Building bridges to 2020 and beyond: the road from Bali

What would the shape of a realistic, yet ambitious, package for the climate regime after 2012 look like? How do we obtain a package deal starting in Bali but building bridges to a post-2020 climate regime? A fair, effective, flexible and inclusive package deal has to strike a core balance between development and climate imperatives (mitigation, adaptation, dealing with the impacts of response measures, technology transfer, investment and finance) to create bargaining space and establish a conceptual contract zone. Within a continuum of possible packages, two packages in the contract zone are identified: ‘multi-stage’ and ‘ambitious transitional’. The latter is ambitious, combining domestic cap-and-trade for the USA, deeper cuts for Annex B countries, and quantifiable mitigation actions by developing countries. It is transitional as a possible bridge to a more inclusive regime beyond 2020. Multi-stage is defined around mechanisms by which countries move through increasingly stringent levels of participation, and must be based upon agreed triggers. Our assessment of political dynamics is that multi-stage is not yet in the political contract zone. Key to this is the absence of a ‘trigger from the North’, in that the largest historical emitter must act earlier and most decisively. But progress will also depend on continued leadership from Annex B countries, as well as more proactive, incentivized leadership in the South. Agreeing on the transitional stage is the critical next step in the evolution of the climate regime. Negotiating any package will require an institutional space for bargaining, political leadership and trust, and a clear time-frame.     

Who picks up the remainder? Mitigation in developed and developing countries

A fair, effective, flexible and inclusive climate regime beyond 2012 will need several political balances. Mitigation and funding will be at the heart of the agreement. The IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report indicates that absolute reductions will be needed in Annex I (AI) countries and substantial deviation from baseline in some non-Annex I (NAI) regions by 2020. Although the latter was not explicitly quantified by the IPCC, the EU subsequently proposed a range for developing countries. Sharing the burden for mitigation is essentially zero-sum: if one does less, the other has to do more. We critically examine the implicit assumption that NAI countries would pick up the remainder of the required global effort minus the AI contribution. We suggest that greater levels of ambition can be achieved by turning the formula around politically, starting from the achievable ‘deviation below baseline’ given NAI's national programmes and appropriate international support. AI countries may have to exceed the IPCC ranges or pay for the remainder. For notional levels of NAI mitigation action, Annex I has to reduce by between ?52% and ?69% below 1990 by 2020, only dropping to a domestic ?35% with commitments to offset payments through the carbon market. Given the large mitigation gap, a political agreement on the question of ‘who pays’ is fundamental. The carbon market will provide some investment, but it mainly serves to reduce costs, particularly in developed countries, rather than adding to the overall effort. Market-linked levies and Annex I public funding will therefore be crucial to bridge the gap.     

Great-power politics,order transition,and climate governance: insights from international relations theory

The complex politics of climate change cannot be properly understood without reference to deeper geopolitical trends in the wider international system. Chief among these is the growing resurgence of ‘great-power politics’ between China and the US, along with failures of socialization and enmeshment into global governance structures in relation to these two powers. Traditional theoretical frameworks have failed to adequately account for these developments. Nonetheless, this current great-power contestation is at the core of an order transition that has prevented the large-scale institutional redesign required to remove deadlocks in existing global governance structures, including climate governance. Examples from the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference provide ample evidence for these claims. The slow progress of the climate change negotiations are due not just to the politics of the issue itself, but to the absence of a new political bargain on material power structures, normative beliefs, and the management of the order amongst the great powers. Without such a grand political bargain, which could be promoted through a forum of major economies whose wide-ranging remit would go beyond single issues, the climate change regime is only ever likely to progress in a piecemeal fashion.

Policy relevance

Despite the achievements of the 2012 Doha Climate Change Conference, the climate negotiations are not on course to limit warming to 2 °C, and thereby avoid ‘dangerous’ climate change. Several factors have been invoked to account for such slow progress: notably, the nature of the climate change problem itself, the institutional structure of the climate regime, and lack of political will among key players. An alternative explanation is proposed such that the failure to seriously address climate change – as well as other global problems – reflects a resurgent meta-struggle between the ‘great powers’ of China and the US over the nature of the global order. Without such a broader understanding of the deeper dynamics underlying the stalemates of the climate change negotiations, there is little chance of turning those negotiations around.     

《巴厘行动计划》以来适应气候变化谈判进展及未来需求分析

回顾了《巴厘行动计划》以来形成的与适应气候变化议题相关的国际决议及谈判进展,分析了这些决议对推动发展中国家适应气候变化进程的可能作用和面临的障碍,综述了发展中国家和发达国家对“2015气候协议”的利益诉求和建议。作者认为：《巴厘行动计划》以来,《联合国气候变化框架公约》下适应气候变化方面的谈判取得了较明显的进展,建立了适应委员会、国家适应计划进程和应对损失与危害的国际机制等;资金、技术研发、推广和使用、政策法规、机构设置与能力、信息等是提高发展中国家适应气候变化的限制因素;资金、技术转让和能力建设仍是“2015气候协议”谈判的重点和难点。针对非洲集团和小岛屿国家联盟全球适应目标和应对气候变化造成的损失与危害的补偿的提议,作者建议加强科学研究,开发评估方法和工具,探讨气候自然变率和人类活动导致的气候变化影响的归因;同时建议中国进一步加强适应气候变化的南南合作。     

Climate politics at a crossroad: views on building a consensus

The climate change issue faces a big challenge, perhaps the biggest challenge of all—politics. Pakistan has taken many noticeable steps in relation to climate change: (1) it is the only country in which the Prime Minister is heading an inter-ministerial task force on climate change, (2) it is the first developing country to establish a specialized, self-financed scientific centre to research the impact of climate change, and (3) it is the lead country to earmark budgetary funds for a national carbon sequestration programme. Pakistan, together with many developing countries, has much to offer the climate change issues. The author proposes five approaches to build consensus among climate policy negotiators: (1) reinforcing the polluter pays principle and ‘common but differentiated responsibility’, (2) active partnership by developing countries, (3) recognizing the voluntary actions taken by developing countries, (4) reinforcing the issue of adaptation, and (5) considering the option of equal per capita entitlements.     

A new look at climate equity in the UNFCCC

Equity has been at the core of the global climate debate since its inception over two decades ago, yet the current negotiations toward an international climate agreement in 2015 provide a new and critical opportunity to make forward progress on the difficult web of equity issues. These negotiations and the discussions about equity are taking place in a context that has shifted: all countries will be covered under a new agreement; growing climate impacts are being felt, especially by the most vulnerable; and there is an emergence of new institutions and increasing complexity in the international climate regime. Innovative thinking on equity, including which countries should take action and how, is therefore essential to finalizing an agreement by 2015. A broader, deeper, and more holistic view of equity is necessary, one that sees equity as a multi-dimensional challenge to be solved across all the facets of the international climate process.

Policy relevance

This article is relevant to policy makers following the development of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform as it prepares the way for a new agreement in 2015. The article focuses specifically on the issues most relevant to the debate around equity in the negotiations and how that debate is evolving with the expansion of the UNFCCC. It explains the current state of the negotiations and what issues are on the negotiating table, including the fact that negotiations on equity are now much broader than the mitigation commitments, to include the possible ‘equity reference framework’, concerns relating to adaptation and loss and damage, and the need for ambition in terms of mitigation and finance support.     

Constructed peer groups and path dependence in international organizations: The case of the international climate change negotiations

International organizations sometimes institutionalize country groupings by specifying differentiated commitments that may, in turn, affect negotiation dynamics. Drawing on incentive-based and socialization arguments, we develop a “constructed peer group” hypothesis suggesting that by creating these groups those organizations may actually construct new lines of confrontation over and above the substance-based disagreements existing between countries. This generates a particular type of path dependence, rendering broad-based international agreements more difficult in the future.We analyze this question at the example of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change's increasingly politicized split between Annex I and non-Annex I countries. Using a self-coded dataset of country oral statements during the negotiations between December 2007 and December 2009 we assess whether Annex I membership influences a country's stance toward other countries’ arguments, while controlling for country characteristics that may drive their preferences and the affiliation to Annex I. We find that the split between Annex I and non-Annex I has indeed influenced negotiation behavior and amplified the divide between developing and industrialized countries in the climate negotiations.     

波兹南会议之后的气候变化政治格局

2008年12月的波兹南会议作为巴厘岛和哥本哈根一次中间会议,既要全面回顾巴厘路线图的执行情况又要为即将到来的哥本哈根谈判作好准备,因此极为重要。发达国家、发展中国家两大谈判阵营,欧盟、美国和"77国集团+中国"三股主要力量围绕长期愿景、减排目标、适应、资金和技术转让等问题谈判激烈。2009年奥巴马执政以来美国与欧盟气候立场逐渐靠拢,新兴发展中大国地位愈发凸显,其他谈判力量也根据自身情况不断作出立场调整。中国在国际气候机制形成和发展中已处于关键位置,如何根据政治格局变化维护发展中国家利益和立场,实现负责任大国形象和国内低碳发展将伴随着整个后京都过程。     

Difficulties in accounting for private finance in international climate policy

It is widely acknowledged that private finance has a key role to play in achieving low-carbon development and resilience to climate change. However, while there have been several studies that have closely examined the data on public climate finance, there have been few such studies of the private climate-related finance data. There is a political dimension to accounting for ‘private finance’ given the commitment of industrialized countries – enshrined in the Copenhagen Accord and the Cancun Agreements – to mobilize US$100 billion of public and private finance for developing countries by 2020, on an annual basis. The availability and quality of data for different types of private climate finance flows with climate benefits (investments, carbon market payments, and voluntary funding) are analysed, and these flows are assessed according to various criteria for inclusion in the $100 billion figure. While existing data suggest that private climate finance invested in developing countries and mobilized by industrialized countries might currently be in the range of $27–123 billion per year, this number is a questionable point of reference. Existing data are limited and of very poor quality: definitions of ‘private climate finance’ are missing and data are hardly verified. Therefore, policy makers will first have to clearly define ‘private climate finance’ and develop systems for measuring, reporting, and verifying it, before using private finance numbers in international climate agreements.     

Sector-based approach to the post-2012 climate change policy architecture

A sectoral approach to GHG emissions reductions in developing countries is proposed as a key component of the post-2012 climate change mitigation framework. In this approach, the ten highest-emitting developing countries in the electricity and other major industrial sectors pledge to meet voluntary, ‘no-lose’ GHG emissions targets in these sectors. No penalties are incurred for failing to meet a target, but emissions reductions achieved beyond the target level earn emissions reduction credits (ERCs) that can be sold to industrialized nations. Participating developing countries establish initial ‘no-lose’ emissions targets, based upon their national circumstances, from sector-specific energyintensity benchmarks that have been developed by independent experts. Industrialized nations then offer incentives for the developing countries to adopt more stringent emissions targets through a ‘Technology Finance and Assistance Package’, which helps to overcome financial and other barriers to technology transfer and deployment. These sectorspecific energy-intensity benchmarks could also serve as a means for establishing national economy-wide targets in developed countries in the post-2012 regime. Preliminary modelling of a hybrid scenario, in which Annex I countries adopt economy-wide absolute GHG emissions targets and high-emitting developing countries adopt ‘no-lose’ sectoral targets, indicates that such an approach significantly improves the likelihood that atmospheric concentrations of CO₂ can be stabilized at 450 ppmv by the end of the century.     

Governing-by-aspiration? Assessing the nature and implications of including negative emission technologies (NETs) in country long-term climate strategies

In order to address the pressing challenge of climate change, countries are now submitting long-term climate strategies to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process. These strategies include within them potential future use of ‘negative emissions technologies’ (NETs). NETs are interventions that remove carbon from the atmosphere, ranging from large-scale terrestrial carbon sequestration in forests, wetlands and soils, to use of carbon capture and storage technologies. We assess here how NETs are discussed in 29 long-term climate strategies, in order to ascertain the risk that including the promise of future NETs may delay the taking of short-term mitigation actions. Our analysis shows that almost all countries plan to rely on NETs, particularly enhanced use of natural carbon sinks, even as a wide array of challenges and trade-offs in doing so are highlighted. Many strategies call for improved accounting systems and market incentives in realizing future NETs. While no strategy explicitly suggests that NETs can be a substitute for short-term mitigation, most estimate substantial potential for future use of NETs even in the face of acknowledged uncertainties. This, we suggest, may have the consequence of resulting in what we describe here as ‘a spiral of delay’ characterized by the promise of future NET options juxtaposed with the simultaneous uncertainty around these future options. Our analysis highlights that this inter-connected delaying dynamic may be intrinsic to what we term ‘governing-by-aspiration’ within global climate politics, wherein the voicing of lofty future ambition risks replacing current action and accountability.     

从哥本哈根气候变化大会看气候变化谈判的焦点问题及IPCC第五次评估报告的可能作用

从哥本哈根气候变化大会的谈判焦点可以预期,后续国际气候变化谈判的重点将是谈判的基础案文、发达国家在《京都议定书》第二承诺期进一步的量化减排承诺以及长期目标的表述等问题。IPCC第五次评估报告将对以往报告已阐述的科学问题和基本结论加以巩固并提供更有说服力的证据和论据,更加侧重区域问题,增加适应和减缓经济学成本、气候变化与可持续发展等内容的分析。关于气候变化检测和归因、气候变化影响和关键脆弱性、大气温室气体浓度稳定水平、适应的选择及其成本效益、减缓措施的选择和社会经济成本、责任分担机制及公平性等问题的评估结论,将对谈判进程的推进发挥重要作用。     

Proposal for a poverty-adaptation-mitigation window within the Green Climate Fund

The stakes for alleviating poverty and avoiding unbridled climate change are inextricably linked. Climate change impacts will slow down and may even reverse trends in poverty reduction. The pathways consistent with global warming of no more than 2?°C require strategies for poverty alleviation to make allowance for the constraint of low-carbon development. Existing climate funds have failed to target poverty alleviation as a high-priority strategy for adaptation or as a component of low-carbon development. This article proposes a funding window as part of the Green Climate Fund in order to foster synergies targeting greater satisfaction of basic needs, while making allowance for adaptation and mitigation. This financial mechanism is based on indicators of the satisfaction of basic needs and could respond to the claims of the developing countries, which see alleviating poverty as the first priority in climate negotiations. It defines a country continuum, given that there are poor people everywhere; all developing countries are therefore eligible with a mechanism of this sort.

Policy relevance

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) calls for substantial emissions reductions and adaptation strategies over the next decades to reduce the high risks of severe impacts of climate change over the 21st century. Industrialized countries and developing countries alike recognize the need to mitigate climate change and to adapt to it. But they face many challenges that lead to an ‘emissions gap’ between an emissions level consistent with the 2?°C increase limit and the voluntary pledges that they have made thus far in the climate negotiations (United Nations Environment Programme. (2014). The Emissions Gap Report 2014. A UNEP synthesis report). In this arena, many developing countries underline that their first domestic priority is the satisfaction of basic needs. In the run-up to the next climate negotiations at the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP 21) in Paris, the proposed poverty-adaptation-mitigation funding window could contribute to alleviate the conflict between development and climate goals in developing countries. In this sense, it could spur developing countries to integrate more ambitious emissions limitations pledges into their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions. This could in turn entice industrialized countries to act similarly. In the end, it could pave the way to an ambitious climate agreement in Paris at COP 21.     

中国参与构建2012年后国际气候制度的战略思考

 2009年将是构建2012年后应对气候变化国际制度的关键时期,而除了温室气体的减排目标和责任分摊之外,减缓和适应气候变化以及相应的技术和资金支持都将会是最为关键的影响要素。在对国际气候制度的关键影响要素进行梳理并对其进程进行分析的基础上,结合不断变化的国际国内政治、经济、环境和社会形势,对中国在2012年后国际气候谈判以及中长期应对气候变化的策略进行了探讨。     

Measurable,reportable and verifiable: the keys to mitigation in the Copenhagen deal

The climate negotiations up to Copenhagen will need to elaborate on measurable, reportable and verifiable (MRV) mitigation commitments and actions as part of the future of the climate regime. The conceptual, political, scientific, financial and institutional principles for MRV are explored for (1) mitigation commitments in developed countries, (2) mitigation actions in developing countries, supported by (3) means of implementation. For developed countries, the procedures in Articles 5, 7, 8 and 18 of the Kyoto Protocol will be critical in order to ensure comparability of commitments, both in effort and compliance. Outcomes should be reportable and verifiable through Annex I national communications and in-depth review. Existing procedures could be enhanced and need to apply across Protocol and Convention. MRV mitigation actions by developing countries should result in measurable deviations below baseline. Inventories will be important to measure, and enhanced national communications for reporting. The challenge will be to make mitigation actions verifiable, and options include verification by domestic institutions working to internationally agreed guidelines. A critical distinction is to be made between unilateral mitigation actions and those with international support. MRV applies to the provision of the means of implementation, including technology and finance. Investment in technology can be measured, so that institutional arrangements for technology and finance should be aligned. Verification of funds raised at international level would be simpler than raising funds nationally.     

Drivers of national climate policy

Patterns of national climate policy performance and their implications for the geopolitics of climate change are examined. An overview of levels of emissions performance across countries is first provided. Substantial changes in emissions trends over time are documented, notably with GHG emissions trajectories, which are shaped less and less by the developed/developing country divide. Various patterns of policy convergence and divergence in the types of policies states implement are then surveyed. Four broad types of explanation that may account for these trends are then explored: (1) variation in the institutional form of country-level governance regimes, (2) patterns of dependence on fossil fuel energy, (3) broad systemic differences among states (specifically in their population densities, carbon intensity, and per capita incomes, and (4) variations in the traditions of economic intervention by states. The article contributes to the growing body of work on comparative climate policy, and provides a first attempt at exploring the comparative politics of instrument choice. The analysis challenges the continued importance of a North–South divide for the future of climate policy, thus reinforcing a sense of the ‘new geopolitics’ of climate change. Some of the implications of the analysis for debates about the form of future international agreement on mitigation policy are also explored.

Policy relevance

The article contributes to the understanding of the variety of institutional conditions under which policy makers develop policy and thus the constraints and opportunities for the design of international agreements under these conditions.     

Future mitigation commitments: differentiating among non-Annex I countries

Abstract

In the long term, any definition of adequacy consistent with UNFCCC Article 2 will require increased mitigation efforts from almost all countries. Therefore, an expansion of emission limitation commitments will form a central element of any future architecture of the climate regime. This expansion has two elements: deepening of quantitative commitments for Annex B countries and the adoption of commitments for those countries outside of the current limitation regime. This article seeks to provide a more analytical basis for further differentiation among non-Annex I countries. To be both fair and reflective of national circumstances, it is based on the criteria of responsibility, capability and potential to mitigate. Altogether, non-Annex I countries were differentiated in four groups, each including countries with similar national circumstances: newly industrialized countries (NICs), rapidly industrializing countries (RIDCs), ‘other developing countries’, and least developed countries (LDCs). Based on the same criteria that were used for differentiating among non-Annex I countries, a set of decision rules was developed to assign mitigation and financial transfer commitments to each group of countries (including Annex I countries). Applying these decision rules results in (strict) reduction commitments for Annex I countries, but also implies quantifiable mitigation obligations for NICs and RIDCs, assisted by financial transfers from the North. Other developing countries are obliged to take qualitative commitments, but quantifiable mitigation commitments for these countries and the LDC group would be not justifiable. As national circumstances in countries evolve over time, the composition of the groups will change according to agreed triggers.     

附件一国家温室气体排放趋势及其履约进展

对《联合国气候变化框架公约》秘书处最新公布的温室气体排放数据进行统计分析,结果显示：相对于基准年（1990年）,附件一国家温室气体排放总量整体呈下降趋势。其中,经济转型期国家温室气体排放总量总体上呈逐年下降趋势,非经济转型期国家的温室气体排放总量有逐年增长的趋势。美国和加拿大能源部门的温室气体排放量增长最为显著,相对于1990年,2005年其增幅分别为19.2%和28.6%;英国和德国能源部门温室气体减排量最为显著,其减幅分别为7.8%和17.4%。在2005年,有超过一半的附件一国家的实际排放量低于其目标排放量,履约进展状况良好。     

附件一国家温室气体排放趋势及其履约进展

 对《联合国气候变化框架公约》秘书处最新公布的温室气体排放数据进行统计分析,结果显示：相对于基准年（1990年）,附件一国家温室气体排放总量整体呈下降趋势。其中,经济转型期国家温室气体排放总量总体上呈逐年下降趋势,非经济转型期国家的温室气体排放总量有逐年增长的趋势。美国和加拿大能源部门的温室气体排放量增长最为显著,相对于1990年,2005年其增幅分别为19.2%和28.6%;英国和德国能源部门温室气体减排量最为显著,其减幅分别为7.8%和17.4%。在2005年,有超过一半的附件一国家的实际排放量低于其目标排放量,履约进展状况良好。     

Rising powers: the evolving role of BASIC countries

The exponential growth in global populations, economic activity and resource utilization means it is becoming increasingly difficult to satisfy global demand for a number of fundamental resources, while some key ecosystems services are under stress. The likelihood of future resource scarcities have begun to influence the positions taken within international climate change negotiations by fast-growing developing countries. When Brazil, South Africa, India, and China formed the BASIC group it took many by surprise. The coordination needed to align this heterogeneous group of countries cannot simply be understood in terms of a set of shared interests around climate policy. How the BASIC group emerged and the nature of its cooperation on climate change are examined within the broader context in which these increasingly powerful countries came to join forces. Although traditionally aligned with the G77 group of developing countries, recent strategising as a group of emerging economies reflects their realization that there are insufficient global resources available to follow the same development pathway as industrialized countries. Hence, they must seek alternative growth pathways, which requires establishing common ground while also keeping track of each others' positions on important global issues like climate change.