Barriers perceived to engaging with climate change among the UK public and their policy implications

This paper reports on the barriers that members of the UK public perceive to engaging with climate change. It draws upon three mixed-method studies, with an emphasis on the qualitative data which offer an in-depth insight into how people make sense of climate change. The paper defines engagement as an individual's state, comprising three elements: cognitive, affective and behavioural. A number of common barriers emerge from the three studies, which operate broadly at ‘individual’ and ‘social’ levels. These major constraints to individual engagement with climate change have implications for achieving significant reductions in greenhouse gases in the UK. We argue that targeted and tailored information provision should be supported by wider structural change to enable citizens and communities to reduce their carbon dependency. Policy implications for effective engagement are discussed.     

Sharing the burden of financing adaptation to climate change

Climate change may cause most harm to countries that have historically contributed the least to greenhouse gas emissions and land-use change. This paper identifies consequentialist and non-consequentialist ethical principles to guide a fair international burden-sharing scheme of climate change adaptation costs. We use these ethical principles to derive political principles – historical responsibility and capacity to pay – that can be applied in assigning a share of the financial burden to individual countries. We then propose a hybrid ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ approach as a promising starting point for international negotiations on the design of burden-sharing schemes. A numerical assessment of seven scenarios shows that the countries of Annex I of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change would bear the bulk of the costs of adaptation, but contributions differ substantially subject to the choice of a capacity to pay indicator. The contributions are less sensitive to choices related to responsibility calculations, apart from those associated with land-use-related emissions. Assuming costs of climate adaptation of USD 100 billion per year, the total financial contribution by the Annex I countries would be in the range of USD 65–70 billion per year. Expressed as a per capita basis, this gives a range of USD 43–82 per capita per year.     

The new climate discourse: Alarmist or alarming?

The discourse on climate change is in part divided between a sense of alarm and a sense of alarmism in assessments of the magnitude and urgency of the problem. The divide in the discourse among climatologists relates to tensions in the use of key phrases to describe climate change. This article reviews evidence to support claims that climate change can be viewed as ‘catastrophic’, ‘rapid’, ‘urgent’, ‘irreversible’, ‘chaotic’, and ‘worse than previously thought’. Each of these terms are imprecise and may convey a range of meaning. The method used here is to assess whether the conventional understandings of these terms are broadly consistent or inconsistent with the science, or else ambiguous. On balance, these terms are judged to be consistent with the science. Factors which divide climatologists on this discourse are also reviewed. The divide over a sense of urgency relates to disagreement on the manner and rate at which ice sheets breakdown in response to sustained warming. Whether this rate is fast or slow, the amount of time available to reduce emissions sufficient to prevent ice sheet breakdown is relatively short, given the moderate levels of warming required and the inertia of the climate and energy systems. A new discourse is emerging which underscores the scope of the problem and the scope and feasibility of solutions. This discourse differentiates itself from existing discourses which view the magnitudes of the problem or of solutions as prohibitive.     

Ethics and public perception of climate change: Exploring the Christian voices in the US public debate

Climate change raises many questions with strong moral and ethical dimensions that are important to address in climate-policy formation and international negotiations. Particularly in the United States, the public discussion of these dimensions is strongly influenced by religious groups and leaders. Over the past few years, many religious groups have taken positions on climate change, highlighting its ethical dimensions. This paper aims to explore these ethical dimensions in the US public debate in relation to public support for climate policies. It analyzes in particular the Christian voices in the US public debate on climate change by typifying the various discourses. Three narratives emerge from this analysis: ‘conservational stewardship’ (conserving the ‘garden of God’ as it was created), ‘developmental stewardship’ (turning the wilderness into a garden as it should become) and ‘developmental preservation’ (God's creation is good and changing; progress and preservation should be combined). The different narratives address fundamental ethical questions, dealing with stewardship and social justice, and they provide proxies for public perception of climate change in the US. Policy strategies that pay careful attention to the effects of climate change and climate policy on the poor – in developing nations and the US itself – may find support among the US population. Religious framings of climate change resonate with the electorates of both progressive and conservative politicians and could serve as bridging devices for bipartisan climate-policy initiatives.     

Climate change or nuclear power—No thanks! A quantitative study of public perceptions and risk framing in Britain

The UK is witnessing a new line in political debate around new nuclear energy generation as one potential feature of future energy policy, specifically for contributing to climate change mitigation alongside energy security. Little is known about how ordinary citizens might be responding to this reframing. This paper reports the results from a major British survey (n=1491) undertaken in the autumn of 2005. The consistent message is that while higher proportions of the British public are prepared to accept nuclear power if they believe it contributes to climate change mitigation, this is a highly conditional view, with very few actively preferring this over renewable sources given the choice. People see both climate change and nuclear power as problematic in terms of risks and express only a ‘reluctant acceptance’ of nuclear power as a ‘solution’ to climate change. The combined data from this survey can also be interpreted as an indication of the complexity surrounding beliefs about energy futures and the difficulty of undertaking simplistic risk–risk tradeoffs within any single framing of the issues; such as nuclear energy versus climate change. The results also indicate that it would be unwise, in the UK as elsewhere, to simplistically assume that there exists any single or stable public ‘opinion’ on such complex matters. We conclude with a discussion of the role and implications of the survey evidence for the policy process.     

Some economics of ‘dangerous’ climate change: Reflections on the Stern Review

The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change concluded that there can be “no doubt” the economic risks of business-as-usual (BAU) climate change are “very severe” [Stern, 2006. The Economics of Climate Change. HM Treasury, London, p. 188]. The total cost of climate change was estimated to be equivalent to a one-off, permanent 5–20% loss in global mean per-capita consumption today. And the marginal damage cost of a tonne of carbon emitted today was estimated to be around $312 [p. 344]. Both of these estimates are higher than most reported in the previous literature. Subsequently, a number of critiques have appeared, arguing that discounting is the principal explanation for this discrepancy. Discounting is important, but in this paper we emphasise that how one approaches the economics of risk and uncertainty, and how one attempts to model the very closely related issue of low-probability/high-damage scenarios (which we connect to the recent discussion of ‘dangerous’ climate change), can matter just as much. We demonstrate these arguments empirically, using the same models applied in the Stern Review. Together, the issues of risk and uncertainty on the one hand, and ‘dangerous’ climate change on the other, raise very strongly questions about the limits of a welfare-economic approach, where the loss of natural capital might be irreversible and impossible to compensate. Thus we also critically reflect on the state-of-the-art in integrated assessment modelling. There will always be an imperative to carry out integrated assessment modelling, bringing together scientific ‘fact’ and value judgement systematically. But we agree with those cautioning against a literal interpretation of current estimates. Ironically, the Stern Review is one of those voices. A fixation with cost-benefit analysis misses the point that arguments for stabilisation should, and are, built on broader foundations.     

Does public policy support or undermine climate change adaptation? Exploring policy interplay across different scales of governance

Policy makers have now recognised the need to integrate thinking about climate change into all areas of public policy making. However, the discussion of ‘climate policy integration’ has tended to focus on mitigation decisions mostly taken at international and national levels. Clearly, there is also a more locally focused adaptation dimension to climate policy integration, which has not been adequately explored by academics or policy makers. Drawing on a case study of the UK, this paper adopts both a top-down and a bottom-up perspective to explore how far different sub-elements of policies within the agriculture, nature conservation and water sectors support or undermine potential adaptive responses. The top-down approach, which assumes that policies set explicit aims and objectives that are directly translated into action on the ground, combines a content analysis of policy documents with interviews with policy makers. The bottom-up approach recognises the importance of other actors in shaping policy implementation and involves interviews with actors in organisations within the three sectors. This paper reveals that neither approach offers a complete picture of the potentially enabling or constraining effects of different policies on future adaptive planning, but together they offer new perspectives on climate policy integration. These findings inform a discussion on how to implement climate policy integration, including auditing existing policies and ‘climate proofing’ new ones so they support rather than hinder adaptive planning.     

Compounds, creativity and complexity in climate change communication: The case of ‘carbon indulgences’

This article deals with climate change from a linguistic perspective. Climate change is an extremely complex issue that has exercised the minds of experts and policy makers with renewed urgency in recent years. It has prompted an explosion of writing in the media, on the internet and in the domain of popular science and literature, as well as a proliferation of new compounds around the word ‘carbon’ as a hub, such as ‘carbon indulgence’, a new compound that will be studied in this article. Through a linguistic analysis of lexical and discourse formations around such ‘carbon compounds’ we aim to contribute to a broader understanding of the meaning of climate change. Lexical carbon compounds are used here as indicators for observing how human symbolic cultures change and adapt in response to environmental threats and how symbolic innovation and transmission occurs.     

‘Strange changes’: Indigenous perspectives of climate change and adaptation in NE Arnhem Land (Australia)

Despite growing global attention to the development of strategies and policy for climate change adaptation, there has been little allowance for input from Indigenous people. In this study we aimed to improve understanding of factors important in integration of Yolngu perspectives in planning adaptation policy in North East Arnhem Land (Australia). We conducted workshops and in-depth interviews in two ‘communities’ to develop insight into Yolngu peoples’ observations and perspectives on climate change, and their ideas and preferences for adaptation. All participants reported observing changes in their ecological landscape, which they attributed to mining, tourism ‘development’, and climate change. ‘Strange changes’ noticed particularly in the last five years, had caused concern and anxiety among many participants. Despite their concern about ecological changes, participants were primarily worried about other issues affecting their community's general welfare. The results suggest that strategies and policies are needed to strengthen adaptive capacity of communities to mitigate over-arching poverty and well-being issues, as well as respond to changes in climate. Participants believed that major constraints to strengthening adaptive capacity had external origins, at regional, state and federal levels. Examples are poor communication and engagement, top-down institutional processes that allow little Indigenous voice, and lack of recognition of Indigenous culture and practices. Participants’ preferences for strategies to strengthen community adaptive capacity tended to be those that lead towards greater self-sufficiency, independence, empowerment, resilience and close contact with the natural environment. Based on the results, we developed a simple model to highlight main determinants of community vulnerability. A second model highlights components important in facilitating discourse on enhancing community capacity to adapt to climatic and other stressors.     

“Mind the (Policy-Implementation) Gap”: Transport decarbonisation policies and performances of leading global economies (1990–2018)

Despite a series of transport decarbonisation initiatives, transport carbon emissions have been growing in both absolute and relative terms since 1990, and this is contributing to climate change. This study scrutinises the decoupling experiences of transport carbon emissions in 16 selected countries, including both developed and developing countries, over a 29-year timeframe (1990–2018). Resting upon the concept of socio-ecological resilience, collaborative planning and policy-implementation gap, a new conceptual framework is proposed to understand transport decarbonisation policies. In doing so, data of transport carbon emissions and Real Gross National Income in Purchasing Power Parity (based 2017) are first analysed. Progress of decoupling is then categorized for each country in every five-year period (a total of 96 data points). We then select consecutive periods when a country moves towards absolute decoupling (i.e. improvement) or deviates from it (i.e. worsening) and identify relevant policy instruments implemented based on a nine-component strategic framework that addresses the policy-implementation gap. Results indicate that defining clear sectoral objectives in action plans and integrating a holistic policy package to reinforce sustainable transport is pivotal. While there are no magic bullets to achieve transport decarbonisation, the strategic framework can help enhance policy effectiveness by formulating context-specific strategies.     

The Tolerable Windows Approach: Theoretical and Methodological Foundations

The tolerable windows (TW) approach is presented as a novel scheme for integrated assessment of climate change. The TW approach is based on the specification of a set of guardrails for climate evolution which refer to various climate-related attributes. These constraints, which define what we call tolerable windows, can be purely systemic in nature – like critical thresholds for the North Atlantic Deep Water formation – or of a normative type – like minimum standards for per-capita food production worldwide. Starting from this catalogue of knock-out criteria and using appropriate modeling techniques, those policy strategies which are compatible with all the constraints specified are sought to be identified. In addition to the discussion of the basic elements and the general theory of the TW approach, a modeling exercise is carried out, based on simple models and assumptions adopted from the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU). The analysis shows that if the global mean temperature is restricted to 2°C beyond the preindustrial level, the cumulative emissions of CO2 are asymptotically limited to about 1550 Gt C. Yet the temporal distribution of these emissions is also determined by the climate and socio-economic constraints: using, for example, a maximal tolerable rate of temperature change of 0.2°C/dec and a smoothly varying emissions profile, we obtain the maximal cumulative emissions, amounting to 370 Gt C in 2050 and 585 Gt C in 2100.     

An equity first, risk-based framework for managing global climate change

This paper presents an alternative framework to the approach currently embodied in the Kyoto Protocol for managing global climate change post-2012. The framework has two key provisions. The first is that each person in the world would be ‘allowed’ an equal amount of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This is labeled the equity-first provision. The second provision focuses on incorporating risk concepts into the setting of GHG emission reductions. It is proposed that the global climate be managed as to avoid three categories of risks: (I) Substantial regional economic, political, and/or biological impacts; (II) Severe global economic, political, and/or biological impacts; and (III) Extinction of humans. Acceptable risk thresholds are suggested to be one-in-a-million, one-in-one-hundred-million, and one-in-ten-billion, respectively. This equity-first, risk-based framework overcomes many criticisms of the current Kyoto Protocol: it explicitly involves all countries on earth; it avoids several administrative issues that are anticipated to plague a global carbon emissions trading market; and it avoids several contentious issues associated with pegging carbon emission reductions to 1990 levels. Because the framework is risk-based and emissions are tied to population and not historic emission levels, the basic framework would not have to be frequently renegotiated, as will be needed for the Kyoto-style approach to take the world past that agreement's 2012 endpoint.     

The political ecology of Chilean salmon aquaculture, 1982–2010: A trajectory from economic development to global sustainability

Through the case of the salmon aquaculture sector in Chile, the risks involved in the development of a non-traditional export sector are reviewed, in order to point to failings (lessons not learned) and opportunities (lessons learned, new plans), and the changing scales of stakeholder interactions. In particular the paper highlights the ways in which sustainability considerations have gained ground in terms of evaluating sectoral development and what is expected from this development. These considerations have emerged as a result of the increasing globalisation of the sector, through investment, exports and international ‘attention’ from an increasingly diverse set of stakeholders. These sustainability considerations have generated a range of conflicts linked to these diverse actors. The actors are local, national and global, operating through alliances to bring pressure on others. The conflicts relate to environmental quality, foreign direct investment (FDI), local socio-economic development, regional development, national economic strategies, and new globalised issues relating to the production and consumption of foodstuffs. The contemporary panorama in the sector is significantly different from the early origins in the 1980s under the dictatorship – the period of ‘the socio-ecological silence’ – also different from the 1990s period of economic expansion – ‘the economic imperative’. Over the past twenty-five years, the Chilean aquaculture sector has evolved from experimental production to a major global industry. Regulatory frameworks and civil society awareness and mobilisation have struggled to ‘catch up’ with the dynamism of the sector, however the gap has reduced and the future of the sector within the contemporary context of ‘glocal’ sustainability is now under the microscope: the ‘sustainable globalisation perspective’. The collapse of the sector during the period 2008–2010 as a consequence of the ISA virus is a key moment with production severely diminished. The way out of the crisis, via new legislation and inspection regimes, will create a new structure of aquaculture governance. Nevertheless, the crisis marks a turning point in the industry, revealing the weaknesses built into the former productive system.     

International reductions of greenhouse-gas emissions: An equitable and efficient approach

A strategy for a successful climate protection convention must highlight the role of equity in order to bring more nations to the bargaining table. The authors propose two commercial energy protocols for consideration by negotiators in this light. The first links international trading in greenhouse-gas emission ‘rights’ to a country's historical per capita carbon emissions. The charge for these rights should be based on the negotiated reduction in global emissions and the demand for them, via the marketplace. The second requires inefficient countries to make steady improvements in energy efficiency or fuel substitution away from carbon as their economies develop.     

Views from the vulnerable: Understanding climatic and other stressors in the Sahel

In much of sub-Saharan Africa, considerable research exists on the impacts of climate change on social-ecological systems. Recent adaptation studies emphasize sectoral vulnerability and largely physical adaptation strategies that mirror anti-desertification plans. The adaptive role of subsistence farmers, the vulnerable ‘target’ population, is largely overlooked. This article aims to fill this gap by putting the views from the vulnerable in the center of the analysis. Drawing from participatory risk ranking and scoring among smallholders in central Senegal, data on multiple hazards indicate that farmers’ adaptive capacity to climate change is undermined by poor health, rural unemployment, and inadequate village infrastructure. Results from conceptual mapping reveal incomplete understanding of causes and consequences of climate change. Yet, shared knowledge and lessons learned from previous climatic stresses provide vital entry points for social learning and enhanced adaptive capacity to both wetter and drier periods now and in the future.     

A cost–benefit appraisal of coastal managed realignment policy

European coasts are coming under increasing threat as a result of climate change from erosion and flooding. While coastal defences such as sea walls have been constructed since Roman times to protect human settlements from the sea, it is now increasingly recognised that these defences are unsustainable. The security provided by ‘hard’ engineered defences has encouraged development on the coast, and the defences themselves have led to the loss of intertidal habitat and the natural protection it provides.An alternative to maintaining ‘hard’ defences (hold-the-line) to protect land from increasing sea levels is managed realignment, where the engineered defences are deliberately breached. By allowing the coastline to recede to a new line of defence further inland, intertidal habitat is created providing natural protection from flooding and erosion.The study evaluates the economic efficiency—using cost–benefit analysis—of various managed realignment scenarios compared to a strategy of holding-the-line within the Humber estuary in North-east England. The results of this analysis show that managed realignment can be more economically efficient than holding-the-line over a sufficiently long time period—generally greater than 25 years. Sensitivity analysis demonstrates that results are more sensitive to the amount and value of intertidal habitat generated than they are to the amount and value of carbon stored by this habitat. Cost–benefit analysis is viewed as one component of a wider policy appraisal process within integrated coastal management.     

Evaluating the Global Environment Facility: A goodwill gesture or a serious attempt to deliver global benefits?

Over its 17 years, the UN's Global Environment Facility (GEF) has allocated US $7.5 billion intended to develop and implement scientifically and socially credible solutions to key global environmental problems such as climate change, biological diversity loss and degradation of transboundary aquatic systems. We studied 906 GEF projects to analyse the challenges that it is facing in delivering solutions that are likely to be sustainable in the long-term. The research included desk reviews of relevant documents and follow-up interviews with a wide range of stakeholders. Some of the challenges the GEF faces are deeply rooted in temporal and spatial mismatches of scale between human economies and their environmental consequences and the strongly sectoral way current society is managed. We conclude that the GEF obtained impressive results for tackling problems of limited complexity and easily quantified benefits but progress is slower on more complex and less tangible problems impeding sustainable development. Potentially, the GEF could enable adaptive management through a ‘learning by doing’ process, transforming it into an innovative mechanism for delivering global benefits. Continued emphasis on ‘easy wins’ would not allow it to achieve this goal.     

The cost of achieving South Africa’s ‘fair share’ of global climate change mitigation

Global climate change mitigation action is hampered by systematic under-assessment of national ‘fair shares’, largely on the basis of perceived national interests. This paper aims to inform discussions centred on South Africa’s nationally determined contribution (NDC) by estimating (1) emissions reduction pathways for the country using the Climate Equity Reference Calculator (CERC) assuming a maximum 2°C aggregate warming target and (2) the likely economy-wide net mitigation costs or savings associated with reaching these pathways if known lower-cost mitigation measures, identified through the national mitigation potential analysis, are prioritised. The cumulative net savings associated with achieving the CERC ‘fair share’ emissions pathway, assuming the moderate use of low carbon power generation measures, would reach $5.3 billion by 2030. Net savings could be substantially greater reaching $46.8 billion by 2030 assuming power generation focuses on moving towards full decarbonisation. An unconditional commitment to the mitigation action implied by the ‘fair share’ emissions pathway therefore seems reasonable and prudent purely from the point of view of net country-wide savings. Only if power generation moves towards full decarbonisation would there be a reasonable chance of achieving the more ambitious CERC domestic emissions pathway. However, the significant additional cost associated with achieving the domestic emissions pathway should be conditional on international assistance.

Key policy insights

• South Africa can only achieve its ‘fair share’ of the global mitigation effort if greater use is made of renewable energy options, and can realise significant net savings if it does so.

• Further emissions reductions would incur costs and require significant upscaling of the share of renewable energy and full implementation of all non-power generation mitigation measures available.

• Committing to this further mitigation action contingent on international finance would both strengthen the nation’s position in climate negotiations and support the provision of finance for those vulnerable developing nations that bear little or no responsibility for climate change.

     

‘Green’ on the ground but not in the air: Pro-environmental attitudes are related to household behaviours but not discretionary air travel

The rise in greenhouse gas emissions from air travel could be reduced by individuals voluntarily abstaining from, or reducing, flights for leisure and recreational purposes. In theory, we might expect that people with pro-environmental value orientations and concerns about the risks of climate change, and those who engage in more pro-environmental household behaviours, would also be more likely to abstain from such voluntary air travel, or at least to fly less far. Analysis of two large datasets from the United Kingdom, weighted to be representative of the whole population, tested these associations. Using zero-inflated Poisson regression models, we found that, after accounting for potential confounders, there was no association between individuals’ environmental attitudes, concern over climate change, or their routine pro-environmental household behaviours, and either their propensity to take non-work related flights, or the distances flown by those who do so. These findings contrasted with those for pro-environmental household behaviours, where associations with environmental attitudes and concern were observed. Our results offer little encouragement for policies aiming to reduce discretionary air travel through pro-environmental advocacy, or through ‘spill-over’ from interventions to improve environmental impacts of household routines.     

Impacts on Global Ozone and Climate from Use and Emission of 2,2-Dichloro-1,1,1-Trifluoroethane (HCFC-123)

Analyses of emissions, and consequent chlorine loading, show that projected use of 2,2-dichloro-1,1,1-trifluoroethane (HCFC-123) will result in a virtually indiscernible impact on stratospheric ozone. Parametric scenarios uphold this conclusion, even for extreme levels of emissions far exceeding those of current technologies and practices. Additional scenarios reaffirm the conclusion for continued use – beyond the scheduled phaseout date – as a refrigerant in closed systems. By contrast, use of this compound offers unique opportunities to reduce global warming. Moreover, time-dependent analyses show that the minimal contribution to stratospheric chlorine from HCFC-123 emissions will not peak until more than a decade after the residual peaks of chlorine and bromine, from prior chlorofluorocarbon and halon releases, subside. While no single index exists to compare the relative demerits of ozone depletion and climate change, three conclusions are clear. First, reversal of the buildup of bromine and chlorine (i.e., healing of the ozone layer) is underway and progressing on target, while sufficient practical remedies for global climate change are far more difficult. Second, the analyses show that phaseout of all chlorinated, and conceptually – but much less probably – all brominated, compounds of anthropogenic origin targets some compounds that provide environmental benefits. Most chlorinated and brominated compounds do warrant phaseout; the exceptions are those with very short atmospheric lifetimes, and consequent low ozone depletion potential (ODP), that also offer offsetting environmental benefits. And third, since new global environmental concerns may, and probably will, be identified in the future, a more scientific approach is needed to determine environmental acceptability or rejection.