The exposure of global base metal resources to water criticality,scarcity and climate change

Mining operations are vital to sustaining our modern way of life and are often located in areas that have limited water supplies or are at an increased risk of the effects of climate change. However, few studies have considered the interactions between the mining industry and water resources on a global scale. These interactions are often complex and site specific, and so an understanding of the local water contexts of individual mining projects is required before associated risks can be adequately assessed. Here, we address this important issue by providing the first quantitative assessment of the contextual water risks facing the global base metal mining industry, focusing on the location of known copper, lead, zinc and nickel resources.The relative exposure of copper, lead-zinc and nickel resources to water risks were assessed by considering a variety of spatial water indices, with each providing a different perspective of contextual water risks. Provincial data was considered for water criticality (CRIT), supply risk (SR), vulnerability to supply restrictions (VSR) and the environmental implications (EI) of water use. Additionally, watershed or sub-basin scale data for blue water scarcity (BWS), the water stress index (WSI), the available water remaining (AWaRe), basin internal evaporation recycling (BIER) ratios and the water depletion index (WDI) were also considered, as these have particular relevance for life cycle assessment and water footprint studies. All of the indices indicate that global copper resources are more exposed to water risks than lead-zinc or nickel resources, in part due to the large copper endowment of countries such as Chile and Peru that experience high water criticality, stress and scarcity. Copper resources are located in regions where water consumption is more likely to contribute to long-term decreases in water availability and also where evaporation is less likely to re-precipitate in the same drainage basin to cause surface-runoff or groundwater recharge.The global resource datasets were also assessed against regional Köppen-Geiger climate classifications for the observed period 1951–2000 and changes to 2100 using the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s A1FI, A2, B1 and B2 emission scenarios. The results indicate that regions containing copper resources are also more exposed to likely changes in climate than those containing lead-zinc or nickel resources. Overall, regions containing 27–32% (473–574 Mt Cu) of copper, 17–29% (139–241 Mt Pb + Zn) of lead-zinc and 6–13% (19–39 Mt Ni) of nickel resources may have a major climate re-classification as a result of anthropogenic climate change. A further 15–23% (262–412 Mt) of copper, 23–32% (195–270 Mt) of lead-zinc and 29–32% (84–94 Mt) of nickel are exposed to regional precipitation or temperature sub-classification changes. These climate changes are likely to alter the water balance, water quality and infrastructure risks at mining and mineral processing operations. Effective management of long-term changes to mine site water and climate risks requires the further adoption of anticipatory risk management strategies.     

湖南气候对全球气候变化的响应

利用湖南省96个台站1960—2010年逐日气象观测资料,在进行均一性检验和订正的基础上对湖南省气候变化事实进行检测分析。结果表明:湖南气候与全球气候变化一致,呈现以变暖为主要特征的变化,且变暖存在季节、地域上的差异,冬、春、秋气温变暖趋势显著,增暖幅度最大的区域在湘北地区;对气候变暖响应敏感的要素主要是与平均气温、冬季气温相关密切的要素,如季平均气温、年平均最低气温、活动积温等;湖南气温在突变时间上具有较好的时间逻辑关系;湖南降水量无显著趋势变化,但极端降水增加,地域性差异明显,湖南东部地区降水量呈现明显增加趋势,日降水量大于等于100 mm的日数呈显著增加趋势;湖南日照时数、风速、相对湿度均呈现显著减少的变化趋势。     

Learning and climate change

Abstract

Learning—i.e. the acquisition of new information that leads to changes in our assessment of uncertainty—plays a prominent role in the international climate policy debate. For example, the view that we should postpone actions until we know more continues to be influential. The latest work on learning and climate change includes new theoretical models, better informed simulations of how learning affects the optimal timing of emissions reductions, analyses of how new information could affect the prospects for reaching and maintaining political agreements and for adapting to climate change, and explorations of how learning could lead us astray rather than closer to the truth. Despite the diversity of this new work, a clear consensus on a central point is that the prospect of learning does not support the postponement of emissions reductions today.     

Security and climate change

Despite it being the most studied and arguably most profound of global environmental change problems, there is relatively little research that explores climate change as a security issue. This paper systematically explores the range of possible connections between climate change and security, including national security considerations, human security concerns, military roles, and a discussion of the widely held assumption that climate change may trigger violent conflict. The paper explains the ways in which climate change is a security issue. It includes in its discussion issues to do with both mitigation and adaptation of climate change.     

Human control of climate change

The use of analogies and repeated feedback might help people learn about the dynamics of climate change. In this paper, we study the influence of repeated feedback on the control of a carbon-dioxide (CO₂) concentration to a goal level in a Dynamic Climate Change Simulator (DCCS) using the “bathtub” analogy. DCCS is a simplification of the complex climate system into its essential elements: CO₂ concentration (stock); man-made CO₂ emissions (inflow); and natural CO₂ removal or absorption in the atmosphere (outflow). In a laboratory experiment involving DCCS, we manipulated feedback delays in two ways: the frequency of emission decisions and the rate of CO₂ absorption from the atmosphere (climate dynamics). Our results revealed that participants’ ability to control the CO₂ concentration generally remained poor even in conditions where they were allowed to revise their emission decisions frequently (i.e., every 2?years) and where the climate dynamics were rapid (i.e., 1.6% of CO₂ concentration was removed every year). Participants’ control of the concentration only improved with repeated feedback in conditions of lesser feedback delay. Moreover, the delay due to climate dynamics had a greater effect on participants’ control than the delay due to emission decisions frequency. We provide future research directions and highlight the potential of using simulations like DCCS to help people learn about dynamics of Earth’s climate.     

Self-assessed understanding of climate change

Survey researchers often treat self-assessed understanding of climate change as a rough proxy for knowledge, which might affect what people believe about this topic. Self-assessments can be unrealistically high, however, and correlated with politics, so they deserve study in their own right. Turning the usual perspective around to view self-assessed understanding as dependent variable, problematically related to actual knowledge, casts self-assessments in a new light. Analysis of a 2016 US survey that carried a five-item test of very basic, belief-neutral but climate-relevant knowledge (such as knowing about the location of North and South Poles) finds that, at any given level of knowledge, people saying they “understand a great deal” about climate change are more likely to be older, college-educated, and male. Self-assessed understanding exhibits a U-shaped political pattern: highest among liberals and the most conservative, but lowest among moderate conservatives. Among liberal and middle-of-the-road respondents, self-assessed understanding of climate change is positively related to knowledge. Among the most conservative, however, understanding is unrelated or even negatively related to knowledge. For that group in particular, high self-assessed understanding reflects confidence in political views, rather than knowledge about the physical world.     

Perceptions of climate and climate change by Amazonian communities

The Amazon region has been undergoing profound transformations since the late ‘70s through forest degradation, land use changes and effects of global climate change. The perception of such changes by local communities is important for risk analysis and for subsequent societal decision making. In this study, we compare and contrast observations and perceptions of climate change by selected Amazonian communities particularly vulnerable to alterations in precipitation regimes. Two main points were analysed: (i) the notion of changes in the annual climate cycle and (ii) the notion of changes in rainfall patterns. About 72% of the sampled population reports perceptions of climate changes, and there is a robust signal of increased perception with age. Other possible predictive parameters such as gender, fishing frequency and changes in/planning of economic activities do not appear overall as contributing to perceptions. The communities’ perceptions of the changes in 2013–2014 were then compared to earlier results (2007–2008), providing an unprecedented cohort study of the same sites. Results show that climate change perceptions and measured rainfall variations differ across the basin. It was only in the southern part of the Amazon that both measured and perceived changes in rainfall patterns were consistent with decreased precipitation. However, the perception of a changing climate became more widespread and frequently mentioned, signalling an increase in awareness of climate risk.     

Politics eclipses climate extremes for climate change perceptions

Whether or not actual shifts in climate influence public perceptions of climate change remains an open question, one with important implications for societal response to climate change. We use the most comprehensive public opinion survey data on climate change available for the US to examine effects of annual and seasonal climate variation. Our results show that political orientation has the most important effect in shaping public perceptions about the timing and seriousness of climate change. Objective climatic conditions do not influence Americans’ perceptions of the timing of climate change and only have a negligible effect on perceptions about the seriousness of climate change. These results suggest that further changes in climatic conditions are unlikely to produce noticeable shifts in Americans’ climate change perceptions.     

企业气候变化意识及应对措施调查研究

基于2012—2015年在华北、珠三角和湖南湖北地区对企业管理人员进行的气候变化意识的问卷调查,构建了气候变化意识和企业应对气候变化措施两个一级指数。通过对调查结果交叉列联表分析,得出以下结论：企业管理人员的气候变化意识指数处于一般水平,并且受年龄、产业类型、企业类型的影响显著;企业应对气候变化措施指数也处于一般水平且不同企业水平差距较大,企业管理人员气候变化意识水平、未来预期和自主知识产权拥有量对其影响显著。     

Racing climate change: Collaboration and conflict in California's global climate change policy arena

Media accounts routinely refer to California's Assembly Bill 32 (AB 32), the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, as “landmark” climate change legislation. On its surface, this label is an accurate reflection of the state's forward-thinking stance across many environmental issues including pesticides, toxic substances, solid waste, and air quality. For all its promise, however, AB 32 can also be considered a low point in the landscape of conflict between state environmental regulators and California's environmental justice movement. While the legislation included several provisions to address the procedural and distributive dimensions of environmental justice, the implementation of AB 32 has been marked by heated conflict. The most intense conflicts over AB 32 revolve around the primacy of market mechanisms such as “cap and trade.” This article examines the drivers and the manifestations of these dynamics of collaboration and conflict between environmental justice advocates and state regulators, and pays particular attention to the scalar and racialized quality of the neoliberal discourse. The contentiousness of climate change politics in California offers scholars and practitioners around the world a cautionary tale of how the best intentions for integrating environmental justice principles into climate change policy do not necessarily translate into implementation and how underlying racialized fractures can upend collaboration between state and social movement actors.     

Integrating climate change into peacebuilding

Peacebuilding countries are concentrated in areas of heightened vulnerability to climate change impacts, and almost certainly lack the capacity to manage these impacts. In spite of this overlap, climate change adaptation and mitigation projects are typically excluded from peacebuilding activities. This is particularly alarming given that many analysts believe climate change will trigger, amplify or perpetuate humanitarian crises, population displacement, political extremism and violent conflict in the regions in which most peacebuilding operations take place. This paper investigates opportunities for integrating climate change into peacebuilding. It identifies three obstacles to this integration—the lack of climate change tools and policies that can be easily introduced into typical peacebuilding programming; the skepticism and complacency of the donor community; and tensions between the objectives and timeframes of peacebuilding and those of climate change response. The paper then examines opportunities to integrate climate change into four principal programmatic areas of peacebuilding—socio-economic recovery, politics and governance, security and rule of law, and human rights—and concludes that more attention needs to be given to these opportunities in order to build resilience and reduce the likelihood of more daunting and costly challenges in the future.     

Weaponizing vulnerability to climate change

As scores of climate change adaptation measures are implemented around the world, there have been growing calls among academics and practitioners to also address the processes that underpin human vulnerability to climate change. However, there is mounting evidence that adaptation and vulnerability are linked, such that ostensibly adaptive responses can have negative consequences and augment people’s vulnerability. We analyzed several climate change responses at various scales and developed a typology of five discrete but related modes by which the vulnerability of already vulnerable populations is being [re]produced. Crucially, this work suggests that for at least one of these modes, the vulnerability of other groups is perversely inverted, such that relatively secure populations perceive themselves to be at risk. The cases we present illustrate that people’s vulnerability is being used against them, or put another way, is being weaponized―exacerbating their precarity by excluding them from much needed and due assistance, while directing resources instead to bolstering the well-being of those already well-positioned to respond to climate threats. Our typology provides a theoretical intervention by illustrating how climate vulnerability and security are co-produced, as well as a practical tool to help decision makers to adopt more just and equitable climate policies.     

Mass-cargo-affine industries and climate change

The impact of low water periods on inland navigation and companies is well known by ship-operators and companies that rely on this mode of transport but it is rarely a topic of climate impact research. As climate change might affect the frequency and intensity of low water periods, quantifying the impact of climate change on companies and the effects of possible adaptation measures is vital. In this study, we present a model for quantifying the impact of low water events on companies which rely on inland navigation and apply that model to three anonymous iron and steel companies along the River Rhine. The deviation of optimal storage, the storage level that evens out risk vs. fixed capital, is used in the model to measure the vulnerability of companies. The results show that, depending on the climate scenario, the companies might have to deal with either one or five additional days of empty storage in the near future (2021–2050) and up to nine more days by the 2071–2100 period. Seasonal analysis shows that, consistent with the change in the river discharge, the biggest deviations from optimal storage level occur in the late summer/early autumn. Analysis of adaptation options shows that companies would need to increase storage capacity by 2.5 % for the 2021–2050 period, and by 25 % by the 2071–2100 period. A reduction of ship sizes is not an adaptation option for the three companies in this study, because these companies already use relatively small vessels. This is however an efficient adaptation option for companies which employ larger vessels for transport. Another adaptation option would be to reduce the share of transportation via inland waters, but the feasibility of this option depends on the availability and cost of other modes of transport.     

Ethics and intentional climate change

In recent years the idea of geoengineering climate has begun to attract increasing attention. Although there was some discussion of manipulating regional climates throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the discussion was largely dormant. What has reawakened the conversation is the possibility that Earth may be undergoing a greenhouse-induced global warming, and the paucity of serious measures that have been taken to prevent it.In this paper I assess the ethical acceptability of ICC, based on my impressions of the conversation that is now taking place. Rather than offering a dispassionate analysis, I argue for a point of view. I propose a set of conditions that must be satisfied for an ICC project to be morally permissible and conclude that these conditions are not now satisfied. However, research on ICC should go forward so long as certain other conditions are met. I do not intend this to be the last word on the subject, but rather the first word. My hope is that others will be stimulated to think through the ethics of ICC.     

Farm programs and climate change

The view that the agricultural sector could largely offset any negative impacts of climate change by altering production practices assumes the government will not create disincentives for farmers to adapt. U.S. farm programs, however, often discourage such obvious adaptations as switching crops, investing in water conserving technologies, and entry or exit. We outline a simple portfolio model describing producer decision making: we then use this framework to assess how specific U.S. farm programs might affect adaption to climate change. Three future climate scenarios are considered and in each the present structure of U.S. farm programs discourages adaptation.