Forestry Projects under the Clean Development Mechanism?

Afforestation is considered an important option for mitigation of greenhousegas emissions. Recently, plantation projects have been suggested for inclusionunder the Clean Development Mechanism. While considered a cheap option,significant uncertainties make it difficult to determine the (net) carbonbenefits and profitability of forestry projects. The current uncertaintiesabout the regulatory framework of the CDM and the environmental and economicperformance of plantation forestry could create uncertainties with respect tothe additionality of such projects and thus their acceptance under themechanism.Six plantation forestry projects that were proposed in Brazil have been usedas cases to study sources of uncertainty for carbon benefits and economics forsuch projects. These cases vary widely in terms of productivity and productsdelivered. A quantitative model for calculating greenhouse gas balances andfinancial benefits and costs, taking a broad range of variables into account,was developed. Data from the developers of the proposed projects was used asmain source material. Subsequently, scenario's were evaluated, containingdifferent and realistic options for baseline vegetation, carbon creditingsystems and CDM modalities, fluctuations in product prices, discount rates andcarbon prices.The real cost of combined carbon sequestration and substitution for the caseprojects was below $3 per ton of carbon avoided, when based exclusivelyon data supplied by project developers. However, potential variations incarbon impact and costs based on scenario options were very large. Differentbaseline vegetation or adopting a different discount rate cause carbon creditsto vary by as much as an order of magnitude. Different carbon crediting systemsor fluctuations in (commodity) product prices cause variations up to200% in carbon credits and NPV. This makes the additionality of suchprojects difficult to determine. Five of the six case projects seem uneligiblefor development under the CDM. A critical attitude towards the use ofplantation projects under the CDM seems justified.     

Experts talk the future Reflections on the Bonn Seminar of Governmental Experts, 16–17 May 2005: a view from Europe

Abstract

This article provides a first-cut estimate of the potential impacts of the clean development mechanism (CDM) on electricity generation and carbon emissions in the power sector of non-Annex 1 countries. We construct four illustrative CDM regimes that represent a range of approaches under consideration within the climate community. We examine the impact of these CDM regimes on investments in new generation, under illustrative carbon trading prices of US$ 10 and 100/t C. In the cases that are most conducive to CDM activity, roughly 94% of new generation investments remains identical to the without-CDM situation, with only 6% shifting from higher to lower carbon intensity technologies.We estimate that the CDM would bolster renewable energy generation by as little as 15% at US$ 10/t C, or as much as 300% at US$ 100/t C.

A striking finding comes from our examination of the potential magnitude of the “free-rider” problem, i.e. crediting of activities that will occur even in the absence of the CDM. The CDM is intended to be globally carbon-neutral—a project reduces emissions in the host country but generates credits that increase emissions in the investor country. However, to the extent that unwarranted credits are awarded to non-additional projects, the CDM would increase global carbon emissions above the without-CDM emissions level. Under two of the CDM regimes considered, cumulative free-riders credits total 250–600 MtC through the end of the first budget period in 2012. This represents 10–23% of the likely OECD emissions reduction requirement during the first budget period. Since such a magnitude of free-rider credits from non-additional CDM projects could threaten the environmental integrity of the Kyoto protocol, it is imperative that policy makers devise CDM rules that encourage legitimate projects, while effectively screening out non-additional activities.     

Characteristics of forest carbon credit transactions in the voluntary carbon market

The voluntary carbon market allows participants to go beyond regulatory carbon offsetting. Recent developments have improved the transparency and credibility of voluntary carbon trading, and forest carbon credit transactions constitute more than half of trade volume. Its workings, however, have not been sufficiently explored in the literature. This study analyses the characteristics of forest carbon credit transactions in the voluntary carbon market using frequency analysis and logistic regression analysis. The results reveal that the co-benefits of forest carbon projects are an important factor influencing carbon credit transactions. From the higher transaction ratio of credits from CCB Standards-labelled projects and projects using co-benefit-oriented standards, it can be inferred that credits with potential for co-benefits (e.g. fostered corporate social responsibility, social cohesion of local communities and voluntary leadership, and positive environmental impacts) are preferred to those focusing exclusively on emission reduction in the voluntary carbon market. The findings of this study suggest that developing co-benefits is important for strengthening the market competitiveness of forest carbon credits in the voluntary carbon market. Additionally, unlike the compliance carbon market, in the voluntary carbon market stringent carbon standards do not always guarantee credit transaction performance.

POLICY RELEVANCE

After UNFCCC COP-21, the global society agreed to acknowledge various forms of international carbon crediting mechanisms, and noted the significance of greenhouse gas emissions reduction for sustainable development and environmental integrity through the Paris Agreement. Moreover, the agreement encouraged both REDD+ activities in developing countries and supports from developed countries. Additionally, co-benefits of forest carbon projects are important for credit transaction in the global voluntary carbon market. Under the new climate regime, co-benefits of forest carbon projects are expected to gain attention in the carbon market. To promote the social, economic, and environmental co-benefits of forest carbon projects, the introduction of an objective co-benefit assessment and certification system should be reviewed at the national level.     

Cleaner generation,free-riders,and environmental integrity: clean development mechanism and the power sector

This article provides a first-cut estimate of the potential impacts of the clean development mechanism (CDM) on electricity generation and carbon emissions in the power sector of non-Annex 1 countries. We construct four illustrative CDM regimes that represent a range of approaches under consideration within the climate community. We examine the impact of these CDM regimes on investments in new generation, under illustrative carbon trading prices of US$ 10 and 100/t C. In the cases that are most conducive to CDM activity, roughly 94% of new generation investments remains identical to the without-CDM situation, with only 6% shifting from higher to lower carbon intensity technologies. We estimate that the CDM would bolster renewable energy generation by as little as 15% at US$ 10/t C, or as much as 300% at US$ 100/t C.A striking finding comes from our examination of the potential magnitude of the “free-rider” problem, i.e. crediting of activities that will occur even in the absence of the CDM. The CDM is intended to be globally carbon-neutral — a project reduces emissions in the host country but generates credits that increase emissions in the investor country. However, to the extent that unwarranted credits are awarded to non-additional projects, the CDM would increase global carbon emissions above the without-CDM emissions level. Under two of the CDM regimes considered, cumulative free-riders credits total 250–600 Mt C through the end of the first budget period in 2012. This represents 10–23% of the likely OECD emissions reduction requirement during the first budget period. Since such a magnitude of free-rider credits from non-additional CDM projects could threaten the environmental integrity of the Kyoto protocol, it is imperative that policy makers devise CDM rules that encourage legitimate projects, while effectively screening out non-additional activities.     

Reducing carbon transaction costs in community-based forest management

Abstract

The article considers the potential for community-based forest management (of existing forests) in developing countries, as a future CDM strategy, to sequester and mitigate carbon and to claim credits in future commitment periods. This kind of forestry is cost-effective, and should bring many more benefits to local populations than do afforestation and reforestation, thus contributing more strongly to sustainable development. However, community forest management projects are small-scale, and the transaction costs associated with justifying them as climate projects are likely to be high. A research project being carried out in five developing countries is testing carbon measurement and monitoring methods which can be carried out by community members with very little formal education, which should greatly reduce these transaction costs. Using hand-held computers with GIS capability and attached GPS, villagers with 4 years of primary education are able to accurately map their forest resource and input biomass data from sample plots into a program which calculates carbon values.     

Estimating the CDM market under the Marrakech Accords

Abstract

The agreement on implementation of the Kyoto Protocol achieved at COP7 in Marrakech has important implications for investment in greenhouse gas emission reduction projects in developing countries through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The required actual emission reductions for participating Annex B countries overall will be relatively small, as the United States do not intend to ratify the protocol and significant amounts of carbon sequestered in domestic sinks can be credited. In addition, the potential supply of surplus emission permits (hot air) from Russia and other economies in transition may be as high as total demand in the first commitment period. Thus, even under restraint of hot air sellers, CDM demand will be limited, and a low demand, low price carbon market scenario appears likely.

The magnitude of the CDM will be influenced by a host of factors both on the demand and the supply-side. We analyse these using a quantitative model of the global carbon market, based on marginal abatement cost curves. Implementation and transaction costs, as well as baseline and additionality rules affect the CDM's share in the carbon market. Demand for the CDM is sensitive to changes in business-as-usual emissions growth in participating Annex B countries, and also to crediting for additional sinks. Permit supply from Russia and other economies in transition is possibly the most crucial factor in the carbon market.     

The contribution of forest carbon credit projects to addressing the climate change challenge

This article addresses the question of how forestry projects, given the recently improved standards for the accounting of carbon sequestration, can benefit from existing and emerging carbon markets in the world. For a long time, forestry projects have been set up for the purpose of generating carbon credits. They were surrounded by uncertainties about the permanence of carbon sequestration in trees, potential replacement of deforestation due to projects (leakage), and how and what to measure as sequestered carbon. Through experience with Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) forestry projects, albeit limited, and with forestry projects in voluntary carbon markets, considerable improvements have been made with accounting of carbon sequestration in forests, resulting in a more solid basis for carbon credit trading. The scope of selling these credits exists both in compliance markets, although currently with strong limitations, and in voluntary markets for offsetting emissions with carbon credits. Improved carbon accounting methods for forestry investments can also enhance the scope for forestry in the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) that countries must prepare under the Paris Agreement.

POLICY RELEVANCE

This article identifies how forestry projects can contribute to climate change mitigation. Forestry projects have addressed a number of challenges, like reforestation, afforestation on degraded lands, and long-term sustainable forest management. An interesting new option for forestry carbon projects could be the NDCs under the Paris Agreement in December 2015. Initially, under CDM and JI, the number of forestry projects was far below that for renewable energy projects. With the adoption of the Paris Agreement, both developed and developing countries have agreed on NDCs for country-specific measures on climate change mitigation, and increased the need for investing in new measures. Over the years, considerable experience has been built up with forestry projects that fix CO₂ over a long-term period. Accounting rules are nowadays at a sufficient level for the large potential of forestry projects to deliver a reliable, additional contribution towards reducing or halting emissions from deforestation and forest degradation activities worldwide.     

Estimating the CDM market under the Marrakech Accords

The agreement on implementation of the Kyoto Protocol achieved at COP7 in Marrakech has important implications for investment in greenhouse gas emission reduction projects in developing countries through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The required actual emission reductions for participating Annex B countries overall will be relatively small, as the United States do not intend to ratify the protocol and significant amounts of carbon sequestered in domestic sinks can be credited. In addition, the potential supply of surplus emission permits (hot air) from Russia and other economies in transition may be as high as total demand in the first commitment period. Thus, even under restraint of hot air sellers, CDM demand will be limited, and a low demand, low price carbon market scenario appears likely.The magnitude of the CDM will be influenced by a host of factors both on the demand and the supply-side. We analyse these using a quantitative model of the global carbon market, based on marginal abatement cost curves. Implementation and transaction costs, as well as baseline and additionality rules affect the CDM’s share in the carbon market. Demand for the CDM is sensitive to changes in business-as-usual emissions growth in participating Annex B countries, and also to crediting for additional sinks. Permit supply from Russia and other economies in transition is possibly the most crucial factor in the carbon market.     

Linking the CDM with domestic carbon markets

Certified emission reductions (CERs) from Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects have traditionally served as an indirect link between cap and trade systems around the world. However, since 2010, import restrictions have increased. Reasons for import limitations include the supplementarity principle, genuine concerns about the environmental integrity of CERs and social benefits of CDM projects, pressure from domestic emissions mitigation industries, concerns about competition in the industries in which reductions take place, as well as the attempt to pressure advanced developing countries to accept national emissions commitments under a future international climate policy regime. It is shown that import limitations lead to a decrease in CER prices and a race to generate CERs as quickly as possible. Such effects are visible in the CDM market after the EU announced its import limitations. The exclusion of CERs from specific project types will distort the CDM supply curve and increase the CER price unless the marginal abatement costs of the excluded project type are above the CER world market price. Similarly, exclusion of CERs from specific host countries will increase the price. Substantial differences are found in CER access to national carbon markets around the world.Policy relevanceCDM regulators could try to improve access of CERs to cap and trade schemes through improvements to additionality testing, standardizing baseline and monitoring methodologies and stakeholder consultation. However, regulators should be aware that standardization is no panacea, and controversies may resurface if standardized additionality determination (e.g. through benchmarks or positive lists) are applied for a certain period and found to be problematic. However, domestic policy concerns such as an unwillingness to send money abroad to buy credits, an inability to control market prices, and competitiveness impacts cannot be resolved by CDM reforms. If, despite such reforms of the CDM, blatant protectionism continues, a challenge before the World Trade Organisation (WTO) could be launched to stop discrimination of service exports from specific countries.     

Replacing carbon lost from forests: an assessment of insurance,reserves, and expiring credits

Abstract

Concern over the “non-permanence” or reversibility of carbon sequestration projects has been prominent in discussions over how to develop guidelines for forest project investments under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol. Accordingly, a number of approaches have been proposed that aim to help ensure that parties do not receive credit for carbon that is lost before project obligations are fulfilled. These approaches include forest carbon insurance, land reserves, and issuance of expiring credits. The potential costs of each of these different approaches are evaluated using a range of assumptions about project length, risk and discount rate, and a comparison of costs is ventured based on the estimated reduction in value of these credits compared with uninsured, and permanent credits. Obstacles to participation in the different approaches are discussed related to problems of long-term commitments, project scale, rising replacement costs, and low credit value. It is concluded that a system of expiring credits, which could be coupled with insurance or reserves, could guarantee obligations that span time-scales longer than that of conventional insurance policies while maintaining incentives for long-term sequestration.     

Should the use of standardized baselines in the CDM be mandatory?

There has been considerable debate on the merits of standardized baselines (SBLs) in the clean development mechanism (CDM), and how such baselines could reduce transaction costs for CDM projects. It has not been considered whether the voluntary versus mandatory use of SBLs by CDM project developers can affect the environmental integrity of the CDM. An example is given in which SBLs are applied to a homogeneous output industry in order to illustrate how the voluntary use of SBLs could lead – even with relatively stringent benchmarks – to over-crediting of emission reduction credits.     

Can the EU emission trading scheme support CDM forestry?

Abstract

The European Commission is mandated to consider the inclusion of credits from land-use projects under the clean development mechanism (CDM) and joint implementation (JI), beginning with the second period of the European Union's emission trading scheme (ETS) in its report due in July 2006. Temporary credits from afforestation and reforestation under the CDM are seen by many as posing a technical problem for their use under the ETS. This article summarizes three feasible, efficient and environmentally sound alternatives for achieving the integration of such temporary credits in the European emissions trading market starting in 2008. The first proposal integrates tCERs and lCERs (temporary credits) into the EU ETS by allowing for their direct use for compliance purposes. The second proposal builds on the idea of swapping temporary credits for EU allowances (EUAs) by Member States. The third proposal would not require a political decision at the EU level. Instead supportive Member States or private carbon fund operators would agree to swap temporary credits for the CERs or ERUs they hold in their accounts. All three solutions would be linked to a risk-mitigation strategy based on levying a fee or fixing an exchange rate, which would allow governments to hedge the risk of losing temporary credits.     

Temporary sequestration credits: an instrument for carbon bears

Abstract

Temporary crediting of carbon storage is an instrument that allows entities with emissions reductions obligations to defer some obligations for a fixed period of time. This instrument provides a means of guaranteeing the environmental integrity of a carbon sequestration project. But because the user of the temporary credit takes on the liability of renewing it, or replacing it with a permanent credit, the temporary credit must sell at a discount compared to a permanent credit. We show that this discount depends on the expected change in price of a permanent credit. Temporary credits have value only if restrictions on carbon emissions are not expected to tighten substantially. The intuition is illustrated by assessing the value of a hypothetical temporary sulfur dioxide sequestration credit, using historical data on actual SO₂ allowance prices.     

Biological carbon sequestration and carbon trading re-visited

Biological activities that sequester carbon create CO₂ offset credits that could obviate the need for reductions in fossil fuel use. Credits are earned by storing carbon in terrestrial ecosystems and wood products, although CO₂ emissions are also mitigated by delaying deforestation, which accounts for one-quarter of anthropogenic CO₂ emissions. However, non-permanent carbon offsets from biological activities are difficult to compare with each other and with emissions reduction because they differ in how long they prevent CO₂ from entering the atmosphere. This is the duration problem. It results in uncertainty and makes it hard to determine the legitimacy of biological activities in mitigating climate change. Measuring, verifying and monitoring the carbon sequestered in sinks greatly increases transaction costs and leads to rent seeking by sellers of dubious sink credits. While biological sink activities undoubtedly help mitigate climate change and should not be neglected, it is shown that there are limits to the substitutability between temporary offset credits from these activities and emissions reduction, and that this has implications for carbon trading. A possible solution to inherent incommensurability between temporary and permanent credits is also suggested.     

Replacing carbon lost from forests: an assessment of insurance, reserves, and expiring credits

Concern over the “non-permanence” or reversibility of carbon sequestration projects has been prominent in discussions over how to develop guidelines for forest project investments under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol. Accordingly, a number of approaches have been proposed that aim to help ensure that parties do not receive credit for carbon that is lost before project obligations are fulfilled. These approaches include forest carbon insurance, land reserves, and issuance of expiring credits. The potential costs of each of these different approaches are evaluated using a range of assumptions about project length, risk and discount rate, and a comparison of costs is ventured based on the estimated reduction in value of these credits compared with uninsured, and permanent credits. Obstacles to participation in the different approaches are discussed related to problems of long-term commitments, project scale, rising replacement costs, and low credit value. It is concluded that a system of expiring credits, which could be coupled with insurance or reserves, could guarantee obligations that span time-scales longer than that of conventional insurance policies while maintaining incentives for long-term sequestration.     

Transaction costs of the Kyoto Mechanisms

Transaction costs will reduce the attractiveness of the Kyoto Mechanisms compared to domestic abatement options. Especially the project-based mechanisms Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) are likely to entail considerable costs of baseline development, verification and certification. The Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) pilot phase and the Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) programme give indications about the level of these costs. Under current estimates of world market prices for greenhouse gas emission permits, projects with annual emission reductions of less than 50,000 t CO₂ equivalent are unlikely to be viable; for micro projects transaction costs can reach several hundred € per t CO₂ equivalent. Thus, the Marrakech Accord rule to have special rules for small scale CDM projects makes sense, even if the thresholds chosen advantage certain project types; projects below 1000 t CO₂ equivalent per year should get further exemptions. An alternative solution with no risk for the environmental credibility of the projects would be to subsidise baseline setting and charge lower, subsidised fees for small projects for the different steps of the CDM/second track JI project cycle.     

Application of the Multiple Benchmark System (MBS) to selected case study projects

Abstract

Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) have been established under the Kyoto Protocol as project-based instruments to mitigate greenhouse gases of the industrialized countries to the levels imposed by their Kyoto commitments. An unresolved issue associated with the implementation of these two flexibility mechanisms, concerns the choice of the appropriate baseline for calculating the emission reductions in JI or CDM projects. This article describes a computerized tool that constructs and compares different types of standardized baselines and benchmarks. The analysis focuses on the suitability of several different types of benchmarks for assessing the emission reductions of certain types of projects. The analysis is also expanded into a discussion of the extent to which benchmarks reduce the crediting of non-additional projects and limit the risk of missed additional investments. This tool has been applied to actual JI and CDM projects in the Russian Federation and Indonesia.     

Trading biomass or GHG emission credits?

Global biomass potentials are considerable but unequally distributed over the world. Countries with Kyoto targets could import biomass to substitute for fossil fuels or invest in bio-energy projects in the country of biomass origin and buy the credits (Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI)). This study analyzes which of those options is optimal for transportation fuels and looks for the key variables that influence the result. In two case studies (Mozambique and Brazil), the two trading systems are compared for the amount of credits generated, land-use and associated costs. We found costs of 17–30 euro per ton of carbon for the Brazilian case and economic benefits of 11 to 60 euros per ton of carbon avoided in the Mozambique case. The impact of carbon changes related to direct land-use changes was found to be very significant (both positive and negative) and can currently only be included in emission credit trading, which can largely influence the results. In order to avoid indirect land-use changes (leakage) and consequent GHG emissions, it is crucial that bioenergy crop production is done in balance with improvements of management of agriculture and livestock management. Whatever trading option is economically most attractive depends mainly on the emission baseline in the exporting (emission credit trading) or importing (physical trading) country since both bio- and fossil fuel prices are world market prices in large scale trading systems where transportation costs are low. Physical trading could be preferential since besides the GHG reduction one could also benefit from the energy. It could also generate considerable income sources for exporting countries. This study could contribute to the development of a methodology to deal with bio fuels for transport, in Emission Trading (ET), CDM and the certification of traded bio fuels.     

Carbon Accounting and Cost Estimation in Forestry Projects Using CO2Fix V.3

Carbon and financial accounting of projects in the Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry sector is a topic of hot debate. Large uncertainty remains concerning the carbon dynamics, the way they should be accounted and the cost efficiency of the projects. Part of the uncertainty can be alleviated by standardisation and transparency of reporting methods. For this reason we further developed CO₂FIX, a forest ecosystem carbon model, with modules for carbon and financial accounting. The model is applied to four cases: 1) Joint implementation afforestation project in Romania, 2) Forest management project in Central Europe, 3) Reduced impact logging possibly under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in the future, and 4) Afforestation with native species under the Clean Development Mechanism. The results show the wide applicability of CO₂FIX, from degrading grasslands as baseline cases to multiple cohort forest ecosystems. Also the results show that Forest Management in the European case can generate considerable amounts of carbon emission reductions. Further, the results show that although reduced impact logging is not yet an allowed option under the Clean Development Mechanism, it shows promising results in that it is 1) very cost effective, 2) seems to be able to generate intermediate amounts of credits and 3) seems to us as a project type that is not prone to leakage issues. These results are yet another indication to seriously consider reduced impact logging as an eligible measure under the CDM.     

Carbon accounting for sinks in the CDM after CoP-9

Abstract

The role of sinks in the clean development mechanism (CDM) has been a subject of controversy for several reasons; one being that temporary carbon storage in forests appeared to prevent any opportunity to use them as an option to reduce permanent greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In Milan (December 2003), the Conference of the Parties (CoP) decided to address this problem by introducing two types of expiring units: temporary CERs (tCERs) and long-term CERs (lCERs). Countries committed to emission reductions may acquire these units to temporarily offset their emissions and thus to postpone permanent emission reductions. As further decided by the CoP, baseline emissions of GHGs and the enhancement of sinks outside the project boundary will not be accounted for in the calculation of tCERs or lCERs. The contribution of CDM-sink projects to GHG emissions abatement will therefore be greater than what will be credited to them. On the other hand, permanent GHG emissions that may result as a consequence of the implementation of sink project activities are treated as non-permanent. If these emissions are above avoided baseline emissions, CDM-sinks will result in net increases of GHG emissions into the atmosphere. After briefly reassessing the non-permanence problem, this article explains how tCERs and lCERs should be quantified according to Decision 19/CP.9 of CoP-9 and how calculations are implemented in the forthcoming software CO₂ Land. Using a simple numerical example, it illustrates how the GHG accounting rule adopted at CoP-9 may result in net increases of GHG emissions. In the conclusion, a possible solution to this problem is proposed.