Climate negotiations beyond Kyoto: developing countries concerns and interests

Five years down the road from Kyoto, the Protocol that bears that city’s name still awaits enough qualifying ratifications to come into force. While attention has been understandably focussed on the ratification process, it is time to begin thinking about the next steps for the global climate regime, particularly in terms of a deeper inclusion of developing countries’ concerns and interests. This paper begins doing so from the perspective of the developing countries. The principal argument is that we need to return to the basic principles outlined in the Framework Convention on Climate Change in searching for a north-south bargain on climate change. Such a bargain may be achievable if we can realign the policy architecture of the climate regime to its original stated goals of sustainable development.     

Climate negotiations beyond Kyoto: developing countries concerns and interests

Abstract

Five years down the road from Kyoto, the Protocol that bears that city's name still awaits enough qualifying ratifications to come into force. While attention has been understandably focussed on the ratification process, it is time to begin thinking about the next steps for the global climate regime, particularly in terms of a deeper inclusion of developing countries' concerns and interests. This paper begins doing so from the perspective of the developing countries. The principal argument is that we need to return to the basic principles outlined in the Framework Convention on Climate Change in searching for a north—south bargain on climate change. Such a bargain may be achievable if we can realign the policy architecture of the climate regime to its original stated goals of sustainable development.     

The UNFCCC as a negotiation forum: towards common but more differentiated responsibilities

The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDRC) captures the idea that it is the common responsibility of states to protect and restore the environment but that the levels and forms of states’ individual responsibilities may be differentiated according to their own national circumstances. This principle has shaped the evolution of the climate regime and has played an important role in promoting compromise and agreement. It is argued that some twenty years after the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the principle of CBDRC remains as relevant as ever. The practice of Parties under the regime and, most recently, the concerted efforts to shape and flesh out the meaning of the principle, underscore the central role that it plays. At the same time, the binary understanding of CBDRC in the Kyoto Protocol is being replaced with a more nuanced, multifaceted understanding. The evolving interpretation of CBDRC is considered, and its continued relevance as the nucleus of a global burden-sharing regime for addressing climate change is demonstrated.

Policy relevance

The development of a common understanding of the principle of CBDRC is essential for the burden sharing and responsibilities under a future climate agreement. The CBDRC principle captures the idea that it is the common responsibility of states to protect and restore the environment, but that the levels and forms of states’ individual responsibilities may be differentiated according to their own national circumstances. This article informs the international climate change negotiations by considering the development of the principle of CBDRC under the UNFCCC over time. It is concluded that, although there has been a significant shift in how the principle is understood, it remains crucial to the integrity and stability of the climate regime.     

Keeping the forest for the climate's sake: avoiding deforestation in developing countries under the UNFCCC

Abstract

A process for reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries has been initiated under the UNFCCC. Efforts to agree on a legally binding instrument to halt deforestation have previously failed in other international fora. The magnitude of the social, economic, technical and political complexities underlying deforestation have led to negotiations being challenging. What policy instruments could provide incentives to reduce deforestation, and how could these instruments be framed, under the UNFCCC? This article analyses the advantages and disadvantages of the available alternatives within and outside of the Kyoto Protocol. Staying within the Kyoto framework means low institutional development costs, established but limited incentives for action, and low flexibility. Alternatives outside the Protocol provide higher institutional development costs, uncertainties with regard to the incentives, but greater flexibility. We argue that a separate protocol may be the most viable option, as it could offer the necessary flexibility and avoid some technical and political pitfalls that would be likely to beset new efforts under the Kyoto Protocol. The article also presents the concept of ‘committed forests’ as a means of defining geographically where the reduction of emissions from deforestation can take place.     

Future mitigation commitments: differentiating among non-Annex I countries

Abstract

In the long term, any definition of adequacy consistent with UNFCCC Article 2 will require increased mitigation efforts from almost all countries. Therefore, an expansion of emission limitation commitments will form a central element of any future architecture of the climate regime. This expansion has two elements: deepening of quantitative commitments for Annex B countries and the adoption of commitments for those countries outside of the current limitation regime. This article seeks to provide a more analytical basis for further differentiation among non-Annex I countries. To be both fair and reflective of national circumstances, it is based on the criteria of responsibility, capability and potential to mitigate. Altogether, non-Annex I countries were differentiated in four groups, each including countries with similar national circumstances: newly industrialized countries (NICs), rapidly industrializing countries (RIDCs), ‘other developing countries’, and least developed countries (LDCs). Based on the same criteria that were used for differentiating among non-Annex I countries, a set of decision rules was developed to assign mitigation and financial transfer commitments to each group of countries (including Annex I countries). Applying these decision rules results in (strict) reduction commitments for Annex I countries, but also implies quantifiable mitigation obligations for NICs and RIDCs, assisted by financial transfers from the North. Other developing countries are obliged to take qualitative commitments, but quantifiable mitigation commitments for these countries and the LDC group would be not justifiable. As national circumstances in countries evolve over time, the composition of the groups will change according to agreed triggers.     

An equity first, risk-based framework for managing global climate change

This paper presents an alternative framework to the approach currently embodied in the Kyoto Protocol for managing global climate change post-2012. The framework has two key provisions. The first is that each person in the world would be ‘allowed’ an equal amount of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This is labeled the equity-first provision. The second provision focuses on incorporating risk concepts into the setting of GHG emission reductions. It is proposed that the global climate be managed as to avoid three categories of risks: (I) Substantial regional economic, political, and/or biological impacts; (II) Severe global economic, political, and/or biological impacts; and (III) Extinction of humans. Acceptable risk thresholds are suggested to be one-in-a-million, one-in-one-hundred-million, and one-in-ten-billion, respectively. This equity-first, risk-based framework overcomes many criticisms of the current Kyoto Protocol: it explicitly involves all countries on earth; it avoids several administrative issues that are anticipated to plague a global carbon emissions trading market; and it avoids several contentious issues associated with pegging carbon emission reductions to 1990 levels. Because the framework is risk-based and emissions are tied to population and not historic emission levels, the basic framework would not have to be frequently renegotiated, as will be needed for the Kyoto-style approach to take the world past that agreement's 2012 endpoint.     

Climate change: long-term targets and short-term commitments

International negotiations under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change could take several different approaches to advance future mitigation commitments. Options range from trying to reach consensus on specific long-term atmospheric concentration targets (e.g. 550 ppmv) to simply ignoring this contentious issue and focusing instead on what can be done in the nearer term. This paper argues for a strategy that lies between these two extremes. Internationally agreed threshold levels for certain categories of impacts or of risks posed by climate change could be translated into acceptable levels of atmospheric concentrations. This could help to establish a range of upper limits for global emissions in the medium term that could set the ambition level for negotiations on expanded GHG mitigation commitments. The paper thus considers how physical and socio-economic indicators of climate change impacts might be used to guide the setting of such targets. In an effort to explore the feasibility and implications of low levels of stabilisation, it also quantifies an intermediate global emission target for 2020 that keeps open the option to stabilise at 450 ppmv CO₂ If new efforts to reduce emissions are not forthcoming (e.g. the Kyoto Protocol or similar mitigation efforts fail), there is a significant chance that the option of 450 ppmv CO₂ is out of reach as of 2020. Regardless of the preferred approach to shaping new international commitments on climate change, progress will require improved information on the avoided impacts climate change at different levels of mitigation and careful assessment of mitigation costs.     

Considering the options: climate targets for all countries

Abstract

This paper assesses five options for targets that could be taken by all countries to meet the ultimate objective of the climate change convention: fixed, binding targets; dynamic targets; non-binding targets; sectoral targets; policies and measures. Each is evaluated according to criteria of environmental effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, contribution to economic growth and sustainable development, and equity. While fixed, binding targets continue to be viable for industrialised countries, they do not seem suitable for many developing countries in the near future. Dynamic targets could alleviate developing countries' concerns about constraining their development as well as broader concerns about possible introduction of “hot air” in a world trading regime; they could also be considered for some or all industrialised countries. Non-binding targets could be politically appealing to developing countries, alleviate fears about development and/or hot air, but might only allow conditional participation in emissions trading by developing countries. Sectoral targets could offer a pragmatic first step—although their cost-effectiveness might be questioned. Finally, targets based on commitments to implement specific policies and measures might drive mitigation action and be part of negotiated packages including financial and technological co-operation. All these options may coexist in the future.     

Corporate responses to the CDM: the Indian pulp and paper industry

The key outcomes of the 2006 Nairobi Conference on Climate Change are described, with a particular emphasis on adaptation, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the future of the United Nations climate change regime beyond 2012. Based on an analysis of the key issues being negotiated, the Nairobi Conference can be understood as an important step in the larger process towards a future climate change regime. Its significance is in establishing the confidence and trust between the key players that will be necessary for the successful completion of the current phase of negotiations and agreement on the post-2012 climate change regime.     

Implications of early action for JI baselines

This article discusses possible implications of early Joint Implementation (JI) action. Some projects which would otherwise be non-additional during the first commitment period, can become additional by implementing them before 2008 through early JI. For example, several environmental investments that will be mandatory under the European Union (EU) Acquis Communautaire as of, e.g. 2008 or 2010 could be carried out earlier than that with early JI action. As such, candidate countries could partly finance the accession process through JI credits and their environmental standards would earlier be in line with the Acquis. The theoretical risk that projects would have to follow a slow track if JI parties are not eligible for the fast track is not large for JI hosts that are candidate for EU membership.     

Common but differentiated convergence (CDC): a new conceptual approach to long-term climate policy

Abstract

This article describes a new concept for an international climate regime for differentiation of future commitments: the ‘common but differentiated convergence’ approach (CDC). Under CDC, Annex-I countries' per-capita emission allowances converge within a convergence period to a low level. Individual non-Annex-I countries' allowances converge to the same level also within the same period (‘common convergence’), but starting when their per-capita emissions are a certain percentage above global average (‘differentiated’). Until then they may voluntarily take on ‘positively binding’ targets. This approach eliminates two concerns often voiced in relation to gradually converging per-capita emissions: (i) advanced developing countries have their commitment to reduce emissions delayed and their targets are not the same as Annex-I countries with equal per-capita emissions; (ii) CDC does not provide excess emission allowances to the least developing countries. Under CDC, stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations at 550 and 650 ppm CO₂-equivalent can be reached with participation at roughly 0% and 50% above global average and convergence to around 3 and 4.5 tCO₂-eq/cap within 40 years. Even if the CDC approach is not implemented in its entirety, it is possible that the step-by-step decisions on the international climate regime can be guided by the principles provided in the CDC approach.     

The trade regime and the climate regime: institutional evolution and adaptation

This article addresses concerns that the multilateral trade regime centered in the WTO and the emerging climate regime may conflict in ways that could be damaging to either or both. The article discusses the institutional and diplomatic context of these concerns, and it identifies the kinds of issues that are in question. The analysis suggests that there are opportunities for win—win outcomes in the interactions of the two regimes, for instance in the possibility of reducing fossil fuel subsidies. However, there are also problematic areas where they intersect. A core issue—and as yet an unresolved one—is whether and how emission credit trading and other activities envisioned by the Kyoto Protocolwould be subject toWTOrules. The resolution of this issue will affect many other issues as well. Additional specific issues about the interactions of particular provisions inWTOagreements and theKyoto Protocol are analyzed in a subsequent companion article in Climate Policy.     

The trade regime and the climate regime: institutional evolution and adaptation

This article addresses concerns that the multilateral trade regime centered in the WTO and the emerging climate regime may conflict in ways that could be damaging to either or both. The article discusses the institutional and diplomatic context of these concerns, and it identifies the kinds of issues that are in question. The analysis suggests that there are opportunities for win–win outcomes in the interactions of the two regimes, for instance in the possibility of reducing fossil fuel subsidies. However, there are also problematic areas where they intersect. A core issue—and as yet an unresolved one—is whether and how emission credit trading and other activities envisioned by the Kyoto Protocol would be subject to WTO rules. The resolution of this issue will affect many other issues as well. Additional specific issues about the interactions of particular provisions in WTO agreements and the Kyoto Protocol are analyzed in a subsequent companion article in Climate Policy.     

Implications of early action for JI baselines

Abstract

This article discusses possible implications of early Joint Implementation (JI) action. Some projects which would otherwise be non-additional during the first commitment period, can become additional by implementing them before 2008 through early JI. For example, several environmental investments that will be mandatory under the European Union (EU) Acquis Communautaire as of, e.g. 2008 or 2010 could be carried out earlier than that with early JI action. As such, candidate countries could partly finance the accession process through JI credits and their environmental standards would earlier be in line with the Acquis. The theoretical risk that projects would have to follow a slow track if JI parties are not eligible for the fast track is not large for JI hosts that are candidate for EU membership.     

Sectoral approaches for a post-2012 climate regime: a taxonomy

Sectoral approaches have been gaining currency in the international climate debate as a possible remedy to the shortfalls of the Kyoto Protocol. Proponents argue that a sector-based architecture can more easily invite the participation of developing countries, address competitiveness issues, and enable immediate emissions reductions. However, given the numerous proposals, much confusion remains as to what sectoral approaches actually are. This article provides a simple, yet comprehensive, taxonomy of the various proposals for sectoral approaches. Based on the dual criteria of content and actors, three such types are identified and described: government targets and timetables; industry targets and timetables; and transnational technology cooperation. For each of these types, existing proposals and ongoing initiatives are discussed. In a second step, the article analyses the political landscape in which sectoral approaches are being debated, identifying the interests of their key advocates as well as the concerns of their critics. The Japanese government and energy-intensive manufacturing industries represent the main proponents of sectoral approaches to address the problems of carbon leakage and economic competitiveness. Developing countries, on the other hand, are wary of attempts to impose emissions reduction targets on their economies through sectoral target-setting. They, therefore, interpret sectoral approaches as sector-based forms of technology cooperation and technology transfer.     

The investment climate for climate investment: Joint Implementation in transition countries

Transition countries are expected to become important players in the emerging market for greenhouse gas emission reductions, as they can cut emissions at a relatively low cost. However, the attractiveness of the region as a supplier of emission reductions will not only depend on its cost advantage. It will also depend on the business climate offered to carbon investors—factors like a well-functioning legal and regulatory system, economic and political stability and the capacity to process emission reduction projects efficiently. This paper looks at the carbon investment climate in the transition countries eligible for Joint Implementation (JI)—Russia, Ukraine, Croatia and the EU accession countries. It concludes that JI investors will face a clear trade-off between the scope for cheap JI on the one hand, and the quality of the business environment and JI institutions on the other. The countries with the highest potential for cheap emission reductions also tend to be the countries with the most difficult business climate and the least institutional capacity for JI. The most attractive JI locations may be median countries with a reasonable JI potential and an acceptable business climate, such as Bulgaria, Romania and the Slovak Republic.     

The investment climate for climate investment: Joint Implementation in transition countries

Transition countries are expected to become important players in the emerging market for greenhouse gas emission reductions, as they can cut emissions at a relatively low cost. However, the attractiveness of the region as a supplier of emission reductions will not only depend on its cost advantage. It will also depend on the business climate offered to carbon investors—factors like a well-functioning legal and regulatory system, economic and political stability and the capacity to process emission reduction projects efficiently. This paper looks at the carbon investment climate in the transition countries eligible for Joint Implementation (JI)—Russia, Ukraine, Croatia and the EU accession countries. It concludes that JI investors will face a clear trade-off between the scope for cheap JI on the one hand, and the quality of the business environment and JI institutions on the other. The countries with the highest potential for cheap emission reductions also tend to be the countries with the most difficult business climate and the least institutional capacity for JI. The most attractive JI locations may be median countries with a reasonable JI potential and an acceptable business climate, such as Bulgaria, Romania and the Slovak Republic.     

应对气候变化南南合作优先合作国家选择方法探讨

应对气候变化南南合作是中国领导人在巴黎气候大会上的庄严承诺,也是体现“十九大”会议精神“成为全球生态文明建设的重要参与者、贡献者、引领者”的具体实践。作为我国重要的对外援助方案,相关研究还比较缺乏。实践中对外援助国的选择通常是根据领导人出访地和一些重要国际会议举办地等确定,缺乏系统性、连续性,这也符合对外援助初级阶段的特征。为了更加高效、系统地推进气候变化南南合作持续开展,产生更好的环境和社会效益,文中基于定量评估的方法学对南南合作优先合作国家的选择开展了讨论。通过专家集体打分与层次分析法确定评价指标及权重,采用阶段阈值法将不同国家在评估指标上的表现转化为定量分值,并进行国家综合得分计算和排名。计算结果显示,南非、巴基斯坦、孟加拉国、柬埔寨、印度尼西亚等国位于潜在受援国前五位,文中还列出了建议优先合作的20个国家及位序。总体来看,排名前20的受援国均属于联合国机制下77+中国集团,90%为“一带一路”倡议参与国,70%是亚投行成员国,评估结论与中国发起的重大合作倡议具有高度的相关性,不仅可以支持应对气候变化南南合作开展,也能呼应和推动中国主导的其他国际议程发展。本文尝试在传统的定性描述和评估为主的领域,引入定量评估研究方法,在研究方法学应用上进行拓展。论文研究结论可以为相关部门选择应对气候变化南南合作优先合作国家提供参考。     

A credible compliance enforcement system for the climate regime

The compliance enforcement system of the Kyoto Protocol provides only weak incentives for Parties to comply with their commitments. For example, the penalties for non-compliant countries are not legally binding, and moreover, there is no second-order punishment for those countries that fail to implement them. Thus, a Party can simply refuse to comply without consequence. The alternative compliance enforcement systems that have been proposed in the literature also face substantial problems. A simple, flexible, potent, and credible compliance enforcement system for a post-Kyoto climate agreement, based on deposits, is proposed here: at ratification, each country deposits a significant amount of money, and continues to do so in the preparation stage each year until the start of the commitment period. At the end of this period, those countries that meet their emissions limitation targets receive a full refund of their deposit, while those that fail to do so forfeit part or all of it. A simplified two-country model of the deposit system and a numerical example of an agreement involving the US, Japan, Russia, and Europe is also provided. If each country's deposit is no less than its abatement costs, there is a strong incentive for participating countries to avoid non-compliance.     

Constructed peer groups and path dependence in international organizations: The case of the international climate change negotiations

International organizations sometimes institutionalize country groupings by specifying differentiated commitments that may, in turn, affect negotiation dynamics. Drawing on incentive-based and socialization arguments, we develop a “constructed peer group” hypothesis suggesting that by creating these groups those organizations may actually construct new lines of confrontation over and above the substance-based disagreements existing between countries. This generates a particular type of path dependence, rendering broad-based international agreements more difficult in the future.We analyze this question at the example of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change's increasingly politicized split between Annex I and non-Annex I countries. Using a self-coded dataset of country oral statements during the negotiations between December 2007 and December 2009 we assess whether Annex I membership influences a country's stance toward other countries’ arguments, while controlling for country characteristics that may drive their preferences and the affiliation to Annex I. We find that the split between Annex I and non-Annex I has indeed influenced negotiation behavior and amplified the divide between developing and industrialized countries in the climate negotiations.