The elephant in the room: The hidden costs of leasing individual transferable fishing quotas

Despite the increasingly positive reviews of individual transferable quotas (ITQs), few studies have considered how quota leasing activities can reduce the economic benefits to society and to fishermen operating under the ITQ fisheries system. This analysis reveals negative economic impacts of ITQs previously overlooked by examining the extent of quota leasing and the relationship between the catch value, the cost of fishing, and the quota lease price in the BC halibut fishery, long considered a poster child for ITQs. Findings challenge assumptions of economic theory used to promote the benefits of ITQs.     

Where could catch shares prevent stock collapse?

In a widely received study Costello and his colleagues found that catch shares give better stock persistence and higher catch for fishermen. The conclusions made by Costello et al. were further supported by Grafton and McIlgorm where they suggested a framework in order to determine the costs and benefits of separate ITQ management in seven Australian commonwealth fisheries, and what the alternatives should be if the net benefits do not justify ITQs. This raises the question why we do not see catch shares being used more often. We explore at a global scale which countries would have the potential to, and indeed do, fulfil the conditions necessary to implement such a management strategy.     

Are input controls required in individual transferable quota fisheries to address ecosystem based fisheries management objectives?

This study examined the use of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) to effectively manage fishing impacts on all ecosystem components, as required under Ecosystem Based Fisheries Management (EBFM) principles. A consequence of changing from input controls to output-based (catch) management is that the control of the regulating authority tends to be reduced, which may affect the outcomes for ecosystem management. This study reviewed the use of input controls across six fishing methods in 18 ITQ fisheries, which have been independently accredited as ecologically sustainable by the Marine Stewardship Council (12 fisheries) or under Australian environmental legislation for Wildlife Trade Operation (six fisheries). Input controls were retained across a range of ITQ fisheries, with non-selective fisheries such as trawl, gillnet and line employing more input controls than selective fisheries such as purse-seine, pot/trap and dredge. Further case-studies confirmed the widespread and recent use of input controls (spatial and temporal closures) with the aim of managing ecosystem impacts of fishing. The retention of input controls, particularly closures affects the security (quality of title) characteristic of the fishing use right and the theoretical ability of fishers to manage their right for their future benefit. The security characteristic is weakened by closures through loss of access, which undermines industry trust and incentive for long-term decision making. By reducing the security of ITQs, individual fisher incentives and behaviour may separate from societal objectives for sustainability, which was one of the foremost reasons for introducing ITQ management.     

A rejoinder to E. Pinkerton et al., the elephant in the room: The hidden costs of leasing individual transferable fishing quotas

The purpose of this rejoinder is to respond to and question the many assertions made by Pinkerton et al. in the recently published Marine Policy article entitled: “The elephant in the room: The hidden costs of leasing individual transferable fishing quotas”. Particular attention is paid to the assertion that 79% of the British Columbia Pacific halibut TAC is being leased out by “armchair fishermen”. The rejoinder also discusses how ITQs, when used with other fishery management tools, such as catch monitoring, creates incentives that align more closely the fishermen harvesting behaviour and practices with the objectives of the resource manager.     

Beyond individual quotas: The role of trust and cooperation in promoting stewardship of five Australian abalone fisheries

Private property rights, such as individual transferable quotas, are thought to encourage fishers to act as resource stewards. To achieve this, however, fishers must be able to cooperate with each other. This paper examines the relationship between trust, cooperation and stewardship in five abalone (Haliotis) fisheries in southeastern Australia. Industry-led resource management initiatives are used as indicators of stewardship, sometimes including substantial sacrifice of catch quota. Higher levels of trust and cooperative capacity enabled greater levels of industry-based resource management in four of the five fisheries. In one case, however, high levels of trust and cooperative capacity did not translate into associated levels of resource management. It is suggested that additional factors, such as perceptions of resource condition, are key determinants of resource stewardship. Private property rights may, therefore, be less important than previously argued.     

Lesser-known consequences of managing marine fisheries using individual transferable quotas

Managing marine fisheries using output controls in the form of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) can be an attractive alternative to more traditional input controls. There are now a number of examples of where ITQ-managed fisheries have been able to reduce the impact of the major management problems in global fisheries, namely, gross over-capitalisation and effort. However, ITQs are not the perfect management tool and one of the lesser known consequences of ITQ-managed fisheries where ITQs consist of a harvest right is the implicit relationship between ITQ property rights and rights of access to the fishing grounds. This implicit spatial right to the grounds can provide obstacles in the way of allocating water-space within fishing grounds for alternative uses such as marine-protected areas, large-scale aquaculture, and wind farms. These lesser-known consequences of ITQ-managed fisheries are discussed here.     

Self-governance within a QMS framework—The evolution of self-governance in the New Zealand Bluff oyster fishery

This paper examines efforts to develop stakeholder led self-governance in the Bluff oyster fishery. The paper focuses on collaborative management and its ability to address some of the unintended consequences of management. The Bluff oyster fishery's administrative, biological, and economic performances are analysed to assess whether or not the participatory management model, in this case fisheries self-governance, complements individual transferable quota (ITQ) for this inshore shellfish fishery.The paper argues that the Bluff oyster fishery's current self-governance model, based on a fishery plan, aids in improving the performance of the fishery, and that the Bluff oyster fishery has the capacity to shift further towards a stakeholder led self-regulated fishery.     

A decade of ITQ-management in Icelandic fisheries: consolidation without consensus

Icelandic fisheries have been managed by individual transferable quotas (ITQs) for a decade but there is still no consensus about the quota issue. Distributional effects of ITQs, in terms of income distribution between owner and crew, and the vulnerability of fisheries communities short of quota, have been in the centre of the debate.The author discusses changes in stakeholder involvement in policy-making, conflicts of interest and legal disputes linked to the ITQ-system. By way of conclusion, some options for resolving conflicts and reaching consensus on the fisheries management issue are discussed.     

The economics of ending Canada's commercial harp seal hunt

The roots of the Canadian harp seal hunt can be traced to the 16th Century. But in the mid-20th century, opposition to the commercial hunt became widespread after television images of seal pups being killed with clubs on the pack ice off the coast of Newfoundland were broadcast around the world. International conservation groups, animal welfare groups, animal rights groups, and foreign governments have been calling for the Canadian government to end the commercial seal hunt on the grounds that it is inhumane and that harvest levels are unsustainable. The Canadian government defends the traditional practices of hunting harp seals, argues that seal pelts are an important source of income for sealers, and insists that the killing methods are humane and that harvest levels are sustainable. Emotions run high on both sides of the debate. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether or not there is a purely economic argument for ending Canada's commercial seal hunt. The paper finds that the benefits of ending the commercial hunt exceed the costs, but not unequivocally. However, the paper argues there should be a higher criterion—the Pareto criterion—for ending the commercial hunt; that is the hunt should end only if winners compensate the losers. The paper goes on to argue that an effective way to satisfy this criterion is to introduce a system of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) and let the market reveal the value of the commercial seal hunt. In addition to many other advantages such as improving the safety and efficiency of the hunt, the ITQ market could provide a mechanism by which those willing to pay to end the hunt could do so directly to sealers thereby ensuring that the hunt is scaled back or ultimately ended only when it is economically efficient and unambiguously welfare-improving.     

Designing ITQ programs for commercial recreational fishing

This paper discusses the potential for implementing individual transferable quota (ITQ) schemes in commercial recreational fisheries, focusing particularly on charter and headboat fisheries. After a brief discussion of ITQs in commercial fisheries, the paper discusses the manner in which rents get dissipated in commercial recreational fisheries. Fishing mortality in recreational fisheries is determined as a joint outcome of angler behavior and trip supply. In the recreational sector under open access conditions, there are likely to be too many vessels providing too many trips at prices that are too low. Vessel input configurations are likely to be distorted in a manner that generates excessive fishing mortality. Designing ITQs for recreational fisheries requires consideration of issues not prominent in the design of commercial fisheries. Among the most important is the manner in which angler preferences and types affect overall mortality from both landings and discards. While catch and release fisheries and pure food fish recreational fisheries are relatively easy to manage with recreational ITQs, fisheries with both angler types present difficult monitoring problems that add complexities to ITQ design. Various ways to design programs that account for both landings and discard mortalities and that generate incentives for anglers and vessel owners to reduce discard mortality are discussed.     

New Zealand seafood firm competitiveness in export markets: The role of the quota management system and aquaculture legislation

New Zealand's quota management system (QMS) was implemented in 1986 to address problems caused by a regulated open entry management system in place for the previous two decades. Excess capacity in the inshore fisheries caused several stocks to become depleted and conflicts to intensify between fishing sectors. The allocation of individual transferable quota (ITQ) was viewed as the best way to improve efficiency within the over-capitalised inshore fisheries and provide incentives for developing the deepwater fisheries. The expected benefits of the QMS fit with the political climate at that time, as the government was using market forces to address the deteriorating economy. This article outlines the results of a research project that involved four medium to large-sized, highly vertically integrated New Zealand seafood firms. The purpose of the project was to identify these firms’ sources of competitiveness in export markets and the process the firms used to develop sources of competitiveness, while adapting to rapid and radical changes to the political and business environment and transformation of the fisheries management system. The project's results show that the basis to seafood firm competitiveness is the security of supply to the fisheries resource provided by the QMS and aquaculture legislation. The project also outlines the role that government policies have in sustaining firm- and industry-level competitiveness. This article contributes to the broader discussion on the application of ITQ and other types of long-term access rights to the management of fisheries and does not express the views of the Ministry of Fisheries.     

Privatization,financialization and ocean grabbing in New Brunswick herring fisheries and salmon aquaculture

The growing literature on individual transferable quotas (ITQs) and on intensive salmon aquaculture and its negative impacts on the environment and other users of related marine space has been little connected to the developing literature on financialization and to the literature on ocean grabbing within fisheries. This paper seeks to address this gap through a case study of the recent history of herring fisheries and intensive aquaculture in New Brunswick, Canada, exploring how specific neoliberal processes – including privatization and marketization (in herring fleet ITQs and aquaculture lease systems), (re)regulation, financialization and globalization – have interacted to support the reshaping of regional fisheries from mixed small-scale, family-based, petty commodity fisheries towards vertically-integrated, corporate, financialized fisheries characterized by ocean grabbing.     

Development in fleet fishing capacity in rights based fisheries

Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) fisheries management systems are supposed to remedy the over-capacity problem associated with traditional command-and-control management systems. This paper provides some insight with respect to the impact of ITQs on vessel numbers in six different countries. The results indicate that the number of vessels was reduced by at least 30% within a few years of the implementation of individual vessel quotas. Thereafter a slow reduction in vessel numbers continued, indicating that it may take time period before over-capacity is fully removed. Moreover, the total effect on vessel numbers is surprisingly similar across countries and fisheries despite different degrees of transferability in the different cases analysed.     

Using individual transferable quotas (ITQs) to achieve social policy objectives: A proposed intervention

ITQs offer environmental and economic benefits, including better conservation of a fish stock and greater profitability for fishers. With some limitations, they achieve fairly good alignment between the profit incentive and stewardship objectives. Nevertheless, critics have objected to ITQ schemes because of such factors as the “armchair fishing” phenomenon, unfairness to the public (the owner of the fish), economic and social damage to remote communities, and increased concentration within the fishery. Economists generally dismiss these as distributional issues rather than matters of efficiency or economics, but economic principles are clearly not the only factors that may require attention or action from a government or regulator. This paper proposes an intervention that addresses these concerns within the context of an ITQ scheme. The intervention does not reduce the permanence or values of ITQs, and therefore retains the benefits that ITQs are designed to deliver. Nevertheless, the intervention addresses the criticisms identified above. Modifications of the intervention may enable additional goals and benefits to be achieved as well.     

The perceptions of fisheries management options by Spain's Atlantic fishermen

This paper analyses the perceptions of Spanish fishermen working in Atlantic fishing grounds on current fishery regulation measures and the possibility of introducing transferable rights as is established in the EC's latest proposal to reform the Common Fisheries Policy. A survey was conducted through face-to-face interviews and ordered logistic and multiple regression models to identify which characteristics influence fishermen's perceptions and attitudes. The results show that the fleet segments most in favour of implementing ITQs correspond to industrial fishing, while the smaller-scale fisheries (artisanal, gillnets, longline and coastal trawl) are more in favour of a system involving individual effort (fishing days or kW days), transferable or otherwise.     

Figuring fish and measuring men: the individual transferable quota system in the Icelandic cod fishery

This article discusses inequality in the Icelandic cod fishery, focusing on changes in the actual distribution of fishing quotas and the ways in which Icelanders currently talk about equity and ownership. The individual transferable quota (ITQ) system, introduced in 1984, divided access to an important resource among those who happened to be boat owners at that time. Statistical findings with respect to the cod fishery - based on a database (the ‘Quotabase’) constructed using detailed information on all vessels that have been allotted ITQs from the onset of the system - show that ITQs have been increasingly concentrated in the hands of the biggest companies. Many of the small-scale boat owners that still hold ITQs are increasingly compelled to enter into contracts that involve fishing for larger ITQ holders. It is suggested that the distribution of ITQs, as well as their evaluation in social discourse, represents an important field of research. In Iceland, public discontent with the concentration of fishing rights and the ensuing social repercussions is increasingly articulated in terms of loaded metaphors, including ‘profiteering’, ‘tenancy’ and ‘lords of the sea’. It is argued that the ultimate efficiency of management programs may be jeopardized if managers ignore the history and culture of the fisheries involved and the likely social and ecological consequences of their programs.     

Perceptions and preferences of commercial fishers for dedicated access privilege framework in a multispecies fishery

The decline of the world's fisheries and the inability of traditional management frameworks to maintain them, has led managers to adopt alternative management frameworks. The use of dedicated access privileges have often been shown to have varying popularity among factions within the commercial fishing industry and managers. Here, we examine commercial fishers' preference for alternative management frameworks in the context of a unique multispecies fisheries of the Florida Keys. By surveying commercial fishers, we find that that the size of operation plays no role in affecting fisher perception regarding dedicated access privileges. Furthermore, fishers who are organized are less likely to support dedicated access privilege frameworks. Overall, we do not find enough support in the fishing industry for the implementation of dedicated access privileges in the Florida Keys. These findings can provide inputs in developing effective management plans in the region.     

Applicability of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) in Japanese fisheries: A comparison of rights-based fisheries management in Iceland, Japan, and United States

ITQs have not yet been introduced by the Government of Japan. In coastal areas, fishery cooperative associations have traditionally played an important role in managing fisheries through self-imposed rules and peer-monitoring systems. Recently, however, the economic competitiveness of Japanese fisheries in the international market is being questioned. In this paper, a detailed examination of the pros and cons of the current system in Japan is compared to the current fishery management measures of Iceland and the United States, where attaining economically or biologically efficient outcomes may be prioritized in making fisheries management decisions. For many coastal fisheries in Japan, maintaining a management scheme in which stakeholders play an active role in determining fisheries measures seems more relevant if their priority is to maintain the stability of coastal communities and equity of stakeholders. Intensive dialog among stakeholders would be necessary to identify shared objectives of their fishery operations and to make decisions to establish specific steps toward the goal of increasing economic efficiency, environmental sustainability, or stability of communities and equity of stakeholders.     

Spatial conflicts in New Zealand fisheries: The rights of fishers and protection of the marine environment

New Zealand fisheries legislation provides commercial fishing rights to holders of individual transferable quota (ITQ). The settlement of fisheries claims against the Crown by Mäori, New Zealand's indigenous people, brought about the transfer of ITQ holdings to Mäori, and an obligation on the Crown to recognise and provide for indigenous (customary) fishing rights over fishing grounds and other areas that have been of special significance to Mäori. Some types of customary fishing areas exclude commercial fishing and could affect recreational fishing. Fisheries legislation requires that regulatory measures be put in place to avoid, remedy or mitigate the adverse effects of fishing. The Government also aims to protect marine biodiversity by having 10% of New Zealand waters in some form of protection by 2010. The legislative processes for protecting the marine environment and establishing customary fishing areas include assessment of effects on fishing rights. This paper explores the conflicts that arise from legislative obligations to uphold the rights of fishers, to sustain fishstocks and to protect the marine environment. The paper concludes that inconsistent legislative obligations and their disparate processes have led to spatial conflicts and a race for the allocation of space. Legislative obligations need to be integrated to maintain a balance between use of fisheries resources and protection of the marine environment.