Benchmark-based allocations in EU ETS Phase 3: an early assessment

Phase 3 of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS; 2013–2020) sees the introduction of new rules governing the free allocations of emissions allowances given to energy-intensive industries. In contrast to Phases 1 and 2, allocations will be based on historical production multiplied by best available emissions technology benchmarks. This article exploits an original database to provide a first analysis of the distributional and economic efficiency implications of the new rules. It is shown empirically that the new allocation rules reduce the scope for windfall gains by EU ETS firms while also effectively mitigating carbon leakage risks, even assuming optimistic forecasts of Phase 3 carbon prices. The example of the cement sector is used to show that benchmarking significantly improves the harmonization of the levels of free allocations to competing firms throughout the EU compared to Phase 2. However, it is also found that the use of ex ante output levels to determine allocations still leaves considerable scope for windfall gains and possible distortions of the internal market.     

Emissions trading and competitiveness: lessons from Germany

Germany's National Allocation Plans (NAP I and NAP II) for implementing the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) are critically analysed. Emissions trading has created a new scarcity, and grandfathering constitutes a subsidy that is used to reach additional policy goals related to energy and distribution policy. With respect to energy policy, the objective was to protect the German coal industry; but in terms of distribution policy the hidden agenda was to allocate as many emissions allowances as possible to the industries involved. The whole discussion is based on the false premise that a generous, or at least ‘needs-based’, allocation of costless emissions allowances increases an industry's competitiveness. As a consequence, NAP I is overburdened with several complex special rules and exemptions which distort the incentive effect of emissions trading, thus making climate change mitigation in Germany more costly than necessary. The attempted continuation of this policy, in particular with regard to new installations and an over-generous cap, has led to the European Commission's rejection of these rules in the German NAP II in November 2006. Despite significant improvements since then, some important shortfalls remain. Unfortunately, the economic literature available on this topic refers to highly stylized models of allocation rules and neglects the concrete details of the German NAP II. This article tries to close this gap in the literature by analysing the most distorting rules as well as the most important and arguments of the misguided debate on competitiveness.     

A decision aid tool for equity issues analysis in emission permit allocations

Abstract

In the long term, the Kyoto Protocol will be insufficient to stabilize the greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere; quantified commitments will also be essential for major developing countries (and the US). International cooperation mechanisms, such as permit trading systems, can help achieve global economic efficiency. However, the initial allocation of emission permits raises many debates on equity. The main objective is to propose a decision aid tool for decision makers, which is capable of providing relevant information on various equitable permit allocation schemes and burden sharing. A dynamic multicriteria model is proposed to share the global quantity of permits among 15 regions, taking into account multiple definitions of equity and regional interests. The World-MARKAL energy model is used to compute the gross reduction cost (before permit exchanges) for each region. Afterward, it is possible to calculate their net reduction costs (after permit exchanges) according to different allocation schemes. A realistic simulation of the tool provides examples of results, i.e. ranges of permit allocations and net costs for each region. Finally, some recommendations are proposed to policy makers to design a decision process adapted to the global context of negotiations.     

Protecting “First world” markets and “Third world” nature: The politics of illegal logging in Australia,the European Union and the United States

Global forest governance has recently seen the emergence of a timber legality regime. In an aim to regulate global timber trade flows, the US, the EU and Australia adopted laws prohibiting illegally harvested timber from entering their markets. While some view this as a milestone for environmental and social stewardship in the global forest sector, the effects of the regime remain contested.In order to better understand likely effects of the regime, we apply the Discursive Agency Approach to analyze discursive dynamics of policy making among the stakeholders involved in the creation of each law and their effects on governance design and implementation.Based on 120 interviews in the US, Australia, the EU and with global organizations/institutions, as well as 19 informal conversations, 300 documents, and participant observation data, our results show that legality is a powerful concept in forest governance. Drawing attention away from sustainability, it enables discursive divides between the global North and South as well as between wood producers and importers. These divides were crucial for the emergence of the legality regime. While some forest industry groups perceived the new laws as an opportunity, others saw them as a threat. In all three regions this led to coalitions between supportive industry factions and environmental groups. These coalitions were based on a complementarity of goals; environmentalists aimed to protect “Third World” forests while industry groups aimed to protect “First World” markets against growing competition from these former regions. Yet each coalition was composed differently and employed distinct – albeit related – discursive strategies in policy making. This affected the design of each law and its implementation. The shift from sustainability towards legality re-surfaces prominently in implementation. Stakeholder discussions range from coercive “threatening” to more learning-oriented “educating” approaches. We conclude by discussing the effects these discursive struggles in Australia, the EU and the US have on the global timber legality regime.     

Historic versus output-based allocation of GHG tradable allowances: a comparison

Two ways of allocating greenhouse gas (GHG) allowances are compared: historic allocation (HA) based solely on past information, and output-based allocation (OBA) based on an allocation proportional to the current output level. The advantages and problems of each allocation method are considered and compared. It is essential to distinguish the sectors sheltered from international competition (e.g. power generation) from the exposed sectors. In the sheltered sectors, OBA entails a much higher overall cost because it provides too little incentive to reduce the production of the polluting goods. HA does not suffer from this drawback but its distributional impact is highly unfair. Hence in these sectors neither of these two ways of freely allocating allowances can be supported, and auctioning should be favoured. However, in the exposed sectors, OBA is an option worth considering because it reduces carbon leakage, although it also suffers from some drawbacks compared with auctioning.     

Distribution of emissions allowances as an opportunity

Much of the debate on climate policy in the USA focuses on the gain or loss to the macroeconomy of alternative policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. However, the economy is made up of multiple individuals, not a single representative agent. This article reports the results of alternative ways of distributing emissions allocations across citizens. Macroeconomic effects interact with the policy for distribution, but the distributional weights are more important for the welfare of individual agents than the economy-wide effects of the emissions reductions. Egalitarian distributions of the emissions allowances have the potential to increase the welfare of most people, even if significant emissions reductions are mandated. Focusing on the distribution of emissions allowances (or the revenues generated from an emissions tax) rather than on aggregate GDP may provide guidance in identifying and implementing politically viable solutions to the climate change mitigation problem.     

Certified emissions reductions and CDM limits: revenue and distributional aspects

The EU allows those installations that are subject to emissions trading to use a limited volume of certified emissions reductions (CERs), generated through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), to cover their own GHG emissions. These CERs can be used in addition to the EU allowances (EUAs), which were primarily allocated free to installations in Phase II of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) from 2008 to 2012. For the year 2008, the CER limits, which are differentiated by EU Member State, created substantial arbitrage rents (due to the CER-EUA spread) of approximately EU€250 million. Different options for the allocation of this rent are discussed and it is found that, according to economic theory, making the right to use CERs tradable or the regulator pre-committing to buying CERs at the level of the relevant limit reduces the inefficiencies connected to the current regulation. Furthermore, auctioning these CER usage rights shifts the rents created through the CER-EUA spread to the Member State itself. The improved design and implementation of CDM limits justifies EU policy makers intervening to correct previously competition-distorting choices.     

Allocating planetary boundaries to large economies: Distributional consequences of alternative perspectives on distributive fairness

The planetary boundaries (PBs) framework proposes global quantitative precautionary limits for human perturbation of nine critical Earth system processes. Together they define a global safe operating space for human development. Translating the global limits to the national level increases their policy relevance. Such translation essentially divides up the global safe operating space. What is considered fair distribution is a political decision and there is no globally agreed principle that can be applied. Here, we analyse the distributional consequences of alternative perspectives on distributive fairness. We scale the global limits of selected PBs to resource budgets for the EU, US, China and India, using three allocation approaches from the climate change literature. Furthermore, we compare the allocated budgets to 2010 environmental footprints of the four economies, to assess their performance with respect to the selected PBs. The allocation approaches are based on (1) current shares of global environmental pressure (‘grandfathering’); (2) ‘equal per capita’ shares, and (3) ‘ability to pay’ to reduce environmental pressure. The results show that the four economies are not living within the global safe operating space. Their 2010 environmental footprints are larger than the allocated budgets for all approaches and parameterisations analysed for the PBs for climate change and biogeochemical flows, and, except for India, also for the PB for biosphere integrity. Grandfathering was found to be most favourable for the EU and US for all PBs, and ability to pay as least favourable. For climate change and biogeochemical flows, ability to pay even resulted in negative resource budgets for the two economies. In contrast, for China and India, equal per capita allocation and ability to pay were most favourable. Results were sensitive to the parameterisation. Accounting for future population growth in the equal per capita approach benefits India, with lower budgets for the EU, US and China, while accounting for future economic growth in ability to pay benefits the EU and US, with lower budgets for China and India. Our results underline the need for all four economies to act, while hinting at diverging preferences for specific allocation approaches. The methodology and results may help countries to define policy targets in line with global ambitions, such as those defined by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), accounting for differences in countries’ circumstances and capacities. Further attention is required for PB-specific allocation approaches and integration of biophysical and socioeconomic considerations in the allocation.     

欧盟将民航运输纳入欧盟排放交易体系问题探析

按照欧盟法律,自2012年1月1日起在欧盟境内起降的航班排放将被纳入欧盟排放交易系统。通过详细解读欧盟这一法律,指出欧盟排放交易体系是典型的"上限-交易"系统,即通过规定排放上限与进行配额交易实现减排目标。欧盟此举本质目的是强化气候变化主导权,最终为经济谋利,加快完善欧盟碳交易市场以建设欧元货币权力体系。其结果可能引发其与《联合国气候变化框架公约》及《京都议定书》等国际法之间的法律冲突,购买配额将对民航运输发展造成制约,"可测量、可报告和可核实"将对发展中国家能力建设提出挑战,并将一定程度影响《联合国气候变化框架公约》下的行业减排谈判走向。     

Slovenia's climate policy efforts: CO2 tax and implementation of EU ETS

Slovenia is required to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to an average of 8% below the base year 1986 in the period 2008–2012, due to the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2002. It was the first of the transition countries to implement a CO₂ tax in 1997. At the beginning of 2005, Slovenia joined other EU Member States by implementing the Emissions Trading Scheme. In contrast with other new EU Member States, Slovenia will be a net buyer of allowances. Therefore future movements on the emissions market will play an important role in the compliance costs of achieving the Kyoto target. The main purpose of this article is to present the establishment and characteristics of the first national allocation plan (NAP1) and to describe the main elements of the second national allocation plan (NAP2) for Slovenia within the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, the expected movements on the emissions allowances market in Slovenia, the expected compliance cost of achieving the Kyoto target and to present the main characteristics and efficiency of the CO₂ tax in Slovenia.     

Benchmark-based emission allocation in a cap-and-trade system

Abstract

One of the important bottlenecks for the introduction of emission trading is how allowances should be distributed among the participants in a trading scheme. Both grandfathering on the basis of historic emissions and auctioning have important drawbacks. In this paper, we propose an allowance distribution rule based on benchmarking of production processes: each company's share in the total allowance is determined by its production level and a reference emission level per product. The scheme shows some important advantages compared to other schemes.     

Climate governance,justice, and transnational civil society

Justice dilemmas associated with climate change and the regulatory responses to it pose challenges for global governance, arguably hampering progress and raising concerns over efficacy and relevance. Scholarly literature suggests that transnational civil society groups can help address problems of governance and injustice that cross borders and pit states against each other. Findings of a comparative, qualitative study of climate justice advocacy suggest, however, that civil society groups' work in the US and EU is significantly shaped by institutional factors specific to those regimes, limiting advocates' broader impact. Moreover, political opportunities for the pursuit of climate action, and justice particularly, have diminished in those settings. By contrast, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) provides greater opportunities for discussions of justice, although civil society actors are significantly constrained within it. It is argued that greater roles for civil society in the UNFCCC could prove constructive in the face of current challenges connected with justice issues. Three themes in civil society advocacy linking principles of global justice with current climate policy debates are summarized. Finally, it is suggested that the first iteration of the UNFCCC Periodic Review provides timely opportunities to more fully draw upon civil society's potential contributions toward a fair and effective global climate regime.

Policy relevance

The roles of civil society organizations in climate governance were examined in three policy contexts: the UNFCCC, the US, and the EU, with special attention to advocacy addressing issues of equity and justice, identified as key challenges for a post-2012 global agreement. Findings suggest that (1) civil society roles are significantly constrained in each context, and (2) political opportunities for climate advocacy have diminished since 2009 in the US and EU, underlining (3) the continued salience of the UNFCCC as a forum for engagement and the construction of effective and equitable climate policy. Potential exists for increased civil society involvement at the UNFCCC to help resolve obstacles based in divergent national priorities. Three areas of justice-focused civil society activity are reviewed for current negotiation topics and the governance structure of the institution. The current UNFCCC Periodic Review is identified as an opportunity to increase civil society involvement.     

Cap setting and allowance allocation in China's emissions trading pilot programmes: special issues and innovative solutions

Seven emissions trading scheme (ETS) pilots have been established in China. They have introduced some unique methods to set emissions caps and allocate allowances, different from textbook models and their counterparts in the EU, California, and many other regions. This article provides a detailed introduction to the methods for cap setting and allowance allocation adopted by the pilots, and presents detailed comparisons of these methods. In terms of cap setting, the pilots adopt flexible caps that can be adjusted where necessary, which primarily depends on the outcomes of the bottom-up approach, namely aggregating the allowances allocated to participants. As for allowance allocation, the pilots not only adopt such methods as grandfathering and benchmarking, which are also widely applied in other existing schemes, but also some special methods that require ex post adjustment, such as those based on enterprises’ historical emissions intensity (including both physical quantity and added-value intensity) and current production/output. The factors influencing the design are further analysed, including the impacts of theory and experience from foreign systems, concerns about economic development, traditions regarding intensity targets and policy, constraints from data availability and preparation time, tight regulation of the electricity and heat generation sector, and concerns regarding price stability. The practice of pilots presents an improvement opportunity and a challenge for China to further balance the theoretical and practical requirements in ETS design in establishing its national system.

Policy relevance

China is piloting emissions trading in seven regions, as part of efforts to try to rely more on market-based instruments to achieve GHG emissions control targets. All seven pilots have been confronted with special issues in the design process when compared with existing foreign schemes. This article analyses in depth the special issues related to cap setting and allowance allocation and the approaches adopted to address these issues. Flexible cap setting through a bottom-up approach and different types of allocation methods with or without ex post adjustment are adopted in the pilots. The flexible and innovative approaches the pilots have developed could provide useful experience for designing the nationwide ETS in China and promoting emissions trading policy in other parts of the world.     

2℃温升目标下中国排放配额分析

本文以国际社会当前所有主要分配方案为基础,研究了2℃温升目标下中国2011-2050年间排放配额,通过控制变量进一步分析了配额分配对于主要参数设置的敏感性。研究结果表明,在与2℃目标相兼容的RCP2.6路径下,到2050年中国CO₂累计排放配额范围为150～440 Gt CO₂,基于等人均排放的分配方式已经变得最不利于中国。为维护合理的排放权益,在气候谈判中中国必须坚持对历史排放的完整追溯。全球排放路径的设定对中国配额也有着非常显著的影响,当2050年全球配额比2010年排放减少40%～50%时,中国在2℃目标下CO₂累计配额范围为151～474 Gt CO₂,当减少50%～60%时为138～478 Gt CO₂,构成中国配额公平范围下限的方案受排放路径的影响更大。     

On the regional distribution of mitigation costs in a global cap-and-trade regime

This paper analyzes the regional distribution of climate change mitigation costs in a global cap-and-trade regime. Four stylized burden-sharing rules are considered, ranging from GDP-based permit allocations to schemes that foresee a long-term convergence of per-capita emission permits. The comparison of results from three structurally different hybrid, integrated energy-economy models allows us to derive robust insights as well as identify sources of uncertainty with respect to the regional distribution of the costs of climate change mitigation. We find that regional costs of climate change mitigation may deviate substantially from the global mean. For all models, the mitigation cost average of the four scenarios is higher for China than for the other macro-regions considered. Furthermore, China suffers above-world-average mitigation costs for most burden-sharing rules in the long-term. A decomposition of mitigation costs into (a) primary (domestic) abatement costs and (b) permit trade effects, reveals that the large uncertainty about the future development of carbon prices results in substantial uncertainties about the financial transfers associated with carbon trade for a given allocation scheme. This variation also implies large uncertainty about the regional distribution of climate policy costs.     

碳成本传递原理、影响因素及对中国碳市场的启示——以电力部门为例

以欧盟碳市场的实践以及中国碳市场的发展现状为背景,调研分析了碳成本传递原理,重点以电力行业为例分析碳成本传递率的主要影响因素。结果显示影响电力行业碳成本传递率的主要因素包括碳排放权交易的配额分配方式以及电力市场结构。分配方式对传递率的影响主要包括配额是否免费发放、是否实时更新免费配额的发放额度、关闭的发电设备是否获得免费配额和新进入者是否发放免费配额等因素。电力市场结构对传递率的影响主要体现在市场竞争程度、市场需求与供给条件。最后,基于当前国内碳市场试点的碳配额分配方式,给出了循序渐进地改变碳排放额初始分配的方法、减少一次性发放未来相对长时期的免费配额、选择基于发电量发放免费配额而非装机容量发放免费配额等相关政策建议。     

Foreign policy ‘trilemmas’: understanding China's stance on international cap-and-trade

This article uses a policy analogy approach to explore China's attitude toward the possibility of global carbon market integration, including the development of a common cap-and-trade market for the global civil aviation industry. Like in other foreign policy domains, in international cap-and-trade, China faces a ‘trilemma’ between carbon market integration, state sovereignty and policy flexibility. By referring to how China has approached a comparable trilemma in foreign exchange policy making, we analyse China's possible stance on international cap-and-trade. We argue that China will prefer to gradually establish and strengthen, to a limited extent, intergovernmental governance mechanisms, which allow nation-states to prioritize sovereignty and policy flexibility in carbon trading policy making. In the conclusion we use this argument to explain China's responses to the carbon-trading initiatives of Australia, the EU, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the World Bank.

Policy relevance

The international community has reached a consensus on the use of market mechanisms for mitigating climate change. While opposing the EU's plan to include Chinese airlines in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, China has started to co-explore with Australia the possibility of linking their carbon markets, and has adopted a supportive attitude toward the carbon trading initiatives led by the ICAO and the World Bank. Considering China's status as the largest emitting country of GHGs and its interdependence with major developed and developing countries, China's substantial participation would be crucial to the success of the global market-based efforts to reduce GHG emissions. This article presents an initial attempt to develop a better understanding of China's stance on international cap-and-trade.     

EU emissions trading and the cement sector: a spatial competition analysis

An oligopoly competition model is described and used to illustrate the potential effect of EU emissions trading and transport issues on the production decisions and profitability of cement producers in a typical western European country market. The role of geography is introduced from three viewpoints: the existence of regional markets, the fact that EU producers may operate multiple plants across these regions, and the possibility of production capacity constraints. A typical EU state is divided into a coastal region which is initially exposed to international competition, and an inland region which is initially protected. Assuming pure auctioning of EU Allowances and a range of CO₂ prices up to €50/t, our model predicts a large increase of imports into the coastal region. Consequences for the inland producers include reduced attractiveness of the coastal market, as well as increased competition from coastal producers and from non-EU imports. The model includes a number of simplifications and therefore does not claim to offer definitive predictions, but our results do suggest that an increase in non-EU imports could feasibly offset more than 70% of the decrease in EU cement sector emissions. The likely impact on producer profits is considered for each region, and the advantages and disadvantages of potential mitigating policy measures are reviewed for either the EU Allowance allocation process or border adjustments on cement products.     

Electricity regulation in the Chinese national emissions trading scheme (ETS): lessons for carbon leakage and linkage with the EU ETS

Carbon leakage is central to the discussion on how to mitigate climate change. The current carbon leakage literature focuses largely on industrial production, and less attention has been given to carbon leakage from the electricity sector (the largest source of carbon emissions in China). Moreover, very few studies have examined in detail electricity regulation in the Chinese national emissions trading system (which leads, for example, to double counting) or addressed its implications for potential linkage between the EU and Chinese emissions trading systems (ETSs). This article seeks to fill this gap by analysing the problem of ‘carbon leakage’ from the electricity sector under the China ETS. Specifically, a Law & Economics approach is applied to scrutinize legal documents on electricity/carbon regulation and examine the economic incentive structures of stakeholders in the inter-/intra-regional electricity markets. Two forms of ‘electricity carbon leakage’ are identified and further supported by legal evidence and practical cases. Moreover, the article assesses the environmental and economic implications for the EU of potential linkage between the world’s two largest ETSs. In response, policy suggestions are proposed to address electricity carbon leakage, differentiating leakage according to its sources.

Key policy insights

• Electricity carbon leakage in China remains a serious issue that has yet to receive sufficient attention.

• Such leakage arises from the current electricity/carbon regulatory framework in China and jeopardizes mitigation efforts.

• With the US retreat on climate efforts, evidence suggests that EU officials are looking to China and expect an expanded carbon market to reinforce EU global climate leadership.

• Given that the Chinese ETS will be twice the size of the EU ETS, a small amount of carbon leakage in China could have significant repercussions. Electricity carbon leakage should thus be considered in any future EU–China linking negotiations.