Who gets what? Developing a more equitable framework for EU fishing agreements

The reform of the European Union’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is focusing attention on EU distant water fishing activities, including the agreements signed with developing coastal states. Here, the EU’s fishing agreement with Madagascar, among the poorest countries to hold such an agreement, is examined. Incomes received by Madagascar since the first agreement with the EU in 1986 are documented, in both nominal and real terms, and discussed in the context of other conditions tied to the agreement, in particular support provided by the EU to improve Madagascar’s fisheries management capacity. Results indicate that since 1986, EU quotas increased by 30% while the fees paid by the EU decreased by 20%. Yet, Madagascar’s treasury income from these agreements decreased by 90%. This shows that the EU agreements with Madagascar are in direct contradiction to the goals set forth by the CFP, which states that benefits of agreements should be directed towards developing countries, and not towards private EU entities. This raises profound ethical questions that the CFP reform must address. A new framework is proposed, prioritizing fisheries sustainability and equitable benefit sharing, in which reasonable quotas are set, fees are indexed to the landed value of catches, and all costs of agreements are borne directly by the benefiting industries. EU development assistance should be decoupled from these agreements, and should focus on enhancing the host countries’ monitoring and enforcement capacities. This new framework would increase the benefits to Madagascar while reducing costs to EU taxpayers.     

Economic gains from introducing international ITQs—The case of the mackerel and herring fisheries in the Northeast Atlantic

Achieving a balance between fishing capacity and fishing opportunities is one of the major challenges in European fisheries. One way to achieve this is to introduce individual tradable quotas or similar management measures. In several mackerel and herring fisheries in the Northeast Atlantic, such systems have already been introduced on a national basis and the long term economic gains of this have been acknowledged. This paper takes this a step further and investigates the potential economic gains from introducing individual tradable quotas between countries. Overall, the results show that the gross cash flow can be improved by 21% by allowing the mackerel and herring quotas to be traded internationally in the Northeast Atlantic. This rent gain arises mainly from increased productivity by allowing tradability between areas and fleets. The analysis also shows that the Danish pelagic fleet will gain from increasing its share of mackerel and herring quotas, whereas the Irish fleets are incentivised to sell quota, if individual quotas are allowed to be traded among countries. This result is in line with the qualitative analyses that show that Irish fishermen targeting herring in the Celtic Sea are negatively oriented towards international individual tradable quotas, whereas the Danish pelagic fishermen have strong preferences for international individual tradable quotas.     

Small versus large-scale,multi-fleet fisheries: The case for economic,social and environmental access criteria in European fisheries

Overfishing is a major problem in global fisheries, plaguing 32% of stocks around the world and a massive 72% in the EU. Despite this, access to public fish resources in the EU and its member states are granted without any social or environmental conditions. Without these, the process of allocating quotas – essentially determining the future health of marine resources and the fishing industry – is blind to virtually all of the impacts of fisheries. Here, the United Kingdom's North Sea cod fishery is studied, comparing the social, environmental and economic impacts of trawlers and gillnets, the two major fishing gears targeting cod in this area. Comparisons are also made on a vessel-length basis to address recent debate concerning the benefits of small-scale fisheries. The results show that, for each tonne of cod landed in these fisheries, all trawlers have impacts that are more costly than the value of their landings. There are also vessel length-specific differences, with the largest trawlers the most destructive (−£1992/tonne and −£2.50/fish). Gillnets, on the other hand, generate positive value to society (+£865/tonne and +£2.16/fish). Despite these impacts, gillnets land only 1% as much cod as trawlers do. The results support the policy implementation of access criteria into the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy, to ensure fishermen generate positive outcomes for society and to provide incentives that align fishermen's interests with conservation objectives.     

Review of participatory fisheries management arrangements in the European Union

Promoting and attaining sustainable use of resources through community participation is a central tenet of the European Union's (EU) 2013 Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy. A systematic review approach was used to identify participatory fisheries management arrangements within the EU. Following this, the participatory arrangements were categorized based on the nature of the decision-making arrangement, influence and empowerment of the fishing industry. The study identified 40 management arrangements distributed through 8 member states, with a variety of fisheries and institutional settings for participation in fisheries management in the EU. The majority of the partnerships identified are “Functional participation”, i.e., the participatory arrangement is based in pre-determined goals encouraged by higher decision-making levels in order to increase efficiency of management decisions. Interactive partnership was the highest level of participation identified in the systematic review, and is usually more conducive with local arrangements in coastal and small-scale fisheries targeting low mobility species.     

Lesser-known consequences of managing marine fisheries using individual transferable quotas

Managing marine fisheries using output controls in the form of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) can be an attractive alternative to more traditional input controls. There are now a number of examples of where ITQ-managed fisheries have been able to reduce the impact of the major management problems in global fisheries, namely, gross over-capitalisation and effort. However, ITQs are not the perfect management tool and one of the lesser known consequences of ITQ-managed fisheries where ITQs consist of a harvest right is the implicit relationship between ITQ property rights and rights of access to the fishing grounds. This implicit spatial right to the grounds can provide obstacles in the way of allocating water-space within fishing grounds for alternative uses such as marine-protected areas, large-scale aquaculture, and wind farms. These lesser-known consequences of ITQ-managed fisheries are discussed here.     

Lessons for fisheries management from the EU cod recovery plan

The performance of the EU long-term management plan for cod stocks, in force since 2009, is analysed focusing on the human and institutional factors. The plan operates through landings quotas (TACs) and effort restrictions following a Harvest Control Rule, and deploys a novel instrument allowing Member States to ‘buy back’ or increase fishing effort for fleet segments engaged in cod-avoidance measures. The stipulated fishing mortality reductions have not been achieved. On the positive side, the ‘buy-back’ instrument has led to increased uptake of selective gear and implementation of permanent and real-time temporary closures. On the negative side, ignoring the dimension of fishers as reactive agents in the design, the impact assessment, and the annual implementation of the measures has contributed to the failure to adequately implement the plan and achieve its objectives. The main problem is that the landings quotas taken in a mixed fishery did not limit catches because fishers were incentivised to continue fishing and discard overquota catch while quota for other species was available. The effort limitations intended to reduce this effect were insufficient to adequately limit fishing mortality in targeted fisheries, although fishers experienced them as prohibiting the full uptake of other quotas. Recommendations for future plans include (i) management through catch rather than landings quotas, (ii) the internalisation of the costs of exceeding quotas, (iii) use of more selective gear types, (iv) the development of appropriate metrics as a basis for regulatory measures and for evaluations, (v) participatory governance, (vi) fishery-based management, (vii) flexibility in fishing strategy at vessel level.     

System evaluation of sustainability in the Norwegian cod-fisheries

Overcapacity in the fishing fleets is considered as the most serious threat to sustainable fisheries. More effective fishing vessels and catching gear contribute to increased catch capacity. Increased catch capacity causes environmental problems such as overexploitation and calls for larger quotas. The problem of overcapacity indicates the need for a stronger integration of technological aspects into fisheries management. This article assesses the differences in sustainability between the Norwegian ocean and coastal fishing fleets in the cod fisheries, by using systems engineering methods. Attributes of sustainability in the Norwegian cod fishing fleets are investigated, as well as acceptance criteria and performance indicators. The results show that there are huge differences in the performance between the vessel groups, and that the results of an evaluation of sustainability in the fishing fleets are dependent on which attributes are explored. Thus, the discussion may contribute to a better decision basis and improved sustainability in fisheries management.     

Unreported fishing, hungry people and political turmoil: the recipe for a food security crisis in Madagascar?

Madagascar, the world's fourth largest island, is one of the world's poorest developing countries, and its people depend heavily on marine resources for subsistence and income. Exports of these resources and foreign fishing access agreements are also important, at least from a large-scale economic perspective. In recent years, concerns have been voiced amongst local fishers and industry groups regarding the growth of the country's fishing effort. Despite these concerns, existing knowledge of the scale, composition and trends of Malagasy fisheries remains poor, and there is negligible information regarding unreported catches and illegal fishing in Madagascar's waters. Small-scale fisheries, which are often substantial in developing countries such as Madagascar, are often unreported or underestimated. Unfortunately, fisheries legislations, management plans and foreign fishing access agreements are often influenced by these incomplete data, leading to serious over-estimations of resource availability. This also appears to be the situation in Madagascar, where the reconstruction of total catches by all Malagasy fisheries sectors conducted here showed that total catches between 1950 and 2008 were twice the volume reported by national fisheries agencies. Most importantly, much of the subsistence sector is missing from official statistics, and signs of decline have already been observed in several stocks, suggesting that current levels of catches are likely to be exceeding sustainable yields. This has profound implications for the economic and ecological sustainability of fisheries, as well as food security in a country where people rely heavily on the ocean for their daily protein needs and livelihoods.     

The structure of tuna access agreements in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean: Lessons for Vessel Day Scheme planning

The tuna industry in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) is one of the largest and most valuable fisheries in the world. Since the 1980s, Pacific island countries have used licensing agreements with foreign fishing interests—known as access agreements—to earn tuna-related revenue and control the environmental impacts of fishing, with only minimal success. To date, there has been little work detailing the structure of access agreements and assessing how this structure relates to economic and environmental outcomes in the sector. This article helps to fill this gap by providing an overview of various access structures and a detailed empirical assessment of how these structures are applied in access agreements between Pacific island countries and the major foreign fishing interests active in the WCPO. This analysis is placed in the context of evolving regional fisheries management structures. The study reveals that while there is no uniform formula for access agreements, each structure is subject to distinct political, economic and environmental considerations that influence outcomes for Pacific island countries. As Pacific island countries develop the mechanism to allocate fishing rights under the new Vessel Day Scheme, drawing on their long history with access agreements will assist efforts to use access to achieve policy objectives. Improved transparency will enable Pacific island countries to identify successes and problems and adapt the Vessel Day Scheme allocation mechanisms accordingly.     

Incentivising selective fishing under a policy to ban discards; lessons from European and global fisheries

The reduction of discards in European fisheries has been identified as a specific objective of the reform of the EU Common Fisheries Policy. To reduce the uncertainty in catch data and the socially unacceptable waste of resources that results from the disposal of catch at sea, a policy to ban discards has been proposed. Discard bans are currently implemented in Alaska, British Columbia, New Zealand, the Faroe Islands, Norway and Iceland. Experience from these countries highlights that a policy of mandatory landings can result in a reduction in discards, but relies upon a high level of surveillance or economic incentives to encourage fishers to land more of their catch. Discard bans will also not result in long term benefits to stocks unless total removals are reduced, through the avoidance of undersized, non-commercial or over quota catch. Experience shows that additional management measures are required to incentivise such a move towards more selective fishing. Success has resulted from the use of area closures and bycatch limits, with potential applications in EU fisheries. However, selective fishing will not be a panacea for the current state of European fisheries; discard bans and accompanying measures must be embedded in a wider management system that constrains fishing mortality to reasonable levels before sustainable exploitation can occur.     

The challenges of the landing obligation in EU fisheries

A feasibility study was conducted on the impacts of the new Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) rules requiring catches in regulated fisheries to be landed and counted against quotas of each Member State - the landing obligation (LO), and that catch of species subject to the LO below a minimum conservation reference size (MCRS) be restricted to purposes other than direct human consumption. The aim was to estimate the level of discarded fish likely to be covered by the new rules, the impact of the rules on EU fisheries and the regulatory challenges and responses to them. Data from EU's Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee on Fisheries (STECF) database were analysed to estimate the volume of unwanted catches produced by EU fisheries. Views were sought from policy officials and fisheries scientists through a questionnaire on the implications of the LO and the control of fisheries across Member States, and the potential adjustments that might be needed. Findings show that 11% (44,000 t) of the total catches of EU countries from which data were available are of fish under MCRS. The species with the highest volume of undersized discards associated with the lowest quota, which would potentially restrict the fishing opportunities for other quota species (i.e. choke species), are plaice and haddock with 18,000 and 14,000 t of undersized fish respectively, followed by whiting and cod with 5000 and 6000 t of undersized fish respectively. Discards data shows that the Netherlands, United Kingdom, France and Belgium will be most affected by landings for non-human markets. Findings also show that existing infrastructure at landing ports in all Member States is limited because there are currently limited facilities in place to handle animal by-products produced by the catching sector. Policy officials maintained that while they could support the fishing industry through funding programmes, it is the responsibility of fishers to ensure they have the right infrastructure to handle unwanted catches. The expectation is that the LO combined with the restriction to non-human consumption purposes will encourage fishers to internalise the costs of catching unwanted fish and motivate them to avoid unwanted catch. This will be realised if sufficient flexibility is given to fishers to find their own solutions to reducing unwanted catches. It is concluded that gear technology measures exist to enable the regulated fisheries to increase gear selectivity.     

WTO fisheries subsidies negotiations: implications for fisheries access arrangements and sustainable management

The paper considers the WTO negotiations on fisheries subsidies and the implications that envisaged disciplines will have on coastal developing countries. This is considered in relation to fisheries access agreements in the Central and Western Pacific where several least developed but resource rich island states such as Kiribati and Tuvalu are highly exposed to the risks associated with new WTO fisheries subsidies disciplines that do not consider their particular vulnerabilities. The paper considers some of the issues that coastal developing countries should incorporate into their emerging negotiating positions at the WTO. State-to-Sate fisheries access agreements which are often highly subsidised but where fishing vessel owners pay the equivalent of lump sum tax are paradoxically, the least distortionary and damaging to the environment. Strategies for managing the possible new disciplines are considered.     

Navigating customary law and state fishing legislation to create effective fisheries governance in India

When customary legal systems exist alongside state regulations, individuals can choose between these different frameworks to support their claims to resources. Research suggests that such framework switching to maximize self-interest weakens and challenges resource management. Multiple legal systems are at work in India's fisheries and this study examines how they work to govern conflict over purse-seine fishing in the Sindhudurg district of Maharashtra State. Through participant observations, interviews and state fishing law reviews, this study finds evidence of strong customary legal systems, operating through local cultural practices, to protect common property rights, equitable access, ethical and ecological concerns. In contrast, state legislation appears weak because it addresses issues of local concern, such as equitable access, at a slow pace and over such a large scale as to be absent. Consequently, multiple legal systems in these fisheries do not create a management challenge that follows a predictable path towards resource degradation. Instead informal, customary rules applied alongside formal state legislation interact in complex ways that create opportunities for effective co-management.     

Fishing access agreements and harvesting decisions of host and distant water fishing nations

The declaration of exclusive economic zones (EEZs) granted coastal states sovereign rights over the marine resources in their EEZs and enabled developing coastal states to legally charge access fees to distant water fishing (DWF) nations for access to the resources in these waters. Despite the potential for economic gains, however, the ability of coastal states to benefit from the granting of sovereign rights and to ensure the sustainable use of their fisheries resources depends on how domestic fishing effort responds to the harvesting decisions of the DWF nations. We develop a stylized bioeconomic model to explore the change in fishing behavior of host and DWF nations when the two nations enter into an access agreement with varying levels of access fee. We further conduct an econometric analysis of changes in Pacific island nations’ harvesting behavior in response to the harvest decisions of DWF nations using data from the Western and Central Pacific tuna fishery. Our model results show that there is a range of variable access payment levels over which the host nation substitutes benefits from its domestic fishing activity with access payments from the DWF nation and that setting fees in this range can create a trap whereby host nations are forced to trade-off receiving a fair return to their fishery resources through access fees and retaining their own active fleet capacity. Our empirical analysis further shows a gradual shift in the way in which Pacific island host nations responded to the harvest decision of DWF nations as a result of the creation of the 200-nautical-mile EEZ.     

Constraints on community participation in salmon fisheries management in Northwest Russia

Salmon fishing used to be the primary source of income in many rural areas of Arkhangelsk oblast in northwest Russia. People who settled in the area received a name Pomory, from Russian po moriu, meaning by sea, because their subsistence activities became marine fishing and hunting and seafaring. Local fisheries have undergone significant changes as post-Soviet Russia embraced the market economy and the state introduced fishing concessions. The current Russian law only allows fishing for salmon through officially registered recreational or commercial fisheries. Both these options are often either unavailable or unaffordable to rural dwellers, which leaves them with limited or no legal access to their traditional salmon fisheries. There has been a growing concern for protecting communities’ fishing rights among wider society in Arkhangelsk oblast. City activists promoted Pomory identity and appealed to the Russian government to grant Pomory an indigenous status to secure their access to fisheries. Although Pomor activism did not reach most of its proclaimed goals, it has contributed to promoting the image of Arkhangelsk oblast as a homeland to Pomor fishing. This image has played an important part in what Arkhangelsk authorities have called socially-oriented fisheries management. Officials have made good attempts to better accommodate rural communities’ access to fishing resources. Yet, these attempts have failed to include fishermen as active participants in the process. This paper looks at constraints on community participation in fisheries management in Russia. It considers both historical and contemporary reasons for the low participation of local community in fisheries management.     

Monitoring fishing mortality: Compliance in Norwegian offshore fisheries

Sustainable management of wild fish stocks by means of catch quotas requires reliable data on fishing mortality. Norwegian authorities have attempted to ensure the reliability of this data through catch report procedures and a ban on dumping. The reliability of data on fishing mortality depends on the fishers’ compliance with these regulations. This article outlines the main factors that govern compliance and non-compliance in the Norwegian pelagic fisheries. Data was generated during fieldwork in the offshore pelagic fishing fleet.     

Regulating the access to fisheries: learning from European experiences

The pressure on aquatic renewable resources has rapidly increased over past decades as a result of both sustained high demand and technological innovation. The relative scarcity of fishing resources is not new, but it seems today to have become a generalised phenomena for most aquatic ecosystems from local to oceanic scales. Either motivated by the desire to regulate conflicts between groups of fishermen (gears, communities, etc.) or to improve efficiency by internalising part of free access externalities, fisheries management appears fundamentally to represent a process of access rule definition and implementation. Whatever is the instrument (output or input based, regulatory or economic, market oriented or not) it is the structure of access rights that is initially affected. There is nothing original in the fact that increasing relative scarcity calls for property right structure changes. It is also not surprising that in many cases, creating an access right structure provides an opportunity for a market expression of resource value. But in the case of fisheries resource appropriation is not as simple or easy as on land. Mobility and variability of the resource, diversity of fishing techniques interacting over stocks or areas, makes the case more difficult. Furthermore, management instruments are not as similar as the economic theory of management implies. Therefore, there is no straightforward answer. This is the reason why many different routes have been chosen to regulate world fisheries. In practice, efficiency and equity objectives are rarely successfully met. The European Union, with the Common Fisheries Policy and the various local or national management schemes, offers a fair range of such examples. Referring to European examples, the key issues in the debate over fisheries management are considered.     

Constructing logbook-like statistics for coastal fisheries using coastal surveillance radar and fish market data

As catch and effort statistics including fishing time and location are essential for producing abundance indices for utilized fish stocks, fishing states are encouraged under the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries to collect and maintain such statistics. However, for coastal fisheries (including artisanal fisheries) that are mainly composed of small-sized vessels which are usually too numerous to monitor, fisheries statistics collection systems are often either lacking or of insufficient quality (e.g. incomplete or inaccurate). Vessel monitoring system (VMS) data are commonly used to construct or improve estimation of fishing effort and fishing location in large-scale fisheries. Most coastal fisheries lack VMS but their countries do have coastal surveillance radar systems (CSRS) for security and enforcement purposes. This study illustrates and recommends opportunistic use of CSRS data to provide similar scientific benefits to VMS data for coastal fisheries. CSRS in combination with market landings data can construct logbook-like catch and effort statistics. This study introduces a method and demonstrates its usefulness for scientific research and management purposes, including the potential to obtain a higher accuracy and precision, particularly for fishing location and catch amount. Limitations of the CSRS data and challenges to managers involved in its application are also discussed.     

Fishing capacity management in China: Theoretic and practical perspectives

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Committee on Fisheries (COFI) adopted an International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity, which calls for all member states to achieve efficient, equitable and transparent management of fishing capacity by 2005. Based on the theoretical review of fishing capacity management, this paper examines the major practices made by China's government in managing the fishing capacity of its marine capture fisheries. Finally, it categorizes the main practices and then analyses and evaluates their effects.     

China's distant water fishing industry: Evolving policies and implications

This article examines China's distant water fishing industry, with a focus on China's bilateral fisheries access agreements in Africa. The article argues that China largely conforms to international norms and rules on sustainable fisheries, but that challenges remain in efforts to work with China on the sustainable management of fish stocks. Developed countries contribute to China's policies and behavior in international fisheries in both positive and negative ways.