Great expectations: can international emissions trading deliver an equitable climate regime?

Abstract

Climate change equity debates tend to focus on achieving a fair and global ‘allocation’ of emission rights among countries. Allocation proposals typically envision, if implicitly, two purposes for international emissions trading. First, trading is expected to serve as a cost-effective means of promoting compliance with emissions targets. Second, trading is posited as a means to generate financial transfers, typically from industrialized to transitioning and developing countries.

This article investigates the common assumption that international emissions trading will effectively serve both of these purposes. We conclude that the two purposes might not be mutually supportive, and that efforts to use international emissions trading as a financial transfer mechanism may potentially undermine cost-effectiveness goals. International emissions trading on a global scale would create new risks in terms of both cost-effectiveness and environmental performance, some of which will be challenging to manage. In particular, uncertainties over market prices and trading eligibility, coupled with the costs of participation, may together be the Achilles heel of some allocation proposals that entail large financial transfers from industrialized to developing countries. Any proposal for an ‘equitable’ allocation of emission allowances, we conclude, must be cognizant of the risks and costs implied by a reliance on international emissions trading. We offer some suggestions to this end.     

Global fossil energy markets and climate change mitigation – an analysis with REMIND

We analyze the dynamics of global fossil resource markets under different assumptions for the supply of fossil fuel resources, development pathways for energy demand, and climate policy settings. Resource markets, in particular the oil market, are characterized by a large discrepancy between costs of resource extraction and commodity prices on international markets. We explain this observation in terms of (a) the intertemporal scarcity rent, (b) regional price differentials arising from trade and transport costs, (c) heterogeneity and inertia in the extraction sector. These effects are captured by the REMIND model. We use the model to explore economic effects of changes in coal, oil and gas markets induced by climate-change mitigation policies. A large share of fossil fuel reserves and resources will be used in the absence of climate policy leading to atmospheric GHG concentrations well beyond a level of 550 ppm CO₂-eq. This result holds independently of different assumptions about energy demand and fossil fuel availability. Achieving ambitious climate targets will drastically reduce fossil fuel consumption, in particular the consumption of coal. Conventional oil and gas as well as non-conventional oil reserves are still exhausted. We find the net present value of fossil fuel rent until 2100 at 30tril.US$ with a large share of oil and a small share of coal. This is reduced by 9 and 12tril.US$ to achieve climate stabilization at 550 and 450 ppm CO₂-eq, respectively. This loss is, however, overcompensated by revenues from carbon pricing that are 21 and 32tril.US$, respectively. The overcompensation also holds under variations of energy demand and fossil fuel supply.     

Convergence or divergence? Status and prospects for US climate strategy

The objective of this paper is to assess recent developments and prospects for future changes in United States (US) climate strategy. In doing so, the paper explores some of the key factors that have shaped strategies and policies to date, distinguishing between factors related to institutional and governance structures, linkages between science and policy, energy technology and the role of interest groups. Against this background, the paper attempts to explore future development paths for US climate policy. More specifically, the paper assesses opportunities for policy changes compared to the preferences of the current administration, and the prospects for future linkages between US and international climate change strategies. In brief, the paper argues that substantial changes are unlikely to take place in the near to medium term, leaving open, however, the possibility of wide-ranging changes in domestic politics or major incidents that could facilitate a shift in the perceived need for near-term action.     

Hot deontology and cold consequentialism – an empirical exploration of ethical reasoning among climate change negotiators

Philosophers, political theorists and cognitive scientists have applied the traditional distinction between deontology and consequentialism to determine ethical responsibilities – usually of states – to take action in response to climate change. Most of this work is either purely conceptual or based on experiments with individuals, who are not part of the global political process. This paper makes two contributions to this debate. First, based on interview data I describe existing patterns of ethical reasoning among global political actors rather than groups selected for lab experiments. Integrating theories of risk perceptions, international relations and moral philosophy, I identify both deontological and consequentialist cognitive patterns, and examine their constitutive elements. My second contribution concerns the role of emotion in moral reasoning. Using the same qualitative data, I offer support for a controversial argument about the emotional nature of deontological reasoning. Further, I argue that many negotiators experience climate change not as an impersonal threat posed by the environment, but rather as an “up, close and personal” threat, over which other negotiation participants have significant control.     

Evaluating observed and projected future climate changes for the Arctic using the K?ppen-Trewartha climate classification

The ecosystems in the Arctic region are known to be very sensitive to climate changes. The accelerated warming for the past several decades has profoundly influenced the lives of the native populations and ecosystems in the Arctic. Given that the K?ppen-Trewartha (K-T) climate classification is based on reliable variations of land-surface types (especially vegetation), this study used the K-T scheme to evaluate climate changes and their impact on vegetation for the Arctic (north of 50°N) by analyzing observations as well as model simulations for the period 1900–2099. The models include 16 fully coupled global climate models from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment. By the end of this century, the annual-mean surface temperature averaged over Arctic land regions is projected to increase by 3.1, 4.6 and 5.3°C under the Special Report on Emissions Scenario (SRES) B1, A1b, and A2 emission scenarios, respectively. Increasing temperature favors a northward expansion of temperate climate (i.e., Dc and Do in the K-T classification) and boreal oceanic climate (i.e., Eo) types into areas previously covered by boreal continental climate (i.e., Ec) and tundra; and tundra into areas occupied by permanent ice. The tundra region is projected to shrink by ?1.86?×?10⁶?km² (?33.0%) in B1, ?2.4?×?10⁶?km² (?42.6%) in A1b, and ?2.5?×?10⁶?km² (?44.2%) in A2 scenarios by the end of this century. The Ec climate type retreats at least 5° poleward of its present location, resulting in ?18.9, ?30.2, and ?37.1% declines in areal coverage under the B1, A1b and A2 scenarios, respectively. The temperate climate types (Dc and Do) advance and take over the area previously covered by Ec. The area covered by Dc climate expands by 4.61?×?10⁶?km² (84.6%) in B1, 6.88?×?10⁶?km² (126.4%) in A1b, and 8.16?×?10⁶?km² (149.6%) in A2 scenarios. The projected redistributions of K-T climate types also differ regionally. In northern Europe and Alaska, the warming may cause more rapid expansion of temperate climate types. Overall, the climate types in 25, 39.1, and 45% of the entire Arctic region are projected to change by the end of this century under the B1, A1b, and A2 scenarios, respectively. Because the K-T climate classification was constructed on the basis of vegetation types, and each K-T climate type is closely associated with certain prevalent vegetation species, the projected large shift in climate types suggests extensive broad-scale redistribution of prevalent ecoregions in the Arctic.     

Who and what are carbon markets for? Politics and the development of climate policy

Why have carbon markets been rapidly adopted as policy solutions to climate change in the last decade? Perhaps surprisingly, this question has attracted virtually no attention in the large literature on such markets. The standard arguments given for why carbon markets are good ways to respond to climate change do not explain why such markets have flourished as governance mechanisms in relation to climate. Carbon markets have spread and become taken-for-granted because of the potential they give to certain powerful actors (financiers, specifically) to create new cycles of investment, profits and growth. As a consequence, they make possible a political coalition combining financiers with environmentalists. This coalition has considerable potential to legitimize substantial cuts in carbon emissions in the face of continued opposition from other interests. It is the combination of these two elements – the promotion of specific growth sectors and the construction of a political coalition – that constitutes the principal political virtue of carbon markets. In order to demonstrate this claim, the history of emissions trading is traced and the implication of this analysis is explored for the further building of climate governance centred on carbon markets.     

What explains public support for climate policies? A review of empirical and experimental studies

The lack of broad public support prevents the implementation of effective climate policies. This article aims to examine why citizens support or reject climate policies. For this purpose, we provide a cross-disciplinary overview of empirical and experimental research on public attitudes and preferences that has emerged in the last few years. The various factors influencing policy support are divided into three general categories: (1) social-psychological factors and climate change perception, such as the positive influences of left-wing political orientation, egalitarian worldviews, environmental and self-transcendent values, climate change knowledge, risk perception, or emotions like interest and hope; (2) the perception of climate policy and its design, which includes, among others, the preference of pull over push measures, the positive role of perceived policy effectiveness, the level of policy costs, as well as the positive effect of perceived policy fairness and the recycling of potential policy revenues; (3) contextual factors, such as the positive influence of social trust, norms and participation, wider economic, political and geographical aspects, or the different effects of specific media events and communications. Finally, we discuss the findings and provide suggestions for future research.

Policy relevance

Public opinion is a significant determinant of policy change in democratic countries. Policy makers may be reluctant to implement climate policies if they expect public opposition. This article seeks to provide a better understanding of the various factors influencing public responses to climate policy proposals. Most of the studied factors include perceptions about climate change, policy and its attributes, all of which are amenable to intervention. The acquired insights can thus assist in improving policy design and communication with the overarching objective to garner more public support for effective climate policy.     

What future for the voluntary carbon offset market after Paris? An explorative study based on the Discursive Agency Approach

The Paris Agreement heralds a new era in international climate governance. Yet, the Agreement's implementation rulebook is still under negotiation. During this transition, from the Kyoto Protocol to the new regime under the Paris Agreement, many non-state actors are facing a high level of uncertainty. In particular, actors in the voluntary carbon market are struggling to define their new role. The business model of producing carbon credits in developing countries and selling them elsewhere is threatened. Although its financial significance and achieved emission reductions are limited, the voluntary market's role as an incubator for innovation has made it a prominent representative of non-state mitigation mechanisms. Therefore, we ask: What effects will the regime change to the Paris Agreement have on the voluntary carbon offset market (VCM) and how does it react to these effects?

This study analyses perceptions of, and reactions to, the new regulatory environment within the VCM. We apply the Discursive Agency Approach to scrutinize the institutions, discourses and influential agents involved in the VCM, and the strategic practices they apply to manage the transition towards the Paris regime. We find two dominant coping strategies: to align the voluntary offsetting mechanism with the Paris Agreement, and to re-invent its overall purpose as a tool to deliver sustainable development rather than solely emission reductions. Based on these results, we outline ‘thought spaces’ for a future VCM: (1) voluntary and non-party offsetting beyond nationally determined contributions (NDCs), (2) results-based financing for emission reductions and sustainable development, and (3) private climate action under international oversight.

Key policy insights

• The Paris Agreement threatens the VCM's business model, prompting market agents to frame and legitimize their work in new ways.

• The voluntary market's viability depends on the future accounting rules for emission reductions under Paris Agreement Article 6. Discursive struggles surround the risks of double counting and NDC ambitions.

• Based on an understanding of the past, we can draw lessons from agents’ attempts to re-legitimize their role under the new Paris Agreement; their future visions will shape the debates about this nascent regime.

     

Landscape for change? International climate policy and energy transitions: evidence from sub-Saharan Africa

What is the role of the climate regime in facilitating rapid decarbonization of the world’s energy systems? We examine how core assumptions concerning the roles of the nation state, carbon markets and finance and technology in international climate policy are being challenged by the realities of how transitions in the energy systems are unfolding. Drawing on the critical region of sub-Saharan Africa, we examine the potential for international climate policy to foster new trajectories towards decarbonization.

Policy relevance

The international regime for climate policy has been in place for some twenty years. Despite significant changes in the landscape of energy systems and drivers of global GHG emissions over this time, the core principles and tools remain relatively stable – national governments, carbon markets, project-based climate finance and the transfer of technological hardware. Given the diversity of actors and drivers and the limited direct reach and influence of international climate policy, however, there is an urgent need to consider how the climate regime can best support the embryonic transitions that are slowly taking form around the world. To do this effectively requires a more nuanced understanding of the role of the state in governing these transitions beyond the notion of a cohesive state serving as rule-enforcer and transition manager. It also requires a broader view of technology, not just as hardware that is transferred, but as a set of practices and networks of expertise and enabling actors. Likewise, though markets have an important role to play as vehicles for achieving broader ends, they are not an end in themselves. Finally on finance, while acknowledging the important role of climate aid, often as a multiplier or facilitator of more ambitious private flows, it is critical to differentiate between the types of finance required for different transitions, many of which will not be counted under, or directed by, the climate regime. In sum, the (low-) carbon economy is being built in ways and in numerous sites that the climate regime needs to be cognizant of and engage with productively, and this may require fundamental reconsideration of the building blocks of the international climate regime.     

On the coattails of climate? Opportunities and threats of a warming Earth for biodiversity conservation

The relationship between climate change and biodiversity was a central issue at the 10th Conference of the Parties (COP 10) to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). In this paper we draw from participant observation data collected at COP 10, and related policy documentation, to examine how concerns about climate change are shaping the conservation policy landscape – in terms of the knowledge and rationales used as inputs, networks of actors involved, objectives sought, and actions proposed. We find that debates at the intersection of climate and biodiversity were overwhelmingly framed in relation to, or through the lens of carbon. Through a discussion of four core Climate-Motivated Responses, we illustrate how “carbon-logic”, and the initiatives that it generates, simultaneously creates threats to the objectives sought by some actors, and opportunities for the objectives sought by others. We situate our observations in the context of some of the historical dilemmas that have faced conservation, and discuss this current moment in the dynamic trajectory of conservation governance: a moment when decisions about conserving biodiversity are becoming entangled with carbon-logic and the market. In this case, while some actors seek opportunities for biodiversity ends by riding the coattails of the climate agenda, the threats of doing so may undermine the biological and social objectives of the CBD convention itself.     

Is the astronomical forcing a reliable and unique pacemaker for climate? A conceptual model study

There is evidence that ice age cycles are paced by astronomical forcing, suggesting some kind of synchronisation phenomenon. Here, we identify the type of such synchronisation and explore systematically its uniqueness and robustness using a simple paleoclimate model akin to the van der Pol relaxation oscillator and dynamical system theory. As the insolation is quite a complex quasiperiodic signal involving different frequencies, the traditional concepts used to define synchronisation to periodic forcing are no longer applicable. Instead, we explore a different concept of generalised synchronisation in terms of (coexisting) synchronised solutions for the forced system, their basins of attraction and instabilities. We propose a clustering technique to compute the number of synchronised solutions, each of which corresponds to a different paleoclimate history. In this way, we uncover multistable synchronisation (reminiscent of phase- or frequency-locking to individual periodic components of astronomical forcing) at low forcing strength, and monostable or unique synchronisation at stronger forcing. In the multistable regime, different initial conditions may lead to different paleoclimate histories. To study their robustness, we analyse Lyapunov exponents that quantify the rate of convergence towards each synchronised solution (local stability), and basins of attraction that indicate critical levels of external perturbations (global stability). We find that even though synchronised solutions are stable on a long term, there exist short episodes of desynchronisation where nearby climate trajectories diverge temporarily (for about 50 kyr). As the attracting trajectory can sometimes lie close to the boundary of its basin of attraction, a small perturbation could quite easily make climate to jump between different histories, reducing the predictability. Our study brings new insight into paleoclimate dynamics and reveals a possibility for the climate system to wander throughout different climatic histories related to preferential synchronisation regimes on obliquity, precession or combinations of both, all over the history of the Pleistocene.     

Subjective measures of climate resilience: What is the added value for policy and programming?

Subjective approaches to resilience measurement are gaining traction as a complementary approach to the standard frameworks that typically contain objective measures. Proponents suggest that subjective approaches may add value to existing measures in three areas: by improving our understanding of the drivers of resilience, reducing the questionnaire burden on respondents, and potentially offering more valid cross-cultural comparisons. This perspective assesses the potential, evidence and uncertainties around each of these claims, drawing from decades of research using subjective techniques in the wellbeing and psychological resilience literatures. Overall we find that subjective approaches can theoretically add value in each of these three areas. However the design of appropriate indicators must proceed with specificity and rigour for subjective measures to add value to programming and policy for climate resilience.     

Corruption in cyclone preparedness and relief efforts in coastal Bangladesh: Lessons for climate adaptation?

This article seeks to draw possible lessons for adaptation programmes in Bangladesh by examining whether cyclone preparedness and relief interventions are subject to corrupt practices. Based on a random sample survey of 278 households, three focus-group discussions and seven key-informant interviews, the article investigates the nature and extent of corruption in pre- and post-disaster interventions in Khulna before and after Cyclone Aila in May 2009. Ninety nine percent of households reported losses from corrupt practices. Post-disaster interventions (such as food aid and public works schemes) suffered from greater levels, and worse types, of corruption than pre-disaster interventions (such as cyclone warning systems and disaster-preparedness training). Using an asset index created using principal component analysis, the article assesses how corruption affected wealth quartiles. Ultra-poor households were affected more by corruption in pre-disaster interventions, the wealthiest quartile more in certain post-disaster interventions, in particular public works and non-governmental interventions. These findings may hold lessons for attempts to increase resilience as current adaptation measures mirror some cyclone preparedness and relief efforts.     

Which downscaled rainfall data for climate change impact studies in urban areas? Review of current approaches and trends

Changes in extreme precipitation should be one of the primary impacts of climate change (CC) in urban areas. To assess these impacts, rainfall data from climate models are commonly used. The main goal of this paper is to report on the state of knowledge and recent works on the study of CC impacts with a focus on urban areas, in order to produce an integrated review of various approaches to which future studies can then be compared or constructed. Model output statistics (MOS) methods are increasingly used in the literature to study the impacts of CC in urban settings. A review of previous works highlights the non-stationarity nature of future climate data, underscoring the need to revise urban drainage system design criteria. A comparison of these studies is made difficult, however, by the numerous sources of uncertainty arising from a plethora of assumptions, scenarios, and modeling options. All the methods used do, however, predict increased extreme precipitation in the future, suggesting potential risks of combined sewer overflow frequencies, flooding, and back-up in existing sewer systems in urban areas. Future studies must quantify more accurately the different sources of uncertainty by improving downscaling and correction methods. New research is necessary to improve the data validation process, an aspect that is seldom reported in the literature. Finally, the potential application of non-stationarity conditions into generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution should be assessed more closely, which will require close collaboration between engineers, hydrologists, statisticians, and climatologists, thus contributing to the ongoing reflection on this issue of social concern.     

Surface‐absorbed and top‐of‐atmosphere radiation fluxes for the Mackenzie River basin from satellite observations and a regional climate model and an evaluation of the model

Abstract

Both the earth‐reflected shortwave and outgoing longwave radiation (OLR) fluxes at the top of the atmosphere (TOA) as well as surface‐absorbed solar fluxes from Canadian Regional Climate Model (CRCM) simulations of the Mackenzie River Basin for the period March 2000 to September 2003 are compared with the radiation fluxes deduced from satellite observations. The differences between the model and satellite solar fluxes at the TOA and at the surface, which are used in this paper to evaluate the CRCM performance, have opposite biases under clear skies and overcast conditions, suggesting that the surface albedo is underestimated while cloud albedo is overestimated. The slightly larger differences between the model and satellite fluxes at the surface compared to those at the TOA indicate the existence of a small positive atmospheric absorption bias in the model. The persistent overestimation of TOA reflected solar fluxes and underestimation of the surface‐absorbed solar fluxes by the CRCM under all sky conditions are consistent with the overestimation of cloud fraction by the CRCM. This results in a larger shortwave cloud radiative forcing (CRF) both at the TOA and at the surface in the CRCM simulation. The OLR from the CRCM agrees well with the satellite observations except for persistent negative biases during the winter months under all sky conditions. Under clear skies, the OLR is slightly underestimated by the CRCM during the winter months and overestimated in the other months. Under overcast conditions the OLR is underestimated by the CRCM, suggesting an underestimation of cloud‐top temperature by the CRCM. There is an improvement in differences between model and satellite fluxes compared to previously reported results largely because of changes to the treatment of the surface in the model.