Linking the CDM with domestic carbon markets

Certified emission reductions (CERs) from Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects have traditionally served as an indirect link between cap and trade systems around the world. However, since 2010, import restrictions have increased. Reasons for import limitations include the supplementarity principle, genuine concerns about the environmental integrity of CERs and social benefits of CDM projects, pressure from domestic emissions mitigation industries, concerns about competition in the industries in which reductions take place, as well as the attempt to pressure advanced developing countries to accept national emissions commitments under a future international climate policy regime. It is shown that import limitations lead to a decrease in CER prices and a race to generate CERs as quickly as possible. Such effects are visible in the CDM market after the EU announced its import limitations. The exclusion of CERs from specific project types will distort the CDM supply curve and increase the CER price unless the marginal abatement costs of the excluded project type are above the CER world market price. Similarly, exclusion of CERs from specific host countries will increase the price. Substantial differences are found in CER access to national carbon markets around the world.Policy relevanceCDM regulators could try to improve access of CERs to cap and trade schemes through improvements to additionality testing, standardizing baseline and monitoring methodologies and stakeholder consultation. However, regulators should be aware that standardization is no panacea, and controversies may resurface if standardized additionality determination (e.g. through benchmarks or positive lists) are applied for a certain period and found to be problematic. However, domestic policy concerns such as an unwillingness to send money abroad to buy credits, an inability to control market prices, and competitiveness impacts cannot be resolved by CDM reforms. If, despite such reforms of the CDM, blatant protectionism continues, a challenge before the World Trade Organisation (WTO) could be launched to stop discrimination of service exports from specific countries.     

Does the current Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) deliver its sustainable development claim? An analysis of officially registered CDM projects

This article presents an analytical framework for analyzing Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects in terms of their contribution to employment generation, equal distribution of CDM returns, and improvement of local air quality. It assesses 16 officially registered CDM projects with regard to whether they fulfill the two objectives required by the Kyoto Protocol: greenhouse gas emission reductions and contribution to sustainable development in the host country. While a large part (72%) of the total portfolio’s expected Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) are likely to represent real and measurable emission reductions, less than 1% are likely to contribute significantly to sustainable development in the host country. According to our analysis, there are currently no UNFCCC registered CDM projects that are likely to fulfill the Kyoto Protocol’s twofold objective of simultaneously delivering greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction and contributing to sustainable development.     

A CER discounting scheme could save climate change regime after 2012

We can generate a net global GHG emission reduction from developing countries (in an UNFCCC term, non-Annex 1 Parties) without imposing targets on them, if we discount CERs generated from CDM projects. The CER discounting scheme means that a part or all of CDM credits, i.e., CERs, made by developing countries through unilateral CDM projects will be retired rather than sold to developed countries to increase their emissions. It is not feasible to impose certain forms of target (whether sectoral or intensity targets) on non-Annex 1 whose emission trend is hard to predict and whose industrial structure is undergoing a rapid change.

Instead of imposing targets (a command and control approach), we should apply market instruments in generating a net global emission reduction from non-Annex 1. Since April 2005 when the first unilateral CDM was approved by the CDM Executive Board, CDM has been functioning as a market mechanism to provide incentives for developing countries to initiate their own emission reduction projects. As CDM is the only market mechanism engaging developing countries in the Kyoto Protocol, we should try to re-design CDM so that it can generate net global emission reductions by introducing the idea of discounting CERs. But in order to produce meaningful GHG emission reductions by discounting CERs, the project scope of CDM has to be expanded by relaxing project additionality criteria while maintaining strict technical additionality criteria. Agreeing on the CERs Discounting Scheme will have a better political chance than agreeing on imposing emission reduction targets on developing countries.     

Future restrictions for sinks in the CDM: How about a cap on supply?

The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol is expected to result in only a small role for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), including afforestation and reforestation projects. Wide ranging concerns regarding sinks in the CDM have been reflected in the Marrakech Accords capping the total amount of emission offsets from sinks projects to be used by Annex I countries. Decisions about the second commitment period and beyond are likely to be of far greater importance for these projects.This paper contributes to the discussion on how caps on sinks under the CDM could be used to obtain overall improved outcomes for developing countries. We examine two distinctive ways in which quantitative caps on sinks in the CDM can be implemented: one, restricting the use of sinks CERs to meet targets, as under the Marrakech Accords (a cap on demand); and two, restricting supply of sink CERs using a quota system. We argue in favour of a supply side cap, if Parties are to preserve the idea of limiting sinks in the CDM. Limiting the supply of credits could lead to better financial outcomes for developing countries as a whole, make higher-cost projects viable which may have better sustainability impacts, and provide an alternative to deal with equity concerns between developing countries.     

Future restrictions for sinks in the CDM How about a cap on supply?

Abstract

The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol is expected to result in only a small role for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), including afforestation and reforestation projects. Wide ranging concerns regarding sinks in the CDM have been reflected in the Marrakech Accords capping the total amount of emission offsets from sinks projects to be used by Annex I countries. Decisions about the second commitment period and beyond are likely to be of far greater importance for these projects.

This paper contributes to the discussion on how caps on sinks under the CDM could be used to obtain overall improved outcomes for developing countries. We examine two distinctive ways in which quantitative caps on sinks in the CDM can be implemented: one, restricting the use of sinks CERs to meet targets, as under the Marrakech Accords (a cap on demand); and two, restricting supply of sink CERs using a quota system. We argue in favour of a supply side cap, if Parties are to preserve the idea of limiting sinks in the CDM. Limiting the supply of credits could lead to better financial outcomes for developing countries as a whole, make higher-cost projects viable which may have better sustainability impacts, and provide an alternative to deal with equity concerns between developing countries.     

The potential of the CDM to deliver pro-poor benefits

The potential of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects to deliver pro-poor benefits at the community level is examined. Both regular CDM and premium add-on standard projects are evaluated, including the Gold Standard and Climate, Community and Biodiversity (CCB) Standard, through the use of seven poverty indicators. Some key characteristics associated with providing pro-poor benefits are also identified. Finally, the market potential of a revised or new premium add-on standard explicitly designed to deliver pro-poor benefits is assessed through the use of a survey. The results indicate that regular CDM projects are only moderately successful at delivering pro-poor benefits. Although the few projects registered that utilize the CCB Standard all performed well in delivering pro-poor benefits, those that used the Gold Standard performed only slightly better than regular CDM projects. Characteristics associated with providing pro-poor benefits include the use of add-on standards, a high level of stakeholder participation, and the development of projects by not-for-profit and government/intergovernmental organizations. The survey of carbon market participants indicated both an interest and desire for Certified Emission Reduction (CER) credits with pro-poor benefits attached and shows that the market potential for such a standard to be quite good.

Policy relevance

This analysis of the CDM goes beyond sustainable development to consider the potential of a project to deliver pro-poor benefits at the local community level. Specific characteristics associated with projects are identified that appear to deliver pro-poor benefits that may benefit future project design. Through this analysis and identifying these characteristics, actions may be taken to incorporate those into CDM project requirements or guidelines to advance the mechanism as a means to contribute to poverty alleviation.     

Can CDM monitoring requirements be reduced while maintaining environmental integrity?

Monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) requirements in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) are perceived to be of high quality, but also complex and stringent. Only one-third of the registered projects successfully managed initial verification and already received carbon credits. The time required to achieve first issuance remains high despite considerable improvements in other CDM project cycle steps. This leads to the question of whether MRV provisions in the CDM represent barriers that could be lowered while ensuring the CDM's integrity. The CDM requirements are compared with the MRV provisions of the EU Emission Trading System (EU ETS). The comparison shows that CDM–MRV provisions are often stricter and less flexible compared to similar provisions in the EU ETS. Due to structural differences between the EU ETS and the CDM, some different MRV approaches are justified and reflect the CDM's disparate objectives and complexity. It is found that some CDM provisions result in barriers which seem avoidable and do not contribute to the CDM's environmental integrity. Recommendations are made for CDM-specific improvements and general structural changes to improve cost-efficiency and reduce uncertainty with relevance to policy developments around future market mechanisms.     

Combining cap-and-trade with offsets: lessons from the EU-ETS

Linking a cap-and-trade with an offset mechanism has many theoretical advantages: it reduces compliance costs, extends the price signal outside the cap-and-trade, and triggers technology transfer. However, it is feared that such linking will induce outsourcing of emissions reduction at a low price and undermine the price incentive in the cap-and-trade. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the first full-scale example of a cap-and-trade system linked to project-based mechanisms such that offsets have effectively been used by industrial installations. This article is an ex post analysis of EU ETS data for the years 2008 and 2009, and the characteristics of the link and its efficiency are evaluated. Although offsets have been much used, their use is concentrated and not very intense or frequent, which allays the fear that offsets will flood the market. Although the majority of surrendered CERs effectively come from the largest and oldest projects, the credits surrendered are similar to those available on the market. Possible factors that contribute towards inefficiency are the rules for using offsets, transaction costs affecting the participation of small installations, awareness and openness to market-based instruments, and uncertainties regarding CERs offer and demand from other markets. However, the impact on EUA equilibrium price still needs to be quantified.     

A two-track CDM: improved incentives for sustainable development and offset production

The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has been criticized in the literature for encouraging a focus on offset production (OP) at the expense of achieving or encouraging sustainable development (SD). It is argued that one explanation for this is that there is no commonly agreed definition of SD and, moreover, the priority of CDM project developers is often to produce cost-effective OP. Many of the proposals to address these drawbacks are not politically feasible. It is argued that the CDM should be split into a two-track mechanism, with one track for offset production and the other for offset production with an emphasis on sustainable development benefits. This would enable the political deadlock to be broken, allow the inclusion of SD benefits in the price mechanism itself, and allow both SD and OP objectives to be simultaneously achieved.

Policy relevance

The CDM has been criticized for failing to achieve its sustainable development objective, for verification problems regarding the mitigation effects of projects’ emissions, for being complex and bureaucratic, and for the very limited participation by the least developed countries. Given the adoption of a second period of the Kyoto Protocol and the discussion of new market mechanisms in the context of negotiating a new global climate agreement to be adopted in 2015, it is time to explore the ways in which the CDM might be reformed. A two-track version of the CDM is proposed, with one track focused on credit (offset) production and the other track focused on sustainable development. This system could improve the incentive for achieving sustainable development, reduce the uncertainty regarding whether real emissions reductions have been achieved, and be attractive to both developing and industrialized countries.     

Technology transfer in the CDM: an updated analysis

The prevalence of technology transfer (TT) for Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects is analysed, based on information in the project design documents (PDDs) of 3949 projects registered as of 31 March 2012. Responses to a follow-up survey indicate that the PDD statements that concern TT are reasonably accurate and at least 39% of the related projects are expected to involve it. Technology transfer is very heterogeneous across project types and is more common for larger projects. It also usually involves both knowledge and equipment and differs significantly by host country. Technology transfer has declined over time in China, India, and Brazil, the countries that host most of the CDM projects, but it has remained high for other host countries. A host country's existing capacity specific to the technology, the scope for economic deployment of the technology, and complementary policies to build capacity and promote TT, increase the frequency of TT by CDM projects. The technology used by CDM projects originates mostly from Germany, the US, Japan, Denmark, and China, with multiple suppliers of the technology for all project types.     

Assessing the additionality of CDM projects: practical experiences and lessons learned

The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol allows industrialized countries to use credits from greenhouse gas (GHG) abatement projects in developing countries. A key requirement of the CDM is that the emission reductions be real, measurable and additional. This article evaluates how the additionality of CDM projects has been assessed in practice. The analysis is mainly based on a systematic evaluation of 93 registered CDM projects and comes to the conclusion that the current tools for demonstrating additionality are in need of substantial improvement. In particular, the application of the barrier analysis is highly subjective and difficult to validate in an objective and transparent manner. Key assumptions regarding additionality are often not substantiated with credible, documented evidence. In a considerable number of cases it is questionable whether the emission reductions are actually additional. Based on these findings, practical recommendations for improving the assessment of additionality are provided.     

Certified emissions reductions and CDM limits: revenue and distributional aspects

The EU allows those installations that are subject to emissions trading to use a limited volume of certified emissions reductions (CERs), generated through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), to cover their own GHG emissions. These CERs can be used in addition to the EU allowances (EUAs), which were primarily allocated free to installations in Phase II of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) from 2008 to 2012. For the year 2008, the CER limits, which are differentiated by EU Member State, created substantial arbitrage rents (due to the CER-EUA spread) of approximately EU€250 million. Different options for the allocation of this rent are discussed and it is found that, according to economic theory, making the right to use CERs tradable or the regulator pre-committing to buying CERs at the level of the relevant limit reduces the inefficiencies connected to the current regulation. Furthermore, auctioning these CER usage rights shifts the rents created through the CER-EUA spread to the Member State itself. The improved design and implementation of CDM limits justifies EU policy makers intervening to correct previously competition-distorting choices.     

How to attribute market leakage to CDM projects

Abstract

Economic studies suggest that market leakage rates of greenhouse gas abatement can reach the two-digit percentage range. Although the Marrakesh Accords require Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects to account for leakage, most projects neglect market leakage. Insufficient leakage accounting is facilitated by a lack of applicable methods regarding the quantification and attribution of project-related leakage effects. This article proposes a method for attributing CDM-related market leakage effects to individual projects. To this purpose, alternative attribution methods are analysed. We find that project-specific approaches fail to take account of market leakage effects. Consequently, we propose to estimate aggregate market leakage effects and attribute them proportionally to individual projects. We suggest that predetermined commodity-specific leakage factors are applied by project developers to any emission reductions that are associated with a project's leakage-relevant demand or supply changes. This approach is conservative, equitable, incentive-compatible and applicable at manageable costs.     

Carbon accounting for sinks in the CDM after CoP-9

Abstract

The role of sinks in the clean development mechanism (CDM) has been a subject of controversy for several reasons; one being that temporary carbon storage in forests appeared to prevent any opportunity to use them as an option to reduce permanent greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In Milan (December 2003), the Conference of the Parties (CoP) decided to address this problem by introducing two types of expiring units: temporary CERs (tCERs) and long-term CERs (lCERs). Countries committed to emission reductions may acquire these units to temporarily offset their emissions and thus to postpone permanent emission reductions. As further decided by the CoP, baseline emissions of GHGs and the enhancement of sinks outside the project boundary will not be accounted for in the calculation of tCERs or lCERs. The contribution of CDM-sink projects to GHG emissions abatement will therefore be greater than what will be credited to them. On the other hand, permanent GHG emissions that may result as a consequence of the implementation of sink project activities are treated as non-permanent. If these emissions are above avoided baseline emissions, CDM-sinks will result in net increases of GHG emissions into the atmosphere. After briefly reassessing the non-permanence problem, this article explains how tCERs and lCERs should be quantified according to Decision 19/CP.9 of CoP-9 and how calculations are implemented in the forthcoming software CO₂ Land. Using a simple numerical example, it illustrates how the GHG accounting rule adopted at CoP-9 may result in net increases of GHG emissions. In the conclusion, a possible solution to this problem is proposed.     

Technology transfer in the Clean Development Mechanism

Technology transfer is often mentioned as an ancillary benefit of the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), but this claim has hardly been researched or substantiated. The question of technology transfer is important, both for developing countries in need for new technology and knowledge and for industrialized countries, as it provides export potential for climate-friendly technologies. To determine what technology transfer means, whether it is occurring through the CDM, and what the value of the associated capital flows is, this article examines technology transfer in the 63 CDM projects that were registered up until 1 January 2006. Technology hardware originates from outside the host country in almost 50% of the evaluated projects, particularly in non-CO₂ greenhouse gas projects, wind energy projects, and a substantial share of the hydropower projects. Bioenergy and projects in the agricultural sector mainly use local technology. The investment value associated with the CDM projects that transferred technology is estimated to be around €470 million, with about €390 million coming from the EU. As the non-CO₂ greenhouse gas projects had very low capital costs, the investment value was highest in the more capital-intensive wind energy and hydropower projects. We also found substantial soft technology transfer, but uncertainties for this finding are greater.     

Can the EU emission trading scheme support CDM forestry?

Abstract

The European Commission is mandated to consider the inclusion of credits from land-use projects under the clean development mechanism (CDM) and joint implementation (JI), beginning with the second period of the European Union's emission trading scheme (ETS) in its report due in July 2006. Temporary credits from afforestation and reforestation under the CDM are seen by many as posing a technical problem for their use under the ETS. This article summarizes three feasible, efficient and environmentally sound alternatives for achieving the integration of such temporary credits in the European emissions trading market starting in 2008. The first proposal integrates tCERs and lCERs (temporary credits) into the EU ETS by allowing for their direct use for compliance purposes. The second proposal builds on the idea of swapping temporary credits for EU allowances (EUAs) by Member States. The third proposal would not require a political decision at the EU level. Instead supportive Member States or private carbon fund operators would agree to swap temporary credits for the CERs or ERUs they hold in their accounts. All three solutions would be linked to a risk-mitigation strategy based on levying a fee or fixing an exchange rate, which would allow governments to hedge the risk of losing temporary credits.     

Do bilateral trade relationships influence the distribution of CDM projects?

The use of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is increasingly widespread in developing countries. However, CDM projects are still far from being an effective development activity due to the uneven distribution of these projects in a few relatively well-off economies. One potential cause of this imbalance is analysed in terms of the trade relationships between developed and developing countries. By applying a gravity model to a panel dataset, well-established export flows from developed economies towards developing countries are shown to explain why a large proportion of CDM projects are unevenly geographically distributed. This kind of lock-in effect regarding the CDM between developed and developing countries could be avoided by both enhancing the institutional framework in developing countries that host CDM projects and reinforcing compulsory rules for CDM destinations in the least-developed economies.     

The socialization potential of the CDM in EU–Vietnam climate relations

This article argues that the material incentives associated with climate policies such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) may contribute to the socialization of emerging economies such as Vietnam in economic-oriented climate change norms. In current academic research, the CDM has both been extolled as a cost-effective and vilified as an environmentally inadequate instrument. Few studies so far, however, have looked into the CDM's potential contribution to socialization-related phenomena such as raising climate change awareness. This article aims to fill that gap by studying the CDM in EU–Vietnam relations in four periods, namely initiation (2001–2007), improvement (2008–2010), consolidation (2010–2012), and potential habit formation (2012 and beyond), with both the EU and Vietnam being important players in the market for CDM credits (Certified Emission Reductions or CERs). We argue that there is at least a strong potential for habit formation resulting from the CDM's material incentives, and that the underlying causal mechanism involves the emergence and activities of norm entrepreneurs and habit formation through a process of legal institutionalization.

Policy relevance

Normative transformation or change is increasingly attracting the attention of both climate policy makers and scholars alike, certainly in view of the failures of ‘standard’ economic or technological solutions to tackle climate change. There is a need, however, to apply insights from social theory to specific policies and cases. The policy relevance of this article lies here: does the CDM (a specific policy) affect climate concerns (norms) in Vietnam (a specific case)? And, if so, to what extent and why? Based on previous research regarding the Chinese case, it is expected that the CDM's material incentives result in a mild effect in Vietnam, probably less pronounced than in China in view of the latter's relative level of economic development, and the strength of its political and legal-institutional system and (human) capacity to develop CDM projects. This article's research findings point out that whether and how ‘deep’ these new shared ideas will succeed in becoming standards of appropriate behaviour in Vietnam might to some extent depend on whether the international community is able to offer a material incentive structure that fosters such a normative transformation.     

Selecting and assessing sustainable CDM projects using multi-criteria methods

Even though sustainable development has been broadly debated, the clean development mechanism (CDM) still lacks sophisticated multi-criteria decision methods for identifying, selecting and assessing CDM project activities from this perspective. Bearing in mind the huge number of CDM projects that are beginning to accumulate as the carbon market gains momentum, and the importance for non-Annex I Parties to keep focused on the sustainability objective, this article aims at developing a tool for prioritizing—within a given group, and once a specific list of sustainable development criteria is agreed upon and given—proposed CDM projects from this sustainable development point of view. We reached the following conclusions: (1) it is important to make a conscious choice of an appropriate way to normalize the sustainability performance data of CDM projects; (2) it is important to make a conscious choice of how to aggregate across multiple attributes; (3) in contrast with conventional multi-criteria assessments, which elicit preferences from a stakeholder panel, preference optimization infers from CDM projects' performance data an optimal set of weights that proponents would choose in order to win a competitive selection process. Such preference optimization methods (a) yield sensible results, simulating a range of decision circumstances, (b) avoid conflict and convey impartiality in situations where competing project proponents are likely to clash over objectionable weightings, (c) avoid cognitive overload when the number of CDM projects and/or indicators is overwhelmingly large, and (d) circumvent time-consuming and costly interviews and surveys.

From a policy perspective, the multi-criteria assessment described here can be a powerful tool for prioritizing CDM projects (1) when there is a limited amount of grant funding to certain CDM project candidates, and (2) when the decisionmaking process incorporates the CDM objective of promoting sustainable development, in addition to the objective of helping developed countries to meet part of their reduction obligations as specified in Annex I of the Protocol.     

Determinants of technology transfer through the CDM: a within-country analysis for China

Technology transfer (TT) is not mandatory for Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects, yet proponents of CDM argue that TT in CDM can bring new technologies to developing countries and thus not only reduce emissions but also foster development. We review the quantitative literature on determinants of TT in CDM and estimate determinants for CDM projects in China. China is by far the largest host country of CDM projects and it is therefore crucial to understand the factors that drive TT there. To gain better interpretation, we focus on heterogeneity within a single country and results can thus be linked to specific policies of the country. Our probit estimations confirm previous international cross-country studies, indicating that larger projects and more advanced technologies are more likely to involve TT. In addition, we find evidence that agglomeration effects are more pronounced at the province level rather than larger regions. We also find a positive effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on TT, and academic research and development (R&D) is complementary to TT.

Policy relevance

Technology transfer (TT) is a goal of Chinese CDM legislation, but it is not a prerequisite for project approval. Our estimations show the project specific, technological and region-specific features that encourage more TT among CDM projects. Some variables analysed such as R&D spending and FDI (both are found to have positive effects on TT) can be, to some extent, influenced by the policy-makers. Moreover, we find some evidence for the presence of negative agglomeration effects on the provincial level: the likelihood of TT is decreasing in the number of previous projects operating in the same technology and province. This finding needs to be interpreted with great caution. It may suggest the existence of a learning externality, which could serve as a justification for policy intervention. Any policy intervention requires however careful analysis of potential positive or negative externalities resulting from the agglomeration of CDM projects and a comparison of possible benefits with the costs of TT.