Who feels the impacts of climate change?

Feeling affected by climate change related disasters has the potential to mobilize belief in climate change, concern about the issue, and support for mitigation policies – even when accounting for the effects of physically living through a disaster. In this study we use a two-wave survey design where respondents in the United States were interviewed before and after Hurricane Florence to better understand who feels affected by such disasters. First, we find that being worried about climate change increases the feeling of being affected by the hurricane among those who regularly discuss climate change. Second, we find that those who are high in perspective taking are more likely to feel affected. However, those who are high in empathic concern, but feel obligated to help victims of disasters, are less likely to feel affected. This suggests that hurricanes may cause a collapse of compassion, where those who are especially sensitive to the suffering of others down-regulate their emotional response to costly disasters.     

Is climate change a driver of armed conflict?

The world is generally becoming less violent, but the debate on climate change raises the specter of a new source of instability and conflict. In this field, the policy debate is running well ahead of its academic foundation—and sometimes even contrary to the best evidence. Although comparative research on security implications of climate change is rapidly expanding, major gaps in knowledge still exist. Taken together, extant studies provide mostly inconclusive insights, with contradictory or weak demonstrated effects of climate variability and change on armed conflict. This article reviews the empirical literature on short-term climate/environmental change and intrastate conflict, with special attention to possible insecurity consequences of precipitation and temperature anomalies and weather-related natural disasters. Based on this assessment, it outlines priorities for future research in this area.     

The new national climate change documents of Mexico: what do the regional climate change scenarios represent?

This paper presents a review of the methodology applied for generating the regional climate change scenarios utilized in important National Documents of Mexico, such as the Fourth National Communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Fourth National Report to the Convention on Biological Diversity and The Economics of Climate Change in Mexico. It is shown that these regional climate change scenarios, which are one of the main inputs to support the assessments presented in these documents, are an example of the erroneous use of statistical downscaling techniques. The arguments presented here imply that the work based on such scenarios should be revised and therefore, these documents are inadequate for supporting national decision- making.     

Selling climate change? The limitations of social marketing as a strategy for climate change public engagement

Social marketing is the systematic application of marketing concepts and techniques to achieve specific behavioural goals relevant to the social good. Social marketing approaches are becoming increasingly popular among governmental and non-governmental actors seeking to engage the public on climate change. The effectiveness of social marketing in achieving specific behavioural goals is empirically well-supported. However, in the first systematic critique of social marketing as a strategy for engaging the public on climate change, we present evidence that social marketing alone is insufficient to build support for the more ambitious policy changes and interventions that constitute a proportional response to climate change. In some circumstances, social marketing approaches may even be counterproductive. We describe some alternative approaches for engaging the public, which may provide governmental and non-governmental actors with additional or preferable tools for promoting public engagement with climate change. Given the scale of the challenge, it seems critical that those seeking to engage the public are equipped with the most effective strategies available - a goal that this paper seeks to contribute to. We conclude that acknowledging the limitations of social marketing - and exploring alternative methods of engaging the public - is an urgent task for climate change communication researchers and practitioners.     

Is there a common pattern of future gas-phase air pollution in Europe under diverse climate change scenarios?

Climate change alone influences future levels of tropospheric ozone and their precursors through modifications of gas-phase chemistry, transport, removal, and natural emissions. The goal of this study is to determine at what extent the modes of variability of gas-phase pollutants respond to different climate change scenarios over Europe. The methodology includes the use of the regional modeling system MM5 (regional climate model version)-CHIMERE for a target domain covering Europe. Two full-transient simulations covering from 1991–2050 under the SRES A2 and B2 scenarios driven by ECHO-G global circulation model have been compared. The results indicate that the spatial patterns of variability for tropospheric ozone are similar for both scenarios, but the magnitude of the change signal significantly differs for A2 and B2. The 1991–2050 simulations share common characteristics for their chemical behavior. As observed from the NO₂ and α-pinene modes of variability, our simulations suggest that the enhanced ozone chemical activity is driven by a number of parameters, such as the warming-induced increase in biogenic emissions and, to a lesser extent, by the variation in nitrogen dioxide levels. For gas-phase pollutants, the general increasing trend for ozone found under A2 and B2 forcing is due to a multiplicity of climate factors, such as increased temperature, decreased wet removal associated with an overall decrease of precipitation in southern Europe, increased photolysis of primary and secondary pollutants as a consequence of lower cloudiness and increased biogenic emissions fueled by higher temperatures.     

Do international factors influence the passage of climate change legislation?

The number of climate change laws in major economies has grown from less than 40 in 1997 to almost 500 at the end of 2013. The passage of these laws is influenced by both domestic and international factors. This article reviews the main international factors, drawing on a powerful new dataset of climate legislation in 66 national jurisdictions. We find that the propensity to legislate on climate change is heavily influenced by the passage of similar laws elsewhere, suggesting a strong and so far under-appreciated role for international policy diffusion. International treaties such as the Kyoto Protocol work in two ways. The impact of the Kyoto Protocol itself is limited to countries with formal obligations under the treaty. In addition, the prestige of hosting an international climate summit is associated with a subsequent boost in legislation. Legislators seem to respond to the expectations of climate leadership that these events bestow on their host.

Policy relevance

A global solution to climate change will ultimately have to be anchored in domestic legislation, which creates the legal basis for countries to take action. Countries are passing climate legislation in a growing number. This article asks to what extent they are motivated to do so by international factors, such as existing treaty obligations. We find that the Kyoto Protocol has been a less important factor in explaining climate legislation outside Annex I than the passage of similar laws elsewhere. This suggests that international policy diffusion plays an important and so far under-appreciated role in global climate policy, complementing formal treaty obligations.     

Climate change: a profile of US climate scientists’ perspectives

Climate scientists have played a significant role in investigating global climate change. In the USA, a debate has swirled about whether a consensus on climate change exists among reputable scientists and this has entered the policy process. In order to better understand the views of US climate scientists, we conducted an empirical survey of US climate scientists (N?=?468) in 2005, and compared the results with the 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) physical science report and policy summaries. Our results reveal that survey respondents generally agree about the nature, causes, and consequences of climate change, and are in agreement with IPCC findings. We also found that there is strong support for a variety of policy initiatives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.     

What is climate change scepticism? Examination of the concept using a mixed methods study of the UK public

The holding of doubts about climate change is often referred to as ‘scepticism’. However, there has been a lack of clarity in previous work as to what exactly this scepticism comprises. We integrate data obtained from discussion groups and a nationally representative survey, to interrogate and refine the concept of climate change scepticism with respect to the views of members of the public. We argue that two main types should be distinguished: epistemic scepticism, relating to doubts about the status of climate change as a scientific and physical phenomenon; and response scepticism, relating to doubts about the efficacy of action taken to address climate change. Whilst each type is independently associated by people themselves with climate change scepticism, we find that the latter is more strongly associated with a lack of concern about climate change. As such, additional effort should be directed towards addressing and engaging with people's doubts concerning attempts to address climate change.     

The ‘ultimate objective’ of the framework convention on climate change requires a new approach in climate change research

In the Framework Convention on Climate Change an ultimate objective is formulated that calls for stabilization of the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at a level that would allow ecosystems to adapt naturally, safeguard food supply and enable sustainable development to proceed in a sustainable manner. This paper addresses the possible contribution of science to translate this rather vague and ambiguous objective into more practicable terms. We propose a regionalized, risk-based six-step approach that couples an analysis of ecosystem vulnerability to the results of simulations of climate change. An ultimate objective level could be determined in terms of stabilized concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The level and timing of this stabilization would be determined by a political appreciation of associated risks for managed and unmanaged ecosystems. These risks would be assessed by region in an internationally coordinated scientific effort, followed by a global synthesis.     

What makes climate change adaptation effective? A systematic review of the literature

Increased understanding of global warming and documentation of its observable impacts have led to the development of adaptation responses to climate change around the world. A necessary, but often missing, component of adaptation involves the assessment of outcomes and impact. Through a systematic review of research literature, I categorize 110 adaptation initiatives that have been implemented and shown some degree of effectiveness. I analyze the ways in which these activities have been documented as effective using five indicators: reducing risk and vulnerability, developing resilient social systems, improving the environment, increasing economic resources, and enhancing governance and institutions. The act of cataloging adaptation activities produces insights for current and future climate action in two main areas: understanding common attributes of adaptation initiatives reported to be effective in current literature; and identifying gaps in adaptation research and practice that address equality, justice, and power dynamics.     

How do weather characteristics change in a warming climate?

The possible change in the characteristics of weather in the future should be considered as important as the mean climate change because the increasing risk of extremes is related to the variability on daily time scales. The weather characteristics can be represented by the climatological mean interdiurnal (day-to-day) variability (MIDV). This paper first assessed the phase five of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project coupled climate models’ capability to represent MIDV for the surface maximum and minimum temperature, surface wind speed and precipitation under the present climate condition. Based on the assessment, we selected three best models for projecting future change. We found that the future changes in MIDV are characterized by: (a) a marked reduction in surface maximum and minimum temperature over high latitudes during the cold season; (b) a stronger reduction in the surface minimum temperature than in the maximum temperature; (c) a reduction in surface wind speed over large parts of lands in Northern Hemisphere (NH) during NH spring; (d) a noticeable increase in precipitation in NH mid-high latitudes in NH spring and winter, and in particular over East Asia throughout most of the year.     

Is interactive air sea coupling relevant for simulating the future climate of Europe?

Climate Dynamics - The majority of regional climate change assessments for the Euro-CORDEX region is based on high resolution atmosphere models. These models use prescribed lower boundary...     

The first climate refugees? Contesting global narratives of climate change in Tuvalu

Climate change effects such as sea-level rise are almost certain. What these outcomes mean for different populations, however, is far less certain. Climate change is both a narrative and material phenomenon. In so being, understanding climate change requires broad conceptualisations that incorporate multiple voices and recognise the agency of vulnerable populations. In climate change discourse, climate mobility is often characterised as the production of ‘refugees’, with a tendency to discount long histories of ordinary mobility among affected populations. The case of Tuvalu in the Pacific juxtaposes migration as everyday practice with climate refugee narratives. This climate-exposed population is being problematically positioned to speak for an entire planet under threat. Tuvaluans are being used as the immediate evidence of displacement that the climate change crisis narrative seems to require. Those identified as imminent climate refugees are being held up like ventriloquists to present a particular (western) ‘crisis of nature’. Yet Tuvaluan conceptions of climate challenges and mobility practices show that more inclusive sets of concepts and tools are needed to equitably and effectively approach and characterise population mobility.     

Unstoppable climate change? The influence of fatalistic beliefs about climate change on behavioural change and willingness to pay cross-nationally

Although climate change is an urgent problem, behavioural and policy responses have not yet been sufficient to either reduce the volume of greenhouse gas emissions or adapt to a disrupted climate system. Significant efforts have been made to raise public awareness of the dangers posed by climate change. One reason why these efforts might not be sufficient is rooted in people’s need to feel efficacy to solve complex problems; the belief that climate change is unstoppable might thwart action even among the concerned. This paper tests for the effect of fatalistic beliefs on behavioural change and willingness to pay to address climate change using two cross-national surveys representing over 50,000 people in 48 nations.

Key policy insights

• The perception that climate change poses a risk or danger increases the likelihood of behavioural change and willingness to pay to address climate change.

• The belief that climate change is unstoppable reduces the behavioural and policy response to climate change and moderates risk perception.

• Communicators and policy leaders should carefully frame climate change as a difficult, yet solvable, problem to circumvent fatalistic beliefs.

     

Cost–benefit analysis of climate change dynamics: uncertainties and the value of information

We analyze climate change in a cost–benefit framework, using the emission and concentration profiles of Wigley et al. (Nature 379(6562):240–243, 1996). They present five scenarios that cover the period 1990–2300 and are designed to reach stabilized concentration levels of 350, 450, 550, 650 and 750 ppmv, respectively. We assume that the damage cost in each year t is proportional to the corresponding gross world product and the square of the atmospheric temperature increase (ΔT(t)). The latter is estimated with a simple two-box model (representing the atmosphere and deep ocean). Coupling the damage cost with the abatement cost, we interpolate between the five scenarios to find the one that is optimal in the sense of minimizing the sum of discounted annual (abatement plus damage) costs over a time horizon of N years. Our method is simpler than ‘traditional’ models with the same purpose, and thus allows for a more transparent sensitivity study with respect to the uncertainties of all parameters involved. We report our central result in terms of the stabilized emission level E _o and concentration level p _o (i.e. their values at t = 300 years) of the optimal scenario. For the central parameter values (that is, N = 150 years, a discount rate r _dis = 2%/year and a growth rate r _gro = 1%/year of gross world product) we find E _o  = 8.0 GtCO₂/year and p _o = 496 ppmv. Varying the parameters over a wide range, we find that the optimal emission level remains within a remarkably narrow range, from about 6.0 to 12 GtCO₂/year for all plausible parameter values. To assess the significance of the uncertainties we focus on the social cost penalty, defined as the extra cost incurred by society relative to the optimum if one makes the wrong choice of the emission level as a result of erroneous damage and abatement cost estimates. In relative terms the cost penalty turns out to be remarkably insensitive to errors. For example, if the true damage costs are three times larger or smaller than the estimate, the total social cost of global climate change increases by less than 20% above its minimum at the true optimal emission level. Because of the enormous magnitude of the total costs involved with climate change (mitigation), however, even a small relative error implies large additional expenses in absolute terms. To evaluate the benefit of reducing cost uncertainties, we plot the cost penalty as function of the uncertainty in relative damage and abatement costs, expressed as geometric standard deviation and standard deviation respectively. If continued externality analysis reduces the geometric standard deviation of relative damage cost estimates from 5 to 4, the benefit is 0.05% of the present value G _tot of total gross word product over 150 years (about $3.9 × 10¹⁵), and if further research reduces the standard deviation of relative abatement costs from 1 to 0.5, the benefit is 0.03% of G _tot .     

Cairo and climate change: a win–win opportunity

The landmark Program of Action agreed to at the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo calls for a wide range of population-related policies motivated primarily by the improvement of individual well being. Currently, a funding shortfall threatens continued progress toward the Cairo goals. This shortfall risks missing an opportunity not only to improve the lives of individuals around the world, but also to reduce the environmental consequences of population growth. Recent estimates of environmental externalities to childbearing associated with global climate change indicate that climate-related returns to investments in such policies could be of the same order of magnitude as the investments themselves. Thus, continued support of the Cairo program is clearly a “win–win” strategy.     

Might climate change the “healthy migrant” effect?

Migrants from Mexico to the U.S. tend to be healthier than non-migrants in their origin – part of a pattern termed the “healthy migrant effect”. With climate change altering livelihoods across the globe, we ask how the migration-health connection may be altered by environmental strain. On the one hand, positive health selectivity may be intensified if migration becomes more challenging – and therefore increasingly likely to be undertaken by only the healthiest. On the other hand, positive health selectivity may decline if the “push” associated with environmental strain acts upon individuals regardless of health. We use Mexican Migration Project data to model Mexico-US migration by male household heads with consideration of migrant health as well as recent rainfall conditions in communities of origin. Results reveal intriguing interactions such that when moderately dry regions experience rainfall shortage, health selectivity is lower – meaning that less healthy household heads also engage in international migration. We posit that social networks may underlie this association. We further argue that since environmental context may alter the relationship between migration and health, future research on the “healthy migrant effect” should consider environmental conditions. As to implications, if climate change yields pressure on less healthy individuals to migrate, the need for migrant-sensitive health systems and services may be intensified in destination regions.     

Does public policy support or undermine climate change adaptation? Exploring policy interplay across different scales of governance

Policy makers have now recognised the need to integrate thinking about climate change into all areas of public policy making. However, the discussion of ‘climate policy integration’ has tended to focus on mitigation decisions mostly taken at international and national levels. Clearly, there is also a more locally focused adaptation dimension to climate policy integration, which has not been adequately explored by academics or policy makers. Drawing on a case study of the UK, this paper adopts both a top-down and a bottom-up perspective to explore how far different sub-elements of policies within the agriculture, nature conservation and water sectors support or undermine potential adaptive responses. The top-down approach, which assumes that policies set explicit aims and objectives that are directly translated into action on the ground, combines a content analysis of policy documents with interviews with policy makers. The bottom-up approach recognises the importance of other actors in shaping policy implementation and involves interviews with actors in organisations within the three sectors. This paper reveals that neither approach offers a complete picture of the potentially enabling or constraining effects of different policies on future adaptive planning, but together they offer new perspectives on climate policy integration. These findings inform a discussion on how to implement climate policy integration, including auditing existing policies and ‘climate proofing’ new ones so they support rather than hinder adaptive planning.