Certified emissions reductions and CDM limits: revenue and distributional aspects

The EU allows those installations that are subject to emissions trading to use a limited volume of certified emissions reductions (CERs), generated through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), to cover their own GHG emissions. These CERs can be used in addition to the EU allowances (EUAs), which were primarily allocated free to installations in Phase II of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) from 2008 to 2012. For the year 2008, the CER limits, which are differentiated by EU Member State, created substantial arbitrage rents (due to the CER-EUA spread) of approximately EU€250 million. Different options for the allocation of this rent are discussed and it is found that, according to economic theory, making the right to use CERs tradable or the regulator pre-committing to buying CERs at the level of the relevant limit reduces the inefficiencies connected to the current regulation. Furthermore, auctioning these CER usage rights shifts the rents created through the CER-EUA spread to the Member State itself. The improved design and implementation of CDM limits justifies EU policy makers intervening to correct previously competition-distorting choices.     

Transaction costs for firms in the EU ETS: lessons from Ireland

Until now, there has been little empirical evidence that EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) transaction costs are incurred at firm level. The transaction costs (internal costs, capital costs, consultancy and trading costs) incurred by Irish firms under the EU ETS during its pilot phase (2005–2007) were measured and analysed. Evidence for the sources of transaction costs, their magnitude and the distribution of costs shows that these were mainly administrative in nature. Considerable variation in costs was found due to economies of scale, as the costs per tonne of CO₂ were lower for participants with larger allocations. For the largest firms—accounting for over half the emissions—average transaction costs were €0.05 per tonne. However, for small firms, average transaction costs were €2.02—over 18% of the current allowance price. This supports the concerns that transaction costs are excessive for smaller participants. The immediate policy implication is that additional attention will be needed to address different sizes of firms, number of installations per firm, and the size of the initial allocations.     

Linking the CDM with domestic carbon markets

Certified emission reductions (CERs) from Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects have traditionally served as an indirect link between cap and trade systems around the world. However, since 2010, import restrictions have increased. Reasons for import limitations include the supplementarity principle, genuine concerns about the environmental integrity of CERs and social benefits of CDM projects, pressure from domestic emissions mitigation industries, concerns about competition in the industries in which reductions take place, as well as the attempt to pressure advanced developing countries to accept national emissions commitments under a future international climate policy regime. It is shown that import limitations lead to a decrease in CER prices and a race to generate CERs as quickly as possible. Such effects are visible in the CDM market after the EU announced its import limitations. The exclusion of CERs from specific project types will distort the CDM supply curve and increase the CER price unless the marginal abatement costs of the excluded project type are above the CER world market price. Similarly, exclusion of CERs from specific host countries will increase the price. Substantial differences are found in CER access to national carbon markets around the world.Policy relevanceCDM regulators could try to improve access of CERs to cap and trade schemes through improvements to additionality testing, standardizing baseline and monitoring methodologies and stakeholder consultation. However, regulators should be aware that standardization is no panacea, and controversies may resurface if standardized additionality determination (e.g. through benchmarks or positive lists) are applied for a certain period and found to be problematic. However, domestic policy concerns such as an unwillingness to send money abroad to buy credits, an inability to control market prices, and competitiveness impacts cannot be resolved by CDM reforms. If, despite such reforms of the CDM, blatant protectionism continues, a challenge before the World Trade Organisation (WTO) could be launched to stop discrimination of service exports from specific countries.     

The impact of administrative transaction costs in the EU emissions trading system

This article empirically investigates the impact of transaction costs for monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) of emissions on companies regulated by the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) in Germany. Based on a unique panel dataset, we investigate if MRV costs are dependent on the amount of annual emissions of regulated companies and if there are differences in transaction costs between economic sectors. The results indicate that administrative costs are dependent on the amount of annual emissions for larger companies, which has implications for the economic efficiency of the EU ETS. The most important finding, however, is that there are significant differences in MRV transaction costs dependent on the type and size of companies. This implies the existence of considerable economies of scale. Overall, the EU ETS could benefit from reforms by means of a push towards upstream regulation as this would likely increase administrative efficiency.

Policy relevance statement

Transaction costs are, among other things, an important aspect of market-based climate policy design. A policy instrument with low transaction costs is preferred over instruments with larger transaction costs under equal conditions. This is occasionally referred to as administrative efficiency, and its importance was acknowledged in directive 2009/29/EC of the European Commission. Thoughtful empirical examination of transaction costs is essential in order to inform about the extent and impact of these costs. This article provides an analysis of transaction costs for monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) of emissions in the EU ETS. It is shown that administrative costs will likely have negative effects on the cost efficiency of the EU ETS. However, the most relevant finding is that small companies (<250 employees) or firms emitting small amounts of carbon dioxide per year face far higher average transaction costs compared with larger firms or emitters. Thus, there is a tendency for the EU ETS to cause MRV transaction costs that are disadvantageous for small companies. A regulation that is more upstream-oriented could mitigate this negative effect to some extent. The EU ETS could initiate a reform that is targeted on putting a price on the carbon content of fossil fuels instead of directly regulating emissions in a so-called ‘end-of-the-pipe’ way at the installation level.     

Corrigendum to: Incremental CH4 and N2O mitigation benefits consistent with the U.S. Government's SC-CO2 estimates

The light bulb ban introduced by the EU is used as an example to illustrate how to assess the climate impact of a policy that overlaps with a cap-and-trade scheme. The European Commission estimates that by 2020 the reduction in GHG emissions induced by banning incandescent light bulbs will reach 15 million tons annually. The number is a conservative estimate for the reduction in emissions from lighting if the total residential stock of incandescent light bulbs in 2008 is replaced by more efficient lighting sources. However, it ignores that use-phase and some non-use-phase emissions are covered by the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). This drastically reduces the amount of GHG emissions saved.

Policy relevance

Several policies such as the EU-wide ban on incandescent light bulbs, energy efficiency mandates and support mechanisms for renewable energy overlap with the EU ETS. While there are typically several justifications for these policies, a chief reason is the reduction of GHG emissions. However, given that the aggregate emissions of the industries covered are fixed by the EU ETS, the climate change mitigation aspect of these policies is not obvious. Using the light bulb ban as an example, this article illustrates how a focus on non-EU ETS emissions changes the assessment of an intervention in terms of GHG reductions.     

Strengthening bottom-up and top-down climate governance

Although the UN and EU focus their climate policies on the prevention of a 2 °C global mean temperature rise, it has been estimated that a rise of at least 4?°C is more likely. Given the political climate of inaction, there is a need to instigate a bottom-up approach so as to build domestic support for future climate treaties, empower citizens, and motivate leaders to take action. A review is provided of the predominant top-down cap-and-trade policies in place – the Kyoto Protocol and EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) – with a focus on the grandfathering of emissions entitlements and the possibility of offsetting emissions. These policies are evaluated according to two criteria of justice and it is concluded that they fail to satisfy them. Some suggestions as to how the EU ETS can be improved so as to enable robust climate action are also offered.

Policy relevance

The current supranational climate policy has not been successful and global leaders have postponed the adoption of a meaningful successor to the Kyoto Protocol. In view of this inaction, bottom-up approaches with regard to climate policy should be further developed. It is argued that two of the main top-down policies, grandfathering and offsetting, impede the avowed goals of EU climate policy and pose significant ethical dilemmas with regard to participatory and intergenerational justice. In order to provide a more robust EU climate policy, the EU should inter alia provide a long-term perspective for investors, reduce the volatility of the carbon price, and prepare for the possibility of carbon leakage.     

Understanding carbon trading: Effects of delegating CO2 responsibility on organizations’ trading behaviour

The establishment of a carbon market assumes that there is an effective means of transforming price information into technical carbon reduction measures. However, empirical evidence reveals that the links between price information and carbon management strategies are far from obvious. To understand how delegating CO₂ responsibility affects CO₂ trading behaviour, this article proposes a neo-institutionalist approach to answering the question of why companies became sellers, buyers or a combination of both during phase I of the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Original data from a survey on companies that participated in this scheme were collected and analysed. It was assumed that the trading scheme offered two ways to delegate decisions regarding emissions trading: decoupling from technical knowledge and financialization (i.e. delegating to financial departments) or coupling using technicalization (i.e. delegating to manufacturing departments). The results support the hypothesis that a company that adopts a decoupling strategy is more likely to buy certificates to fulfil their emissions targets. Adopting a coupling strategy indicates that a company is more likely to become a seller, all else equal. Professional identity is the theoretical basis for this relationship. Delegating carbon management to different departments represents either a stronger coupling or a stronger decoupling from core technological processes.

Policy relevance

The transaction data from phase I of the EU ETS open new questions and possibilities regarding the reasons that drive selling and buying in companies. It is important to look not only at the traditional sources of transaction costs, but rather also at the reasons for these tensions. One important source is the professional education of the people in charge of the EU ETS. Tailored information that directly addresses the different professional backgrounds of managers working in both financial departments and more technical departments might help to lower these types of transaction costs. In today's context, important emitter countries, such as China and Korea, have launched their own emissions markets, copying many aspects of the EU ETS. For the positive development of these markets and as a way of establishing a global emissions market, these new schemes should learn from the EU ETS experience.     

Benchmark-based allocations in EU ETS Phase 3: an early assessment

Phase 3 of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS; 2013–2020) sees the introduction of new rules governing the free allocations of emissions allowances given to energy-intensive industries. In contrast to Phases 1 and 2, allocations will be based on historical production multiplied by best available emissions technology benchmarks. This article exploits an original database to provide a first analysis of the distributional and economic efficiency implications of the new rules. It is shown empirically that the new allocation rules reduce the scope for windfall gains by EU ETS firms while also effectively mitigating carbon leakage risks, even assuming optimistic forecasts of Phase 3 carbon prices. The example of the cement sector is used to show that benchmarking significantly improves the harmonization of the levels of free allocations to competing firms throughout the EU compared to Phase 2. However, it is also found that the use of ex ante output levels to determine allocations still leaves considerable scope for windfall gains and possible distortions of the internal market.     

EU ETS对欧洲电力行业的影响及对我国的建议

简要介绍欧盟排放交易体系（EU ETS）的发展情况,调研EU ETS对欧洲电力行业影响的研究现状,认为EU ETS将增加发电企业的生产成本,迅速提高电力市场价格,大幅增加发电企业利润,刺激能源技术投资和创新。同时简要评述EU ETS引发的争议问题,包括当前EU ETS对发电企业和电力市场的实际影响、发电企业巨额利润问题的产生原因等。在此基础上,对比中国和欧盟之间的差异,初步分析建设国内碳交易市场将对我国电力行业产生的影响,最后对我国建设碳交易市场提出建议。     

Can the EU emission trading scheme support CDM forestry?

Abstract

The European Commission is mandated to consider the inclusion of credits from land-use projects under the clean development mechanism (CDM) and joint implementation (JI), beginning with the second period of the European Union's emission trading scheme (ETS) in its report due in July 2006. Temporary credits from afforestation and reforestation under the CDM are seen by many as posing a technical problem for their use under the ETS. This article summarizes three feasible, efficient and environmentally sound alternatives for achieving the integration of such temporary credits in the European emissions trading market starting in 2008. The first proposal integrates tCERs and lCERs (temporary credits) into the EU ETS by allowing for their direct use for compliance purposes. The second proposal builds on the idea of swapping temporary credits for EU allowances (EUAs) by Member States. The third proposal would not require a political decision at the EU level. Instead supportive Member States or private carbon fund operators would agree to swap temporary credits for the CERs or ERUs they hold in their accounts. All three solutions would be linked to a risk-mitigation strategy based on levying a fee or fixing an exchange rate, which would allow governments to hedge the risk of losing temporary credits.     

Analysing the interaction between emission trading and renewable electricity support in TIMES

As the number of instruments applied in the area of energy and climate policy is rising, the issue of policy interaction needs to be explored further. This article analyses the interdependencies between the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and the German feed-in tariffs (FITs) for renewable electricity in a quantitative manner using a bottom-up energy system model. Flexible modelling approaches are presented for both instruments, with which all impacts on the energy system can be evaluated endogenously. It is shown that national climate policy measures can have an effect on the supranational emissions trading system by increasing emission reduction in the German electricity sector by up to 79 MtCO₂ in 2030. As a result, emission certificate prices decline by between 1.9 €/tCO₂ and 6.1 €/tCO₂ and the burden sharing between participating countries changes, but no additional emission reduction is achieved at the European level. This also implies, however, that the cost efficiency of such a cap-and-trade system is distorted, with additional costs of the FIT system of up to €320 billion compared with lower costs for ETS emission certificates of between €44 billion and €57 billion (cumulated over the period 2013–2020).

Policy relevance

In order to fulfil ambitious emission reduction targets a large variety of climate policy instruments are being implemented in Europe. While some, like the EU ETS, directly address CO₂ emissions, others aim to promote specific low-carbon technologies. The quantitative analysis of the interactions between the EU ETS and the German FIT scheme for renewable sources in electricity generation presented in this article helps to understand the importance of such interaction effects. Even though justifications can be found for the implementation of both types of instrument, the impact of the widespread use of support mechanisms for renewable electricity in Europe needs to be taken into account when fixing the reduction targets for the EU ETS in order to ensure a credible long-term investment signal.     

Transfer patterns in Phase I of the EU Emissions Trading System: a first reality check based on cluster analysis

In 2005, the world's largest Emissions Trading System (ETS) was introduced in the EU. Economic theory assumes high efficiency of such market-based instruments since companies have the flexibility to trade allowances. However, to date there is a lack of understanding on how companies have participated in the allowance markets. This article uses data on transfers of allowances between 2005 and the end of 2007, published by the EU in the Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL) after a five-year delay. We use cluster analysis to detect patterns in the data and differentiate transfer behaviour. We find that the vast majority of participants (7212 accounts) are rather passive in terms of transfers. Of these, more than half are hardly participating in the market at all, whereas one-third are accounts managed by another account belonging to the parent company. Opposed to that, 143 accounts show more active, but relatively diverse transfer behaviour. We also identify differences in sectoral representations, account types, and primary allocation across the seven clusters. While the passive accounts mostly belong to installations regulated under the EU ETS, the most active accounts are classified as ‘non-regulated account type'.     

Assessing the EU ETS with a bottom-up,multi-sector model

The European Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is the central pillar of the EU response against climate change. This trading mechanism is considered, from the theoretical point of view, as the most cost-effective method to reduce GHG. However, previous studies show that the agents who participate in these markets may behave in a way that may lead to inefficient CO₂ prices, creating doubts about the static and dynamic efficiency of the system. This article analyses these possible anomalies by first trying to model the ETS in a more realistic way, addressing some of the limitations of previous models, and second, by comparing the results with real market transactions. For this, a bottom-up, multi-sector model has been built, which represents the EU ETS in an integrated, cross-sectoral way, paying particular attention to the interactions among the most emissions intensive industries. The results show the benefits of this modelling approach and how it better reflects real market conditions. Some preliminary conclusions regarding the behaviour of the agents in the ETS market are also presented.

POLICY RELEVANCE

Low allowance prices in the EU ETS have put into question the dynamic efficiency of the EU ETS system, prompting various ideas for structural reform. However, determining the right reform also requires estimating correctly how agents will respond to it. This article proposes a tool to realistically simulate the EU ETS under the assumption of rational agents, and compare it to real market outcomes, in order to understand better the behaviour of agents in this carbon market, and therefore how to design better policies.     

On the importance of baseline setting in carbon offsets markets

Incorporating carbon offsets in the design of cap-and-trade programs remains a controversial issue because of its potential unintended impacts on emissions. At the heart of this discussion is the issue of crediting of emissions reductions. Projects can be correctly, over- or under-credited for their actual emissions reductions. We develop a unified framework that considers the supply of offsets within a cap-and-trade program that allows us to compare the relative impact of over-credited offsets and under-credited emissions reductions on overall emissions under different levels of baseline stringency and carbon prices. In the context of a national carbon pricing scheme that includes offsets, we find that the emissions impacts of over-credited offsets can be fully balanced out by under-credited emissions reductions without sacrificing a significant portion of the overall supply of offsets, provided emissions baselines are stringent enough. In the presence of high predicted business-as-usual (BAU) emissions uncertainty or low carbon prices, to maintain the environmental integrity of the program, baselines need to be set at stringent levels, in some cases below 50 percent of predicted BAU emissions. As predicted BAU emissions uncertainty declines or as the carbon market achieves higher equilibrium prices, however, less stringent baselines can balance out the emissions impacts of over-credited offsets and under-credited emissions reductions. These results imply that to maintain environmental integrity of offsets programs, baseline stringency should be tailored to project characteristics and market conditions that influence the proportion of over-credited offsets to under-credited emissions reductions.     

碳税和碳交易机制的行业减排成本比较优势研究

碳税和碳交易机制是控制温室气体排放的环境管理工具,对工业行业的减排成本造成不同的影响。以污染控制政策的稳态总期望社会成本函数为基础构建碳减排成本函数,比较碳税和碳交易机制下水泥行业减排成本,发现影响两种环境管理工具成本的要素。以广东和山东水泥行业的实证数据进行模拟分析,得到如下结论：当碳价和碳税税率差距不大时,由于碳交易机制需要较高的建设成本,碳税更具成本优势;短期内,由于减排技术投入成本较高,与强制性的行政管理手段相比,碳交易机制更具成本效益;碳价、碳税税率、最佳可获得技术的价格、企业预期、碳交易建设与管理成本都会影响碳交易机制和碳税在减排成本上的比较优势。建议设计互补型碳排放管理政策组合,使碳税和碳交易机制发挥各自的制度优势。     

Carbon pricing in practice: a review of existing emissions trading systems

This article analyses the implementation of emissions trading systems (ETSs) in eight jurisdictions: the EU, Switzerland, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and California in the US, Québec in Canada, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea and pilot schemes in China. The article clarifies what is working, what isn’t and why, when it comes to the practice of implementing an ETS. The eight ETSs are evaluated against five main criteria: environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency, market management, revenue management and stakeholder engagement. Within each of these categories, ETS attributes ? including abatement cost, stringency of the cap, improved allocation practices over time and the trajectory of price stability ? are assessed for each system. Institutional learning, administrative prudence, appropriate carbon revenue management and stakeholder engagement are identified as key ingredients for successful ETS regimes. Recent implementation of ETSs in regions including California, Québec and South Korea indicates significant institutional learning from prior systems, especially the EU ETS, with these regions implementing more robust administrative and regulatory structures suitable for handling unique national and sub-national opportunities and constraints. The analysis also shows that there is potential for a ‘double dividend’ in emissions reductions even with a modest carbon price, provided the cap tightens over time and a portion of the auctioned revenues are reinvested in other emissions-reduction activities. Knowledge gaps exist in understanding the interaction of pricing instruments with other climate policy instruments and how governments manage these policies to achieve optimum emissions reductions with lower administrative costs.

Key policy insights

• Countries are learning from each other on ETS implementation.

• Administrative and regulatory structures of ETS jurisdictions appear to evolve and become more robust in every ETS analysed.

• A ‘double dividend’ for emissions reductions may also exist in cases where mitigation occurs as a result of the ETS policy and when auction revenues are reinvested in other emissions-reduction activities.

     

Controlling GHG emissions from the transportation sector through an ETS: institutional arrangements in Shenzhen,China

Many different approaches are needed to achieve reductions in GHG emissions from the transportation sector. Carbon emissions trading schemes (ETSs) are widely used in industry and are effective in reducing the overall social cost of emissions abatement. This article reports the development of a downstream ETS for the transportation sector and its application in Shenzhen, China. The ETS was devised as a mandatory cap-and-trade scheme and, as a first step, was applied to public transportation. An integrated cap was set on the total emissions from buses and taxis: an absolute cap for existing vehicles and a relative increment for new entrants. Allowances were allocated by grandfathering or benchmarking and a ‘reverse mechanism’ was established to encourage the transformation of urban transportation to a low-carbon system. Online fuel consumption monitoring was used to quantify the emissions from vehicles, and the operators were required to surrender enough allowances or credits to account for their verified annual emissions. The mechanisms for allowance trading and carbon offsets provided sufficient flexibility to make emissions abatement and the use of new-energy vehicles and environmentally friendly travel within Shenzhen's urban transportation system economically attractive.

Policy relevance

The transportation sector is becoming a major contributor to the growth in China's GHG emissions. Achieving large reductions in GHG emissions from the transportation sector is a great challenge and requires both technology and policy innovation. The tradable carbon permit is a popular concept in mitigating climate change, but the introduction of a cap-and-trade ETS into the transportation sector is a relatively innovative concept. Shenzhen has launched the first cap-and-trade ETS in a developing country and is currently exploring ways to mitigate carbon emissions by a downstream cap-and-trade ETS for the transportation sector. This article considers the main institutional arrangements and regulatory framework of Shenzhen's transportation carbon ETS. It not only refreshes the theoretical analysis and practical application of downstream cap-and-trade carbon emissions trading in urban transportation, but also provides developing countries with a cost-effective instrument to mitigate their rapid growth in traffic carbon emissions during urbanization.     

Foreign policy ‘trilemmas’: understanding China's stance on international cap-and-trade

This article uses a policy analogy approach to explore China's attitude toward the possibility of global carbon market integration, including the development of a common cap-and-trade market for the global civil aviation industry. Like in other foreign policy domains, in international cap-and-trade, China faces a ‘trilemma’ between carbon market integration, state sovereignty and policy flexibility. By referring to how China has approached a comparable trilemma in foreign exchange policy making, we analyse China's possible stance on international cap-and-trade. We argue that China will prefer to gradually establish and strengthen, to a limited extent, intergovernmental governance mechanisms, which allow nation-states to prioritize sovereignty and policy flexibility in carbon trading policy making. In the conclusion we use this argument to explain China's responses to the carbon-trading initiatives of Australia, the EU, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the World Bank.

Policy relevance

The international community has reached a consensus on the use of market mechanisms for mitigating climate change. While opposing the EU's plan to include Chinese airlines in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, China has started to co-explore with Australia the possibility of linking their carbon markets, and has adopted a supportive attitude toward the carbon trading initiatives led by the ICAO and the World Bank. Considering China's status as the largest emitting country of GHGs and its interdependence with major developed and developing countries, China's substantial participation would be crucial to the success of the global market-based efforts to reduce GHG emissions. This article presents an initial attempt to develop a better understanding of China's stance on international cap-and-trade.     

Korea’s approach to overcoming difficulties in adopting the emission trading scheme

In this study, we aim to describe the background for design characteristics of emissions trading schemes (ETS) in developing and emerging economies, with a particular focus on the case of Korea. These countries may face unique hardships such as fierce opposition from industry sectors, the presence of a power imbalance between the Ministry of Environment (MOE) and ministries that are in charge of supporting output growth, and the absence or incomplete development of financial markets and auctioning mechanisms. To overcome these hardships, the Korean government legislated laws that defined timelines for every stage of ETS development, established a strategic governance architecture to make up the weak position of the MOE, offered strong market-stabilizing measures focused on maintaining the allowance price below a certain level, and provided support packages to make the low-carbon transition easy by compensating for losses caused by the Korea Emissions Trading Scheme (KETS). Such policy instruments that made adoption of KETS easier could be obstacles to making it efficient.

Policy relevance

In the process of adopting a cap-and-trade system, both a developing economy and an emerging economy may face unique hardships, such as strong opposition from industry sectors, the presence of a power imbalance between the Ministry of Environment (MOE) and ministries that are in charge of supporting output growth, and the absence or incomplete development of financial markets and auctioning mechanisms. To make up for the weak base of Korea’s ETS, the government legislated laws that defined timelines for every stage of the ETS development, established a strategic governance architecture to make up for the weak position of the MOE, offered strong market-stabilizing measures focused on maintaining the allowance price below a certain level, and provided support packages to make the low-carbon transition easy by compensating for losses caused by the Korea’s ETS. Korea’s experiences can be shared with other developing economies that are considering adoption of a cap-and-trade scheme.