Resilience through interlinkage: the green climate fund and climate finance governance

The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is a significant and potentially innovative addition to UNFCCC frameworks for mobilizing increased finance for climate change mitigation and adaptation. Yet the GCF faces challenges of operationalization not only as a relatively new international fund but also as a result of US President Trump’s announcement that the United States would withdraw from the Paris Agreement. Consequently the GCF faces a major reduction in actual funding contributions and also governance challenges at the levels of its Board and the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP), to which it is ultimately accountable. This article analyzes these challenges with reference to the GCF’s internal regulations and its agreements with third parties to demonstrate how exploiting design features of the GCF could strengthen its resilience in the face of such challenges. These features include linkages with UNFCCC constituted bodies, particularly the Technology Mechanism, and enhanced engagement with non-Party stakeholders, especially through its Private Sector Facility. The article posits that deepening GCF interlinkages would increase both the coherence of climate finance governance and the GCF’s ability to contribute to ambitious climate action in uncertain times.

Key policy insights

• The Trump Administration’s purported withdrawal from the Paris Agreement creates challenges for the GCF operating model in three key domains: capitalization, governance and guidance.

• Two emerging innovations could prove crucial in GCF resilience to fulfil its role in Paris Agreement implementation: (1) interlinkages with other UNFCCC bodies, especially the Technology Mechanism; and (2) engagement with non-Party stakeholders, especially private sector actors such as large US investors and financiers.

• There is also an emerging soft role for the GCF as interlocutor between policy-makers and non-Party actors to help bridge the communication divide that often plagues cross-sectoral interactions.

• This role could develop through: (a) the GCF tripartite interface between the Private Sector Facility, Accredited Entities and National Designated Authorities; and (b) strengthened collaborations between the UNFCCC Technical and Financial Mechanisms.

     

Muddling through with climate change targets: a multi-level governance perspective on the transport sector

The UK Climate Change Act 2008 commits to a reduction of 80% in national GHG emissions by 2050 compared to 1990 levels. This article explores what happens next where these top-level aspirations are expected to be turned into radical action. It does so through examination of the transport sector, which is a highly complex, fragmented, and multi-level delivery environment. The research draws on cases studies of four major cities with different governance structures within the two distinct, yet connected, national contexts of England and Scotland. It integrates a range of theoretical legacies, namely ‘muddling through’, multi-level governance, and positional analysis, to look across governmental layers and out to non-governmental actors at all levels. Underneath the 80% target, the framework for action remains unclear. Lower-tiered authorities report difficulties in acting in a more comprehensive or rapid manner than upper tiers of government, largely because of the potential costs involved and a significant resource dependency on national governments. Ambition is also tempered by conflicts with economic growth objectives and the difficulties in aligning the objectives of the myriad of public and private organizations that need to take action.     

Swimming upstream: addressing fossil fuel supply under the UNFCCC

Reducing fossil fuel supply is necessary to meet the Paris Agreement goal to keep warming ‘well below 2°C’, yet the Agreement is silent on the topic of fossil fuels. This article outlines reasons why it is important that Parties to the Agreement find ways to more explicitly address the phasing out of fossil fuel production under the UNFCCC. It describes how countries aiming to keep fossil fuel supply in line with Paris goals could articulate and report their actions within the current architecture of the Agreement. It also outlines specific mechanisms of the Paris Agreement through which issues related to the curtailment of fossil fuel supply can be addressed. Mapping out a transition away from fossil fuels – and facilitating this transition under the auspices of the UNFCCC process – can enhance the ambition and effectiveness of national and international climate mitigation efforts.

Key policy insights

• The international commitment to limit global average temperature increases to ‘well below 2°C’ provides a strong rationale for Parties to the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC to pursue a phase-down in fossil fuel production, not just consumption.

• Several countries have already made commitments to address fossil fuel supply, by agreeing to phase down coal or oil exploration and production.

• Integrating these commitments into the UNFCCC process would link them to global climate goals, and ensure they form part of a broader global effort to transition away from fossil fuels.

• The Paris Agreement provides a number of new opportunities for Parties to address fossil fuel production.

     

国际气候治理中的公正转型议题：概念辨析与治理进展

国际气候治理中的公正转型议题涉及就业、关乎民生,是各国都很关注的政策领域之一,因此也被视为是支持应对气候变化的一种重要社会机制。近年来,国际社会积极推动建设气候治理公正转型制度体系,各国也在所制定的国家应对气候变化战略和规划中越来越多地提出与公正转型和就业相关的目标与措施。公正转型议题在国际气候治理进程中主流化的趋势给中国参与和引领全球气候治理带来了新的机遇与挑战。中国应加强关于该问题的基础性研究;在国内应对气候变化的行动中充分考虑该问题,保障受影响就业群体获得社会公正对待;总结具体实践经验;在政策领域协调上做好新的布局;积极参与《联合国气候变化框架公约》下公正转型治理体系的构建中。     

Breaking the impasse: towards a new regime for international climate governance

The reality of the current international order makes it imperative that a just and effective climate regime should balance the historical responsibility of developed countries with the increasing absolute emissions from many developing nations. The key pillars are briefly proposed for a new international climate architecture that envisions replacing the current annex system with two new annexes: Annex α, for countries with high current emissions and historically high emissions, and Annex β, for countries with high current emissions and historically low emissions. Countries in both annexes would implement legally binding targets under this framework. Additionally, this proposal includes alterations and revisions to funding and technology transfer mechanisms to correct for weaknesses and inequities under the current Kyoto architecture. The proposed framework stems from a belief that a top-down, international approach to climate policy remains the most effective for ensuring environmental integrity. Given the slow rate of institutional learning, the reform and improvement of the current system is held as a more efficient course of action than abandoning the progress already achieved. It is argued that the proposed framework could effectively accommodate key equity, environmental integrity, and political feasibility concerns.     

Great-power politics,order transition,and climate governance: insights from international relations theory

The complex politics of climate change cannot be properly understood without reference to deeper geopolitical trends in the wider international system. Chief among these is the growing resurgence of ‘great-power politics’ between China and the US, along with failures of socialization and enmeshment into global governance structures in relation to these two powers. Traditional theoretical frameworks have failed to adequately account for these developments. Nonetheless, this current great-power contestation is at the core of an order transition that has prevented the large-scale institutional redesign required to remove deadlocks in existing global governance structures, including climate governance. Examples from the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference provide ample evidence for these claims. The slow progress of the climate change negotiations are due not just to the politics of the issue itself, but to the absence of a new political bargain on material power structures, normative beliefs, and the management of the order amongst the great powers. Without such a grand political bargain, which could be promoted through a forum of major economies whose wide-ranging remit would go beyond single issues, the climate change regime is only ever likely to progress in a piecemeal fashion.

Policy relevance

Despite the achievements of the 2012 Doha Climate Change Conference, the climate negotiations are not on course to limit warming to 2 °C, and thereby avoid ‘dangerous’ climate change. Several factors have been invoked to account for such slow progress: notably, the nature of the climate change problem itself, the institutional structure of the climate regime, and lack of political will among key players. An alternative explanation is proposed such that the failure to seriously address climate change – as well as other global problems – reflects a resurgent meta-struggle between the ‘great powers’ of China and the US over the nature of the global order. Without such a broader understanding of the deeper dynamics underlying the stalemates of the climate change negotiations, there is little chance of turning those negotiations around.     

从巴黎到卡托维兹：全球气候治理中的统一和分裂

《巴黎协定》达成之后的实施细则谈判从一开始就面临各种挑战。尽管如此,卡托维兹气候大会基本完成了实施细则的磋商,通过统一规则的制定夯实了基于规则的气候治理框架,为“自下而上”的松散协定注入了更多规则绑定强制性色彩,提升了协定的法律地位。会议也见证了气候世界的分裂,包括主要缔约方立场的退化、谈判集团的分化重组、利益集团的博弈、对科学报告的分歧等,从而使关于力度的磋商没有实质进展。从巴黎到卡托维兹的谈判路程表明治理全球化、治理效率以及国家主权之间暂时存在“不可能三角”。未来的谈判应促进从规则到行动的转变。     

马德里气候大会盘点及全球气候治理展望

《联合国气候变化框架公约》（简称《公约》）第25次缔约方会议取得了一定进展,但未能就各方最为关注的《巴黎协定》第六条市场机制实施细则达成一致。会议成果平淡主要有4个原因:第一,过度强调提高各方减排目标力度而未能聚焦《巴黎协定》第六条相关谈判;第二,主席国和部分缔约方急切将各方尚未形成政治共识的提高承诺力度问题引入谈判进程,破坏了谈判氛围;第三,各个议题推进不平衡;第四,发达国家企图逃避责任,促使发展中国家更加团结并形成对立。展望2020年的全球气候多边进程形势,《巴黎协定》第六条相关谈判将继续作为重点,提高力度也将成为讨论主题,但片面强调1.5℃目标可能引发重谈《巴黎协定》风险,同时发达国家背弃《公约》、转嫁责任意图明显。全球气候治理应聚焦落实承诺的力度,并平行推进《公约》及其《巴黎协定》的实施。     

Bookkeeping rather than climate policy making: national mitigation strategies in Western Europe

Climate change mitigation is a wicked problem that cuts horizontally across sectors and vertically across levels of government. To address it effectively, governments around the world, in particular in the EU, have developed several generations of multi-sectoral national mitigation strategies (NMS) since the early 1990s. Although NMS became the main effort to systematically coordinate mitigation policies, few works have studied them comparatively so far. The present article fills this gap by analysing how the EU-15 group of countries operationalized climate protection through NMS. First, we introduce the three roles policy strategies usually aim to fulfil: besides being policy documents they also represent governance processes (supposed to coordinate sectoral implementation), and capacity-building efforts. Empirically, we then explore the rationale, origins and prevalence of NMS. Subsequently, we characterize them as policy documents (with regards to their contents and structures) and as governance processes that address capacity building only implicitly. Based on existing assessments we finally review some performance indications of NMS. We find that in particular second- and third-generation NMS aimed to take their governance function seriously but resembled ‘lacklustre bookkeeping' of emissions, targets and mitigation options. Instead of approximating NMS towards their obviously overcharging governance function, we suggest to recalibrate them towards their communication and capacity-building function in a way that goes beyond bookkeeping.

Policy relevance

The present article shows that NMS fail to effectively govern climate change mitigation across a broad range of sectoral policy domains. Since most European countries have adopted not one but up to three generations of NMS since the 1990s, this finding is highly relevant for them – and for all others aiming to adopt similarly broad strategies. Instead of piling one strategy on top of another irrespective of their implementation, and instead of abolishing mitigation strategies altogether, we recommend recalibrating them towards what they can realistically accomplish: effective communication and capacity building so that NMS can advance from lacklustre bookkeeping to actively promoting a government-wide climate change mitigation vision. The article can help governments to realise that renewing integrated strategies such as NMS without overhauling them comes close to flogging a dead horse.     

The promise of carbon capture and storage: evaluating the capture-readiness of new EU fossil fuel power plants

To what degree are recently built and planned power plants in the EU ‘capture-ready’ for carbon capture and storage (CCS)? Survey results show that most recently built fossil fuel power plants have not been designed as capture-ready. For 20 planned coal-fired plants, 13 were said to be capture-ready (65%). For 31 planned gas-fired power plants, only 2 were indicated to be capture-ready (6%). Recently built or planned power plants are expected to cover a large share of fossil fuel capacity by 2030 and thereby have a large impact on the possibility to implement CCS after 2020. It is estimated that around 15–30% of fossil fuel capacity by 2030 can be capture-ready or have CO₂ capture implemented from the start. If CCS is implemented at these plants, 14–28% of baseline CO₂ emissions from fossil fuel power generation in 2030 could be mitigated, equivalent to 220–410 MtCO₂. A key reason indicated by utilities for building a capture-ready plant is (expected) national or EU policies. In addition, financial incentives and expected high CO₂ prices are important. The implementation of a long-term regulatory framework for CCS with clear definitions of ‘capture- readiness’ and policy requirements will be important challenges.     

Climate policy strength compared: China,the US,the EU,India, Russia,and Japan

The few systematic international comparisons of climate policy strength made so far have serious weaknesses, particularly those that assign arbitrary weightings to different policy instrument types in order to calculate an aggregate score for policy strength. This article avoids these problems by ranking the six biggest emitters by far – China, the US, the EU, India, Russia, and Japan – on a set of six key policy instruments that are individually potent and together representative of climate policy as a whole: carbon taxes, emissions trading, feed-in tariffs, renewable energy quotas, fossil fuel power plant bans, and vehicle emissions standards. The results cast strong doubt on any idea that there is a clear hierarchy on climate policy with Europe at the top: the EU does lead on a number of policies but so does Japan. China, the US, and India each lead on one area. Russia is inactive on all fronts. At the same time climate policy everywhere remains weak compared to what it could be.

Policy relevance

This study enables climate policy strength, defined as the extent to which the statutory provisions of climate policies are likely to restrict GHG emissions if implemented as intended, to be assessed and compared more realistically across space and time. As such its availability for the six biggest emitters, which together account for over 70% of global CO₂ emissions, should facilitate international negotiations (1) by giving participants a better idea of where major emitters stand relative to each other as far as climate policy stringency is concerned, and (2) by identifying areas of weakness that need action.     

Experimentalist governance in climate finance: the case of REDD+ in Brazil

One of the most significant impacts of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has been the establishment of a participatory process for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+). We analyse the case of Brazil, the country whose land-use emissions from deforestation and forest degradation have declined the most. Through semi-structured interviews with 29 country policy experts – analysed in full text around 7 categories of activities that existing literature identifies as central elements of an effective governance system – we find weak links between the international REDD+ system and what actually happens on the ground inside Brazil. The greatest weaknesses are rooted in the absence of any formal learning system, which prevents higher-level efforts from obtaining useful feedback from lower-level entities responsible for implementation. Analytically our approach is rooted in the idea of ‘experimentalist governance’ in which local policy experiments map the space of what is possible and effective with transformative land policy. These experiments provide information to broader international initiatives on how local implementation shapes the ability and strategy to reach global goals. The Brazilian experience suggests that even when international funding is substantial, local implementation remains a weak link. REDD+ reforms should focus less on the total amount of money being spent and much more on how those funds are used to generate useful local policy experiments and learning.

Key policy insights

• A nascent system of experimentalist governance to implement REDD+ is taking shape in Brazil. However, the potential for experimentalism to improve policy reforms within Brazil is far from realized;

• Experimentalist problem-solving approaches could have a big impact on REDD+ with stronger incentives to promote experimentation and learning from experience;

• Reforms to REDD+ incentive schemes should focus less on the total amount of money being spent and more on whether those funds are actually generating experimental learning and policy improvement – in Brazil and in other countries struggling with similar challenges.

     

Climate change and the transition to neoliberal environmental governance

What are the guiding principles of contemporary international governance of climate change and to what extent do they represent neoliberal forms? We document five main political and institutional shifts within the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and outline core governance practices for each phase. In discussing the current phase since the Paris Agreement, we offer to the emerging literature on international neoliberal environmental governance an analytical framework by which the extent of international neoliberal governance can be assessed. We conceptualize international neoliberal environmentalism as characterized by four main processes: the prominence of libertarian ideals of justice, in which justice is defined as the rational pursuit of sovereign self-interest between unequal parties; marketization, in which market mechanisms, private sector engagement and purportedly ‘objective’ considerations are viewed as the most effective and efficient forms of governance; governance by disclosure, in which the primary obstacles to sustainability are understood as ‘imperfect information’ and onerous regulatory structures that inhibit innovation; and exclusivity, in which multilateral decision-making is shifted from consensus to minilateralism. Against this framework, we argue that the contemporary UNFCCC regime has institutionalized neoliberal reforms in climate governance, although not without resistance, in a configuration which is starkly different than that of earlier eras. We conclude by describing four crucial gaps left by this transition, which include the ability of the regime to drive adequate ambition, and gaps in transparency, equity and representation.     

The tools of climate adaptation policy: analysing instruments and instrument selection

Governments have a key role to play in the process of climate adaptation, through the development and implementation of public policy. Governments have access to a diverse array of instruments that can be employed to adapt their operations and influence the behaviour of individuals, organizations, and other governments. However, the choice of policy instrument is political, because it affects the distribution of benefits and costs, and entrenches institutional procedures and resources that are difficult to redeploy. This article identifies four key governing resources that governments employ in the service of adaptation and analyses these resources using criteria drawn from the policy studies literature. For each category, specific policy instruments are described, and examples are provided to illustrate how they have been used in particular jurisdictions. The article also discusses instrument selection, focusing on trade-offs among the instrument attributes, processes for setting the stage for instrument choice, jurisdictional constraints on instrument selection, and ways to avoid negative vertical and horizontal policy interplay.

Policy relevance

Adaptation is a nascent field of public policy, and courses of action to reduce vulnerability and build adaptive capacity are in their infancy. This article contributes to policy development and analysis by identifying the range of policy instruments available to governments and analysing concrete ways in which they are employed to implement adaptation policy objectives. Taking stock of these adaptation tools and comparing their behavioural assumptions and attributes helps to illuminate potential policy options, and to evaluate their technical viability, political acceptability, and economic feasibility. Providing examples of how these instruments have been implemented successfully in other jurisdictions offers ideas and lessons for public officials.     

Interactions between European agricultural policy and climate change: a Slovenian case study

This article analyses the interactions between agricultural policy measures in the EU and the factors affecting GHG emissions from agriculture on the one hand, and the adaptation of agriculture to climate change on the other. To this end, the article uses Slovenia as a case study, assessing the extent to which Slovenian agricultural policy is responding to the challenges of climate change. All agricultural policy measures related to the 2007–2013 programming period were analysed according to a new methodological approach that is based on a qualitative (expert evaluation) and a quantitative (budgetary transfers validation) assessment. A panel of experts reached consensus on the key factors through which individual measures affect climate change, in which direction and how significantly. Data on budgetary funds for each measure were used as weights to assess their relative importance. The results show that there are not many measures in (Slovenian) agricultural policy that are directly aimed at reducing GHG emissions from agriculture or at adaptation to climate change. Nevertheless, most affect climate change, and their impact is far from negligible. Current measures have both positive and negative impacts, but overall the positive impacts prevail. Measures that involve many beneficiaries and more budgetary funds had the strongest impact on aggregate assessments. In light of climate change, agricultural policy should pay more attention to measures that are aimed at raising the efficiency of animal production, as it is the principal source of GHG emissions from agriculture.

Policy relevance

Agricultural policy must respond to climate challenges and climate change impact assessment must be included in the process of forming European agricultural policy. Agricultural policy measures that contribute to the reduction of emissions and adaptation, whilst acting in synergy with other environmental, economic and social goals, should be promoted. The approach used in this study combines qualitative and quantitative data, yielding an objective assessment of the climate impact of agricultural policy measures and providing policy makers with a tool for either ex ante or ex post evaluations of climate-relevant policy measures.     

Reform or reversal: the impact of REDD+ readiness on forest governance in Indonesia

Indonesia has turned its alleged role as global leader of land-based carbon emissions into a role as a global trailblazer exploring modalities for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+). REDD+ readiness is largely about improving forest governance, but this itself is a multilayered concept. This article analyses how the processes and practices of REDD+ readiness are leading to various forest governance reforms in Indonesia. We analysed six dimensions of REDD+ readiness progress over the past six years and the way these interact with land tenure reform and land-use planning. We found evidence that (1) tenure issues are taken more seriously, as evidenced by the development of social safeguard mechanisms and efforts to accelerate the gazettement of forest boundaries, although a constitutional court recognition in 2013 for customary forest management is, however, yet to be operationalized; (2) spatial planning relates forests more clearly to other parts of the landscape in terms of compliance with Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) commitments; and (3) the forest and peatland conversion moratorium initiative led to a revamping of forest management. Despite progress, there are still major obstacles to full REDD+ implementation in Indonesia. The discussion focuses on the weaker part of readiness and possible ways forward.     

绿色气候基金在全球气候治理体系中的作用和展望

作为《联合国气候变化框架公约》(简称公约）和《巴黎协定》资金机制最大运营实体,绿色气候基金(GCF)不仅是发达国家兑现1000亿美元长期资金承诺的重要平台,亦是公约和《巴黎协定》目标达成的关键因素。文中系统总结了GCF在推进气候变化国际合作进程、为发展中国家应对气候变化提供资金支持、推动私营部门参与应对气候变化行动等方面的积极作用。提出在当前多边合作面临挑战的复杂背景下,GCF亦面临美国退群、缺乏有效决策机制、项目质量及秘书处能力有待提高等系列问题。文章认为,一个持续有效运营的GCF是国际社会落实《巴黎协定》实施细则的重要保障,各方应尽快凝聚政治共识,推动GCF在全球气候治理体系中继续发挥积极作用。首先,应通过引入投票权决策机制、完善政策缺口、创新业务模式等措施提升基金治理和运营效率;其次,通过尽快完成正式增资进程、拓宽资金渠道、加强剩余资金管理等方式确保充足及可持续的资金来源;最后,还应通过强化与现有气候基金的协调互补、加大与多边发展银行的合作等途径与各方资金形成合力,推动资金流向低碳和气候韧性发展领域。文章还提出,中国应在有效发挥发达国家和发展中国家桥梁作用的基础上,引导GCF投票权改革以消除政治因素对GCF长远发展的负面影响,同时通过积极争取获得下届董事席位,推进与GCF全方位合作、参与GCF正式增资进程等举措,服务生态文明建设及全球应对气候变化目标。     

Climate policy networks in South Korea: alliances and conflicts

A policy network analysis using a questionnaire survey was conducted to identify the main climate policy actors in South Korea and examine how they form alliances and come into conflict over four major issues. Generally, it was found that governmental organizations are the main actors in the South Korean climate policy arena and that they mediate between the business and civil sectors. In particular, key organizations in each sector play a leading role in the formation and maintenance of at least two distinct alliance networks: growth and environmental. In particular, the growth network has been stronger and more intense than the environmental network, with the exception of nuclear power policy. The crucial drivers of proactive policy discourse in South Korea have been scientific discourse and a consensus on the advent of anthropogenic climate change by the international scientific community, the international climate change negotiations and the pressure to commit to GHG emissions reduction, and low-carbon green growth strategy.

Policy relevance

The positions of South Korean governmental organizations (as well as other civil society organizations) on the four major issues of climate policy have not been aligned. The government has not acted as a unified body; instead it is an aggregated body composed of organizations with competing interests. If policy actors with different interests share the recognition of the state of the country within global society and understand international pressure as well as the urgency of combating climate change, then a common policy goal can be achieved. It is essential for the government to exert proactive leadership for climate policies in mediating the growth and environmental networks. It is important to boost environmental networks in order to overcome the alliance of growth networks. A more proactive response for combating climate change would establish open policy-making processes for environmental network actors and provide economic opportunities for climate actions.     

Confronting the nitrogen challenge: Options for governance and target setting

The release of excessive anthropogenic nitrogen contributes to global climate change, biodiversity loss, and the degradation of ecosystem services. Despite being an urgent global problem, the excess nitrogen is not governed globally. This paper considers possible governance options for dealing with excessive nitrogen through target setting, which is an approach commonly adopted to address global environmental problems. The articulation of the nitrogen problem and the numerous international institutions dealing with it, provide evidence of a nitrogen regime characterised by limited coordination and targets covering sources and impacts only partially. This calls for improving the nitrogen governance in the direction of more integrated approaches at the global scale. In this vein, the paper investigates two opposite governance options – here labelled as ‘holistic’ and ‘origin-based’ – and evaluates them for their capability to define solutions and targets for human-induced nitrogen. From the analysis, it emerges that origin-based solutions can be preferable to holistic solutions as they can be more specific and potentially have greater immediate results. Independent from which governance arrangement is chosen, what matters most is the speed at which an arrangement can deploy solutions to combat (fast-growing) nitrogen pollution.     

Telling stories with models and making policy with stories: an exploration

Narrative research is in vogue in the social sciences. A current debate in philosophy of economics concerns the role of storytelling in economic modelling, and a growing research programme in policy studies investigates the influence of stories on policy outcomes. These two streams of research have yet to be connected in an investigation of how scientific models, in addition to delivering numerical results, also shape policy through the stories that are told with them. This article addresses that gap, arguing that stories produced with integrated assessment models of global climate change are particular types of policy narratives. An analytical framework for studying their composition and content is suggested. The narrative analysis of modelled stories illuminates some of the models' underpinning values and beliefs. These values and beliefs influence the normative, policy-relevant conclusions generated with the models. For illustration, the framework is applied to the analysis of two variations of the Dynamic Integrated Climate Economy model that are used to tell different stories about climate justice and climate policy.

Key policy insights

• IAMs consist of mathematical structures and the stories told by manipulating these structures.

• There is an intricate but not fully deterministic relationship between IAM structures and stories.

• Examining both these elements contributes to our understanding of the models' role in climate governance.

• Appreciation of modelled stories may facilitate more effective use of IAMs in the policy process.