A CER discounting scheme could save climate change regime after 2012

We can generate a net global GHG emission reduction from developing countries (in an UNFCCC term, non-Annex 1 Parties) without imposing targets on them, if we discount CERs generated from CDM projects. The CER discounting scheme means that a part or all of CDM credits, i.e., CERs, made by developing countries through unilateral CDM projects will be retired rather than sold to developed countries to increase their emissions. It is not feasible to impose certain forms of target (whether sectoral or intensity targets) on non-Annex 1 whose emission trend is hard to predict and whose industrial structure is undergoing a rapid change.

Instead of imposing targets (a command and control approach), we should apply market instruments in generating a net global emission reduction from non-Annex 1. Since April 2005 when the first unilateral CDM was approved by the CDM Executive Board, CDM has been functioning as a market mechanism to provide incentives for developing countries to initiate their own emission reduction projects. As CDM is the only market mechanism engaging developing countries in the Kyoto Protocol, we should try to re-design CDM so that it can generate net global emission reductions by introducing the idea of discounting CERs. But in order to produce meaningful GHG emission reductions by discounting CERs, the project scope of CDM has to be expanded by relaxing project additionality criteria while maintaining strict technical additionality criteria. Agreeing on the CERs Discounting Scheme will have a better political chance than agreeing on imposing emission reduction targets on developing countries.     

Additionality reconsidered: lax criteria may not benefit developing countries

Abstract

International negotiation on the additionality issue of the CDM (Clean Development Mechanism) seems to be proceeding without sufficient information or understanding. Especially apparent is a lack of recognition that the non-additional CERs (certified emission reductions) generated by relaxing the additionality criteria may lead to economic losses for developing countries. This article quantitatively reconfirms the effects of non-additional CERs on the international community, while clarifying that the generation of non-additional CERs in excess of a certain number will eventually lead to negative consequences for developing countries, even if these countries were able to acquire all the non-additional CERs. Furthermore, the Discussion section demonstrates that future system design would significantly affect the benefits of developing countries as well as the overall environmental integrity of the Kyoto mechanisms.     

Future restrictions for sinks in the CDM: How about a cap on supply?

The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol is expected to result in only a small role for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), including afforestation and reforestation projects. Wide ranging concerns regarding sinks in the CDM have been reflected in the Marrakech Accords capping the total amount of emission offsets from sinks projects to be used by Annex I countries. Decisions about the second commitment period and beyond are likely to be of far greater importance for these projects.This paper contributes to the discussion on how caps on sinks under the CDM could be used to obtain overall improved outcomes for developing countries. We examine two distinctive ways in which quantitative caps on sinks in the CDM can be implemented: one, restricting the use of sinks CERs to meet targets, as under the Marrakech Accords (a cap on demand); and two, restricting supply of sink CERs using a quota system. We argue in favour of a supply side cap, if Parties are to preserve the idea of limiting sinks in the CDM. Limiting the supply of credits could lead to better financial outcomes for developing countries as a whole, make higher-cost projects viable which may have better sustainability impacts, and provide an alternative to deal with equity concerns between developing countries.     

Future restrictions for sinks in the CDM How about a cap on supply?

Abstract

The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol is expected to result in only a small role for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), including afforestation and reforestation projects. Wide ranging concerns regarding sinks in the CDM have been reflected in the Marrakech Accords capping the total amount of emission offsets from sinks projects to be used by Annex I countries. Decisions about the second commitment period and beyond are likely to be of far greater importance for these projects.

This paper contributes to the discussion on how caps on sinks under the CDM could be used to obtain overall improved outcomes for developing countries. We examine two distinctive ways in which quantitative caps on sinks in the CDM can be implemented: one, restricting the use of sinks CERs to meet targets, as under the Marrakech Accords (a cap on demand); and two, restricting supply of sink CERs using a quota system. We argue in favour of a supply side cap, if Parties are to preserve the idea of limiting sinks in the CDM. Limiting the supply of credits could lead to better financial outcomes for developing countries as a whole, make higher-cost projects viable which may have better sustainability impacts, and provide an alternative to deal with equity concerns between developing countries.     

Certified emissions reductions and CDM limits: revenue and distributional aspects

The EU allows those installations that are subject to emissions trading to use a limited volume of certified emissions reductions (CERs), generated through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), to cover their own GHG emissions. These CERs can be used in addition to the EU allowances (EUAs), which were primarily allocated free to installations in Phase II of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) from 2008 to 2012. For the year 2008, the CER limits, which are differentiated by EU Member State, created substantial arbitrage rents (due to the CER-EUA spread) of approximately EU€250 million. Different options for the allocation of this rent are discussed and it is found that, according to economic theory, making the right to use CERs tradable or the regulator pre-committing to buying CERs at the level of the relevant limit reduces the inefficiencies connected to the current regulation. Furthermore, auctioning these CER usage rights shifts the rents created through the CER-EUA spread to the Member State itself. The improved design and implementation of CDM limits justifies EU policy makers intervening to correct previously competition-distorting choices.     

Estimating the CDM market under the Marrakech Accords

The agreement on implementation of the Kyoto Protocol achieved at COP7 in Marrakech has important implications for investment in greenhouse gas emission reduction projects in developing countries through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The required actual emission reductions for participating Annex B countries overall will be relatively small, as the United States do not intend to ratify the protocol and significant amounts of carbon sequestered in domestic sinks can be credited. In addition, the potential supply of surplus emission permits (hot air) from Russia and other economies in transition may be as high as total demand in the first commitment period. Thus, even under restraint of hot air sellers, CDM demand will be limited, and a low demand, low price carbon market scenario appears likely.The magnitude of the CDM will be influenced by a host of factors both on the demand and the supply-side. We analyse these using a quantitative model of the global carbon market, based on marginal abatement cost curves. Implementation and transaction costs, as well as baseline and additionality rules affect the CDM’s share in the carbon market. Demand for the CDM is sensitive to changes in business-as-usual emissions growth in participating Annex B countries, and also to crediting for additional sinks. Permit supply from Russia and other economies in transition is possibly the most crucial factor in the carbon market.     

Estimating the CDM market under the Marrakech Accords

Abstract

The agreement on implementation of the Kyoto Protocol achieved at COP7 in Marrakech has important implications for investment in greenhouse gas emission reduction projects in developing countries through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The required actual emission reductions for participating Annex B countries overall will be relatively small, as the United States do not intend to ratify the protocol and significant amounts of carbon sequestered in domestic sinks can be credited. In addition, the potential supply of surplus emission permits (hot air) from Russia and other economies in transition may be as high as total demand in the first commitment period. Thus, even under restraint of hot air sellers, CDM demand will be limited, and a low demand, low price carbon market scenario appears likely.

The magnitude of the CDM will be influenced by a host of factors both on the demand and the supply-side. We analyse these using a quantitative model of the global carbon market, based on marginal abatement cost curves. Implementation and transaction costs, as well as baseline and additionality rules affect the CDM's share in the carbon market. Demand for the CDM is sensitive to changes in business-as-usual emissions growth in participating Annex B countries, and also to crediting for additional sinks. Permit supply from Russia and other economies in transition is possibly the most crucial factor in the carbon market.     

Forestry Projects under the Clean Development Mechanism?

Afforestation is considered an important option for mitigation of greenhousegas emissions. Recently, plantation projects have been suggested for inclusionunder the Clean Development Mechanism. While considered a cheap option,significant uncertainties make it difficult to determine the (net) carbonbenefits and profitability of forestry projects. The current uncertaintiesabout the regulatory framework of the CDM and the environmental and economicperformance of plantation forestry could create uncertainties with respect tothe additionality of such projects and thus their acceptance under themechanism.Six plantation forestry projects that were proposed in Brazil have been usedas cases to study sources of uncertainty for carbon benefits and economics forsuch projects. These cases vary widely in terms of productivity and productsdelivered. A quantitative model for calculating greenhouse gas balances andfinancial benefits and costs, taking a broad range of variables into account,was developed. Data from the developers of the proposed projects was used asmain source material. Subsequently, scenario's were evaluated, containingdifferent and realistic options for baseline vegetation, carbon creditingsystems and CDM modalities, fluctuations in product prices, discount rates andcarbon prices.The real cost of combined carbon sequestration and substitution for the caseprojects was below $3 per ton of carbon avoided, when based exclusivelyon data supplied by project developers. However, potential variations incarbon impact and costs based on scenario options were very large. Differentbaseline vegetation or adopting a different discount rate cause carbon creditsto vary by as much as an order of magnitude. Different carbon crediting systemsor fluctuations in (commodity) product prices cause variations up to200% in carbon credits and NPV. This makes the additionality of suchprojects difficult to determine. Five of the six case projects seem uneligiblefor development under the CDM. A critical attitude towards the use ofplantation projects under the CDM seems justified.     

Assessing the additionality of CDM projects: practical experiences and lessons learned

The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol allows industrialized countries to use credits from greenhouse gas (GHG) abatement projects in developing countries. A key requirement of the CDM is that the emission reductions be real, measurable and additional. This article evaluates how the additionality of CDM projects has been assessed in practice. The analysis is mainly based on a systematic evaluation of 93 registered CDM projects and comes to the conclusion that the current tools for demonstrating additionality are in need of substantial improvement. In particular, the application of the barrier analysis is highly subjective and difficult to validate in an objective and transparent manner. Key assumptions regarding additionality are often not substantiated with credible, documented evidence. In a considerable number of cases it is questionable whether the emission reductions are actually additional. Based on these findings, practical recommendations for improving the assessment of additionality are provided.     

Trading biomass or GHG emission credits?

Global biomass potentials are considerable but unequally distributed over the world. Countries with Kyoto targets could import biomass to substitute for fossil fuels or invest in bio-energy projects in the country of biomass origin and buy the credits (Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI)). This study analyzes which of those options is optimal for transportation fuels and looks for the key variables that influence the result. In two case studies (Mozambique and Brazil), the two trading systems are compared for the amount of credits generated, land-use and associated costs. We found costs of 17–30 euro per ton of carbon for the Brazilian case and economic benefits of 11 to 60 euros per ton of carbon avoided in the Mozambique case. The impact of carbon changes related to direct land-use changes was found to be very significant (both positive and negative) and can currently only be included in emission credit trading, which can largely influence the results. In order to avoid indirect land-use changes (leakage) and consequent GHG emissions, it is crucial that bioenergy crop production is done in balance with improvements of management of agriculture and livestock management. Whatever trading option is economically most attractive depends mainly on the emission baseline in the exporting (emission credit trading) or importing (physical trading) country since both bio- and fossil fuel prices are world market prices in large scale trading systems where transportation costs are low. Physical trading could be preferential since besides the GHG reduction one could also benefit from the energy. It could also generate considerable income sources for exporting countries. This study could contribute to the development of a methodology to deal with bio fuels for transport, in Emission Trading (ET), CDM and the certification of traded bio fuels.     

Why has China not embraced a global cap-and-trade regime?

Although many economic studies suggest that China would reap significant benefits from participating in a global cap-and-trade regime, China has consistently refused to participate in international negotiations on this issue. Understanding China's underlying concerns is a key to explaining why China has not embraced an international greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme. This is explored as a potential basis for including China in future negotiations and schemes. This issue is considered from the following perspectives that impact upon China: (a) fairness: how do developing countries perceive emissions caps? (b) why have China and India been sceptical about international emissions trading? (c) what would China's political perceptions be of an inflow of CDM investment in comparison with the exports of emissions permits to the USA? (d) what are the implications of ‘lock in’ to an emissions cap, particularly when no rules and principles exist for setting emissions targets for post-2012? (e) the complex question of establishing future emissions caps for developing countries.     

Assessing the authenticity of national carbon prices: A comparison of 31 countries

Many countries have carbon pricing in place, in the form of a tax and/or market. Generally, this involves low price rates, incomplete emissions coverage, and price reductions for particular sectors. This raises the question whether the label “carbon price” – in the environmental-economics textbook sense – really applies. To answer it, we assess the authenticity of 31 national carbon prices, calculating average carbon prices and their gap with advertised prices, at both national and sector levels. The results indicate a poor level of authenticity. This means that the carbon prices published by sources such as the World Bank provide a misleading representation of the actual national policy pressure on emissions. Countries show considerable differences regarding the average carbon price level and the gap with advertised prices. Moreover, there is not a one-to-one relationship between advertised and average carbon prices, suggesting the former are not a good basis for international comparison of policy effectiveness. Across countries, the mean carbon price equals €7.90/ton of CO₂ while the mean price gap is 57.7%. Most noticeably, the highest advertised price for Sweden should be interpreted with care as it goes along with a price gap of almost €100 to the average price. In addition, Switzerland and Finland show relatively high price gaps. To illustrate the relevance and non-triviality of our indicators, note that Sweden occupies a 3rd position in terms of average carbon price (after Norway and Switzerland), 27th in terms of price gap, and 16th in terms of effective rate (i.e. sum of implicit and explicit carbon prices). We further find that implicit carbon prices dominate explicit ones for most countries, notably in road transport, whereas the reverse holds for industrial and electricity sectors. Combining our findings with recent empirical evidence for carbon-pricing effectiveness highlights the potential of the instrument to combat climate change, provided implementation is improved and internationally harmonized. Shifting the attention from advertised to average carbon prices might help in this regard.     

关税变化对中国贸易碳排放的影响研究北大核心CSCD

为了适应气候变化,中国作为世界上产生碳排放最多的国家,正在从多方面制定减少碳排放的计划,并提出了2060年实现碳中和的目标。随着贸易全球化,全球其他国家消费的排放越来越多地在中国生产。国家间的贸易条件受政策影响很大,关税的高低会导致商品的贸易出现变化,进而导致进出口商品包含排放的变化。本文结合中美两国的贸易冲突,对中美两国加征关税后的贸易变化进行模拟,结合全球贸易分析模型的结果与投入产出分析法,定量地研究了关税变动后中国进出口隐含排放的变化。研究发现,在中美加征关税后,中美两国的贸易量大幅减少,并导致两国贸易涉及的排放变少,而中国向世界出口的排放反而有所增加。另外,由于进口市场被冲击,中国从全世界进口的排放明显变少,进而导致中国净出口的碳排放在加征关税后变多,且集中于能源密集型产业。从结果看,中国在贸易受限的情况下依旧向世界出口了大量排放,通过贸易合作来促进新能源产业的进步或许可以更好地解决减排需求。     

The future of the CDM: same same,but differentiated?

Policy-makers and scientists have raised concerns about the functioning of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), in particular regarding its low contribution to sustainable development, unbalanced regional and sectoral distribution of projects, and its limited contribution to global emission reductions. Differentiation between countries or project types has been proposed as a possible way forward to address these problems. An overview is provided of the different ways in which CDM differentiation could be implemented. The implications for the actors involved in the CDM are analysed, along with a quantitative assessment of the impacts on the carbon market, using bottom-up marginal abatement cost curves. The discounting of CDM credits, quota systems, or differentiated eligibility of countries could help to address several of the concerns raised. Preferential treatment may also make a limited contribution to achieving the aims of CDM differentiation by increasing opportunities for under-represented host countries. The impact on the carbon market appears to be limited for most options.     

Time to market in the CDM: variation over project characteristics and time

Not only is the carbon market inundated with Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) issued by successful projects, it is also littered with failed projects, that is, projects that either fail to be registered under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) or projects that have been successfully registered but fail to issue CERs. By relying on a novel application of survival analysis in the context of the CDM, this article shows that half of all projects that start the Global Stakeholder Process fail to issue CERs, while the other half have a median time to market of four years. Furthermore, it is shown that some of the best projects, in terms of being additional, are those that are least likely to make it to market, whereas some of the worst projects, in terms of not being additional, are the ones that are most likely to make it to market. This presents a fundamental challenge for the CDM and future offset schemes that rely on the same design as the CDM. In contrast with previous studies, it is shown that, when project characteristics are controlled for, not all durations measured along the CDM project cycle have increased over time.

Policy relevance

This article develops a novel method for analysing durations measured along the CDM project cycle that avoids the biases of previous studies, and corrects for some misconceptions of what the delays faced by CDM projects are and how these delays have changed over time. Developing an understanding of the delays is important in order not to draw the wrong lessons from the CDM experience. As the leading example of an offset scheme, both in terms of geographical scope and sectoral coverage, and some would say institutional complexity, the CDM serves as a benchmark and reference for all future offset schemes, among others, for the New Market Mechanisms (NMMs) and the Chinese domestic offset programme. While the NMMs are still very much in development, China has announced that it will rely on the methodologies and procedures developed under the CDM for generating offsets for their regional carbon trading schemes.     

Post-2012 CDM multi-criteria analysis of industries in six Asian countries: Iranian case study

The prospects of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and for carbon income, up to and beyond 2012, in the industrial sectors of Iran and five other Asian countries are investigated. The attractiveness and suitability of each host country, the status of their industrial sectors (based on four post-2012 scenarios), and the post-2012 potential of the CDM (or similar carbon projects) in these sectors are all examined. A multi-criteria analysis of Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, China, and India, based on seven sets of criteria (institutional, regulatory, economic, political, social, CDM experience, and energy production/consumption), is conducted, and the post-2012 potential carbon incomes of each country – based on CO₂e emissions of industrial processes – are calculated. Finally, the Iranian industrial sector and the impact of deregulation of energy prices are examined. The post-2012 potential savings in the Iranian industrial sector are calculated based on energy savings, carbon income, and environmental savings. The results indicate that there is strong demand for investment and new technology in this sector to combat several-fold energy price increases. Moreover, high-priced carbon credits could play a meaningful role in post-2012 energy policies in this sector.

Policy relevance

This research is the first study to quantify the carbon market potentials in the industrial sectors of the selected Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) members. The Kyoto Protocol is considered by most OPEC countries to be a mixed bag of threats and opportunities and they have shown ambivalence towards it, mainly due to the threat a reduction of fossil fuel consumption poses to their economies. On the other hand, energy efficiency is a desirable goal for their industrial sectors. Iran, as an OPEC member country with vast energy resources, has mostly ignored the CDM during the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and has performed poorly on CDM implementation. However, the current deregulation of energy prices in Iran, with profound cuts in energy subsidies, would definitely alter the perspective of its industrial decision makers on the post-2012 carbon potentials.     

Past as prologue: an innovation-diffusion approach to additionality

The ‘additionality’ criterion for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (which is key to ensuring that CDM projects lead to real and additional emission reductions) has been a topic of much analysis and discussion. A number of different approaches, including those based on financial, barrier and market-penetration criteria, have been suggested as a test for additionality. A simple test for additionality is proposed that draws on the framework of the diffusion of innovations, especially the risk profile of adopters of new technologies or innovations. This approach has the potential to streamline the assessment for additionality, although it will require data on the rate of implementation of specific technologies or innovations.     

Experts talk the future Reflections on the Bonn Seminar of Governmental Experts, 16–17 May 2005: a view from Europe

Abstract

This article provides a first-cut estimate of the potential impacts of the clean development mechanism (CDM) on electricity generation and carbon emissions in the power sector of non-Annex 1 countries. We construct four illustrative CDM regimes that represent a range of approaches under consideration within the climate community. We examine the impact of these CDM regimes on investments in new generation, under illustrative carbon trading prices of US$ 10 and 100/t C. In the cases that are most conducive to CDM activity, roughly 94% of new generation investments remains identical to the without-CDM situation, with only 6% shifting from higher to lower carbon intensity technologies.We estimate that the CDM would bolster renewable energy generation by as little as 15% at US$ 10/t C, or as much as 300% at US$ 100/t C.

A striking finding comes from our examination of the potential magnitude of the “free-rider” problem, i.e. crediting of activities that will occur even in the absence of the CDM. The CDM is intended to be globally carbon-neutral—a project reduces emissions in the host country but generates credits that increase emissions in the investor country. However, to the extent that unwarranted credits are awarded to non-additional projects, the CDM would increase global carbon emissions above the without-CDM emissions level. Under two of the CDM regimes considered, cumulative free-riders credits total 250–600 MtC through the end of the first budget period in 2012. This represents 10–23% of the likely OECD emissions reduction requirement during the first budget period. Since such a magnitude of free-rider credits from non-additional CDM projects could threaten the environmental integrity of the Kyoto protocol, it is imperative that policy makers devise CDM rules that encourage legitimate projects, while effectively screening out non-additional activities.     

A two-track CDM: improved incentives for sustainable development and offset production

The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has been criticized in the literature for encouraging a focus on offset production (OP) at the expense of achieving or encouraging sustainable development (SD). It is argued that one explanation for this is that there is no commonly agreed definition of SD and, moreover, the priority of CDM project developers is often to produce cost-effective OP. Many of the proposals to address these drawbacks are not politically feasible. It is argued that the CDM should be split into a two-track mechanism, with one track for offset production and the other for offset production with an emphasis on sustainable development benefits. This would enable the political deadlock to be broken, allow the inclusion of SD benefits in the price mechanism itself, and allow both SD and OP objectives to be simultaneously achieved.

Policy relevance

The CDM has been criticized for failing to achieve its sustainable development objective, for verification problems regarding the mitigation effects of projects’ emissions, for being complex and bureaucratic, and for the very limited participation by the least developed countries. Given the adoption of a second period of the Kyoto Protocol and the discussion of new market mechanisms in the context of negotiating a new global climate agreement to be adopted in 2015, it is time to explore the ways in which the CDM might be reformed. A two-track version of the CDM is proposed, with one track focused on credit (offset) production and the other track focused on sustainable development. This system could improve the incentive for achieving sustainable development, reduce the uncertainty regarding whether real emissions reductions have been achieved, and be attractive to both developing and industrialized countries.     

Tenders: an option for developing countries to support renewable energies under the CDM

Abstract

Renewable energy sources are generally considered as an important tool on the way towards sustainable development. However, if developing countries want to actively promote renewable energies, they may need to face the problem that current legislation conflicts with the clean development mechanism (CDM) rules, and especially with the additionality concept. Thus, CDM projects may become impossible to implement. This article presents an approach to overcoming these potential difficulties. One solution lies in offering a tender specifically for RE-CDM-projects.