Processes of elite power and low-carbon pathways: Experimentation,financialisation, and dispossession

What is a low-carbon pathway? To many, it is a way of mitigating climate change. To others, it is about addressing market failure or capturing the co-benefits attached to low-carbon systems, such as jobs or improved health. To still others, it represents building adaptive capacity and resilience in the face of climate change. However, these interpretations can fail to acknowledge how pathways of low-carbon transitions can also become intertwined with processes and structures of inequality, exclusion and injustice. Using a critical lens that draws from a variety of disciplines, this article explores three ways through which responses to climate change can entrench, exacerbate or reconfigure the power of elites. As society attempts to create a low-carbon society, including for example via coastal protection efforts, disaster recovery, or climate change mitigation and renewable energy, these efforts intersect with at least three processes of elite power: experimentation, financialisation, and dispossession. Experimentation is when elites use the world as a laboratory to test or pilot low-carbon technologies or policy models, transferring risks yet not always sharing benefits. Financialisation refers to the expansion and proliferation of finance, capital, and financial markets in the global economy and many national economies, processes of which have recently extended to renewable energy. Dispossession is when elites use decarbonisation as a process through which to appropriate land, wealth, or other assets (and in the process make society more majoritarian and/or unequal). We explore these three themes using a variety of evidence across illustrative case studies, including hard and soft coastal protection measures (Bangladesh, Netherlands), climate risk insurance (Malawi), and renewable energy auctions and associated mechanisms of finance and investment (South Africa and Mexico).     

Landscape for change? International climate policy and energy transitions: evidence from sub-Saharan Africa

What is the role of the climate regime in facilitating rapid decarbonization of the world’s energy systems? We examine how core assumptions concerning the roles of the nation state, carbon markets and finance and technology in international climate policy are being challenged by the realities of how transitions in the energy systems are unfolding. Drawing on the critical region of sub-Saharan Africa, we examine the potential for international climate policy to foster new trajectories towards decarbonization.

Policy relevance

The international regime for climate policy has been in place for some twenty years. Despite significant changes in the landscape of energy systems and drivers of global GHG emissions over this time, the core principles and tools remain relatively stable – national governments, carbon markets, project-based climate finance and the transfer of technological hardware. Given the diversity of actors and drivers and the limited direct reach and influence of international climate policy, however, there is an urgent need to consider how the climate regime can best support the embryonic transitions that are slowly taking form around the world. To do this effectively requires a more nuanced understanding of the role of the state in governing these transitions beyond the notion of a cohesive state serving as rule-enforcer and transition manager. It also requires a broader view of technology, not just as hardware that is transferred, but as a set of practices and networks of expertise and enabling actors. Likewise, though markets have an important role to play as vehicles for achieving broader ends, they are not an end in themselves. Finally on finance, while acknowledging the important role of climate aid, often as a multiplier or facilitator of more ambitious private flows, it is critical to differentiate between the types of finance required for different transitions, many of which will not be counted under, or directed by, the climate regime. In sum, the (low-) carbon economy is being built in ways and in numerous sites that the climate regime needs to be cognizant of and engage with productively, and this may require fundamental reconsideration of the building blocks of the international climate regime.     

From Lima to Paris,Part 1: The Lima Hangover

A growing body of literature suggests that an economic case may exist for investment in large-scale climate change mitigation. At the same time, however, investment is persistently falling well short of the levels required to prevent dangerous climate change, suggesting that economically attractive mitigation opportunities are being missed. To understand whether and where these opportunities exist, this article contrasts macro-level analyses of climate finance with micro-level bottom-up analyses of the scale and composition of low-carbon investment opportunities in four case study developing world cities. This analysis finds that there are significant opportunities to redirect existing finance streams towards more cost-effective, lower-carbon options. This would mobilize substantial new investment in climate mitigation. Two key explanations are proposed for the failure to exploit these opportunities. First, the composition of cost-effective measures is highly context-specific, varying from place to place and sector to sector. Macro-level analyses of climate finance flows are therefore poor indicators of the micro-level landscape for low-carbon investment. Specific local research is therefore needed to understand the opportunities for cost-effective mitigation at that level. Second, many opportunities require enabling governance arrangements that are not currently in place. Mobilizing new low-carbon investment and closing the ‘climate finance gap' therefore requires attention to policy frameworks and financing mechanisms that can facilitate the exploitation of cost-effective low-carbon options.

Policy relevance

The importance of increasing investment in climate mitigation, especially in developing nations, is well established. This article scrutinizes four city-level studies of the scope for cost-effective low-carbon investment, and finds that significant opportunities are not being exploited in developing world cities. Enabling governance structures may help to mainstream climate considerations into investments by local actors (households, businesses and government agencies). While climate finance distributed through international bodies such as the Green Climate Fund may not always be a suitable vehicle to invest directly in disaggregated, local-level measures, it can provide the incentives to develop these governance arrangements.     

Difficulties in accounting for private finance in international climate policy

It is widely acknowledged that private finance has a key role to play in achieving low-carbon development and resilience to climate change. However, while there have been several studies that have closely examined the data on public climate finance, there have been few such studies of the private climate-related finance data. There is a political dimension to accounting for ‘private finance’ given the commitment of industrialized countries – enshrined in the Copenhagen Accord and the Cancun Agreements – to mobilize US$100 billion of public and private finance for developing countries by 2020, on an annual basis. The availability and quality of data for different types of private climate finance flows with climate benefits (investments, carbon market payments, and voluntary funding) are analysed, and these flows are assessed according to various criteria for inclusion in the $100 billion figure. While existing data suggest that private climate finance invested in developing countries and mobilized by industrialized countries might currently be in the range of $27–123 billion per year, this number is a questionable point of reference. Existing data are limited and of very poor quality: definitions of ‘private climate finance’ are missing and data are hardly verified. Therefore, policy makers will first have to clearly define ‘private climate finance’ and develop systems for measuring, reporting, and verifying it, before using private finance numbers in international climate agreements.     

New lessons for technology policy and climate change: investment for innovation

The direction of UK energy policy requires a renewed impetus if the goal of climate change stabilization is to be met. Cost is not the main issue: a transformation to a low-carbon energy system may be no more expensive than meeting future energy demands with fossil fuels. Institutional barriers are preventing the large-scale adoption of the necessary technologies. New institutions to promote low-carbon technologies have not yet led to investment on the necessary scale. Further changes to the operation of the UK electricity markets to create a ‘level playing field’ for small-scale and intermittent generation are necessary. UK policy can contribute to international agreements following on from the Kyoto Accord, which also need to address the institutional barriers to energy technology development and transfer.     

Modelling innovation and the macroeconomics of low-carbon transitions: theory,perspectives and practical use

Energy and climate policies may have significant economy-wide impacts, which are regularly assessed based on quantitative energy-environment-economy models. These tend to vary in their conclusions on the scale and direction of the likely macroeconomic impacts of a low-carbon transition. This paper traces the characteristic discrepancies in models’ outcomes to their origins in different macro-economic theories, most importantly their treatment of technological innovation and finance. We comprehensively analyse the relevant branches of macro-innovation theory and group them into two classes: ‘Equilibrium’ and ‘Non-equilibrium’. While both approaches are rigorous and self-consistent, they frequently yield opposite conclusions for the economic impacts of low-carbon policies. We show that model outcomes are mainly determined by their representations of monetary and finance dimensions, and their interactions with investment, innovation and technological change. Improving these in all modelling approaches is crucial for strengthening the evidence base for policy making and gaining a more consistent picture of the macroeconomic impacts of achieving emissions reductions objectives. The paper contributes towards the ongoing effort of enhancing the transparency and understanding of sophisticated model mechanisms applied to energy and climate policy analysis. It helps tackle the overall ‘black box’ critique, much-cited in policy circles and elsewhere.

Key policy insights

• Quantitative models commissioned by policy-makers to assess the macroeconomic impacts of climate policy generate contradictory outcomes and interpretations.

• The source of the differences in model outcomes originates primarily from assumptions on the workings of the financial sector and the nature of money, and of how these interact with processes of low-carbon energy innovation and technological change.

• Representations of innovation and technological change are incomplete in energy-economy-environment models, leading to limitations in the assessment of the impacts of climate-related policies.

• All modelling studies should state clearly their underpinning theoretical school and their treatment of finance and innovation.

• A strong recommendation is given for modellers of energy-economy systems to improve their representations of money and finance.

     

Quantifying barriers to decarbonization of the Russian economy: real options analysis of investment risks in low-carbon technologies

Russia has significant potential for reducing its carbon emissions. However, investment in new low-carbon technologies has significant risks. Ambiguous energy and climate policy in Russia, along with deterioration of the country's investment climate, create investment barriers that are well described in qualitative terms in the literature. This paper attempts to provide a quantitative analysis of these barriers. For this numerical experiment, we apply the RU-TIMES model. Using a real options methodology, we estimate the risk-adjusted cost of capital in the Russian energy sector (including energy production and consumption technologies represented in the TIMES framework) to be approximately 43% (including a risk-free interest rate) and demonstrate the high risk of investment into energy-efficient and low-carbon technologies. Any future low-carbon emissions pathway depends on the ability of the Russian government to reduce climate and energy policy uncertainties, and to reduce financial risks through improvements of the general investment climate.

Key policy insights

• The high cost of capital investment into Russian energy production and consumption may prevent the adoption of new energy-efficient and low-carbon technologies.

• These investment risks, if not addressed, will delay Russia's low-carbon transition for the coming decades.

• Adopting a clear and unambiguous long-term climate and energy policy is important to reduce these risks and alleviate some of the barriers to the new technologies.

• The first step could be ratification of the Paris Agreement and adoption of a long-term emission target for the period up to 2050.

     

Investment risk and return under renewable decarbonization of a power market

How does financial performance risk affect investments in low-carbon electricity-generating technologies to achieve climate policy targets? A detailed risk simulation of price formation in the Great Britain wholesale power market is used to show that the increasing replacement of fossil facilities with wind, ceteris paribus, may cause a deterioration of the financial risk–return performance metrics for incremental investments. Low-carbon investments appear to be high risk, low return, and as such may require a progressively higher level of support over time than envisaged by the conventional degression trajectories. The increasing riskiness of the wholesale market will to some extent offset the benefits of lower capital costs and operational efficiencies if investors need to satisfy cautious debt coverage ratios alongside positive expected returns. This increased risk is additional to the well-known ‘merit order effect’ of low-carbon investments progressively depressing wholesale prices and hence their expected investment returns.

Policy relevance

Policy support for renewable technologies such as wind is usually based upon levelized costs and is expected to reduce over time as capital costs and operational efficiencies improve. However, levelized costs do not take full account of the risk aversion that investors may have in practice. Expected policy support reductions may be moderated to some extent by the increased financial performance risk that intermittent technologies bring to the power market. The annual risk-return profiles for incremental investments deteriorate for all technologies as wind replaces fossil fuels. This extra risk premium will need to be incorporated into evaluating policy incentives for new investments in a decarbonizing power market.     

Triggering the low-carbon transition in the aftermath of the global financial crisis

An assessment of the post-Kyoto climate change negotiations, and the altered role of climate finance post-financial crisis, is presented. First, the paradigm shift of the Cancun Agreements is examined from an historical perspective and it is shown that the impasse in the negotiations, caused by the underlying over-emphasis on burden sharing reductions in emissions, can be overcome. Second, using information from two modelling exercises, it is demonstrated how climate finance can encourage the decoupling of carbon emissions from economic growth and thereby help align the development pattern with global climate goals. Third, a framework to place carbon finance within current discussions is sketched regarding both the reformation of the world financial systems and the facilitation of a sustainable economic recovery that is beneficial for North and South while addressing the low-carbon transition. It is concluded that upgrading climate finance is the key to triggering the shift to a low-carbon society and a system is proposed in which an agreed social cost of carbon is used to support the establishment of carbon emissions certificates to reorient a significant portion of global savings towards low-carbon investments.

Policy relevance

Investments that align development and climate objectives are shown to substantially lower the social cost of carbon and deliver long-term carbon emissions reductions. These reductions are greater than those contributed by the sole carbon price signal generated by a world cap-and-trade system. Carbon finance, as a part of the broader reform of financial systems and overseas aid, can help overcome the dual adversity of climate and financial crisis contexts. The carbon certificate, with an upfront agreed social cost of carbon, can be used as its instrument. The portion of the banking system that intends to reorient a significant part of world savings towards low-carbon investments could thus issue such carbon certificates. By giving carbon assets the status of a reserve currency, the system could even respond to the need of emerging countries to diversify their foreign exchange reserves and trigger a wave of worldwide sustainable growth through infrastructure markets.     

Escaping the climate policy uncertainty trap: options contracts for REDD+

Climate policy uncertainty significantly hinders investments in low-carbon technologies, and the global community is behind schedule to curb carbon emissions. Strong actions will be necessary to limit the increase in global temperatures, and continued delays create risks of escalating climate change damages and future policy costs. These risks are system-wide, long-term and large-scale and thus hard to diversify across firms. Because of its unique scale, cost structure and near-term availability, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation in developing countries (REDD+) has significant potential to help manage climate policy risks and facilitate the transition to lower greenhouse gas emissions. ‘Call’ options contracts in the form of the right but not the obligation to buy high-quality emissions reduction credits from jurisdictional REDD+ programmes at a predetermined price per ton of CO₂ could help unlock this potential despite the current lack of carbon markets that accept REDD+ for compliance. This approach could provide a globally important cost-containment mechanism and insurance for firms against higher future carbon prices, while channelling finance to avoid deforestation until policy uncertainties decline and carbon markets scale up.

Key policy insights

• Climate policy uncertainty discourages abatement investments, exposing firms to an escalating systemic risk of future rapid increases in emission control expenditures.

• This situation poses a risk of an abatement ‘short squeeze,’ paralleling the case in financial markets when prices jump sharply as investors rush to square accounts on an investment they have sold ‘short’, one they have bet against and promised to repay later in anticipation of falling prices.

• There is likely to be a willingness to pay for mechanisms that hedge the risks of abruptly rising carbon prices, in particular for ‘call’ options, the right but not the obligation to buy high-quality emissions reduction credits at a predetermined price, due to the significantly lower upfront capital expenditure compared to other hedging alternatives.

• Establishing rules as soon as possible for compliance market acceptance of high-quality emissions reductions credits from REDD+ would facilitate REDD+ transactions, including via options-based contracts, which could help fill the gap of uncertain climate policies in the short and medium term.

     

Public policy, institutional investors and climate change: a UK case-study

Institutional investors have two important roles to play in encouraging companies to address the risks and take advantage of the opportunities presented by climate change. The first is through using their influence as shareholders to encourage companies to adopt more proactive approaches to managing the risks and opportunities presented by climate change. The second is through explicitly factoring climate change risks and opportunities into ‘mainstream’ investment analysis processes. While there is growing investor activity on the former, the integration of climate change into investment analysis remains confined to sectors where there are strong government incentives (e.g. for renewable energy) or where greenhouse gas emissions have a market price. This article reviews the evolution of UK institutional investor interest in climate change from 1990 to 2005, focusing in particular on the relative contributions of ‘soft’ policy measures such as information-disclosure and awareness raising, and ‘hard’ policy measures such as regulation and market-based instruments. The article concludes that, over this period, soft policy measures played an important role in encouraging investors to discuss climate change issues with companies, but had minimal influence on investment decisions. It was only with the introduction of hard policy measures that climate change started to be systematically factored into investment analysis. The article canvasses the implications of these findings for government efforts in the UK and elsewhere to encourage investors to play a more proactive role in the climate change debate. It also considers the role that institutional investors themselves can play in strengthening public policy measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.     

Low-carbon transition risks for India’s financial system

As the low-carbon transition accelerates, loans to and investments in carbon-intensive assets, firms and sectors are at risk of not generating the anticipated returns, with implications for individual financial institutions as well as financial markets more broadly. However, research on this topic has largely been focused on high- and upper-middle income economies to date. In this paper, we explore the salience of this issue in India – one of the world’s largest emitters and economies – by asking: (1) how extensive is financial-sector exposure to transition risks? And: (2) are finance professionals and financial institutions taking sufficient action to manage those transition risks? Our findings reveal that India’s financial sector is much more heavily exposed to low-carbon transition risks than standard borrowing classifications might suggest. For example, our granular assessment of individual loans and bonds finds that three-fifths of lending to the ‘mining’ sector is for oil and gas extraction, while one-fifth of ‘manufacturing’ debt is for petroleum refining and related industries. We also find that electricity production – by far the largest source of emissions – accounts for 5.2% of outstanding credit, but that only 17.5% of this lending is to pureplay renewables. Yet our survey of India’s largest financial institutions suggests that there have been limited efforts to identify, measure or manage low-carbon transition risks. Fewer than half of the 154 finance professionals surveyed were familiar with environmental issues including climate change mitigation and adaption, greenhouse gas emissions or transition risks. Only four of the ten major financial institutions surveyed collect information on ESG risks, and these firms do not systematically incorporate that data into business continuity planning, internal capital adequacy assessment processes, credit risk assessments, enterprise risk management frameworks or loan product pricing. Given extensive financial-sector exposure to low-carbon transition risks coupled with the absence of bottom-up action to manage those risks, our findings suggest that financiers, regulators and policymakers in emerging and developing economies should be acting swiftly to ensure an orderly transition to net-zero.     

Encouraging clean energy investment in developing countries: what role for aid?

A large portion of foreign assistance for climate change mitigation in developing countries is directed to clean energy facilities. To support international mitigation goals, however, donors must make investments that have effects beyond individual facilities. They must reduce barriers to private-sector investment by generating information for developers, improving relevant infrastructure, or changing policies. We examine whether donor agencies target financing for commercial-scale wind and solar facilities to countries where private investment in clean energy is limited and whether donor investments lead to more private investments. On average, we find no positive evidence for these patterns of targeting and impact. Coupled with model results that show feed-in tariffs increase private investment, we argue that donor agencies should reallocate resources to improve policies that promote private investment in developing countries, rather than finance individual clean energy facilities.

Policy relevance

We suggest that international negotiations could usefully shift the focus of climate change finance towards adaptation in exchange for mitigation-improving policy reforms in developing countries. There is little evidence that mitigation-related financing is having broader effects on energy production, so new financial arrangements should be the focus of future negotiations. Additionally, international donors should focus efforts on reforming policies to attract private investment.     

Using carbon finance to support climate policy objectives in high mountain ecosystems

Carbon markets and climate finance payments are being used to incentivize the mitigation of CO₂ arising from anthropogenic land-use change in forests, marine ecosystems, and lowland grasslands. However, no such consideration has been given to how these ‘carbon finance incentives’ might be applied to mountain grasslands and shrublands, ecosystems that contain a substantial amount of carbon. These incentives amount to more than US$350 billion per annum and could potentially support underfunded natural resource management (NRM) activities, which are urgently needed to address numerous stressors impacting these important ecosystems. In the mountain context, NRM activities could include adaptive grazing management, sustainable cropping, ecosystem preservation, ecosystem restoration, and engineered soil conservation measures. This article investigates the stressors, challenges, and priorities related to the NRM of carbon stocks in mountain grasslands and shrublands; why carbon markets and climate finance have not yet been utilized in this context; and, what is required to position mountain-based NRM activities as eligible for carbon finance incentives. Using surveys and interviews triangulated with a systematic literature review, the study found that carbon finance incentives are not well understood, both amongst mountain-focused experts and in the literature. The study also found the required technical methodologies, policy frameworks, and data to be largely undeveloped. This article proposes a top-down conceptual policy framework that can be used to develop key ‘enabling factors’ with the view of extending the eligibility of carbon markets and climate finance to NRM activities undertaken in mountain grasslands and shrublands in the same way that has been afforded to other ecosystems.

Policy relevance

This is the first study to explicitly highlight the important role that the mountain grasslands and shrublands might play in international climate policy, and how carbon finance mechanisms might support better NRM in these areas. It is also the first to investigate why these incentives have not been adopted thus far. The article concludes by proposing a novel top-down ‘carbon incentive enabling’ framework that could be driven by governments and mountain development focused organizations so as to capture some of the opportunities offered by carbon-based incentives, and help meet international climate policy objectives.     

Economic instruments for mitigating carbon emissions: scaling up carbon finance in China’s buildings sector

The relevance and cost-effectiveness are key criteria for policymakers to select appropriate policy and economic instruments for reducing carbon emissions. Here we assess the applicability of carbon finance instruments for the improvement in building energy efficiency by adopting the high efficiency standards as well as advanced energy supply systems, building on a case study in a northern city in China. We find that upgrading the current Chinese BEE standard to one of the best practices in the world coupled with the state-of-the-art energy supply system implies an abatement cost at 16US$/tCO₂, which is compatible with the international carbon market price. The institutional reorganization turns out to be indispensable to facilitate the implementation of the proposed scheme of local government-led energy efficiency programme in the form of programmatic CDM in China’s buildings sector. We show that with international support such as carbon finance, the BEE improvement will facilitate city’s transition to low-carbon supply in the longer term. More importantly, it is argued that demand-side energy performance improvement in buildings should be considered a prerequisite to shifting low-carbon energy supply technologies such as fuel-switching, renewable power generation and Carbon Capture and Storage to address climate mitigation in light of cost-effectiveness and environmental integrity.     

Climate policy and financial institutions

This article examines how financial institutions, such as pension funds and insurance companies, have interpreted and used UN-issued climate change management policies. A critical discourse approach is used to analyse material issued by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the World Bank Group and some business and investment consultancies, with interview data supplementing the document analysis. It is argued that although policymakers and business consultants have been eager to appropriate the discourses of financial services, they have not produced guidance on how the outputs of climate science might best be used to allocate managed capital. In terms of outcomes, financial services remain on the periphery of policy implementation, attention has been deflected from the emitters of greenhouse gases, and policy objectives have been frustrated. By unspoken fiat, the market is here the new truth that cannot be contradicted.     

The role of climate finance beyond renewables: demand-side management and carbon capture,usage and storage

Mobilizing climate finance for climate change mitigation is a crucial part of meeting the ‘well-below’ 2°C goal of the Paris Agreement. Climate finance refers to investments specifically in climate change mitigation and adaptation activities, which involve public finance and the leveraging of private finance. A large proportion of climate finance is Official Development Assistance (ODA) from OECD countries to ODA-eligible countries. The evidence shows that the largest proportion of climate finance for climate change mitigation has been channelled to the development of renewable energy, with a much smaller proportion flowing to other crucial forms of clean energy-related measures, such as demand-side management (DSM) (particularly sustainable cooling) and carbon capture, usage and storage (CCUS). This forms the rationale and aim of this synthesis paper: to review the role of climate finance to develop clean energy beyond renewables. In doing so, the paper draws on practical policy and programme experiences of some donor countries, such as the UK, and Development Finance Institutions (DFIs). This paper argues that a greater amount of climate finance from OECD countries to ODA-eligible fossil fuel-intensive emerging economies and developing countries is required for sustainable cooling and CCUS, particularly in the form of technical assistance and clean energy innovation.

Key policy insights

• Demand-side management (DSM) and carbon capture, usage and storage (CCUS) are underfunded in climate finance compared with the promotion of renewables.

• Climate finance for sustainable cooling, in particular, represents just 0.04% of total ODA, despite cooling projected to represent 13% of global emissions by 2030.

• Public investment in CCUS is limited at US $28 billion since 2007, despite the costs of meeting the Paris Agreement estimated to be 40-128% more expensive without CCUS.

• Additional climate finance for these sectors should not come at the expense of funding for renewables but should be complementary to it.

     

Risk-opportunity analysis for transformative policy design and appraisal

The climate crisis demands a strong response from policy-makers worldwide. The current global climate policy agenda requires technological change, innovation, labour markets and the financial system to be led towards an orderly and rapid low-carbon transition. Yet progress has been slow and incremental. Inadequacies of policy appraisal frameworks used worldwide may be significant contributors to the problem, as they frequently fail to adequately account for the dynamics of societal and technological change. Risks are underestimated, and the economic opportunities from innovation are generally not assessed in practice. Here, we identify root causes of those inadequacies and identify them to structural features of standard analysis frameworks. We use a review of theoretical principles of complexity science and the science of dynamical systems and formulate a generalisation of existing frameworks for policy analysis and the appraisal of outcomes of proposed policy strategies, to help better identify and frame situations of transformational change. We use the term “risk-opportunity analysis” to capture the generalised approach, in which conventional economic cost-benefit analysis is a special case. New guiding principles for policy-making during dynamic and transformational change are offered.     

Climate change, adaptation and economic growth

This paper explores the links between economic growth and the impacts of climate change. Inclusive, pro-poor growth is central to the development of low-income countries. There is also a broad consensus that growth and development are important to reduce vulnerability to climate change. Growth does not automatically reduce vulnerability, only the right kind of growth does. The paper aims to develop a better understanding of what the ??right kind of growth?? may be. We find that many growth policies, such as investment in skills and access to finance, indeed reduce vulnerability to climate change. However, climate change calls for some adjustments in growth policy. In particular, investment in infrastructure and efforts to stimulate entrepreneurship and competitive markets must take more of a risk management perspective and recognise climate risks.     

Policy incentives for carbon capture and storage technologies in Europe: A qualitative multi-criteria analysis

In this paper, we compare different policy incentives for overcoming investment uncertainties that are typical for low-carbon technologies prior to their commercialisation, some of which may be attributable to market failures. The paper focuses on the particular case of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies and conducts a qualitative multi-criteria analysis of different public policy support schemes for CCS demonstration to evaluate their suitability. The assessed schemes include mandatory CCS, emission performance standards and several different financial incentives (in addition to the European Union Emission Trading Scheme). Based on the available literature and on experience in the UK and Germany with promotion instruments for low-carbon technologies, the results of our analysis suggest that two alternative schemes, a CCS bonus incentive or a carbon dioxide (CO₂) price guarantee, perform best in comparison with the other assessed instruments. While they reduce the uncertainty of CCS investments in the face of low European Union Allowance prices, they also avoid significant adverse impacts on operational and investment decisions in electricity markets.