different integrated assessment modeling scenarios building on Shared Socioeconomic Pathways and their climate change mitigation scenarios. Results project a global average carbon intensity ranging between 8.6 and 18.0 kg CO₂ eq/kg in 2100, compared to 18.3 kg CO₂ eq/kg at present, that could be further reduced under mitigation scenarios. Co-benefits with other environmental indicators are observed. Scaling aluminium production impacts to the global demand shows total emission between 1250 and 1590 Gt CO₂ eq for baseline scenarios by 2050 while absolute decoupling is only achievable with stringent climate policy changing drastically the electricity mix. Achieving larger emission reductions will require circular strategies that go beyond primary material production itself and involve other stakeholders along the aluminium value chain.     

Prospects for a saturation of humanity’s resource use? An analysis of material stocks and flows in nine world regions from 1900 to 2035

Material stocks in infrastructure, buildings and machinery shape current and future resource use and emissions. Analyses of specific countries and selected materials suggest that material stocks might saturate, which would be important for a more sustainable social metabolism. However, it is unclear to what extent the evidence holds for a wider range of stocks and flows, as well as for world regions or globally.We present an inflow-driven dynamic stock-flow model for 14 bulk materials, end-of-life outflows, recycling, and waste flows for nine world regions from 1900 to 2015, extended with trend scenarios until 2035. Material stocks are growing in all regions and show little signs of saturation yet. In 2015, China used half of global stock-building materials, overtook everyone in stock size around 2012 and grows its stock at ∼8%/year. The Industrialized regions, including the Former Soviet Union, are slowly expanding their high stock levels at ∼1%/year. Stocks in all other regions, inhabited by 60% of the world population, grow at ∼3–5%/year. Inequalities in per capita stocks between regions are large. Trend scenarios suggest potential absolute or per capita stock saturations in some of the industrialized regions, while all other regions are expected to continue high stock growth.Accumulated stocks drive future end-of-life materials and substantial maintenance and replacement requirements. Growing material stocks hamper a potential stabilization or reduction of resource use. Low stock levels in most world regions suggest a crucial window of opportunity for avoiding resource-intensive stock development. In the industrialized regions and especially China, stabilising and reducing resource use requires halting net stock expansion and transforming existing stocks. More materials- and energy-efficient and long-lived stocks which deliver high quality services, and improved reuse, repair and recycling of increasing end-of-life materials to close loops and actually replace virgin resources, are crucial for a more sustainable social metabolism.     

Should carbon-exporting countries strive for consumption-based accounting in a global cap-and-trade regime?

In the context of the post-Kyoto policy debate, the question was raised whether the current practice of production-based emissions accounting should be replaced by a consumption-based approach. In this paper, we qualify the conditions under which the way of carbon accounting makes a difference, and show how this affects the incentive of countries to opt for one or the other alternative. Two main insights are presented: First, it is emphasized—and formally shown with a general equilibrium trade model—that the way of accounting has neither efficiency nor distributive effects in the presence of a global cap-and-trade regime with full coverage and given national emission caps. Second, the accounting scheme does matter whenever the initial allocation rule for emission rights is related to past emissions. However, for a net exporter of carbon such as China, the preference for one or the other turns out to be ambiguous, since the current production-based accounting would be favored under grandfathering, whereas consumed carbon would be the preferred measure whenever higher current or historic emissions imply a lower initial allowance, as e.g. under the principle of historical responsibility.     

The variabilities of convective precipitation and large-scale precipitation in southern China for the period 1980–2020

Theoretical and Applied Climatology - In this paper, the spatial and temporal characteristics of convective precipitation (CP) and large-scale precipitation (LSP) in southern China during...     

Scenarios for a 2 °C world: a trade-linked input–output model with high sector detail

In this study a scenario model is used to examine if foreseen technological developments are capable of reducing CO₂ emissions in 2050 to a level consistent with United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) agreements, which aim at maximizing the temperature rise to 2 °C compared to pre-industrial levels. The model is based on a detailed global environmentally extended supply–use table (EE SUT) for the year 2000, called EXIOBASE. This global EE SUT allows calculating how the final demand in each region drives activities in production sectors, and hence related CO₂ emissions, in each region. Using this SUT framework, three scenarios have been constructed for the year 2050. The first is a business-as-usual scenario (BAU), which takes into account population, economic growth, and efficiency improvements. The second is a techno-scenario (TS), adding feasible and probable climate mitigation technologies to the BAU scenario. The third is the towards-2-degrees scenario (2DS), with a demand shift or growth reduction scenario added to the TS to create a 2 °C scenario. The emission results of the three scenarios are roughly in line with outcomes of typical scenarios from integrated assessment models. Our approach indicates that the 2 °C target seems difficult to reach with advanced CO₂ emission reduction technologies alone.

Policy relevance

The overall outlook in this scenario study is not optimistic. We show that CO₂ emissions from steel and cement production and air and sea transport will become dominant in 2050. They are difficult to reduce further. Using biofuels in air and sea transport will probably be problematic due to the fact that agricultural production largely will be needed to feed a rising global population and biofuel use for electricity production grows substantially in 2050. It seems that a more pervasive pressure towards emission reduction is required, also influencing the basic fabric of society in terms of types and volumes of energy use, materials use, and transport. Reducing envisaged growth levels, hence reducing global gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, might be one final contribution needed for moving to the 2 °C target, but is not on political agendas now.     

Future restrictions for sinks in the CDM How about a cap on supply?

Abstract

The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol is expected to result in only a small role for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), including afforestation and reforestation projects. Wide ranging concerns regarding sinks in the CDM have been reflected in the Marrakech Accords capping the total amount of emission offsets from sinks projects to be used by Annex I countries. Decisions about the second commitment period and beyond are likely to be of far greater importance for these projects.

This paper contributes to the discussion on how caps on sinks under the CDM could be used to obtain overall improved outcomes for developing countries. We examine two distinctive ways in which quantitative caps on sinks in the CDM can be implemented: one, restricting the use of sinks CERs to meet targets, as under the Marrakech Accords (a cap on demand); and two, restricting supply of sink CERs using a quota system. We argue in favour of a supply side cap, if Parties are to preserve the idea of limiting sinks in the CDM. Limiting the supply of credits could lead to better financial outcomes for developing countries as a whole, make higher-cost projects viable which may have better sustainability impacts, and provide an alternative to deal with equity concerns between developing countries.     

Future restrictions for sinks in the CDM: How about a cap on supply?

The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol is expected to result in only a small role for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), including afforestation and reforestation projects. Wide ranging concerns regarding sinks in the CDM have been reflected in the Marrakech Accords capping the total amount of emission offsets from sinks projects to be used by Annex I countries. Decisions about the second commitment period and beyond are likely to be of far greater importance for these projects.This paper contributes to the discussion on how caps on sinks under the CDM could be used to obtain overall improved outcomes for developing countries. We examine two distinctive ways in which quantitative caps on sinks in the CDM can be implemented: one, restricting the use of sinks CERs to meet targets, as under the Marrakech Accords (a cap on demand); and two, restricting supply of sink CERs using a quota system. We argue in favour of a supply side cap, if Parties are to preserve the idea of limiting sinks in the CDM. Limiting the supply of credits could lead to better financial outcomes for developing countries as a whole, make higher-cost projects viable which may have better sustainability impacts, and provide an alternative to deal with equity concerns between developing countries.     

Thinking globally and siting locally – renewable energy and biodiversity in a rapidly warming world

Increasing greenhouse gas emissions are projected to raise global average surface temperatures by 3?–4 °C within this century, dramatically increasing the extinction risk for terrestrial and freshwater species and severely disrupting ecosystems across the globe. Limiting the magnitude of warming and its devastating impacts on biodiversity will require deep emissions reductions that include the rapid, large-scale deployment of low-carbon renewable energy. Concerns about potential adverse impacts to species and ecosystems from the expansion of renewable energy development will play an important role in determining the pace and scale of emissions reductions and hence, the impact of climate change on global biodiversity. Efforts are underway to reduce uncertainty regarding wildlife impacts from renewable energy development, but such uncertainty cannot be eliminated. We argue the need to accept some and perhaps substantial risk of impacts to wildlife from renewable energy development in order to limit the far greater risks to biodiversity loss owing to climate change. We propose a path forward for better reconciling expedited renewable energy development with wildlife conservation in a warming world.     

A permafrost warming in a cooling Antarctica?

The magnitude and even direction of recent Antarctic climate change is still debated because the paucity of long and complete instrumental data records. While along Antarctic Peninsula a strong warming coupled with large retreat of glaciers occurred, in continental Antarctica a cooling was recently detected. Here, the first existing permafrost data set longer than 10 years recorded in continental Antarctica is presented. Since 1997 summer ground surface temperature showed a strong warming trend (0.31°C per year) although the air temperature was almost stable. The summer ground surface temperature increase seemed to be influenced mainly by the increase of the total summer radiation as confirmed also by the increase of the summer thawing degree days. In the same period the active layer exhibited a thickening trend (1 cm per year) comparable with the thickening rates observed in several Arctic locations where air warming occurred. At all the investigated depths permafrost exhibited an increase of mean annual temperature of approximately 0.1°C per year. The dichotomy between active layer thickness and air temperature trends can produce large unexepected and unmodelled impacts on ecosystems and CO₂ balance.     

Creating win-wins from trade-offs? Ecosystem services for human well-being: A meta-analysis of ecosystem service trade-offs and synergies in the real world

Ecosystem services can provide a wide range of benefits for human well-being, including provisioning, regulating and cultural services and benefitting both private and public interests in different sectors of society. Biophysical, economic and social factors all make it unlikely that multiple needs will be met simultaneously without deliberate efforts, yet while there is still much interest in developing win-win outcomes there is little understanding of what is required for them to be achieved. We analysed outcomes in a wide range of case studies where ecosystem services had been used for human well-being. Using systematic mapping of the literature from 2000 to 2013, we identified 1324 potentially relevant reports, 92 of which were selected for the review, creating a database of 231 actual or potential recorded trade-offs and synergies. The analysis of these case studies highlighted significant gaps in the literature, including: a limited geographic distribution of case studies, a focus on provisioning as opposed to non-provisioning services and a lack of studies exploring the link between ecosystem service trade-offs or synergies and the ultimate impact on human well-being. Trade-offs are recorded almost three times as often as synergies and the analysis indicates that there are three significant indicators that a trade-off will occur: at least one of the stakeholders having a private interest in the natural resources available, the involvement of provisioning ecosystem services and at least one of the stakeholders acting at the local scale. There is not, however, a generalisable context for a win-win, indicating that these trade-off indicators, although highlighting where a trade-off may occur do not indicate that it is inevitable. Taking account of why trade-offs occur (e.g. from failures in management or a lack of accounting for all stakeholders) is more likely to create win-win situations than planning for a win-win from the outset. Consequently, taking a trade-offs as opposed to a win-win approach, by having an awareness of and accounting for factors that predict a trade-off (private interest, provisioning versus other ES, local stakeholder) and the reasons why trade-offs are often the outcome, it may be possible to create the synergies we seek to achieve.     

Can Eurasia Experience a Cold Winter under a Third-Year La Ni?a in 2022/23?

The Northern Hemisphere(NH) often experiences frequent cold air outbreaks and heavy snowfalls during La Ni?a winters. In 2022, a third-year La Ni?a event has exceeded both the oceanic and atmospheric thresholds since spring and is predicted to reach its mature phase in December 2022. Under such a significant global climate signal, whether the Eurasian Continent will experience a tough cold winter should not be assumed, despite the direct influence of mid-to high-latitude,large-scale atmospheric ...     

Will a drier climate result in more lightning?

With recent projections of a warmer climate in the future, one of the key questions is related to the impact of global warming on thunderstorms, and severe weather. Will lightning activity increase in a warmer world? Since the majority of global lightning activity occurs in the tropics, changes in future global lightning activity will depend on changes in the tropical climate. The latest IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 2007] projections show a partial drying out of the tropical landmasses as the global climate gets warmer. This is caused by both changes in rainfall patterns, but also due to increases in evapo-transpiration. We would expect a drier climate to produce fewer thunderstorms, and less lightning. However, experimental and modeling studies have shown that as tropical regions dry in the present climate, they experience greater lightning activity. This paradox may be explained by noting that while drier climate conditions result in fewer thunderstorms and less rainfall, the thunderstorms that do occur are more explosive, resulting in more lightning activity.     

Do individuals care about fairness in burden sharing for climate change mitigation? Evidence from a lab experiment

One of the reasons for deadlock in global climate policy is countries’ disagreement on how to share the mitigation burden. Normative theory suggests various fairness criteria for structuring burden sharing, most prominently, historical responsibility for emissions, economic capacity, and vulnerability to climate change. Governments have taken up these criteria in their rhetoric at UNFCCC negotiations. I examine whether normative criteria influence individual burden sharing preferences. This bottom-up perspective is important for two reasons. First, it is unknown if governments’ fairness rhetoric matches citizens’ actual preferences. Second, international climate agreements directly affect individuals through domestic policy measures (e.g. energy taxes), and therefore require domestic public support for successful implementation. I conducted two laboratory experiments where participants have to agree on how to share climate change mitigation costs in an ultimatum game. Treatment conditions include differences between proposer and responder in capacity, vulnerability (experiment 1), and historical emissions (experiment 2). Historical emissions are endogenously determined in a prior game. Capacity inequality strongly affects burden sharing, with richer players ending up paying more, and poorer players less. Vulnerability differences reduce the influence of fairness, leading to suggested cost distributions more unfavorable to vulnerable players. However, vulnerable responders still reject many “unfair” offers. Differences in historical responsibility result in cost distributions strongly correlated with players’ relative contributions to climate change. The results suggest that more nuanced consideration of fairness criteria in burden sharing could make ambitious climate agreements more acceptable for reluctant countries and their citizens.     

Tropical pacific forcing of a 1998–1999 climate shift: observational analysis and climate model results for the boreal spring season

Observational data and climate model simulations and experiments are utilized to document an abrupt shift in Pacific sea surface temperatures (SSTs) and associated atmospheric conditions, which occurred in 1998–1999. Emphasis is placed on the March–May (MAM) season, as the motivation for the work is to extend a recent study that reported an abrupt decline in East African MAM rainfall at that time. An empirical orthogonal function analysis of MAM SSTs over the last century following the removal of the concurrent influence of the El Niño-Southern Oscillation and global warming trend by linear regression reveals a pattern of multidecadal variability in the Pacific similar to the Pacific Decadal Oscillation. Examination of MAM precipitation variations since 1940 indicates, among other findings, that recurrent drought events since 1999 in East Africa, central-southwest Asia, parts of eastern Australia and the southwestern US are all regional manifestations of a global scale multidecadal pattern. Associated shifts in the low-level wind field and upper-level stationary waves are discussed. Simulations using an atmospheric climate model forced with observed, global SSTs capture many of the salient precipitation and atmospheric circulation features associated with the observed shift. Further, when the model is forced only with observed SSTs from the tropical Pacific it also captures many of the observed atmospheric changes, including the abrupt shift in 1999. The results point to the fundamental role played by the tropical Pacific in driving the response to multidecadal variability of SSTs in the basin and provide important context for recent seasonal climate extremes in several regions of the globe.