Watered down? Civil society organizations and hydropower development in the Darjeeling and Sikkim regions,Eastern Himalaya: A comparative study

ABSTRACT

Mitigating climate change is often framed as the ultimate collective action problem of this era and great emphasis is made on the need for approaches that foster ‘cooperation’ and ‘consensus’. This paper argues that the irony of this rhetoric could not be more stark; climate policy framing is an exclusionary process, and climate mitigating interventions that are engineered essentially to address neoliberal economic concerns rather than environmental challenges are often the source of multiple new conflicts. In this regard, this paper shows how the response of local non governmental organisations (NGOs) to hydropower development in the Darjeeling region of West Bengal in the Eastern Himalayas bears evidence to Gramscian analyses of ‘the manufacture of consent’ between elite bourgeois actors – the state, formal civil society, political parties and the private sector. Such ‘associational’ unions are only occasionally interrupted, as in the case of the people’s movement, Affected Citizens of Teesta (ACT) in North Sikkim. Finding a balance between resistance and enabling political space to think and act differently, the movement led to the cancellation of several hydropower projects put forward in the name of climate mitigation, and in the process, drew attention to political processes involved in the manufacture of consent. Using case studies from the Darjeeling and Sikkim regions, this paper distinguishes between Gramsci’s vision of the political space of disruption vis-à-vis the covert agenda of climate consensus.

Key policy insights

• A politics of consensus in relation to climate change is an outcome of, and in turn reiterates, a narrowing of distance between the state and civil society.

• Including civil society in climate policy decision making and implementation is considered positive and inclusive, however, it is important to note that civil society is not always and everywhere inclusive and transformative.

• Both at global and national levels, it is claimed that climate change interventions happen in an overall framework of participatory, inclusive environmental governance; in relation to hydropower development, we note that this is hardly the practice on the ground.

     

Bookkeeping rather than climate policy making: national mitigation strategies in Western Europe

Climate change mitigation is a wicked problem that cuts horizontally across sectors and vertically across levels of government. To address it effectively, governments around the world, in particular in the EU, have developed several generations of multi-sectoral national mitigation strategies (NMS) since the early 1990s. Although NMS became the main effort to systematically coordinate mitigation policies, few works have studied them comparatively so far. The present article fills this gap by analysing how the EU-15 group of countries operationalized climate protection through NMS. First, we introduce the three roles policy strategies usually aim to fulfil: besides being policy documents they also represent governance processes (supposed to coordinate sectoral implementation), and capacity-building efforts. Empirically, we then explore the rationale, origins and prevalence of NMS. Subsequently, we characterize them as policy documents (with regards to their contents and structures) and as governance processes that address capacity building only implicitly. Based on existing assessments we finally review some performance indications of NMS. We find that in particular second- and third-generation NMS aimed to take their governance function seriously but resembled ‘lacklustre bookkeeping' of emissions, targets and mitigation options. Instead of approximating NMS towards their obviously overcharging governance function, we suggest to recalibrate them towards their communication and capacity-building function in a way that goes beyond bookkeeping.

Policy relevance

The present article shows that NMS fail to effectively govern climate change mitigation across a broad range of sectoral policy domains. Since most European countries have adopted not one but up to three generations of NMS since the 1990s, this finding is highly relevant for them – and for all others aiming to adopt similarly broad strategies. Instead of piling one strategy on top of another irrespective of their implementation, and instead of abolishing mitigation strategies altogether, we recommend recalibrating them towards what they can realistically accomplish: effective communication and capacity building so that NMS can advance from lacklustre bookkeeping to actively promoting a government-wide climate change mitigation vision. The article can help governments to realise that renewing integrated strategies such as NMS without overhauling them comes close to flogging a dead horse.     

Challenges in financing public sector low-carbon initiatives: lessons from private finance for a school district in British Columbia,Canada

Governments are major investors in climate change mitigation, but aversion to public indebtedness has led to reliance on private finance to deliver public assets. Compounding this challenge, financing through Energy Service Contracts is ruled out by accounting rules. With public and traditional private funding avenues closed, government departments have sought contracts that do not disclose the full cost of borrowing, such as the Public–Private Partnership (PPP) described in this case study. We unpack the utility contract filed with the provincial regulator to show that circumventing budgetary constraints cost the Delta School Board (DSB) 8.75% per annum on borrowed private funds while public finance would have cost 4%pa. All levels of the public sector are keen to play their role in climate mitigation. Climate policy is about not passing our burden of unbridled fossil fuel use and greenhouse gas emissions to future generations. If we do not exempt public sector capital investments for decarbonization from deficit regulations, we risk passing an unnecessary economic burden to future generations.

Key policy insights

• Transition to a low-carbon economy requires public sector investments that exceed budget deficit regulations and political aversion in many jurisdictions;

• Private–Public Partnerships are currently viewed as the solution to this self-imposed fiscal constraint;

• PPPs without clear performance targets or contractual templates will expose less experienced public sector investors to high costs and emissions above expectations.

     

Resilience through interlinkage: the green climate fund and climate finance governance

The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is a significant and potentially innovative addition to UNFCCC frameworks for mobilizing increased finance for climate change mitigation and adaptation. Yet the GCF faces challenges of operationalization not only as a relatively new international fund but also as a result of US President Trump’s announcement that the United States would withdraw from the Paris Agreement. Consequently the GCF faces a major reduction in actual funding contributions and also governance challenges at the levels of its Board and the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP), to which it is ultimately accountable. This article analyzes these challenges with reference to the GCF’s internal regulations and its agreements with third parties to demonstrate how exploiting design features of the GCF could strengthen its resilience in the face of such challenges. These features include linkages with UNFCCC constituted bodies, particularly the Technology Mechanism, and enhanced engagement with non-Party stakeholders, especially through its Private Sector Facility. The article posits that deepening GCF interlinkages would increase both the coherence of climate finance governance and the GCF’s ability to contribute to ambitious climate action in uncertain times.

Key policy insights

• The Trump Administration’s purported withdrawal from the Paris Agreement creates challenges for the GCF operating model in three key domains: capitalization, governance and guidance.

• Two emerging innovations could prove crucial in GCF resilience to fulfil its role in Paris Agreement implementation: (1) interlinkages with other UNFCCC bodies, especially the Technology Mechanism; and (2) engagement with non-Party stakeholders, especially private sector actors such as large US investors and financiers.

• There is also an emerging soft role for the GCF as interlocutor between policy-makers and non-Party actors to help bridge the communication divide that often plagues cross-sectoral interactions.

• This role could develop through: (a) the GCF tripartite interface between the Private Sector Facility, Accredited Entities and National Designated Authorities; and (b) strengthened collaborations between the UNFCCC Technical and Financial Mechanisms.

     

Can national policy blockages accelerate the development of polycentric governance? Evidence from climate change policy in the United Kingdom

Many factors can conspire to limit the scope for policy development at the national level. In this paper, we consider whether blockages in national policy processes − resulting for example from austerity or small state political philosophies − might be overcome by the development of more polycentric governance arrangements. Drawing on evidence from three stakeholder workshops and fifteen interviews, we address this question by exploring the United Kingdom’s recent retrenchment in the area of climate change policy, and the ways in which its policy community have responded. We identify two broad strategies based on polycentric principles: ‘working with gatekeepers’ to unlock political capital and ‘collaborate to innovate’ to develop policy outputs. We then empirically examine the advantages that these actions bring, analysing coordination across overlapping sites of authority, such as those associated with international regimes, devolved administrations and civic and private initiatives that operate in conjunction with, and sometimes independently of, the state. Despite constraining political and economic factors, which are by no means unique to the UK, we find that a polycentric climate policy network can create opportunities for overcoming central government blockages. However, we also argue that the ambiguous role of the state in empowering but also in constraining such a network will determine whether a polycentric approach to climate policy and governance is genuinely additional and innovative, or whether it is merely a temporary ‘sticking plaster’ for the retreat of the state and policy retrenchment during austere times.     

(Re)Framing ocean acidification in the context of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Paris Agreement

ABSTRACT

Ocean acidification is most frequently framed by the scientific community as a concurrent threat to climate change, rather than an effect of it. This separation of the two phenomena has long been deemed as a way of garnering heightened policy attention for ocean acidification rather than having it bound up in the often contested politics of climate change. This effort, however, appears to have resulted in the inadvertent placing of ocean acidification outside of the mandate of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This has created a significant gap in the global governance of this issue with no multilateral agreement understood as having jurisdiction over the mitigation of rising ocean acidity. For these reasons this paper argues that an alternative framing of ocean acidification as an effect of climate change is warranted. This would include ocean acidification in the core obligations of the Convention, thereby filling the mitigation governance gap and avoiding perverse implementation outcomes. It is contended that interpreting the UNFCCC in this way is more consistent with its objective and purpose than the existing interpretations that place ocean acidification beyond the remit of the Convention.

Key policy insights

• Ocean acidification is best understood as an effect of climate change in the context of the UNFCCC, and therefore is included in its obligations to combat climate change and its adverse effects.

• An obligation to address ocean acidification has implications for the way that the provisions of the Convention, particularly on mitigation, are implemented. Mitigation activities that exacerbate ocean acidification or lead to emission reduction pathways that do not prevent dangerous acidification should be deemed inconsistent with the Convention.

• Protection, conservation and restoration of coastal and marine ecosystems should become a priority area for action within the UNFCCC.

     

Europe adapts to climate change: Comparing National Adaptation Strategies

For the last two decades, European climate policy has focused almost exclusively on mitigation of climate change. It was only well after the turn of the century, with impacts of climate change increasingly being observed, that adaptation was added to the policy agenda and EU Member States started to develop National Adaptation Strategies (NASs). This paper reviews seven National Adaptation Strategies that were either formally adopted or under development by Member States at the end of 2008. The strategies are analysed under the following six themes. Firstly, the factors motivating and facilitating the development of a national adaptation strategy. Secondly, the scientific and technical support needed for the development and implementation of such a strategy. Thirdly, the role of the strategy in information, communication and awareness-raising of the adaptation issue. Fourthly, new or existing forms of multi-level governance to implement the proposed actions. Fifthly, how the strategy addresses integration and coordination with other policy domains. Finally, how the strategy suggests the implementation and how the strategy is evaluated. The paper notes that the role of National Adaptation Strategies in the wider governance of adaptation differs between countries but clearly benchmarks a new political commitment to adaptation at national policy levels. However, we also find that in most cases approaches for implementing and evaluating the strategies are yet to be defined. The paper concludes that even though the strategies show great resemblance in terms of topics, methods and approaches, there are many institutional challenges, including multi-level governance and policy integration issues, which can act as considerable barriers in future policy implementation.     

The economic case for prioritizing governance over financial incentives in REDD+

It is argued that the subordination of policies to results-based payments for emissions reductions causes severe economic inefficiencies, which affect the opportunity cost, transaction cost, and economic rent of the programme. Such problems can be addressed by establishing sound procedural, land, and financial governance at the national level, before Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) economic incentives are delivered at scale. Consideration is given to each governance dimension, the entry points for policy intervention, and the impact on costs. International support must consider the financial and political cost of governance reforms, and use a pay-for-results ethos based on output and outcome indicators. This can be done in the readiness phase but only if the latter's legal force, scope, magnitude, and time horizon are adequately reconsidered. This article provides ammunition for the institutionalists’ argument that United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Parties must prioritize governance reforms between now and the entry into force of the new climate agreement in 2020. Finally, specific recommendations about how such governance reforms can be achieved, which will create the basis for the programme's financial sustainability, are offered.

Policy relevance

UNFCCC Parties could make the most cost-effective use of REDD+ resources if they were to prioritize investments in governance over the interim period 2012–2020. REDD+’s financial, technical and political capital should be used to establish sound procedural, sectoral (land), and financial governance systems in relevant countries. This will generate long-term economic savings, compared to an approach that privileges the implementation of results-based payments for emissions reductions. In particular, it will reduce economic inefficiencies, which affect the opportunity and transaction costs, and the private rents embedded in the current programme design. In order to promote the necessary policy reforms, stakeholders should work together to address technical, financial, and political economy issues at the domestic level. In particular, UNFCCC Parties should re-conceptualize the readiness phase by strengthening its legal force, expanding its scope, increasing its financial firepower, and extending its time horizon.     

Transnational adaptation governance: An emerging fourth era of adaptation

Climate change adaptation, which has previously been seen as a national and local matter, is today systematically addressed by international institutions such as the UNFCCC, the FAO and the WTO. Research has focused on the overarching institutional architecture of global adaptation, particularly how it relates to development, political economy, efficiency and equity. In contrast to the transnational dimension of climate mitigation, the transnationalization of adaptation governance has received scant attention. By creating a dataset of adaptation projects, we examine transnational adaptation governance in terms of its scope, institutionalization and main functions. We find transnational adaptation governance to be firmly anchored within the UNFCCC, but a recent change towards adaptation governed by a transnational constituency can be identified. When non-state actors become integral to the project of governing adaptation, a ‘fourth era’ of adaption seems to be emerging. This new era is not replacing other forms of governing, but is emerging alongside and in a complementary fashion. In the ‘fourth era’, adaptation is increasingly governed globally and transnationally, and the attention is turned toward ‘softer’ forms of governance such as agenda setting, information sharing and capacity building.     

Climate governance,justice, and transnational civil society

Justice dilemmas associated with climate change and the regulatory responses to it pose challenges for global governance, arguably hampering progress and raising concerns over efficacy and relevance. Scholarly literature suggests that transnational civil society groups can help address problems of governance and injustice that cross borders and pit states against each other. Findings of a comparative, qualitative study of climate justice advocacy suggest, however, that civil society groups' work in the US and EU is significantly shaped by institutional factors specific to those regimes, limiting advocates' broader impact. Moreover, political opportunities for the pursuit of climate action, and justice particularly, have diminished in those settings. By contrast, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) provides greater opportunities for discussions of justice, although civil society actors are significantly constrained within it. It is argued that greater roles for civil society in the UNFCCC could prove constructive in the face of current challenges connected with justice issues. Three themes in civil society advocacy linking principles of global justice with current climate policy debates are summarized. Finally, it is suggested that the first iteration of the UNFCCC Periodic Review provides timely opportunities to more fully draw upon civil society's potential contributions toward a fair and effective global climate regime.

Policy relevance

The roles of civil society organizations in climate governance were examined in three policy contexts: the UNFCCC, the US, and the EU, with special attention to advocacy addressing issues of equity and justice, identified as key challenges for a post-2012 global agreement. Findings suggest that (1) civil society roles are significantly constrained in each context, and (2) political opportunities for climate advocacy have diminished since 2009 in the US and EU, underlining (3) the continued salience of the UNFCCC as a forum for engagement and the construction of effective and equitable climate policy. Potential exists for increased civil society involvement at the UNFCCC to help resolve obstacles based in divergent national priorities. Three areas of justice-focused civil society activity are reviewed for current negotiation topics and the governance structure of the institution. The current UNFCCC Periodic Review is identified as an opportunity to increase civil society involvement.     

A shale gas revolution for China?

The question of whether China is on the verge of a ‘shale gas revolution’ is examined. This has potentially significant consequences for energy policy and climate change mitigation. Contrary to the optimistic reading of some commentators, it argues that various technological, environmental, political, regulatory and institutional factors will constrain the growth of China's shale gas market and that such a revolution might in any event have consequences that are at best mixed, at worst antithetical to climate change mitigation.Policy relevanceChina's reserves of unconventional gas have the potential to transform energy policy, as has occurred in the US, resulting in the substitution of shale gas for coal in the energy mix. Because gas emits only approximately half the GHG per unit as coal, such a move would have important implications for climate policy. However, substantial obstacles stand in the way of the ‘energy revolution’ that some policy analysts see China as embarking upon. The need to acknowledge these obstacles, particularly those relating to regulation and governance (and whether or to what extent they can be overcome), is an issue of profound importance to the future of climate and energy policy.     

美国退出《巴黎协定》的原因、影响及中国的对策

综合应用定性与定量分析方法,分析美国宣布退出《巴黎协定》的原因,评估美国退出《巴黎协定》对《巴黎协定》履约前景的影响并提出中国的应对策略。美国宣布退出《巴黎协定》是全球气候治理的重大事件,将对《巴黎协定》的履约产生多重影响,包括将对《巴黎协定》的普遍性构成严重伤害,动摇以《巴黎协定》为核心的国际气候治理体制的基础;将导致《巴黎协定》履约中的领导力赤字问题显著恶化;可能引发不良示范效应,降低国际气候合作信心;将会对其他地区碳排放空间形成不可忽视的挤压,进而推高其他地区碳减排成本;美国大幅削减国际气候援助资金将削弱发展中国家减缓和适应气候变化的能力;美国延迟采取气候行动可能导致全球减排错失最佳时间窗口;美国大幅削减气候变化基础研究经费将对未来全球气候科学研究产生不利影响,进而影响《巴黎协定》履约谈判的权威性等,最后显著加大实现温控目标的难度,甚至导致目标无法实现。就全球气候治理的全局而言,全球气候治理的框架不会坍塌,但确实会受到动摇;全球气候治理的进程不会逆转,但确实会迟滞。美国宣布退出《巴黎协定》使中国面临多重挑战,其中之一是中国面临急剧上升的期望中国承担全球气候治理领导的国际压力。为此,中国对内应实现国家自主贡献的上限目标,对外应积极重建全球气候治理集体领导体制,即用C5取代G2,同时继续努力改变美国对气候变化的消极立场。     

Unpacking multilevel adaptation to climate change in the Great Barrier Reef,Australia

Multilevel governance is regarded as a promising approach to deal with the multidimensional nature of climate change adaptation. However, the policy context in which it is implemented is very often complex and fragmented, characterised by interacting climate and non-climate strategies. An understanding of multilevel decision-making and governance is particularly important, if desired adaptation outcomes are to be achieved. This paper examines how climate change adaptation takes place in a complex multilevel system of governance, in the context of Australia's Great Barrier Reef (GBR) region. It examines over one hundred adaptation strategies at federal, state, regional and local levels in terms of type, manifestation, purposefulness, drivers and triggers, and geographic and temporal scope. Interactions between strategies are investigated both at the same level of governance and across governance levels. This study demonstrates that multilevel approach is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition in responding to complex multiscale and multisector issues, such as climate change adaptation. Short-term adaptation measures; a predominant incremental, sectoral, top-down approach to adaptation; and the lack of a framework for managing interactions are major threats to effective climate adaptation in the GBR region. Coping with such threats will require long-term transformative action, establishing enabling conditions to support local adaptation, and, most important, creating and maintaining strategic interactions among adaptation strategies. Coordinating and integrating climate and non-climate strategies across jurisdictions and policy sectors are the most significant and challenging tasks for multilevel governance in the GBR region and elsewhere.     

Could Cohesion Policy push EU climate efforts?

The main purpose of this article is to evaluate the extent to which the Cohesion Policy of the EU contributes to its climate change mitigation effort. While climate change mitigation and the EU Cohesion Policy have been both thoroughly studied theoretically, the novelty of the present article lies in an analysis of their mutual relationship. Also, a unique feature of this research is an analysis of the contribution of the Cohesion Policy to climate change mitigation over a period of 20 years, including a comparison of the three last programming periods (2000–2006, 2007–2013 and 2014–2020). The results of this research suggest that, while the beginning of the new millennium saw the Cohesion Policy neglecting the issue of climate change mitigation, the current programming period (2014–2020) placed it among its key priorities. This conclusion is supported by a comprehensive set of data on five selected indicators. This article also displays the results against the perspective of the overall climate change mitigation objectives of the EU.

POLICY RELEVANCE

The present article shows how a policy, which used to be considered rather distant from climate change, progressively adopted climate change mitigation as one of its principal objectives. As such, it provides a practical guidance on the integration of climate change mitigation in other policy areas, which may be applied not only in a supranational organisation but also on a national, regional or local level.     

Great-power politics,order transition,and climate governance: insights from international relations theory

The complex politics of climate change cannot be properly understood without reference to deeper geopolitical trends in the wider international system. Chief among these is the growing resurgence of ‘great-power politics’ between China and the US, along with failures of socialization and enmeshment into global governance structures in relation to these two powers. Traditional theoretical frameworks have failed to adequately account for these developments. Nonetheless, this current great-power contestation is at the core of an order transition that has prevented the large-scale institutional redesign required to remove deadlocks in existing global governance structures, including climate governance. Examples from the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference provide ample evidence for these claims. The slow progress of the climate change negotiations are due not just to the politics of the issue itself, but to the absence of a new political bargain on material power structures, normative beliefs, and the management of the order amongst the great powers. Without such a grand political bargain, which could be promoted through a forum of major economies whose wide-ranging remit would go beyond single issues, the climate change regime is only ever likely to progress in a piecemeal fashion.

Policy relevance

Despite the achievements of the 2012 Doha Climate Change Conference, the climate negotiations are not on course to limit warming to 2 °C, and thereby avoid ‘dangerous’ climate change. Several factors have been invoked to account for such slow progress: notably, the nature of the climate change problem itself, the institutional structure of the climate regime, and lack of political will among key players. An alternative explanation is proposed such that the failure to seriously address climate change – as well as other global problems – reflects a resurgent meta-struggle between the ‘great powers’ of China and the US over the nature of the global order. Without such a broader understanding of the deeper dynamics underlying the stalemates of the climate change negotiations, there is little chance of turning those negotiations around.     

Solidarity in transboundary flood risk management: A view from the Dutch North Rhine–Westphalian catchment area

Climate change is putting pressure on water systems, and its effects transcend man-made boundaries, making cooperation across territorial borders essential. The governance of transboundary flood risk management calls for solidarity among riparians, as climate change will make river basins more prone to flooding. ‘Solidarity’ means that individuals act to support members of a particular community to which they belong. Recently, the solidarity principle has become institutionalized due to its formalization in the EU Floods Directive. However, it is not clear what solidarity means in the upstream–downstream practices of transboundary flood risk management. Understanding the meaning of solidarity is important for the development of cross-border climate adaptation governance. This article discusses the conceptualization of the solidarity principle and explores its meaning for international cooperation in the Dutch North Rhine–Westphalian border region. Our critical case study reveals that although all actors understand the importance of solidarity, they interpret it differently, often based on self-interest related to their position in the catchment. The formal inclusion of the solidarity principle in the Floods Directive can best be seen as a step in the continuous development of transboundary flood risk governance, as no striking changes in practice have been identified after its formalization.

Policy relevance

As climate change increasingly puts pressure on river basins and other shared resources, cross-border cooperation and solidarity are seen as increasingly important. This article discusses the meaning of solidarity in practice and reveals how this normative principle may contribute to transboundary climate adaptation governance. Understanding its meaning is important for future cross-border climate adaptation governance.     

Read all about it!? Public accountability,fragmented global climate governance and the media

The way that the media reports and comments on key events in the fragmented global climate governance landscape is one important route to strengthening public accountability of such governance. Editorials and other opinion pieces provide key contributions to the public sphere, but have been almost entirely neglected in media research on climate change. Another understudied aspect in such research is the reporting on the fragmentation of global climate governance across numerous forums. This article provides an exploratory approach to address these two research gaps. It presents a quantitative analysis of how often leading newspapers in seven countries (Finland, India, Laos, Norway, South Africa, UK and USA) wrote about 18 meetings in six different global climate governance forums between 2004–2009 and whether they provided commentaries about them. The study shows that media coverage (articles and opinion pieces) is limited or absent for many meetings that are not attended by heads of state, are the launch of a new process or do not have the convening power of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The pattern of coverage differs significantly among individual newspapers and there is no clear distinction between developed and developing country newspapers. The article concludes that overall news coverage, and editorial commentary in particular, of global climate meetings in the selected newspapers is too low and too patchy to significantly support domestic publics to hold their own (and indirectly other) governments accountable with regard to fragmented global climate governance.

Policy relevance

This study is instructive for the media and civil society, who should both act as accountholders of governments with regard to how they act in global climate governance and its implementation. Reporting and commentaries need to reflect the overarching process, not only sporadic coverage of high-level meetings, but also critical analysis of what is achieved. They should also take a broader scope in terms of the kinds of meetings and processes in global governance that they cover. Civil society should encourage the media to increase coverage along these lines, e.g. by adequate monitoring of government actions (or lack thereof) and share this with the media.     

An initial scoping of transitional justice for global climate governance

Geopolitical changes combined with the increasing urgency of ambitious climate action have re-opened debates about justice and international climate policy. Tensions about historical responsibility have been particularly difficult and could intensify with increased climate impacts and as developing countries face mounting pressure to take mitigation action. Climate change is not the only time humans have faced historically rooted, collective action challenges involving justice disputes. Practices and tools from transitional justice have been used in over 30 countries across a range of conflicts at the interface of historical responsibility and imperatives for collective futures. Central to this body of theory and experience is the need to reflect both backwards- and forwards-oriented elements in efforts to build social solidarity. Lessons from transitional justice theory and practice have not been systematically explored in the climate context. This article conceptually examines the potential of transitional justice practices to inform global climate governance by looking at the structural similarities and differences between the global climate regime and traditional transitional justice contexts. It then identifies a suite of common transitional justice practices and assesses their potential applicability in the climate context.

POLICY RELEVANCE

• Justice disputes, including about historical responsibility and future climate actions, are long-standing in the climate context and could intensify with increased climate impacts and broadened mitigation pressures.

• Lessons from efforts to use transitional justice mechanisms could provide insight into strategies for balancing recognition of harms rooted in the past, while creating stronger future-oriented collective action.

• Several areas of transitional justice practice including: the combination of amnesties and litigation, truth commissions, reparations and institutional change could provide useful insights for the climate context.

     

From Lima to Paris,Part 1: The Lima Hangover

A growing body of literature suggests that an economic case may exist for investment in large-scale climate change mitigation. At the same time, however, investment is persistently falling well short of the levels required to prevent dangerous climate change, suggesting that economically attractive mitigation opportunities are being missed. To understand whether and where these opportunities exist, this article contrasts macro-level analyses of climate finance with micro-level bottom-up analyses of the scale and composition of low-carbon investment opportunities in four case study developing world cities. This analysis finds that there are significant opportunities to redirect existing finance streams towards more cost-effective, lower-carbon options. This would mobilize substantial new investment in climate mitigation. Two key explanations are proposed for the failure to exploit these opportunities. First, the composition of cost-effective measures is highly context-specific, varying from place to place and sector to sector. Macro-level analyses of climate finance flows are therefore poor indicators of the micro-level landscape for low-carbon investment. Specific local research is therefore needed to understand the opportunities for cost-effective mitigation at that level. Second, many opportunities require enabling governance arrangements that are not currently in place. Mobilizing new low-carbon investment and closing the ‘climate finance gap' therefore requires attention to policy frameworks and financing mechanisms that can facilitate the exploitation of cost-effective low-carbon options.

Policy relevance

The importance of increasing investment in climate mitigation, especially in developing nations, is well established. This article scrutinizes four city-level studies of the scope for cost-effective low-carbon investment, and finds that significant opportunities are not being exploited in developing world cities. Enabling governance structures may help to mainstream climate considerations into investments by local actors (households, businesses and government agencies). While climate finance distributed through international bodies such as the Green Climate Fund may not always be a suitable vehicle to invest directly in disaggregated, local-level measures, it can provide the incentives to develop these governance arrangements.     

Technical characteristics of a solar geoengineering deployment and implications for governance

ABSTRACT

Consideration of solar geoengineering as a potential response to climate change will demand complex decisions. These include not only the choice of whether to deploy solar engineering, but decisions regarding how to deploy, and ongoing decision-making throughout deployment. Research on the governance of solar geoengineering to date has primarily engaged only with the question of whether to deploy. We examine the science of solar geoengineering in order to clarify the technical dimensions of decisions about deployment – both strategic and operational – and how these might influence governance considerations, while consciously refraining from making specific recommendations. The focus here is on a hypothetical deployment rather than governance of the research itself. We first consider the complexity surrounding the design of a deployment scheme, in particular the complicated and difficult decision of what its objective(s) would be, given that different choices for how to deploy will lead to different climate outcomes. Next, we discuss the on-going decisions across multiple timescales, from the sub-annual to the multi-decadal. For example, feedback approaches might effectively manage some uncertainties, but would require frequent adjustments to the solar geoengineering deployment in response to observations. Other decisions would be tied to the inherently slow process of detection and attribution of climate effects in the presence of natural variability. Both of these present challenges to decision-making. These considerations point toward particular governance requirements, including an important role for technical experts – with all the challenges that entails.

Key policy insights

• Decisions about solar geoengineering deployment will be informed not only by political choices, but also by climate science and engineering.

• Design decisions will pertain to the spatial and temporal goals of a climate intervention and strategies for achieving those goals.

• Some uncertainty can be managed through feedback, but this would require frequent operational decisions.

• Some strategic decisions will depend on the detection and attribution of climatic effects from solar geoengineering, which may take decades.

• Governance for solar geoengineering deployment will likely need to incorporate technical expertise for making short-term adjustments to the deployment and conducting attribution analysis, while also slowing down decisions made in response to attribution analysis to avoid hasty choices.