Do people “personally experience” global warming,and if so how,and does it matter?

For most people, the direct and personally observable signals of climate change should be difficult to detect amid the variability of everyday weather. Yet, previous research has shown that some people believe they have personally experienced global warming. Through four related studies, our paper sheds light on what signals of global warming some people believe they are detecting, why, and whether or not it matters. These studies were conducted using population survey and climatic data from a single county in Michigan. Study 1 found that 27% of the county's adult residents felt that they had personally experienced global warming. Study 2 – based on content analysis of people's open-ended responses – found that the most frequently described personal experiences of global warming were changes in seasons (36%), weather (25%), lake levels (24%), animals and plants (20%), and snowfall (19%). Study 3 – based on NOAA climatic data – found that most, but not all, of these detected signals are borne out in the climatic record. Study 4 – using the survey data – found that personal experience of global warming matters in that it predicts perceptions of local risk of global warming, controlling for demographics, political affiliation, and cultural beliefs about national policy outcomes. We conclude that perceived personal experience of global warming appears to heighten people's perception of the risks, likely through some combination of direct experience, vicarious experience (e.g., news media stories), and social construction.     

Communication and mental processes: Experiential and analytic processing of uncertain climate information

People process uncertainty information in two qualitatively different systems. Most climate forecast communications assume people process information analytically. Yet people also rely heavily on an experiential processing system. Better understanding of experiential processing may lead to more comprehensible risk communication products. Retranslation of statistical information into concrete (vicarious) experience facilitates intuitive understanding of probabilistic information and motivates contingency planning. Sharing vicarious experience in group discussions or simulations of forecasts, decisions, and outcomes provides a richer and more representative sample of relevant experience. The emotional impact of the concretization of abstract risks motivates action in ways not provided by an analytic understanding.     

Thinking About Global Warming

Attitudes toward global warming are influenced by various heuristics, which may distort policy away from what is optimal for the well-being of people. These possible distortions, or biases, include: a focus on harms that we cause, as opposed to those that we can remedy more easily; a feeling that those who cause a problem should fix it; a desire to undo a problem rather than compensate for its presence; parochial concern with one’s own group (nation); and neglect of risks that are not available. Although most of these biases tend to make us attend relatively too much to global warming, other biases, such as wishful thinking, cause us to attend too little. I discuss these possible effects and illustrate some of them with an experiment conducted on the World Wide Web.     

Scientific uncertainty and climate change: Part I. Uncertainty and unabated emissions

Uncertainty forms an integral part of climate science, and it is often used to argue against mitigative action. This article presents an analysis of uncertainty in climate sensitivity that is robust to a range of assumptions. We show that increasing uncertainty is necessarily associated with greater expected damages from warming, provided the function relating warming to damages is convex. This constraint is unaffected by subjective or cultural risk-perception factors, it is unlikely to be overcome by the discount rate, and it is independent of the presumed magnitude of climate sensitivity. The analysis also extends to “second-order” uncertainty; that is, situations in which experts disagree. Greater disagreement among experts increases the likelihood that the risk of exceeding a global temperature threshold is greater. Likewise, increasing uncertainty requires increasingly greater protective measures against sea level rise. This constraint derives directly from the statistical properties of extreme values. We conclude that any appeal to uncertainty compels a stronger, rather than weaker, concern about unabated warming than in the absence of uncertainty.     

The Origins and Consequences of democratic citizens' Policy Agendas: A Study of Popular Concern about Global Warming

This article proposes and tests a model of the causes and consequences of Americans’ judgments of the national seriousness of global warming. The model proposes that seriousness judgments about global warming are a function of beliefs about the existence of global warming, attitudes toward it, the certainty with which these beliefs and attitudes are held, and beliefs about human responsibility for causing global warming and people’s ability to remedy it. The model also proposes that beliefs about whether global warming is a problem are a function of relevant personal experiences (with the weather) and messages from informants (in this case, scientists), that attitudes toward global warming are a function of particular perceived consequences of global warming, and that certainty about these attitudes and beliefs is a function of knowledge and prior thought. Data from two representative sample surveys offer support for all of these propositions, document effects of national seriousness judgments on support for ameliorative efforts generally and specific ameliorative policies, and thereby point to psychological mechanisms that may be responsible for institutional and elite impact on the public’s assessments of national problem importance and on public policy preferences.     

Future Changes in Extreme High Temperature over China at 1.5℃-5℃ Global Warming Based on CMIP6 Simulations

Extreme high temperature(EHT)events are among the most impact-related consequences related to climate change,especially for China,a nation with a large population that is vulnerable to the climate warming.Based on the latest Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 6(CMIP6),this study assesses future EHT changes across China at five specific global warming thresholds(1.5℃-5℃).The results indicate that global mean temperature will increase by 1.5℃/2℃ before 2030/2050 relative to pre-industrial levels(1861-1900)under three future scenarios(SSP1-2.6,SSP2-4.5,and SSP5-8.5),and warming will occur faster under SSP5-8.5 compared to SSP1-2.6 and SSP2-4.5.Under SSP5-8.5,global warming will eventually exceed 5℃ by 2100,while under SSP1-2.6,it will stabilize around 2℃ after 2050.In China,most of the areas where warming exceeds global average levels will be located in Tibet and northern China(Northwest China,North China and Northeast China),covering 50%-70%of the country.Furthermore,about 0.19-0.44 billion people(accounting for 16%-41%of the national population)will experience warming above the global average.Compared to present-day(1995-2014),the warmest day(TXx)will increase most notably in northern China,while the number of warm days(TX90p)and warm spell duration indicator(WSDI)will increase most profoundly in southern China.For example,relative to the present-day,TXx will increase by 1℃-5℃ in northern China,and TX90p(WSDI)will increase by 25-150(10-80)days in southern China at 1.5℃-5℃ global warming.Compared to 2℃-5℃,limiting global warming to 1.5℃ will help avoid about 36%-87%of the EHT increases in China.     

Heat vulnerability and adaptation of low-income households in Germany

Heat waves associated with global warming are a significant hazard to human health, and they particularly endanger low-income households. In this study, we systematically analyze how the different components of heat vulnerability are related to household income, and present empirical evidence on the determinants of heat adaptation, focusing on the role of income. We contribute the first empirical analysis of heat vulnerability using household-level data at the national level, based on a longitudinal survey, including data points for 10,226 households in Germany in the period 2012–2020. Our results indicate that low income households are significantly more heat sensitive and have lower adaptive capacity than high income households, measured inter alia by health status, household composition, and economic and psychological resources to implement adaptation measures. However, heat hazard and exposure levels are comparable between income groups, hence there is no sorting of richer households into less hazardous or exposed locations on a national scale. We also contribute robust empirical evidence on the factors influencing household decisions to implement technical adaptation measures (e.g. installation of air conditioning), ultimately showing that the adaptation behavior of the most vulnerable households (e.g. people with poor health conditions or the elderly) is not limited by financial constraints.     

Who remembers a hot summer or a cold winter? The asymmetric effect of beliefs about global warming on perceptions of local climate conditions in the U.S.

This paper explores the phenomenon of local climate perception and the extent to which public perceptions match climate conditions as recorded in instrumental climate data. We further examine whether perceptions of changes in local climates are influenced by prior beliefs about global warming, through the process of motivated reasoning. Using national survey data collected in the United States in 2011, we find that subjective experiences of seasonal average temperature and precipitation during the previous winter and summer were related to recorded conditions during each season. Beliefs about global warming also had significant effects on subjective experiences with above-normal temperatures, particularly among those who believed that global warming is not happening. When asked about the summer of 2010, those who believed that global warming is not happening were significantly less likely to report that they had experienced a warmer-than-normal summer, even when controlling for demographics and local climate conditions. These results suggest that the subjective experience of local climate change is dependent not only on external climate conditions, but also on individual beliefs, with perceptions apparently biased by prior beliefs about global warming.     

The Perception and Valuation of the Risks of Climate Change: A Rational and Behavioral Blend

Over 250 respondents – graduate students in law and public policy – assessed the risks of climate change and valued climate-change mitigation policies. Many aspects of their behavior were consistent with rational behavior. For example, respondents successfully estimated distributions of temperature increases in Boston by 2100. The median value of best estimates was 1–3 degrees Fahrenheit. In addition, people with higher risk estimates, whether for temperature or related risks (e.g., hurricane intensities) offered more to avoid warming. Median willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid global warming was $0.50/gallon, and 3% of income. And important scope tests (e.g., respondents paid more for bigger accomplishments) were passed. However, significant behavioral propensities also emerged. For example, accessibility of neutral information on global warming boosted risk estimates. Warming projections correlated with estimates for unrelated risks, such as earthquakes and heart attacks. The implied WTP for avoidance was much greater when asked as a percent of income than as a gas tax, a percent thinking bias. Home team betting showed itself; individuals predicting a Bush victory predicted smaller temperature increases. In the climate-change arena, behavioral decision tendencies are like a fun-house mirror: They magnify some estimates and shrink others, but the contours of rational decision rmain recognizable.     

Public concern over global warming correlates negatively with national wealth

It has been shown previously that the awareness and concern of the general public about global warming is not only a function of scientific information. Both psychological and sociological factors affect the willingness of laypeople to acknowledge the reality of global warming, and to support climate policies of their home countries. In this paper, I analyse a cross-national dataset of public concern about global warming, utilising data from 46 countries. Based on earlier results at the national and regional level, I expect concern to be negatively correlated to national measures of wealth and carbon dioxide emissions. I find that gross domestic product is indeed negatively correlated to the proportion of a population that regards global warming as a serious problem. There is also a marginally significant tendency that nations’ per capita carbon dioxide emissions are negatively correlated to public concern. These findings suggest that the willingness of a nation to contribute to reductions in greenhouse gas emissions decreases with its share of these emissions. This is in accordance with psychological findings, but poses a problem for political decision-makers. When communicating with the public, scientists ought to be aware of their responsibility to use a language that is understood by laypeople.     

1.5℃增暖对全球和区域影响的研究进展

《巴黎协定》明确提出将全球平均升温控制在相对于工业化前水平2℃以内,并努力将其控制在1.5℃以内,以降低气候变化的风险与影响。随后,《联合国气候变化框架公约》（UNFCCC）邀请IPCC筹备关于1.5℃增暖影响及温室气体排放途径的特别报告,为UNFCCC谈判提供科学依据。通过回顾近期发表的一些成果发现,在1.5℃到2℃的不同升温条件下,很多极端天气事件发生的概率将增加。2℃条件下一些易受威胁的系统,如生态系统和农业系统,将承受全球变暖带来的严重后果;海平面明显上升,珊瑚礁锐减,季风降水减弱等影响将进一步加强。同时,不同地区对全球不同程度增暖的响应也存在很大差异。总的说来,相较于2℃增暖而言,将增暖控制在1.5℃以内能进一步减小气候变化影响的风险。然而,要把全球增暖控制在1.5℃内具有极大的挑战性,并且目前对1.5℃增暖的影响认识仍然十分不足。定量分析2℃和1.5℃增暖对不同区域自然和人类系统造成的影响差异,需要更高分辨率的模式以及更多针对2℃和1.5℃增暖影响而设计的专门试验支持。     

The importance of expressly examining global warming policy issues through an ethical prism

A vast scientific and economic literature on global warming has emerged in the last two decades. Surprisingly, however, there has been little written on the ethical dimensions of human-induced climate change despite the numerous, obvious, and profoundly important ethical questions raised by human activities that are now clearly threatening human health, the environment, and many things humans value greatly. This paper argues that ethical analysis of global warming issues is practically imperative for two reasons. First, unless ethical is made analysis is made of global warming issues, ethically dubious decisions about global warming will be made because many of the most important ethical considerations are hidden in what appear to be ethically neutral scientific and economic arguments about global warming policy options. Secondly, unless issues of ethics, justice and equity are expressly dealt with, urgently needed global solutions to global warming will not likely be adopted by many nations. That is, an ethical focus on global warming matters is the key to achieve a globally acceptable solution and to harness political support for action. The paper concludes with a recommendation on how institutions and nations should go about implementing express examination of the ethical dimensions of global warming questions. The paper argues for express identification of ethical issues often hidden in scientific and economic analyses of global warming policy options.     

Risk,wealth and agrarian change in India. Household-level hazards vs. late-modern global risks at different points along the risk transition

The global poor often prioritise immediate hazards of food insecurity over temporally more distant risks like global warming. Yet the influence of socio-economic factors, temporal and spatial distance on risk perception remains under-researched. Data on risk perception and response were collected from two sets of Indian villages. Participatory approaches were used to investigate variations by socio-economic status, food security, age and gender. Villagers’ risk priorities reflected clear spatial and temporal patterns depending on land ownership, community group and education levels. Poorer groups prioritised household-level risks to health and food security while global environmental risks were mentioned by only three of the wealthiest respondents. The paper concludes that household risk perceptions and responses vary greatly with socio-economic status, age, gender and the spatial or temporal distance of the risk. These factors need to be better understood if the most significant contributors to the global burden of disease are to be reduced.     

Is it hot in here or is it just me? Temperature anomalies and political polarization over global warming in the American public

Do temperature anomalies affect political polarization over global warming? Americans’ attitudes about global warming are affected by whether they reside in states experiencing unseasonably warm (or cold) temperatures versus those experiencing milder temperatures. Specifically, in terms of causal attribution, political polarization over global warming is more pronounced in states experiencing temperature anomalies. Using pooled data collected during 2013–2014, this study utilizes logistic regression to explore how temperature anomalies exacerbate the political polarization among Americans over perceptions of whether global warming impacts are immediately evident as well as the attribution of global warming to human activity. Results indicate that very cold or warm temperature anomalies from a 5-year baseline predict perceptions of global warming impacts and exacerbate existing political polarization over the causal attribution of global warming. These effects are particularly noticeable among Democrats. This analysis provides a contribution to understanding how temperature anomalies from the recent past shape the sociophysical context of global warming attitudes.     

How does framing affect policy support for emissions mitigation? Testing the effects of ocean acidification and other carbon emissions frames

Public support for carbon emissions mitigation is crucial to motivate action to address global issues like climate change and ocean acidification (OA). Yet in the public sphere, carbon emissions mitigation policies are typically discussed in the context of climate change and rarely in the context of OA or other global change outcomes. In this paper, we advance research on OA and climate change perceptions and communication, by (i) examining causal beliefs about ocean acidification, and (ii) measuring support for mitigation policies from individuals presented with one of five different policy frames (climate change, global warming, carbon pollution, air pollution, and ocean acidification). Knowledge about OA causes and consequences is more widespread than we anticipated, though still generally low. Somewhat surprisingly, an “air pollution” mitigation frame elicits the highest degree of policy support overall, while “carbon pollution” performs no better than “climate change” or “global warming.” Framing effects are in part contingent on prior knowledge and attitudes, and mediated by concern. Perhaps due to a lack of OA awareness, the OA frame generates the least support overall, although it seems to close the gap in support associated with political orientation: the OA frame increases support among those (few) conservatives who report having heard of OA before the survey. These findings complement previous work on climate change communication and suggest the need for further research into OA as an effective way to engage conservatives in carbon emissions mitigation policy. Potentially even more promising is the air pollution framing.     

Mass-media coverage,its influence on public awareness of climate-change issues,and implications for Japan’s national campaign to reduce greenhouse gas emissions

We analyse Japanese newspaper coverage of global warming from January 1998 to July 2007 and how public opinion during parts of that period were influenced by newspaper coverage. We show that a dramatic increase in newspaper coverage of global warming from January 2007 correlated with an increase in public concern for the issue. Before January 2007, we find that coverage of global warming had an immediate but short-term influence on public concern. With such transitory high levels of media coverage we suggest that for more effective communication of climate change, strategies aimed at maintaining mass-media coverage of global warming are required.     

Thinking globally and siting locally – renewable energy and biodiversity in a rapidly warming world

Increasing greenhouse gas emissions are projected to raise global average surface temperatures by 3?–4 °C within this century, dramatically increasing the extinction risk for terrestrial and freshwater species and severely disrupting ecosystems across the globe. Limiting the magnitude of warming and its devastating impacts on biodiversity will require deep emissions reductions that include the rapid, large-scale deployment of low-carbon renewable energy. Concerns about potential adverse impacts to species and ecosystems from the expansion of renewable energy development will play an important role in determining the pace and scale of emissions reductions and hence, the impact of climate change on global biodiversity. Efforts are underway to reduce uncertainty regarding wildlife impacts from renewable energy development, but such uncertainty cannot be eliminated. We argue the need to accept some and perhaps substantial risk of impacts to wildlife from renewable energy development in order to limit the far greater risks to biodiversity loss owing to climate change. We propose a path forward for better reconciling expedited renewable energy development with wildlife conservation in a warming world.     

Climate change and world food security: a new assessment

Building on previous work quantitative estimates of climate change impacts on global food production have been made for the UK Hadley Centre's HadCM2 greenhouse gas only ensemble experiment and the more recent HadCM3 experiment (Hulme et al., 1999). The consequences for world food prices and the number of people at risk of hunger as defined by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO, 1988) have also been assessed. Climate change is expected to increase yields at high and mid-latitudes, and lead to decreases at lower latitudes. This pattern becomes more pronounced as time progresses. The food system may be expected to accommodate such regional variations at the global level, with production, prices and the risk of hunger being relatively unaffected by the additional stress of climate change. By the 2080s the additional number of people at risk of hunger due to climate change is about 80 million people (±10 million depending on which of the four HadCM2 ensemble members is selected). However, some regions (particularly the arid and sub-humid tropics) will be adversely affected. A particular example is Africa, which is expected to experience marked reductions in yield, decreases in production, and increases in the risk of hunger as a result of climate change. The continent can expect to have between 55 and 65 million extra people at risk of hunger by the 2080s under the HadCM2 climate scenario. Under the HadCM3 climate scenario the effect is even more severe, producing an estimated additional 70+ million people at risk of hunger in Africa.     

Initial public reactions to carbon capture and storage (CCS): differentiating general and local views

Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is considered a potential climate change mitigation option, but public opposition may hamper its implementation. A quasi-experimental approach is used to examine whether ‘not in my back yard’ (NIMBY) sentiments can be anticipated at the initial stage when CO₂ storage locations have been selected and communicated to the public. Furthermore, the psychological structure of initial reactions to CO₂ storage plans is studied to ascertain the differences between people living in the direct vicinity of a proposed CO₂ storage location (i.e. onsite residents) and people who do not (i.e. offsite residents). The results indicate that initial reactions to local CCS plans are not necessarily dominated by NIMBY sentiments. For onsite residents as well as offsite residents, trust in government affects their judgements of the risks and benefits associated with CCS, which in turn affects their inclination to protest against CCS plans. Onsite residents’ inclination to protest is affected by their perceptions of local safety risks, but this is less of a concern for offsite residents. The inclination to protest against CCS is unrelated to concern about climate change.     

A new approach for evaluating climate change communication

Many scholars study when climate change communication increases citizen engagement. Yet, past work has largely used public opinion-based measures of engagement to evaluate alternative frames. In this paper, we argue for a new approach to evaluation, which is premised on research on the policy-making process showing that space on the political agenda and, ultimately, policy change are more likely to arise in response to changes in both public opinion and collective political action. Thus, we argue that alternative frames should be evaluated based on their consequences for both. This is especially critical given that frames can have divergent effects on attitudes and behavior. Using a combination of field and survey experiments, we apply our approach to evaluate two frames related to climate change risks. We find that they heighten people’s concern about climate change yet decrease their rate of political action to express that concern. Our results suggest caution with regard to these frames in particular and that, more generally, frames that might seem advantageous when examining public opinion may not be when political behavior is analyzed.